NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
`Monterey, California
`
`THESIS
`
`DISSEMINATION AND STORAGE OF TACTICAL
`UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE DIGITAL VIDEO
`IMAGERY AT THE ARMY BRIGADE LEVEL
`
`by
`
`Andreas K. Apostolopoulos
`and
`Riley O. Tisdale
`
`September 1999
`
`Thesis Advisor:
`Associate Advisors:
`
`Orin E. Marvel
`William J. Haga
`Brad R. Naegle
`
`Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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`DTCC QUALITY INSPECTED 3
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`REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
`
`Form Approved
`OMB No. 0704-0188
`Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing
`instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of
`information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions
`for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis
`Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-
`0188) Washington DC 20503.
`
`1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)
`
`2. REPORT DATE
`September 1999
`4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: DISSEMINATION AND STORAGE OF TACTICAL
`UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE DIGITAL VIDEO IMAGERY AT THE ARMY
`BRIGADE LEVEL
`6. AUTHOR(S) Apostolopoulos, Andreas K., and Tisdale, Riley O.
`
`7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
`Naval Postgraduate School
`Monterey, CA 93943-5000
`
`9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
`N/A
`
`3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
`Master's Thesis
`
`5. FUNDING NUMBERS
`
`8. PERFORMING
`ORGANIZATION REPORT
`NUMBER
`
`10. SPONSORING /MONITOR-
`ING AGENCY REPORT
`NUMBER
`
`12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE: A
`
`11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
`The views expressed in this thesis are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of
`the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
`12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
`Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
`13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
`The Department of Defense Joint Technical Architecture has mandated a migration from analog to
`digital technology in the Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
`Reconnaissance (C4ISR) community. The Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) and Tactical Control
`System (TCS) are two brigade imagery intelligence systems that the Army will field within the next three
`years to achieve information superiority on the modern digital battlefield. These two systems provide the
`brigade commander with an imagery collection and processing capability never before deployed under
`brigade control. The deployment of the Warfighter Information Network (WIN), within three to five years,
`will ensure that a digital dissemination network is in place to handle the transmission bandwidth requirements
`of large digital video files.
`This thesis examines the storage and dissemination capabilities of this future brigade imagery system.
`It calculates a minimum digital storage capacity requirement for the TCS Imagery Product Library, analyzes
`available storage media based on performance, and recommends a high-capacity storage architecture based on
`modern high technology fault tolerance and performance. A video streaming technique is also recommended
`that utilizes the digital interConnectivity of the WIN for dissemination of video imagery throughout the
`brigade.
`14. SUBJECT TERMS Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Tactical Control System,
`Redundant Array of Independent Disks, Warfighter Information Network, Tactical Internet, Global
`Broadcast System
`
`15. NUMBER OF
`PAGES 187
`
`17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
`OF REPORT
`Unclassified
`NSN 7540-01-280-5500
`
`18. SECURITY CLASSIFI-
`CATION OF THIS PAGE
`Unclassified
`
`16. PRICE CODE
`20. LIMITATION
`OF ABSTRACT
`UL
`
`19. SECURITY CLASSIFI-
`CATION OF ABSTRACT
`Unclassified
`Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
`Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
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`DISSEMINATION AND STORAGE OF TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL
`VEHICLE DIGITAL VIDEO IMAGERY AT THE ARMY BRIGADE LEVEL
`
`Andreas K. Apostolopoulos
`Major, Hellenic Army
`B.S., Hellenic Army Military Academy, 1982
`
`Riley O. Tisdale
`Captain, United States Army
`B.S., The University of West Florida, 1989
`
`Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
`requirements for the degree of
`
`MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT
`
`from the
`
`NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
`September 1999
`
`Authors:
`
`Approved by:
`
`Andj^as K. Ap'osfolopoulos
`
`Riley O. Tisdale
`
`LTCJEkad Naegle, Associate Advisor
`
`-d2jLl
`
`Dr. Dan C. Boger, Cla&frman
`Information Systems Academic Group
`
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`ABSTRACT
`
`The Department of Defense Joint Technical Architecture has mandated a
`
`migration from analog to digital technology in the Command, Control, Communication,
`
`Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) community. The
`
`Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) and Tactical Control System (TCS) are two
`
`brigade imagery intelligence systems that the Army will field within the next three years
`
`to achieve information superiority on the modern digital battlefield. These two systems
`
`provide the brigade commander with an imagery collection and processing capability
`
`never before deployed under brigade control. The deployment of the Warfighter
`
`Information Network (WIN), within three to five years, will ensure that a digital
`
`dissemination network is in place to handle the transmission bandwidth requirements of
`
`large digital video files.
`
`This thesis examines the storage and dissemination capabilities of this future
`
`brigade imagery system. It calculates a minimum digital storage capacity requirement for
`
`the TCS Imagery Product Library, analyzes available storage media based on
`
`performance, and recommends a high-capacity storage architecture based on modern high
`
`technology fault tolerance and performance. A video streaming technique is also
`
`recommended that utilizes the digital interConnectivity of the WIN for dissemination of
`
`video imagery throughout the brigade.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I. INTRODUCTION 1
`
`A. PURPOSE 1
`
`B. BACKGROUND 1
`
`C. ORGANIZATION 2
`
`D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 4
`
`1. Primary Research Question 4
`
`2. Secondary Research Questions 4
`
`II. INFORMATION WARFARE AND THE ROLE OF THE UAV 7
`
`A. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE 7
`
`1. Information Age. A New View of War-. 7
`
`2. Information is an Abstraction 8
`
`3. The Role of Information Technology in Information
`Warfare 10
`
`4. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 13
`
`5. Intelligence Collection and Automated Processing 16
`
`6. Information Superiority, an Operational Advantage 19
`
`B. THE EVOLUTION OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
`(UAV) 21
`
`1. History of UAVs 22
`
`2. Modern UAV Class Categories 32
`
`3. Employment of UAVs 41
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`C. SUMMARY 44
`
`III. MOTION IMAGERY: THE STAKEHOLDERS AND THE
`TECHNOLOGY 47
`
`A. INTRODUCTION 47
`
`B. DEFINITIONS 48
`
`1. Still Imagery 48
`
`2. Motion Imagery. 48
`
`3. Video Imagery 49
`
`C. STAKEHOLDERS 49
`
`1. Intelligence 50
`
`2. Maneuver 50
`
`3. Fire Support 51
`
`4. Air Defense 51
`
`5. Mobility and Survivability 51
`
`6. Combat Service Support 52
`
`7. Command and Control 52
`
`8. Federal Agencies 53
`
`D. MOTION IMAGERY TECHNOLOGY 54
`
`1. Analog Video 54
`
`2. Digital Video 57
`
`E. SUMMARY 59
`
`IV. ANALYSIS OF STORAGE ALTERNATIVES 61
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`A. INTRODUCTION 61
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`B. IMAGERY PRODUCT LIBRARY 62
`
`C. STORAGE CAPACITY BASIS CALCULATION 63
`
`1. TUAV and TCS Performance Requirements 63
`
`, 2. Video Imagery Standards Profile (VISP) 63
`
`3. Calculation 65
`
`4. Compression 67
`
`D. STORAGE MEDIA 67
`
`1. Magnetic Media 68
`
`2. Optical Media.. 69
`
`3. Magneto-optical Media 70
`
`4. Evaluation Criteria 70
`
`5. Results 71
`
`E. STORAGE MEDIA CONFIGURATION SYSTEM - RAID 72
`
`1. - Definitions 73
`
`2. RAID Levels 73
`
`3. Fault Tolerance 77
`
`4. Accessibility 77
`
`5. Transfer Performance 78.
`
`6. Transaction Performance 78
`
`7. Evaluation Criteria Assumptions 78
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`8. Maintenance Assumption 79
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`9. Results 79
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`10. Proprietary Technology 82
`
`F. SUMMARY 82
`
`V. VIDEO DISSEMINATION NETWORK 83
`
`A. INTRODUCTION 83
`
`B. WARFIGHTER INFORMATION NETWORK (WIN)
`OVERVIEW 85
`
`1. Today's Information Network 85
`
`2. Future Warfighter Information Network (WIN) 86
`
`C. WIN OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 88
`
`1. (AGCCS) Army Global Command and Control System 88
`
`2. (FBCB2) Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
`System 89
`
`3. (ATCCS) Army Tactical Command and Control System 89
`
`D. WIN'S NON-VIDEO COMPONENTS 91
`
`1. The Tactical Internet 91
`
`2. Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
`(FBCB2) System 95
`
`E. WIN'S VIDEO COMPONENTS 99
`
`1. The Satellite Transport of Video Imagery 99
`
`2. The Terrestrial Transport 101
`
`3. Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) 104
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`4. Brigade's Networks 105
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`F. SUMMARY > 107
`
`VI. DIGITAL VIDEO DISSEMINATION VIA THE STREAMING VIDEO
`TECHNIQUE 109
`
`A. INTRODUCTION 109
`
`B. THE PROBLEM 109
`
`C. THREE SOLUTIONS 110
`
`D. DEVELOPMENT OF DIGITAL VIDEO NETWORK
`REQUIREMENTS 111
`
`E. DISSEMINATION OF REAL-TIME-VIDEO-IMAGERY.: 114
`
`1. Streaming Video Technique 114
`
`2. Streaming Protocols 122
`
`3. Multipoint Packet Delivery 125
`
`F. DISSEMINATION OF NON-REAL-TIME VIDEO
`IMAGERY (VIDEO ON DEMAND) 128
`
`G. SUMMARY 133
`
`VII. ANALYSIS OF IMPLEMENTATION ALTERNATIVES FOR
`VIDEO CAPTURE AND STORAGE HARDWARE 135
`
`A. INTRODUCTION 135
`
`B. REAL-TIME OPERATIONS 135
`
`1. Decentralized Video Capture, Centralized Storage 137
`
`2. Decentralized Video Capture, Decentralized Storage 139
`
`C. NON-REAL-TIME OPERATIONS 142
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`1. Centralized Video Capture, Centralized Storage 142
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`2. Centralized Video Capture, Decentralized Storage 144
`
`3. Decentralized Video Capture, Centralized Storage 146
`
`4. Decentralized Video Capture, Decentralized Storage 148
`
`D. CONCLUSION 149
`
`E. SUMMARY 150
`
`VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 151
`
`A. CONCLUSION 151
`
`B. ANSWERS TO PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 152
`
`1. What digital storage technology is available to the
`brigade motion imagery system? 152
`
`2. What digital dissemination technology is available to
`The brigade motion imagery system? 152
`
`C. ANSWERS TO SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 153
`
`1. Why does the tactical warfighter want motion imagery?.... 153
`
`2. How does the brigade currently disseminate motion
`Imagery Intelligence? 153
`
`3. What imagery quality standards does the brigade
`require? 153
`
`4. What are the digital storage capacity requirements for
`motion imagery transmitted by a Tactical Unmanned
`Aerial Vehicle? 154
`
`5. What video dissemination architecture will be in place
`in three to five years? 155
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`6. How might the brigade implement digital hardware for
`the capture and storage of motion imagery? 155
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`D. RECOMMENDATIONS 156
`
`E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 157
`
`1. RAID 7© 157
`
`2. Optical RAID 157
`
`3. Signal Corps Data Warehouse 158
`
`4. Video Server Capacity Requirement 158
`
`5. Cost Benefit Analysis 158
`
`LIST OF REFERENCES 159
`
`INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 163
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`LIST OF FIGURES
`
`Figure 1.1. Context Diagram: Brigade Imagery System 3
`
`Figure 2.1. The Information System 9
`
`Figure 2.2. The Intelligence Cycle. From (Waltz, 1998) 14
`
`Figure 2.3. The Vee Model 17
`
`Figure 2.4. TheFirebee 25
`
`Figure 2.5. AQM-34 Lightning Bug. From (Ref. 24) 27
`
`Figure 2.6. D-21 Drone Riding M-12. From DTIC,1998 30
`
`Figure 2.7. Pioneer Tactical UAV 34
`
`Figure 2.8. Hunter Tactical UAV 35
`
`Figure 2.9. Outrider Tactical UAV 36
`
`Figure 2.10. Eagle Eye. Vertical Take Off and Landing UAV 36
`
`Figure 2.11. Predator Tactical UAV 38
`
`Figure 2.12. DarkStar HAE-UAV 40
`
`Figure 2.13. Global Hawk HAE-UAV 40
`
`Figure 3.1. Set of Still Images (MIADC, 1997, p. 8) 48
`
`Figure 3.2. Sequence of Images (MIADC, 1997, p. 9) 49
`
`Figure 3.3. Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 55
`
`Figure 3.4. UAV Remote Video Terminals 55
`
`Figure 4.1. TCS Shelter 61
`
`Figure 4.2. RAID Level 0 (AC & NC, 1999) 74
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`Figure 4.3. RAID Level 1 (AC & NC, 1999) 74
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`Figure 4.4. RAID Level 10 (AC & NC, 1999) 75
`
`Figure 4.5. RAID Level 3 (AC & NC, 1999) 75
`
`Figure 4.6. RAID Level 5 (AC & NC, 1999) 76
`
`Figure 4.7. , RAID Level 53 (AC & NC, 1999) 76
`
`Figure 4.8. RAID Level 6 (AC & NC, 1999) 77
`
`.Figure 5.1. Increasing Requirements and Competition for Throughput.
`From (WIN Master Plan, 1998) 85
`
`Figure 5.2. Key Components of a Digitized Division 86
`
`Figure 5.3. WIN Subsystems. From (WIN Master Plan, 1998) 87
`
`Figure 5.4. Army Battle Command System Structure 88
`
`Figure 5.5. The Tactical Internet Architecture 91
`
`Figure 5.6. The Brigade LAN. From (FM 24-7. 1998) 92
`
`Figure 5.7. The Communication Systems of Tactical Internet 93
`
`Figure 5.8. The TI at Brigade and Below. From (FM 24-32, 1997) 94
`
`Figure 5.9. TI at Brigade and Below. From (FM 24-7, 1998) 95
`
`Figure 5.10. FBCB2 Interoperates with ATCCS 96
`
`Figure 5.11. The FBCB2 from Brigade to Platoon Level 97
`
`Figure 5.12. The FBCB2 Hardware 98
`
`Figure 5.13. GBS/BADD Deployment Architecture. From (FM 24-32,
`1997) 100
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`Figure 5.14. Proposed Wiring Collection and Segmentation of the Brigade
`Network 107
`
`Figure 6.1. Functional Decomposition and Analysis of the Video Dissemina-
`tion Process 113
`
`Figure 6.2. MPEG-2 over ATM 118
`
`Figure 6.3. Latency and Jitter 119
`
`Figure 6.4. Different Hosts Receive Different Types of Packets. From
`(www.uniqe.ch) 125
`
`Figure 6.5. A Proposed Overview of the Brigade Non-Real-Time Video
`Dissemination 130
`
`Figure 7.1. Real-Time Data Flow 136
`
`Figure 7.2. RT Decentralized Capture, Centralized Storage 138
`
`Figure 7.3. RT Decentralized Capture, Decentralized Storage 140
`
`Figure 7.4. NRT Centralized Capture, Centralized Storage 143
`
`Figure 7.5. Centralized Capture, Decentralized Storage 145
`
`Figure 7.6. NRT Decentralized Capture, Centralized Storage 147
`
`Figure 7.7. NRT Decentralized Capture, Decentralized Storage 148
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`LIST OF TABLES
`
`Table 2.1. Major Intelligence Categories. From (Waltz, 1998) 15
`
`Table 4.1. VSM Characteristics 64
`
`Table 4.2. VSM Levels and Subdivisions 64
`
`Table 4.3. VSM 5 Quantitative Measures , 65
`
`Table 4.4. Storage Media Profile 72
`
`Table 4.5. RAID Configuration Comparison 80
`
`Table 5.1. WIN Terrestrial Transport Implementation Schedule (Only For
`Components that Could be Involved in Transmission of the
`TUAV Video Imagery) , 103
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`ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
`
`The authors would like to acknowledge those individuals who provided
`their support throughout the information gathering phase of this thesis.
`
`Dr. Orin Marvel, C4I Academic Group, Naval Postgraduate School
`Dr. William J. Haga, Information Systems Academic Group, Naval
`Postgraduate School
`LTC Brad Naegle, Department of Systems Management, Naval
`Postgraduate School
`Barry Michel, Science Application International Corporation.
`MAJ William Crozier, S3, 15MI BN (AE), Ft Hood, TX
`CW5 David Gjertson, Modernization Officer, 504MIBDE, Ft Hood, TX
`MSG Purvis, A Co. 15MI BN (AE), Ft Hood, TX
`MAJ Smith, S2, lBde, 4ID(M), Ft Hood, TX
`CPT Rey Pickering, TSM/JSTARS, Ft Monmouth, NJ
`LTC Szyjka, AFOTEC, Kirtland AFB, NM
`Mr. Tim Stack, TRW
`Mr. Gene Leyzarovich, AC&NC, Pittsburgh, PA
`
`A special word of appreciation is due to the two most patient, persevering,
`and supportive members of this thesis team.
`
`Anastasia Apostolopoulos and Shirani Tisdale.
`
`We could not have finished this project without you!
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`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`Over the past several years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
`invested significant resources in developing various Unmanned
`Aerial Vehicles (UAV) systems to meet our nation's 21st century
`surveillance and reconnaissance needs. While UAV programs have
`experienced difficulties, the compelling benefits, such as contribut-
`ing to information superiority and the risk reduction of our pilot
`force, demand a strong, renewed, commitment.
`
`William Cohen, US Defense Secretary
`
`A. PURPOSE
`
`The purpose of this thesis is to provide the Army brigade intelligence
`
`infrastructure a technological solution for efficient storage and dissemination of
`
`digital motion imagery.
`
`B. BACKGROUND
`
`The Department of the Army is developing tactics, techniques, and
`
`procedures for the integration of UAV systems in the Army Force XXI brigade-
`
`level intelligence operation. Designated a Tactical UAV (TUAV), this airborne
`
`reconnaissance platform will provide the brigade commander with Real-time
`
`motion imagery intelligence with which to plan, execute, and assess tactical
`
`operations within his zone of influence. In recognition of the long outstanding
`
`need for a TUAV to support brigade commanders in combat operations, the Joint
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`Requirements Oversight Council considers the fielding of such a system its highest
`
`priority in the area of surveillance and reconnaissance (CBO, 1998).
`
`The TUAV is but one component in the intended Force XXI Command,
`
`Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence network that will radically
`
`alter the processing of imagery intelligence (IMINT) within the brigade. In
`
`addition to the TUAV, the Tactical Control System and the Warfighter Information
`
`Network will play vital roles in storing and disseminating motion IMINT. All
`
`three of these components are currently under development and must be integrated
`
`in the near future as the Army prepares to digitize the modern battlefield.
`
`C. ORGANIZATION
`
`Figure 1.1 graphically portrays the brigade imagery processing function as
`
`the central key to providing the Army brigade, its subordinate battalions, and its
`
`division headquarters both Real-time and Non-real-time motion imagery. The first
`
`part of Chapter II uses a top-down methodology to describe the role of information
`
`in warfare and the role of the UAV as an information collector. The second part of
`
`Chapter II overviews the evolution of the UAV from World War I to
`
`OPERATION ALLIED FORCE in Yugoslavia.
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`TUAV
`
`Division
`Real-Time
`Video
`
`DIVISION
`TOC
`
`Non-Real-Time
`Video
`Request
`
`Brigade
`Real-Time
`Video
`
`BRIGADE
`TOC
`
`BATTALION
`TOC
`
`Other
`I mager
`Sources
`
`Mission
`Task
`
`Figure 1.1. Context Diagram: Brigade Imagery System
`
`Chapter III introduces the brigade stakeholders who stand to benefit from
`
`the availability of motion imagery. It also provides an overview of analog and
`
`digital video technologies as well as digital video capture technology.
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`Chapter IV calculates a minimum storage capacity requirement for the
`
`Force XXI brigade imagery system, compares storage media technology, and
`
`analyzes large capacity storage configurations based on the capacity calculation
`
`and media selection.
`
`Chapter V provides an overview of the Army Warfighter Information
`
`Network (WIN). Upon deployment, the WIN establishes the digital conduit
`
`through which TUAV video will be transported in both Real-time and Non-real-
`
`time.
`
`Chapter VI describes the technological factors involved in delivering
`
`intelligence video to requesting brigade stakeholders. Chapter VII analyzes video
`
`capture and storage hardware implementation alternatives and Chapter VIII
`
`concludes the thesis with a summary and recommendation.
`
`D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
`
`1. Primary Research Questions
`
`• What digital storage and dissemination technology is available to the
`brigade motion imagery system?
`
`• How will digital imagery storage and dissemination technology be
`integrated into the brigade?
`
`2. Secondary Research Questions
`
`• Why does the tactical warfighter want motion imagery?
`
`• What motion imagery technology is available for tactical operations?
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`How does the brigade currently disseminate imagery intelligence?
`
`What imagery quality standards does the brigade require?
`
`•
`
`•
`
`What are the digital storage capacity requirements for motion
`imagery transmitted by a Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle?
`
`What dissemination architecture will be in place in five years?
`
`How might the brigade implement digital hardware for the capture
`and storage of motion imagery?
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`II. INFORMATION WARFARE AND THE ROLE OF THE UAV
`
`A. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE
`
`The 21st century is marked with many inventions as well as innovations in
`
`all sciences and particular domains.
`
`Three events changed the course of modern military history.
`
`First, in the early 20m Century, the invention of the tank influenced the
`
`strategy and tactical decisions of commanders at all levels. Military strategists
`
`accepted the new technology as a decisive contributor to the success of future
`
`battles.
`
`Second, at mid-century, ballistic missiles changed the strategy and tactics of
`
`battlefield commanders, by threatening to destroy whatever was found within their
`
`range of fire.
`
`1. Information Age. A New View of War
`
`The third invention that appeared in the early 1970s in the military and
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`civilian domains: information technology. It is characterized by the growth of
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`information, information sources and information dissemination capabilities.
`
`In the first two cases the invention could be seen. It had volume, weight,
`
`physical dimensions, but in the third case information is an abstract concept, less
`
`tangible but extremely powerful. On the battlefield, information can become
`
`deadly power. Information is not something that can be felt, seen, or touched; it is
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`an abstraction, but we are influenced by it. It can take the form of everything and
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`can be used for different kinds of tasks. Information is limitless and can have
`
`various sources. It can be discovered, created, transformed and repeated, but its
`
`value is temporal.
`
`2. Information is an Abstraction
`
`In order to understand abstractions, human beings have always built
`
`models. This same principle, when applied to the information abstraction,
`
`provides the user an information model that facilitates comprehension and
`
`ultimately produces new knowledge for decision-making. Retrieving information
`
`is a main system process that consists of five processes: Collect Data, Organize
`
`Data, Analyze Information, Distribute and Apply the Knowledge, and Protect the
`
`Information.
`
`a. Collect Data
`
`The collection of data comes from lowest level of command and is
`
`accomplished through individual observations, experiments, human
`
`communications, text messages, newspapers, still and motion imagery, etc.
`
`b. Organize Data
`
`The organization of data in a useful way facilitates the analysis and
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`produces information. The organizing process can be analyzed further to acquire
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`the right data and then sort, classify, and link data.
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`Figure 2.1. The Information System
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`c. Analyze Information
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`Analyze information in order to provide knowledge. Once
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`information has been processed and analyzed, it becomes knowledge. In a conflict
`
`environment, knowledge combined with experience gives the advantage of
`
`"Knowing the enemy." Sun Tzu, the Chinese philosopher, said, "Know the enemy
`
`and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are
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`ignorant about the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning and loosing
`
`are equal. If ignorant both your enemy and yourself, you are certain in every battle
`
`to be in peril."
`
`d. Distribute and Apply Knowledge
`
`Distribute and apply the knowledge in order to be efficient. The
`
`products of information must be delivered to users on time, in an understandable
`
`format, and in sufficient quantity to permit actions to be taken.
`
`e. Protect the Information
`
`Protect the information collection, processing and distribution
`
`channels from all forms of attack.
`
`3. The Role of Information Technology in Information Warfare
`
`Things that seemed futuristic a few years ago are commonly used today. In
`
`the last quarter of this century, an enormous expansion of electronic technology
`
`has occurred that continues still. As a result, electronically collected and managed
`
`information has became a very powerful weapon of both commercial and military
`
`sectors. Additionally, innovations in communications, electronic transmission, and
`
`automated processing of information have fueled the technology expansion.
`
`Commercial development, rather than classified military research and develop-
`
`ment, drive the technology of information warfare - unlike previous war forms.
`
`Current acquisition programs emphasize purchasing Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
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`(COTS) components as much as possible to avoid the expense of unique military
`
`performance specifications.
`
`Key technology areas now in development include the following (Waltz,
`
`1998):
`
`• Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and command and
`control (C2) technologies provide rapid, accurate fusion of all-source
`data and mining of critical knowledge to present high-level
`intelligence to information warfare planners. These technologies are
`applied to understand geographic space (terrain, road networks, and
`physical features) as well as cyberspace (computer networks, nodes,
`and link features).
`
`• Information security technologies include survivable networks,
`multilevel security, network and communication security, and digital
`signature and advance authentication technologies.
`
`• Information technologies developed in the commercial sector and
`applicable to information warfare, include all areas of network
`computing, intelligent mobile agents, multimedia data warehousing
`and mining, and push-pull information dissemination.
`
`• Electromagnetic weapon technologies, deny service to threat
`information networks with a non-lethal means of attack.
`
`• Information creation technologies generate synthetic and deceptive
`virtual information (e.g., video, synthetic imagery, duplicated virtual
`realities).
`
`In a conflict, both combatants intend to win by applying various strategies.
`
`Each one wants to identify enemy weak points and then exploit that information by
`
`attacking the weak point in order to gain an advantage. This advantage should
`
`contribute to victory by destroying the enemy with the least possible friendly
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`casualties in personnel and equipment. Information Warfare includes actions
`
`taken to preserve the integrity of one's own information system from exploitation,
`
`corruption, or disruption, while at the same time trying exploit, corrupt, or disrupt
`
`enemy information systems.
`
`To obtain a visualization of the enemy weak points, we apply surveillance,
`
`situation assessment, strategy development, and assessment of alternatives and
`
`finally, risks for decision making. Information is critical for all these processes
`
`because it is a common input.
`
`In the Art of War, Sun Tzu describes the principles of war. Although these
`
`principles of war were written and applied before sixth century B.C., they are still
`
`applied today. Only the means of acquisition, processing, and dissemination of
`
`information has changed. Battlefield messages and reports that were once
`
`processed manually are now processed by automated electronic systems capable of
`
`acquiring and managing large volumes of information in a very short time. On the
`
`other hand, due to the continuous increase of dependency on electronic and
`
`computerized means, all information personnel, equipment, and installations have
`
`become both a significant target and a valuable weapon.
`
`The steady increase of information technology forces the information to
`
`become more powerful in the warfare domain. Intelligence, as well as surveillance,
`
`and reconnaissance technologies have benefited by increasing their scope and
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`range of operations. Now, instead of observing the objective "just over the hill",
`
`ten objectives can be seen "over the next 10 hills" with great accuracy.
`
`In addition, communication and computer technologies support the
`
`decision-makers at all levels in the command and control process. Commanders
`
`and battle staff get the information very quickly and in near-real-time reducing
`
`their level of uncertainty and decreasing decision cycle time. They can now make
`
`the best possible decision.
`
`Another area of continuous change is the integration of information
`
`technology into weapon systems and the subsequent "birth" of smart weapons that
`
`are more precise lethal, and capable of effectively operating in more environments
`
`(darkness, weather, obscurants.) This fact is easily evidenced by motion imagery
`
`segments recorded in the Persian Gulf, Bosnia and Kosovo.
`
`4. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
`
`Intelligence, the information and knowledge about an adversary obtained
`
`through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding, is the product that
`
`provides battlespace awareness [Waltz, 1998]. Depending on the established level
`
`of war, as well as on the amount of engaged forces, the levels of intelligence are
`
`strategic, operational, and tactical. The intelligence cycle as shown in Figure 2-2,
`
`delivers reports in response to specific requests and queries for knowledge to make
`
`decisions and set policies.
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`Collection
`Plan
`
`Requests
`Queries
`
`Decision
`Policies
`
`Revision
`Recommends
`based on source
`availability
`
`Intelligence
`Report
`
`Indexed,
`Translated,
`Organized
`Information
`
`Discovered
`and detected
`knowledge
`
`Figure 2.2. The Intelligence Cycle. From (Waltz, 1998)
`
`Intelligence data sources can be distinguished as either open or closed. As
`
`expansion of electronic media access (telecommunications, video, and computer
`
`networks) continues. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is becoming the most
`
`important source of data collection. A good example of OSINT is the data
`
`collected from various DOD sources and publications for the purpose of this
`
`thesis. Table 2.1 shows the major intelligence categories and collection means.
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`

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