Case 5:14-cv-02591-ODW-DTB Document 95 Filed 11/16/16 Page 1 of 36 Page ID #:1631
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`United States District Court
`Central District of California
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`Case № 5:14-cv-02591-ODW(DTB)
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`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER
`U.S. PATENT NO. 6,871,356
`U.S. PATENT NO. 7,267,402
`U.S. PATENT NO. 7,448,679
`U.S. PATENT NO. 7,379,125
`U.S. PATENT NO. 5,775,762
`U.S. PATENT NO. 7,050,124
`U.S. PATENT NO. 7,245,274
`U.S. PATENT NO. 6,678,892
`U.S. PATENT NO. 7,839,355
`
`JOHNSON SAFETY, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`v.
`
`VOXX INTERNATIONAL
`CORPORATOIN; VOXX
`ELECTRONICS CORPORATION; and
`INVISION AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS
`INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`This case involves several patents, owned and/or licensed by either Plaintiff
`Johnson Safety, Inc. (“Johnson”) or Defendants Voxx International Corporation, Voxx
`Electronics Corporation, and Invision Automotive Systems, Inc. (collectively,
`“Voxx”). (Compl. ¶¶ 7—23, ECF No. 1; Countercompl. ¶¶ 17—36, ECF No. 42.)
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`Case 5:14-cv-02591-ODW-DTB Document 95 Filed 11/16/16 Page 2 of 36 Page ID #:1632
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`Both Johnson and Voxx are in the consumer vehicle electronics market. (See Compl.
`¶¶ 1, 17—23; Countercompl. ¶¶ 1, 17—36.) The patents at issue cover video systems
`for vehicles, which are embedded in the front seat headrests or hang from the ceiling.
`(See id.) The parties dispute fifteen terms (five within Johnson’s patents, and ten
`within Voxx’s patents) that they have agreed are “significant,” and they list an
`additional eight “less significant” disputed terms. (Joint Claim Chart (“JCC”), ECF
`No. 74). For purposes of claim construction, and in accord with this Court’s Patent
`Standing Order (ECF No. 54), the Court will construct only the terms labeled
`“significant” in the JCC.
`All of the patents at issue cover vehicle electronics, specifically video systems
`and monitors affixed to a car ceiling or headrest. (See Compl. ¶¶ 7—23;
`Countercompl. ¶¶ 17—36.) The types of electronics products that the patents cover
`can be broken down into three categories: Headrest Patents, Overhead Patents, and
`Portable/Non-Specified System Patents.
` The Headrest Patents include: Johnson’s Patent Nos. 6,871,356
`(“the ’356 patent”), 7,267,402 (“the ’402 patent”), and
`7,448,679 (“the ’679 patent”), and Voxx’s Patent Nos.
`7,245,274 (“the ’274 patent”) and 7,839,355 (“the ’355
`patent”);
` The Overhead Patents include: Johnson’s Patent No. 7,379,125
`(“the ’125 patent”) and Voxx’s Patent No. 5,775,762 (“the ’762
`patent”); and
` The Portable/Non-Specified System Patents include: Voxx’s
`Patent Nos. 7,050,124 (“the ’124 patent”) and 6,678,892 (“the
`’892 patent”).
`In the interest of brevity, and due to the number of claims to be constructed, each
`patent’s background is detailed within the analysis section below.
`In short, both parties (Defendants, collectively, and Johnson) allege that the
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`Case 5:14-cv-02591-ODW-DTB Document 95 Filed 11/16/16 Page 3 of 36 Page ID #:1633
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`other is selling products that infringe on its patents. (See Compl. ¶¶ 30—125;
`Countercompl. ¶¶ 38—196.) On October 28, 2016, the Court held a claim
`construction hearing on the disputed terms that the parties have deemed significant.
`For the reasons discussed below, the Court adopts the described constructions outlined
`herein.
`
`II. LEGAL STANDARD
`Claim construction is an interpretive issue “exclusively within the province of
`the court,” and it begins with an analysis of the claim language itself. Markman v.
`Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
`A. Claim Construction Generally
`Claims are to be interpreted from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in
`the art. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). That “person
`of ordinary skill” is deemed to read the claim term in two contexts: the context of the
`claim in which the term appears and the context of the entire patent. Id. Accordingly,
`claims must be read in light of the specification, which is “always highly relevant to
`the claim construction analysis.” Id. at 1315 (internal quotations omitted).
`However, the general rule is that limitations from the specification must not be
`imported into the claims. Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182,
`1186-87 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[T]he line between construing terms and importing
`limitations can be discerned with reasonable certainty and predictability if the court’s
`focus remains on understanding how a person of ordinary skill in the art would
`understand the claim terms.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
`The “ordinary and customary meaning” of the words of a disputed claim is at
`the heart of claim construction. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13 (internal quotations and
`citations omitted). But in two situations, the “ordinary and customary” meaning of the
`terms is superseded: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as its own
`lexicographer; or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either
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`in the specification or during prosecution. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm't Am.
`LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`“To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition
`of the disputed claim term’ other than its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. Disavowal
`occurs “[w]here the specification makes clear that the invention does not include a
`particular feature.” Id. at 1366. “[T]hat feature is [then] deemed to be outside the
`reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language of the claims, read without
`reference to the specification, might be considered broad enough to encompass the
`feature in question.” Id.
`B.
`Special Rules Regarding 35 U.S.C. § 122¶6
`
`Means-plus-function claims are a particular class of claims, and they are
`governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112¶6. Section 112¶6 provides that the scope of a claim
`expressing a means or step for accomplishing something covers the structure,
`material, or acts (and equivalents thereof) in the claim language that correspond with
`the means in the patent’s specification. If § 112¶6 does apply, then the claim is
`limited to the embodiments in the specification and equivalents thereof. See Philips,
`415 F.3d at 1303.
`The first step in the analysis is to determine whether § 112¶6 actually applies to
`the claim at issue; it applies only to claims that describe a function without defining
`the structure with which to carry out the function. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic
`Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2006). If the word “means”
`appears in a claim element in association with a function, a rebuttable presumption
`arises that §112¶6 applies. Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 1368
`(Fed. Cir. 2005). If the claim term lacks the word “means,” the term will be construed
`under § 112¶6 only if the “challenger demonstrates that the claim fails to recite
`sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient
`structure for performing that function.” Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC, 792 F.3d
`1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In other words, if the claim does not include the word
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`Case 5:14-cv-02591-ODW-DTB Document 95 Filed 11/16/16 Page 5 of 36 Page ID #:1635
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`“means,” then the challenger wishing to construe under § 112¶6 must show that the
`structure described in the claim is too indefinite. See id. The overall inquiry is
`whether the claim term, in the context of the broader claim language, suggests a class
`of specific structures. Id. If it does, then the term should not be construed under §
`112¶6. Id.
`The second step, once it is determined that § 112¶6 applies, is interpretation.
`See JVW Enters., Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir.
`2005). The first facet of interpretation is that the court must identify the function of
`the claim term. Id. After identifying the claimed function, the court must then
`identify the corresponding structure by looking at the specification. Callicrate, 427
`F.3d at 1369. All structures in the specification corresponding to the claimed function
`are relevant; it is an error to limit the structure to just the preferred embodiment. Id.
`If the specification does not provide corresponding structure for the claimed function,
`then the claim is invalid as indefinite. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352.
`In addition to the structures, materials, or acts of the embodiments described in
`the patent’s specification, the patentee is also entitled to “equivalents thereof” as of the
`time the patent was issued. See Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969 (Fed. Cir.
`1985). However, the “equivalents” issue arises in the context of the infringement
`determination; thus, whether something constitutes an equivalent is a question of fact
`for the jury. Id.
`
`III. DISCUSSION
`Below, the Court constructs each of the “significant” terms in the order they appear
`in the JCC.
`The ’356 Patent
`A.
`The ’356 Patent discloses headrest mounted video systems with two major
`components: a housing and a display that folds into and out of the housing. (See
`generally the ’356 Patent, Pl. Opening Br., Ex. A, ECF No. 73). The folding function
`of the screen allows the viewer to adjust the tilt of the screen. (Id.) The location of
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`Case 5:14-cv-02591-ODW-DTB Document 95 Filed 11/16/16 Page 6 of 36 Page ID #:1636
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`the hinge allowing this tilt is the subject of the disputed claim term.
`The disputed terms, along with each party’s proposed construction, are as
`follows (disputed claim term in bold):
`U.S. Patent No. 6,871,356, Claims 1 and 5:
`Claim 1: “. . . the first video monitor comprising: a housing comprising a first hinge
`portion adjacent an upper edge thereof and defining a storage cavity having a floor .
`. . .”
`
`Claim 5: “. . . the first video monitor comprising: a housing comprising a first hinge
`portion adjacent an upper edge thereof, the viewing screen facing the passenger
`compartment . . . .”
`Johnson’s Construction Voxx’s Construction
`
`Disputed Claim
`Term
`“upper edge”
`
`“the highest surface of an object,
`a top surface”
`
`Plain and ordinary
`meaning, or if construction
`is necessary, “upward
`edge”
`(The ’356 Patent, Col. 17:36–40.)
`In relevant part, the specification provides that the video monitor and housing
`(affixed to the back of a headrest on a vehicle seat) contain two hinges which
`cooperate to allow the screen structure to pivot. (The ’356 Patent, Col. 14:47—49.)
`These two hinges are, according to the specification, “[p]referably . . . located near an
`upper edge of the screen structure and housing,” which causes that upper edge of the
`screen structure to remain mostly stationary, while a lower edge is capable of
`protruding substantially from the front face of the housing, providing a better viewing
`angle for the user. (Id.)
`
`Notably, a few months after the ’356 Patent was issued to Johnson, Voxx filed a
`request for inter partes reexamination of the patent with the USPTO. (Inter Partes
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`Reexamination Certificate, Pl. Opening Br., Ex. A.) Each claim of the ’356 Patent
`was ultimately confirmed patentable; no amendments to the claim language were
`made. (Id.)
`
`The difference in the parties’ constructions of “upper edge” boils down to a
`disagreement over whether the term is definite and superlative (“the highest”) or
`indefinite and comparative (“an upper”). Johnson states that no construction is
`necessary for this term; a Court and jury will easily understand its meaning. (Pl.
`Opening Br. 7.) If construction is necessary, then Johnson’s alternate position is that
`the word “upward” should be used as a “readily understandable synonym” of “upper.”
`(Id.) Johnson argues that this term must remain indefinite and comparative, allowing
`the hinge located adjacent “an upper edge” to, in theory, be located in a variety of
`different locations in different embodiments of the patent, so long as the location were
`adjacent an upper/upward edge (not necessarily the upper/uppermost edge). (See id.
`at 9.) In contrast, Voxx wishes to limit the claim term to its definite, superlative
`version: “the highest surface of an object, the top surface.” (Def. Responsive Br. 2–3.)
`Voxx’s justification for introducing this limitation when the language of the claim
`itself is “an upper edge” is that Figures 8A and 9A accompanying the specification
`(duplicated below) illustrate the upper edge as the highest or top surface of the
`housing. (Id.)
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`Case 5:14-cv-02591-ODW-DTB Document 95 Filed 11/16/16 Page 8 of 36 Page ID #:1638
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`(The ’356 Patent, Figs. 8A, 9A.)
`In addition, Voxx argues that the term “upward” is ambiguous, noting that it
`could be construed to allow the hinge to be placed at the upward side of the bottom
`edge of the housing. (Def. Responsive Br. at 2.) Voxx states that during prosecution,
`Johnson disavowed the claim to the extent it allowed the hinge to be placed at the
`bottom edge of the housing, in order to overcome rejections based on prior art. (Id. at
`2–3.)
`
`Based on the general rule that claim construction should give preference to the
`plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms, Johnson’s construction should be upheld.
`See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Johnson’s construction preserves the indefinite,
`comparative nature of the claim language (“an upper edge”) rather than distorting it
`into, in essence, “the uppermost edge.” Especially dispositive in the Court’s decision
`is the claim language’s use of the word “an,” which connotes the possibility that the
`hinge could be located on one of multiple “upper edges.” (See the ’356 Patent, Col.
`17:36–40.) In addition, as Johnson points out, Figure 9A from the ’356 Patent in fact
`uses the term “upper edge” to refer to a surface that is not the highest surface of the
`housing. (See Pl. Opening Br. 8.) Item 482 is described as “an upper edge” and also
`“a top edge,” but the “J”-shaped arrow accompanying that number clearly points to an
`edge within the housing that is near the top, but not the highest surface. (See the ’356
`Patent, Fig. 9A.) As such, Voxx is incorrect in arguing that the specification supports
`its construction of “an upper edge.” The Court adopts Johnson’s construction for the
`term “upper edge.”
`B.
`The ’402 Patent
`The ’402 Patent differs from other Headrest Patents in part because of the
`manner in which the video system screen is adjustable and can be opened all the way
`forward, like a latch. (See the ’402 Patent, Pl. Opening Br., Ex. B.) The asserted
`claim outlines a method for replacing the headrest mounted video system.
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`Case 5:14-cv-02591-ODW-DTB Document 95 Filed 11/16/16 Page 9 of 36 Page ID #:1639
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`The disputed terms, along with each party’s proposed construction, are as
`follows (disputed claim terms in bold):
`U.S. Patent No. 7,267,402, Claim 10:
`“A method of replacing a mobile entertainment system, said method comprising . . .
`removing said first monitor from said headrest; providing a second monitor
`comprising: a second housing . . . and a second screen structure . . . .”
`Disputed Claim
`Johnson’s Construction Voxx’s Construction
`Term
`“second housing”
`
`“a housing including like features
`relative to the first housing”
`
`Plain and ordinary
`meaning, or if construction
`is necessary, then the term
`“second” in conjunction
`with the independent
`claim’s paragraph
`structure, associates this
`proposed term with the
`“second monitor”
`Plain and ordinary
`meaning, or if construction
`is necessary, then the term
`“second” in conjunction
`with the independent
`claim’s paragraph
`structure, associates this
`proposed term with the
`“second monitor”
`(The ’402 Patent, Col. 8:41–55.)
`The relevant portion of this patent includes two aspects of the replacement
`
`“second screen
`structure”
`
`“a screen structure including like
`features relative to the first screen
`structure”
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`method: steps for removing the current headrest-mounted video system, and steps for
`installing a replacement system. (Id.) In all, there are five steps involving the
`replacement of a first monitor with a second monitor. (Id.) The steps are fairly
`straightforward, and the actual method for replacement is not in issue. The parties’
`disagreement centers around the type of monitor the consumer should use in replacing
`the system. (See Def. Responsive Br. 5–6; Pl. Opening Br. 13–16.) In context, the
`claim provides that the first housing and screen structure should be replaced with a
`second housing and screen structure. (The ’402 Patent, Col. 8:41–55.)
`Johnson’s argument is that the Court should apply the plain and ordinary
`meaning, with fewest limitations imported, to both claim terms. (Pl. Opening Br. 15.)
`According to Johnson, this means that the terms must be construed simply to signify
`that the replacement housing and screen structure comprise a second, physically
`different structure from the first. (Id.) On the other hand, Voxx contends that the
`terms must be construed to mean that the second screen structure and housing must
`have identical features to the first/original housing. (Def. Responsive Br. 5.) Voxx
`argues that this added limitation is necessary so that the claim is not construed so
`broadly as to cover “upgrading” to a totally different type of screen structure or
`housing. (Id.) Voxx’s reasoning is that only one screen structure and one housing is
`disclosed in the ’402 Patent, so the claim does not support Johnson’s broad
`construction. (Id.)
`Voxx’s argument appears to contradict one of the basic rules of Phillips: that the
`claims of a patent are not necessarily limited to the embodiment or specification of
`that patent, even if the claim language describes only a single embodiment. 415 F.3d
`at 1323 (citation omitted). While the specification discloses one type of screen
`structure and housing, the claim should not be limited to the specification, and it is not
`difficult to imagine numerous other iterations of a screen structure and housing that
`could be used to replace the original system while remaining within the scope of the
`patent. As such, Voxx’s attempt to limit the claim terms is not a valid one. Further,
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`Voxx’s assertion that the second screen structure and housing could comprise a
`completely different “upgrade” when compared with the original screen structure and
`housing is unsupported by logic and by physical limitations of the headrest. (See Def.
`Responsive Br. 5.) For example, the original monitor could not be replaced with a
`wildly different, thirty-inch screen structure and housing, because it simply would not
`fit on the headrest. However, the replacement screen structure may differ somewhat
`from the original, and the limitations of the specification should not be imported into
`claim construction. For these reasons, the Court adopts Johnson’s construction for the
`terms “second housing” and “second screen structure.”
`C.
`The ’679 Patent
`The ’679 Patent is also a Headrest Patent. (See generally the ’679 Patent, Pl.
`Opening Br., Ex. C.) It was issued on November 11, 2008, and Johnson is the
`assignee. (Id.) The relevant portion of Claim 1 is directed to a pivoter that stops the
`screen in the headrest video unit from opening fully. For example, in one
`embodiment, a bracket is used to achieve this effect. Figure 5B is copied below to
`illustrate.
`
`
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`The disputed term in context of the broader claim language at issue in the ’679
`Patent, along with each party’s proposed construction, is as follows (disputed claim
`term in bold):
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`Case 5:14-cv-02591-ODW-DTB Document 95 Filed 11/16/16 Page 12 of 36 Page ID #:1642
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,448,679, Claim 1 (Johnson’s Patent):
`“A mobile video system comprising: a headrest; a screen structure having a front
`face, a rear face opposite the front face, and a first hinge portion; a pivot-limiting
`portion; and a housing . . . .”
`Johnson’s Construction Voxx’s Construction
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`Disputed Claim
`Term
`“pivot-limiting
`portion”
`
`This term is governed by 35
`U.S.C. § 112¶6.
`
`“a bracket [structure] that limits
`the rotation of the screen to less
`than perpendicular relative to the
`closed position of the screen
`structure [function.]”
`
`No construction necessary.
`
`To the extent construction
`is necessary, “pivot limiter,
`distinct from the housing
`and the first and second
`hinge portions, that limits
`the outward rotation of the
`screen structure”
`(The ’679 Patent, Col. 7:53–62.)
`The pivot-limiting portion exists to increase the safety functions of the product.
`(See id. Col 1:47–54.) The device restrains the video screen from being opened fully
`in such a way that it could be perpendicular to the housing. (Id. at Col. 8:61–9:11.)
`In addition, if force is applied to the front of the screen while it is tilted slightly
`outward (as far as the pivot-limiting portion will allow), the pivot-limiting portion will
`not resist the force and the screen will close fully. (Id. at Col. 1:47–54.) Both of these
`aspects of the product protect a person whose head may be thrown forward in a crash
`and hit the front of the screen. (See id.)
`
`The parties disagree about whether this term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112¶6.
`(See Pl. Opening Br. 19–21; Def. Responsive Br. 7–10.) If it is, then the scope of the
`term must be limited to that set forth in the specification. See Philips, 415 F.3d at
`1303. But if § 112¶6 does not apply, as Johnson argues, then the term should not be
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`limited to the specification. (See Pl. Opening Br. 19–21.)
`Johnson points out that Voxx failed to identify this term as being governed by §
`112¶6 in its (1) invalidity contentions; (2) disclosure of terms for construction; and (3)
`exchange of preliminary claim constructions and extrinsic evidence. (See id. at 19–
`20.) The Court’s Patent Local Rules require disclosure of terms that a party intends to
`argue are governed by § 112¶6 in each of those three filings, and Voxx did not disclose
`this term in any of them. (See Patent L.R. 3-3(c); 4-1(a); 3-6.)
`However, Voxx did identify the term as falling under § 112¶6 prior to the claim
`construction hearing, and the Patent Local Rules do not identify non-application of §
`112¶6 as the penalty for failing to timely identify a term as being governed by such.
`(See Def. Responsive Br. 7; Patent L.R. 3-3(c); 4-1(a); 3-6.) For these reasons, the
`Court declines to decide this term on Voxx’s failure to timely identify the application
`of § 112¶6, and instead reaches the merits of constructing the term.
`The wording of the claim does not sufficiently define the structure that acts as a
`“pivot-limiting portion.” (See the ’679 Patent, Col. 8:55 – 9:11.) Because the claim
`term lacks the word “means,” § 112¶6 should apply if the claim describes a function
`without sufficiently reciting corresponding structure. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349.
`Here, the claim states that a pivot-limiting portion is part of the claimed invention and
`describes the way that device limits rotation of the screen structure relative to the
`housing. (Id.) However, this leaves open the question of what structure comprises the
`pivot-limiting portion. (See id.) As such, the claim recites a function without
`corresponding structure, and § 112¶6 applies. In order to find the corresponding
`structure, the Court draws from the specification and determines that the structure is a
`bracket. (See id. Col. 7:63–66.) As a result, the appropriate construction must reflect
`what is recited in the specification. The Court therefore adopts Voxx’s construction of
`“pivot-limiting portion.”
`D.
`The ’125 Patent
`This Overhead Patent, owned by Johnson, was issued on May 27, 2008. (See
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`generally the ’125 Patent, Col. 2:25—34; 3:4—6; 4:49—53, Pl. Opening Br., Ex. D.)
`Like some of the other patented products, the screen of this system can pivot to
`provide a preferred angle for the viewer. (See id.) The angle of this pivoting, and the
`screen structure’s angular relationship to the roof of the vehicle, is the subject of the
`dispute for this claim term.
`
`
`
`The disputed term in context of the broader claim language at issue in the ’125
`Patent, along with each party’s proposed construction, is as follows (disputed claim
`term in bold):
`U.S. Patent No. 7,379,125, Claims 1-6; 8-11 (Johnson’s Patent):
`“An assembly mountable to an interior surface of a roof of a vehicle, the assembly
`comprising: a housing . . . and a video display . . . substantially parallel with an
`interior surface of a roof . . . .”
`Johnson’s Construction Voxx’s Construction
`
`Disputed Claim
`Term
`“substantially
`parallel with an
`interior surface of
`a roof”
`(The ’125 Patent, Col. 2:25–34; 3:4–6; 4:49–53.)
`The parties have already agreed on the meaning of “interior surface of a roof of
`a vehicle cabin”; their agreed construction is “ceiling of a vehicle cabin.” (See Pl.
`Opening Br. 23–24.) Johnson and Voxx disagree about the extent to which the screen
`structure can pivot backwards, measured by whether the screen is parallel with the
`ceiling of the vehicle cabin. (See id. at 22–25; Def. Responsive Br. 4.) Figure 9 from
`the patent, copied below, illustrates the backwards-extended position of the screen
`structure.
`
`
`“substantially parallel with
`the ceiling of a vehicle
`cabin”
`
`“essentially parallel with an
`interior surface of a roof”
`
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`Johnson seeks to maintain the original “substantially” phrasing in the
`construction. (See Pl. Opening Br. 23–25.) Johnson offers Webster’s Third New
`International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged 2280 (1986) as
`extrinsic evidence for the meaning of “substantially”; Webster’s defines it as “being
`that specified to a large degree or in the main.” (Id. at 24.) Johnson also argues that
`the plain meaning of “substantially” in the relevant context (overhead monitors
`mounted in vehicles) is something that jurors would have everyday experience with,
`given the ubiquity of such monitors. (Id.) Johnson substitutes “ceiling of a vehicle
`cabin” for “roof” in its construction; this reflects the agreed construction for this term,
`noted above. (See Pl. Opening Br. 23–24.)
`Voxx’s argument is that Johnson need not import the phrase “ceiling of a
`vehicle cabin” into its construction, suggesting that it will “only act to confuse the
`jury.” Further, Voxx defends its insertion of “essentially” for “substantially” by
`stating that the latter is the commonly understood meaning of the former. (Def.
`Responsive Br. 4.)
`Voxx’s argument that “ceiling of a vehicle cabin” should not be imported to
`replace “roof” in the construction focuses on an immaterial factor, as this phrasing has
`already been agreed upon between the parties as a construction. (See Pl. Opening Br.
`23.) Moreover, Voxx’s defense of its replacing “substantially” with “essentially” is
`weak. Voxx has merely replaced one adverb with another; there is nothing to suggest
`that a jury would understand the meaning of “essentially” any more than it would
`“substantially,” and Voxx has produced no evidence to suggest that “essentially”
`actually represents the commonly-understood meaning of “substantially.” That being
`said, the lack of clarity that either “essentially” or “substantially” provide is not reason
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`to adopt Johnson’s construction; the claim calls for a more precise construction. As
`such, the Court adopts the following construction for the term “substantially parallel
`with an interior surface of a roof”: “having an angular relationship between 170
`degrees and 180 degrees, inclusive, with the ceiling of a vehicle cabin.” This
`construction provides for an arc of ten degrees difference in the relationship of the
`display to the roof when the display is fully extended.
`E.
`The ’762 Patent
`The ’762 Patent is an Overhead Patent and belongs to Voxx. (See generally the
`’762 Patent, Pl. Responsive Br., Ex. B., ECF No. 76) It was issued on July 7, 1998.
`(Id.) The console of this patent includes a leading end, a trailing end, and an optional
`central section. (Id. Col 2:2–6.) The monitor, video source, and wiring for this
`entertainment system are all located within a console; however, the specification does
`not limit the console to a specific size or shape. (See id.)
`The disputed terms in context of the broader claim language at issue in the ’762
`Patent, along with each party’s proposed construction, are as follows (disputed claim
`terms in bold):
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,775,762, Claim 1:
`“An overhead console . . . comprising: an elongated console housing . . . a
`compartment for storing a source of video signals formed in the trailing end of
`the console housing, and conductive means associated with the compartment for
`connecting the television monitor to the compartment to provide ready
`attachment of the source of video signals to the television monitor and
`transmission of video signals between the source of video signals and the
`television monitor.”
`Johnson’s Construction Voxx’s Construction
`
`Disputed Claim
`Term
`“elongated console
`housing”
`
`“A console housing longer
`than it is wide, [wherein
`
`“a console housing that is
`extended or lengthened to include
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`length is determined by the
`longitudinal axis of
`symmetry of a vehicle and
`width is determined by the
`axis of the monitor
`width],” otherwise
`indefinite
`“a separate and partitioned
`space formed entirely
`within the trailing end of
`the console housing”
`
`a television monitor and a
`compartment capable of storing a
`course of video signals”
`
`Voxx asserts that this claim term
`should be given its plain and
`ordinary meaning (no
`construction needed).
`
`This term is governed by
`35 U.S.C. § 112¶6.
`
`Function:
`
`Connecting the television
`monitor to the
`compartment to provide
`ready attachment of the
`source of video signals to
`the television monitor and
`transmission of video
`signals between the source
`of video signals and the
`television monitor
`
`This term is governed by 35
`U.S.C. § 112¶6.
`
`Function:
`
`Connecting the television monitor
`to the compartment to provide
`ready attachment of the source of
`video signals to the television
`monitor and transmission of
`video signals between the source
`of video signals and the television