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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-00755
`Patent 8,191,091
`____________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: June 6, 2017
`____________
`
`
`
`
`Before KARL D. EASTHOM, TRENTON A. WARD, and GEORGIANNA
`W. BRADEN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
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`Case IPR2016-00755
`Patent 8,191,091
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`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`
`MARCUS E. SERNEL, ESQ.
`JOEL R. MERKIN, ESQ.
`ALAN M. RABINOWITZ, ESQ.
`Kirkland & Ellis LLP
`300 North LaSalle Street
`Chicago, Illinois 60654
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF PATENT OWNER:
`
`
`DOUGLAS J. KLINE, ESQ.
`STEPHEN T. SCHREINER, ESQ.
`Goodwin Procter LLP
`100 Northern Avenue
`Boston, Massachusetts 02210
`
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Tuesday, June 6,
`
`2017, commencing at 10:37 a.m., at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
`600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
`
`
`
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`P R O C E E D I N G S
`- - - - -
`JUDGE WARD: We are back on the record to hear arguments in
`the second case set for today. It's IPR 2016-00755.
`Mr. Sernel, when you're ready.
`MR. SERNEL: May I approach, Your Honor?
`JUDGE WARD: You may.
`May I assume five minutes for rebuttal again, Mr. Sernel?
`MR. SERNEL: Yes, please.
`May I proceed?
`JUDGE WARD: Yes.
`MR. SERNEL: So the second proceeding we have today focuses
`on the '091 patent, and if we could turn to slide 1 of my deck, the instituted
`grounds span a number of claims, and there are more grounds here to deal
`with. Three main references are Gilhousen, Mason, and Frezza, and for
`certain of the claims, we have combinations with a Block reference with
`both -- with all of Gilhousen, Mason, and Frezza.
`If we turn to slide 2, which is just the '091 patent. Again, it comes
`from the same PMC patent family, the same specification as the '635. The
`one difference for this proceeding versus the prior proceeding that we just
`dealt with is there is a dispute about priority. PMC argues that -- claims
`priority back to 1981, and it's our position, Apple's position -- and the Board
`preliminarily found in its institution decision -- that it's only entitled to 1987.
`So that's where I'd like to begin in terms of my discussion, the priority
`discussion.
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`Just quickly, slide 3, those are the challenged independent claims.
`Slide 4 lays out just the issues. Priority date, and we have got a few of the
`same claim construction issues that we can get into it again if you would like
`but probably don't want to spend as much time on them in this proceeding,
`and then I will get into the prior art.
`So slide 5 is the priority date. We've listed -- we've included many
`reasons in our papers why PMC is not entitled to the 1981 priority date. I'm
`going to focus on a couple of them here today in the oral hearing.
`First of all, PMC is estopped from claiming priority to the 1981
`date. They disclaimed priority to the 1981 disclosure in prosecution, and we
`believe they need to be held to that disclaimer during prosecution. You can
`see on slide 5, at the left, we have included some of the excerpts from the
`file history where these disclaimers were made.
`And it's important to note that in each of these situations, they are
`not talking about certain claims. They are talking about the present
`application. The present application asserts priority based on the 1987
`disclosure, and the bottom left -- this is Exhibit 1043 at 21 -- specifically this
`disclaimer of priority was made in response to a Schneller double patenting
`rejection.
`And so the argument was made -- a Schneller double patenting
`rejection is not appropriate because we could not claim priority to 1981; we
`are only claiming priority to 1987. These statements were clear statements
`to made to disclaim priority to '81 in prosecution, and as the Board in its
`institution found appropriately -- this is the institution decision at 26 --
`patentee clearly disclaimed priority with respect to the claims then pending
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`and rejected under Schneller, and, in fact, benefited from that disclaimer in
`that the Schneller rejection was overcome by this disclaimer to the 1981
`date.
`
`Now, PMC makes a variety of arguments. One argument they
`make is that, well, that only related to the claims then pending at the time. It
`doesn't relate to claims as they issued in the '091 patent. A couple of things
`I'd point out in response to that.
`First of all, you can see the disclaimers were made regarding "the
`present application." It wasn't limited to particular claims or claims then
`pending. These were broad statements about the present application and
`without -- without qualification.
`Two, the claims as they evolved didn't evolve in any material way
`to disassociate them from the disclaimer that was made.
`And then three -- if we could turn forward to slide 6 -- it's
`important to note that the Federal Circuit has looked at situations like this in
`the past, and I'd specifically call the Board's attention to the Hakim case --
`this is 479 F.3d 1313, Federal Circuit, 2007 -- where in the Hakim case, the
`applicant had made a disclaimer, and the argument was made by Hakim that,
`well, that was in a parent application, and so when we have a child
`application that has -- claims a different scope, it shouldn't apply.
`The Federal Circuit said that when a disclaimer is made, you need
`to clearly rescind or take back that disclaimer if that's what you want to do.
`The public has a right to rely on disclaimers that are made, and if you make
`a disclaimer, you can't just back away from it by including different claims
`in a child application. You have got to make a clear rescind -- you have to
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`clearly rescind the disclaimer. That's what Hakim tells us. That never
`happened in this prosecution history. PMC is stuck with their disclaimer.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: But the key really is is how different these
`claims are, right, because if they're not -- if they aren't -- if they are
`materially differently, the disclaimer only goes to the claims themselves, not
`the whole application.
`MR. SERNEL: I would actually disagree with that because that
`was the argument that was made in Hakim, that, well, we have got a child
`application which claims a different scope, these are different claims --
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Oh, Hakim did have different -- had the
`same issue? I'm sorry.
`MR. SERNEL: Yes, absolutely the same issue.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Okay.
`MR. SERNEL: So Hakim had a disclaimer, and then they
`argued -- and it was not a date disclaimer; it was a scope disclaimer. And
`they said, well, we filed a child application, it's got broader claims, the scope
`disclaimer shouldn't apply to this subsequent application where we have
`cancelled the prior claims, abandoned the prior application, and substituted
`in new broader claims.
`And so the exact argument was made in Hakim, and the Federal
`Circuit said, well, when you have got a disclaimer in the file history, you've
`got to do something clear to rescind that disclaimer, not simply suggest, oh,
`well, the claims are a different scope and it doesn't apply.
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`JUDGE WARD: So, Mr. Sernel, you agree that it is possible to
`rescind -- for an applicant to rescind a disclaimer; just that here, the Patent
`Owner didn't sufficiently make it clear.
`MR. SERNEL: Yes, absolutely, and you can see our quote from
`Hakim on slide 6 says exactly that. "Although a disclaimer made during
`prosecution can be rescinded ... the prosecution history must be sufficiently
`clear to inform the examiner that the previous disclaimer ... may need to be
`revisited."
`And so, yes, you can rescind it. It did not happen here. And, in
`fact, if you look at how prosecution proceeded to the issuance of the '091
`patent claims, throughout the entirety of prosecution, the examiner was
`relying on intervening prior art, you know, art that was 1983, 1984 priority
`date, including one of the art references we are going to look at here, the
`Mason reference.
`So there's nothing, when you look at the file history, that suggests
`that they rescinded this disclaimer and were officially, you know, formally
`seeking the 1981 date. Everything dictates that this disclaimer was made, it
`was not rescinded, and, in fact, it was assumed from then on that the
`examiner was dealing with a 1987 priority date.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Procedurally, do you agree you have the
`burden to show that there is no priority back to 1981?
`MR. SERNEL: I don't know that I would agree with that. I think
`they may bear the burden to claim priority to an earlier application when you
`have a CIP. Certainly I think we meet that burden and then some in terms of
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`the arguments that we have included in our papers, but I'm not sure I would
`agree with that statement.
`So the second argument, turning to slide 7, the second argument,
`even if they're not estopped from claiming the 1981 priority date, I think if
`you dig into the substance of the analysis of the priority analysis, they
`don't get there either. And the second argument I wanted to focus on is with
`respect to the term "programming," and there was some discussion about
`this in the prior proceeding.
`As the Board is well aware, in the 1987 specification, the term
`"programming" was broadened significantly from what it was defined to be
`in the 1981 specification. "Programming," in 1981, was defined to be
`everything transmitted over television or radio, intended for communication
`of entertainment or to instruct or to inform.
`In '87, that term was defined to refer to everything that is
`transmitted electronically to entertain, instruct, or inform, including TV,
`radio, but also broadcast, print, and computer programming, as well as
`compelling media programming.
`And so the appropriate way to do this, as the Board has explained
`in its institution decision here and in prior decisions, is to look at -- okay,
`look at the patent as issued, look at the definition in the 1981 specification
`and the patent as issued, and that defines what "programming" means.
`And then the priority analysis then looks at, okay, going back to
`1981, is there a disclosure in 1981 for this broad definition? The answer is
`very clearly no. Certainly everything that was transmitted electronically to
`entertain, instruct, or inform in '87 is not described in 1981. Things like
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`digital video, computer programming, transmission of combined media
`programming, those things are not described in the 1981 specification, and
`so it fails on analysis of this limitation as well.
`Turning ahead to slide 8, the Board has addressed this issue
`previously. As I mentioned, in the institution decision in this proceeding --
`that's at the bottom or on the right of slide 8, paper 14 at 22 -- and walking
`through that, the analysis, and the Board actually adopted and incorporated
`by reference the findings and reasoning in the '1527 final written decision
`and hearing decision where this issue -- a very similar issue was addressed,
`and we have called out those on the left-hand side.
`Moving ahead to slide 9, PMC makes an argument that the Board
`has misapplied the PowerOasis case. We believe that the Board has
`correctly relied on the PowerOasis case to reject PMC's argument. Again,
`the proper analysis is to look at what's in the patent as issued, defining the
`terms based on that, then look back to the 1981 specification, which --
`JUDGE EASTHOM: So you distinguish the case Patent Owner
`cites because Patent Owner's case only applies to when you change the term
`in the claim? Is that basically your distinction?
`MR. SERNEL: I'm not sure which case you're talking about.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Patent Owner cited a case that said you
`should just look back to 1981 to determine what the claims mean; ignore
`what you're doing in 1987.
`MR. SERNEL: I think they made an argument that that somehow
`was their reading of PowerOasis, and I think that's totally wrong, that
`PowerOasis tells you look to patent as issued, define the term, then set -- the
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`process, look back to the 1981 specification to assess priority. And so that's
`what I think you've done in your prior analysis of this issue, that's the
`appropriate analysis, and you find that there's multiple instances of things
`that are included within that broad definition that are not sufficiently
`described in 1981 and, thus, there is no appropriate claim of priority back to
`1981.
`
`If we move ahead, slide 10, and I don't want to get back into it, but
`the same decrypt/encrypt issue is at issue here as well, the same basic
`evidence involved.
`Slide 12, I don't need to get into it in detail, but it's a very similar
`type of situation, where they claim in the '091 file history there's another
`disclaimer, but if you look at it, you can see that they actually acquiesced in
`the examiner continuing to say that Mason -- which has, they would suggest,
`you know, arguably, analog components as well as digital components --
`taught encrypted, you know, transmissions, and then they amended the
`claims to add a different limitation, and that's what got the examiner to issue
`the patent. It wasn't any disclaimer of claim scope that limited the concept
`of encryption/decryption to an all --
`JUDGE EASTHOM: What about Patent Owner's argument that it
`doesn't really matter what the examiner's reasons were for allowance, that
`they made the argument and that's all that matters? Do you have any cases
`to the con -- do you have any case support to show that's not right?
`MR. SERNEL: Well, I don't know if I have a specific case that
`says that that's not right. I think you look at the totality of the prosecution
`history. Number one, there is no statements about claim scope itself saying,
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`"I am going to limit the claim scope of the terms encryption/decryption to
`something narrower than what they would otherwise be." There are no
`statements that come close to saying that, and that's typically what's required
`for a clear and unmistakable disclaimer to limit claim scope.
`The things that they point to are simply arguments to try to
`distinguish factually these art references, and then, again, they have tried to
`suggest that somehow those arguments are what led to issuance. My point is
`to respond to that and say, no, that's not what happened. The examiner
`never bought into this concept that they had limited the claim scope. In fact,
`they had to make other amendments to gain issuance of the claims. And so I
`don't know that just because the examiner didn't buy it, that's dispositive. I
`think it's relevant evidence for you -- the Board to consider.
`Moving ahead to another claim construction issue, that's -- I guess
`slide 15 is my first slide, "an encrypted digital information transmission
`including encrypted information," a similar type of issue where they argue
`that this phrase requires that the transmission must be all digital, and we
`have several responses to this.
`I think, first of all, if you look just to the claim language, that
`refutes PMC's position because it talks about receiving an encrypted digital
`information transmission, including encrypted information, implying that
`you can have encrypted information that's nondigital, and that's exactly what
`the Board found in its institution decision, paper 14 at 8.
`If we turn to the next slide, slide 16, PMC relied on transmissions
`that include both analog and digital information as providing the written
`description support for the challenged claims. So they pointed to these what
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`are referred to as composite signals, where you have analog and digital
`information, as being the written description support for an encrypted digital
`information transmission, again acknowledging that this doesn't have to be
`an all digital process, and inconsistent with PMC's attempt to read these as
`being an all digital transmission.
`And then if we look at slide 17, we can look at other claims, both
`from the '091 patent and back to the '635 patent, to see that they've done this
`in different ways in showing that an encrypted digital information
`transmission, including encrypted information, is not all digital. You can
`see here, claim 26 of '091, no digital information would be required at all
`based on a plain reading of that.
`And then we look at the '635 patent claims, for example, claim 18,
`and you can see here is an effort to make this an all digital transmission
`where they talk about "wherein the at least one encrypted digital information
`transmission is unaccompanied by any non-digital information
`transmission."
`So for that transmission, yes, that might be all digital. Certainly
`when we only have an encrypted digital information transmission that
`includes encrypted information, reading these claims and looking at how
`they have done it in these different claims, that's not an all digital
`requirement. We think PMC's argument in that respect is not supported.
`JUDGE WARD: Mr. Sernel, can you give me an example of what
`you would consider to be a composite signal?
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`MR. SERNEL: So, you know, you could have a composite signal
`where you have an analog television transmission embedded with digital
`control signals.
`JUDGE WARD: What about an analog transmission where data
`was embedded in the VEI? Would you consider that?
`MR. SERNEL: Sure, sure.
`JUDGE WARD: So that is within your --
`MR. SERNEL: Again, I am not saying that that's necessarily the
`right definition of "composite signals." I have seen that terminology used to
`describe what you have just posited.
`If we turn now to slide 18, this is the definition or construction of
`"locating." PMC seeks a very narrow construction as the basis for their
`arguments on this term, and it's a construction that they argue for, "to
`determine the place or position of something already in existence," and that
`somehow has to be already in existence in order to be located.
`That's not consistent with the plain meaning of "locating." It's not
`consistent with PMC's own usage of the term "locating" in their specification
`and the parts of their specification that they pointed to for written description
`support for this term. You can see -- and this is -- the Board has already
`called this out in its institution decision, paper 14 at 34, where the term
`"located" was equated with things like identifying and decrypting or
`processing and decrypting to then locate a, for example, decryption key.
`And so the specification is inconsistent with this narrow definition that PMC
`attempts to argue.
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`Heading to slide 19, the terms "processor" and "processor
`instructions" are also at issue. You can see here -- again, these are issues
`that the Board has dealt with previously, and much of the same evidence has
`already been looked at.
`If we move actually ahead to slide 21, you can see here the only
`dispute regarding "processor instructions" is really the meaning of
`"processor," so it sort of goes right back to the fight about what a processor
`is. You can see we have included from their paper 20, the response, at 24,
`that it's the "processor instruction" definition, our definition, they claim is
`incorrect for incorporating the incorrect definition of "processor."
`And then the Board's construction in the institution decision we
`think appropriately captures the broadest reasonable interpretation, and you
`can see "processor instructions" were preliminarily defined by the Board to
`mean "instructions, including control or informational signals, to a device
`that operates on data." That's the institution decision at 19. We think that
`appropriately captures the BRI of "processor instructions."
`Moving ahead to Gilhousen, that's the first primary reference, you
`can see at slide 22 -- one quick note I'll make here is you can see in the title
`itself that we've talked about using the terms "encryption" and
`"descrambling" and "scrambling" interchangeably. You can see Gilhousen
`specifically uses these terms interchangeably, again supporting the concept
`that in the 1980s, there was no well-defined line between "encryption" and
`"descrambling." It talks about signal encryption for controlling scrambling,
`so interchangeably using these terms.
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`If we move ahead now to -- I am going to jump ahead to slide 26.
`There's an argument about whether Gilhousen discloses "determining a
`fashion in which said receiver station locates a first decryption key" and then
`"locating said first decryption key." You can see we've laid out at the top
`right of slide 26 how Mr. Wechselberger has annotated Figure 6 from
`Gilhousen. This is Wechselberger declaration, 1001 exhibit, at paragraph
`128; and then there's paragraph 126 from Mr. Wechselberger's declaration
`explaining this.
`But there's an instruct-to-enable signal, a working key generator
`that then determines the fashion of locating the decryption key. That's
`determined by the working key that's generated by that working key
`generator. And then the keystream generator uses that working key to then
`locate the decryption key, which is the keystream, and this is explained in
`column 14 of Gilhousen, meeting these requirements of the claim, and our
`position is laid out at petition 20 to 21.
`Moving on to slide 27 --
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Again, does Gilhousen use the keystream to
`encrypt the information?
`MR. SERNEL: Yes.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: It seems like they do encryption on audio. I
`wasn't clear about the video portion.
`MR. SERNEL: I believe it encrypts both. It encrypts both, and --
`JUDGE EASTHOM: And then they send it back out into audio,
`right? So it actually is digital information at first and it says it goes through
`a DA, and I know in the audio part, it says an DA is actually PAM, pulse
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`amplitude modulation, so it's actually a real strange hybrid. It's digital stuff
`sent out called analog, but it seems to be a digital signal to me. I'm not --
`MR. SERNEL: So I think some of it may be sent in analog form,
`some of it's sent in digital form, and then it does go through the A/D
`converter before the decryption process is done on the receiver side.
`And just addressing the "locating" argument again, slide 27, you
`can see that PMC's, again, argument regarding the these terms is dependent
`on its "already in existence" argument. If we turn ahead -- actually, let me
`turn ahead to slide 28. You can see that even if that's required, that is met,
`as was explained in the institution decision by the Board at 33, paper 14,
`because what's happening is this is a system where it's encrypted with the
`keystream on the transmitter side, and then that keystream is regenerated on
`the receiver side to then decrypt the information. And so the keystream
`already does exist, and then it's regenerated on the receiver side, thus
`locating it.
`If we move ahead to slide 29, this is another argument that they
`make regarding "decrypting said encrypted information," and "decrypt a
`video portion of said programming." This turns on the "decrypt" argument
`again, and so I won't belabor that. This is just based on claim construction.
`I will move on and talk about slide 30. You can see that even
`under PMC's construction, the limitation -- these limitations that we were
`talking about for claims 13, 20, and 15 are met because Gilhousen performs
`scrambling, descrambling, or encryption/decryption in digital format, as
`their expert admits, and this gets to Judge Easthom's point.
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`You can see that when those operations are done, they go through
`this A/D converter, and as their expert, Dr. Weaver, acknowledged -- this is
`Exhibit 1054 at page 85 -- that when their -- when that process is done, it's
`done in digital form.
`Moving ahead to slide 31, this is another argument that PMC
`makes that Gilhousen does not somehow pass the instruct/enable signal to a
`processor. This argument, again, turns on the claim construction of what
`"processor" is. I would point out that -- this is at the bottom of slide 31, and
`it's an excerpt from column 14, 14 to 19 -- that the specification specifically
`talks about the work that the working key generator is being -- is doing as
`"processing the initialization vector signal," on line 191, again, consistent
`with a construction that that is a processor that's doing processing.
`Then if you turn to slide 32, Gilhousen specifically -- there's an
`argument made that somehow claim 20 requires not only two
`instruct-to-enable signals but then also separate processor instructions. We
`think that's an inappropriate and improper reading of the claim. The claim
`simply requires a first instruct-to-enable signal, including a first processor
`instruction. Those are met, as is set forth on slide 32, and this is paragraphs
`144 and 150 of the Wechselberger declaration, 1001, and then he has
`annotated figures that we have on the right of slide 32.
`If I could just jump ahead quickly to slide 34, the Block reference,
`the Block reference fills in the gap in all of the references, Gilhousen,
`Mason, and Frezza, with respect to the requirement of "storing information
`evidencing said step of decrypting." Block specifically teaches that for
`impulse-type purchases, you could have Block -- this functionality that
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`Block teaches that would store a use code, and so if something was
`purchased and then decrypted on the receiver side, you could store a use
`code, and that allows for these impulse-type --
`JUDGE EASTHOM: So are you arguing that you won't get that
`use code unless you decrypt? Because I think Patent Owner, your friends on
`the other side, are saying you may not decrypt even though you have a use
`code.
`
`MR. SERNEL: Yeah. So I think they had an erroneous reading of
`Block. Certainly Block talks about in the specification -- this is on slide
`35 -- that you are going to implement this in this a logical way, where if
`you're having to purchase something and decrypt it, it's going to accurately
`store the use code.
`I think there may be some lines that suggest that if you weren't
`having to decrypt, you might store a use code as well, but those are the
`things that don't need decryption in the first place. So a person of skill in the
`art is going to implement this in a logical way and implement these use
`codes in a way that, where there's decryption of something that requires
`decryption, you are going to store a use code. This is an obvious
`combination where --
`JUDGE EASTHOM: I think when we instituted, we said
`something along those lines, sort of looking at what your petition had. I
`think one of your friend's arguments now is that maybe that's not fair, that
`we -- you never made that argument in your petition about reasonableness.
`MR. SERNEL: I think we did, and I think Mr. Wechselberger did
`make that -- and I see line -- paragraph 166 in the initial declaration I think
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`may have addressed that point, but, you know, I think that would be the way
`a person of skill in the art would look to add Block to something like a pay
`TV system, subscription system, like Gilhousen, like Mason, like Frezza, to
`add this impulse purchase type functionality to it.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Okay. What about their motivational
`arguments? I know we've -- I'm sorry to push you along.
`MR. SERNEL: I don't know -- like I said, I think that this is just
`an obvious thing to be motivated to add. You have paid subscription TV
`references, like Gilhousen, Mason, and Frezza. If you want to add impulse
`purchase type functionality to it, Block tells you how to do that and says, if
`you're going to do it, you have to be able to then track on the receiver side
`what purchases have been made, and that's storing the use code. I think this
`is an obvious --
`JUDGE EASTHOM: What about the long list of things that would
`have to be done to make that happen, all the modifications?
`MR. SERNEL: I think those -- that's just a parade of imaginary
`things. I think this is an incredibly straightforward thing to fit together. It's
`simply adding that little bit of functionality from Block that has some kind
`of trigger that can store a use code when decryption happens.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Finally, if we do decide that Patent Owner's
`correct, they disclaimed and they narrowed this term, limited to digital
`information, are you -- are you still contending that -- is Gilhousen the only
`one that you're contending satisfies that?
`MR. SERNEL: I think Gilhousen -- again, Mason arguably would
`meet even a narrower definition of decrypting.
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`JUDGE EASTHOM: And what would Gilhousen be decrypting
`exactly? What part of the program would be decrypted in Gilhousen? What
`part of the information, I guess? This claim says "encrypted information."
`MR. SERNEL: Yeah. I think if you look at Gilhousen, I mean, it
`has boxes that specifically talk about decrypting and encrypting both the
`audio and/or video, and so I think it's encrypting and decrypting both of
`those.
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`JUDGE EASTHOM: Okay.
`MR. SERNEL: I will reserve my remaining time for rebuttal.
`Thank you.
`JUDGE WARD: Thank you, Counsel. You have 2 1/2 minutes
`for rebuttal remaining.
`Mr. Kline, when you're ready.
`MR. KLINE: Thank you.
`If he can step up, Your Honor.
`JUDGE WARD: Yes, you may approach.
`Thank you, Counsel.
`MR. KLINE: Thank you, Your Honor. Again, Doug Kline for
`Patent Owner, PMC.
`Perhaps the best thing to do is turn directly to slide 6. That is
`where we begin to address the priority question. I would like to, in the time
`available to me, address priority. There are some claim construction issues,
`and I certainly don't want to flog "decrypt" any longer than necessary, but I
`do want to point out that some statements were made during prosecution of
`this '091 patent itself that bear on this issue.
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