0. J. Hanas, P. den Toonder, F. Pennypacker: An Addressable Satellite Encryption System for Preventing Signal Piracy
`
`631
`
`AN ADDRESSABLE SATELLITE ENCRYPTION SYSTEM
`FOR PREVENTING SIGNAL PIRACY
`
`Orest J. Hanas
`Pieter den Toonder
`Frank Pennypacker
`Oak Communications Inc.
`Satellite Systems
`Crystal Lake, I L 60014
`
`ABSTRACT
`
`Satellite signals which transmit tele(cid:173)
`vision and other commercial communications
`can no longer be thought of as secure.
`The advent of low cost TVRO's has opened
`the door to the threat of signal piracy.
`In response to this threat, a signal sec(cid:173)
`urity system was developed which masks
`both audio and video intelligibility. The
`system can effectively shield programming,
`control its delivery, and protect private
`sensitive information. Presently it is
`used at C-band and Ku-band with conventional
`TVRO's and all existing satellites.
`It is,
`of course, directly applicable for the use
`in the Direct Broadcast Systems in the near
`future.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`As each day passes, it seems that we
`become more and more dependent upon comm(cid:173)
`unications satellites. Whether they are
`used to relay audio signals, data signals,
`or distribute broadcast and private tele(cid:173)
`vision signals, our dependence on the
`reliability and security of satellite links
`has accelerated so rapidly that we now
`take their service for granted. Unfortu(cid:173)
`nately the same technology that has made
`
`satellite communications cost effective
`and dependable has also reduced the
`security of its transmissions.
`
`Because of the great height of geo(cid:173)
`synchronous communications satellites,
`their coverage areas or "footprints" are
`extremely wide. As a result, a television
`signal or any other communication signal
`distributed by satellite potentially be(cid:173)
`comes available to millions of people.
`UHtil recently, the high cost of satellite
`earth stations had sharply reduced the
`accessibility of satellite signals to
`unauthorized persons.
`In the past couple
`of years, however, the high cost of
`critical earth station components has
`dropped dramatically and is continuing to
`do so now. What's more, the availability
`of the premium television signals that
`are transmitted over satellites has been
`widely publicized.
`In adJition, the high
`cost of travel makes video teleconferen(cid:173)
`cing over the satellite a very attractive
`alternative for corporations. Government
`deregulation has provided an additional
`incentive to private earth station owner(cid:173)
`ship by discontinuing licensing require(cid:173)
`ments. Complete earth stations are now
`being promoted for only a few thousand
`dollars and some inventive do-it-your-
`
`0098-3063/81/0631-0636$00.75 © 1981 IEEE
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`
`selvers have unlocked the window to "free"
`movies and to private and privileged
`in(cid:173)
`formation for only a few hundred dollars.
`
`While users of satellites who transmit
`valuable or private programming or infor(cid:173)
`mation may be looking to legislative
`actions to discourage unauthorized tapping
`of their signals, it is not realistic to
`believe that this will become a practical
`solution. The protection of the private
`and privileged information is much too
`vital to the economic success of satellite
`users to be left to chance.
`In addition,
`legal ramifications resulting from signal
`piracy may have far reaching effects on
`these users. For that reason, a system
`has been developed utilizing advanced
`encryption and addressability techniques
`and equipment. The system has received
`exhaustive testing with a variety of
`satellites (including Westar I & III,
`Satcom I and II, and ANIK-B) and terminal
`equipment and has been successfully com(cid:173)
`mercially applied for the first time in
`scrambling the satellite TV signals trans(cid:173)
`mitting the Ali-Holmes and Leonard-Duran
`prizefights in October and November of
`1980 respectively.
`It has also been demon(cid:173)
`strated at public and private conferences
`in the U.S. and Canada.
`
`The development of this low cost satel(cid:173)
`lite signal decryption system has used
`scrambling technology similar to that used
`
`in cable and subscription television
`systems. The satellite signal encryption
`system offers a new high in the level of
`program security.
`It is a complete end-to(cid:173)
`end system which provides for the encoding
`of audio and video at the up-link studio
`or control center and decoding of these
`signals at individually selected receive
`earth stations. The system is fully
`addressable, allowing for controlled de(cid:173)
`livery of information to specific decoders.
`Each decoder in the system carries a
`unique code that must be matched with
`digital message transmitted from the up(cid:173)
`link. Other features of the system are:
`
`- Time varying video and audio
`encryption.
`
`- Digitized and encrypted audio.
`
`- Compatible interface levels with
`existing standard satellite earth
`station equipment.
`
`- Standard Baseband TV inputs (at up(cid:173)
`link) and outputs (at down-link).
`
`- Broadcast quality signal processing.
`
`Fully proven computer control of
`entire system.
`
`- Multi level (tiered) program control
`within the secure channel.
`
`-·
`
`-~---·
`
`~)-\·:,~=l-r~
`~
`G';:;;:;:;-;;-J
`l~mt.Lm
`
`Ur-L!NK
`llFCEIVER
`
`--
`
`--
`
`!Ja~<'b<1nd Inpllt
`{\lnC"lamped)
`
`DO~IN-tiNK
`RECEIVER
`- -
`IHI~('band Output
`t {In,-, 1 11mped)
`
`-
`
`J>roo.J.:<>m Vin .. o
`0----~- -·
`
`F11lly F.nc•·yphed
`Video ~ lludio
`{] 2/8 bits)
`..---L__--,
`
`Fully Encrypted
`Audio andrV-;d-•o---'---,
`
`RECEIVE EIRTII STATICI!
`IR~NSIIIT f~RTH SUTIQN
`STUD! 0
`Figure 1 Satellite Signal Encryption System
`
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`0. 1. Hanas, P. den Toonder, F. Pennypacker: An Addressable Satellite Encryption System for Preventing Signal Piracy
`
`633
`
`- Optional second encrypted audio
`channel.
`
`Optional data channel and TVRO
`control units.
`
`SYSTEM OPERATION
`
`A block diagram of the satellite sig(cid:173)
`nal scrambling system is illustrated in
`Figure 1.
`
`It consists of the following subsystems:
`
`A. Control center equipment
`B. Up-link earth station equipm~nt
`C. Receiving site equipment
`
`Figures 2 and 3 show photographs of the
`actual encryption and decryption equipment,
`respectively.
`
`When an unauthorized viewer attempts to
`tune-in the encoded signal, the video sig(cid:173)
`nal will appear severely scrambled and
`without sync. The digitized and encrypted
`audio channel will be received as white
`noise. Even if the unauthorized viewer
`has a decoder system, unless that specific
`decoder has been "turned on" by the up(cid:173)
`link operator, no decoding will take place.
`In addition, decoding intelligence always
`requires two levels of authorization.
`
`Unique information stored in the micro(cid:173)
`computer memory of each decoder, plus a
`second digital code transmitted as dat~,
`are required for decryption. The encr:r?(cid:173)
`tion can be changed as often as desirec
`and can be varied with time in a pseudo(cid:173)
`random fashion, under computer control.
`For added security, the receive decoders
`are tamper-proof.
`
`The system can provide many levels of
`tiering, permitting a time-shared use of
`multiple satellite transponder channels
`by several classes of authorized sub(cid:173)
`scribers.
`In addition, any decoder can
`be remotely denied access to all tiers by
`the authorized controlling party.
`
`Figure 3 Decrypter
`
`At the Control Center, the video is
`partially scrambled, the baseband audio is
`digitized and encrypted (using an advanced
`technique similar to that used by banks
`for electronic funds transfers) and the
`addressing information is formatted.
`
`At the up-link earth station, the video
`signal undergoes further encryption to
`completely mask its recognizable features
`for security. There, the address channel ,
`the encrypted audio and the scrambled
`video are combined, modulated and trans(cid:173)
`mitted to the satellite.
`
`Figure 2 Encrypter
`
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`
`At the receive site, a conventional
`satellite receiver (TYRO) converts the
`satellite frequency modulated (FM) signal
`to a baseband TV signal. The encrypted
`signal may be distributed throughout an
`entire distribution installation, or it
`
`may be decrypted in the decrypter and
`then distributed.
`
`Table I lists the Major performance para(cid:173)
`meters of the Satellite Signal Encryption
`System.
`
`l. Control and Encryption:
`
`In-Channel
`
`2. Addressing:
`
`* Rate: 7,200 subscribers/minute
`* Number of possible subscribers: 2,000,000
`* Method: Digital Data within video signal
`* Compatibility: Preserves Teletext, Teledon,
`VITS, VIRS, source ID and Captioning.
`
`3. Video Encryption:
`
`Analog, with time-varying encryption controlled
`by central computer.
`
`Video Performance:
`
`Meets RS250-B specification
`
`4. Audio Encryption:
`
`Audio Performance:
`
`Digital with time-varying encryption, using
`12 to 8 bits companded.
`
`12 KH: for 12/8 bit, 60 dB S/N
`Bandwidth:
`for 12/8 bit; Distortion
`1.% for 12/8 bit
`
`5. Operational Sequence:
`
`A. Pre-authorize all subscribers
`B. Send decryption data
`
`6. Tiering:
`
`7. Options:
`
`7 tiers are available
`
`Multichannel Audio
`
`8. Applications:
`
`9.
`
`Interface:
`
`10. Input/OJtput connection:
`
`A. One broadcast quality: 12/8 bits digital,
`encrypted
`14 bits digital,
`encrypted
`
`B. One network quality:
`
`Pay program protection
`Secure teleconferencing
`
`Video Input/Output:
`
`Audio Input/Output:
`
`l v p-p into 75 ohms un(cid:173)
`balanced 30 Hz - 4. 2 HHz
`0, +10 dBm into 600 ohms
`balanced
`BNC type (video), XLR type (Audio)
`
`ll. Power requirements:
`
`105-130 VAC, 60 Hz
`
`12. f\1echanical:
`
`;.Jounts in standard 19" rack
`Pre-encrypter:
`3l,z" high
`Post-encrypter: 3l;;'' high
`Decrypter:
`3l,z" high
`PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS
`
`TABLE
`
`l
`
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`0. J. Hanas, P. den Toonder, F. Pennypacker: An Addressable Satellite Encryption System for Preventing Signal Piracy
`
`635
`
`For distribution in a CATV system, the
`decoded signals may be again scrambled,
`using the locally available security sys(cid:173)
`tem. Addressing, at the CONTROL CENTER,
`directs the delivery of the information to
`authorized receivers. The digital address(cid:173)
`ing information is inserted in the video
`during vertical blanking inteTval.
`
`This digital information consists of
`a series of messages ... one for each de(cid:173)
`coder in use. Each message contains a
`number, which identifies the specific
`decoder, followed by a program authori(cid:173)
`zation code telling the decoder what
`programs it is to decode. The system will
`send out these messages, one after another,
`until all of the decoders have been add(cid:173)
`ressed. Up to 7,200 decoders can be
`addressed in one minute.
`(Higher rate of
`addressing is achievable, if required.)
`The addressing is controlled automatically
`by a computer into which all the authori(cid:173)
`zation data has been programmed.
`
`RECEIVE SITE
`
`A standard satellite TVRO (television
`receive-only earth station) is used for
`converting the satellite-transponded FM
`signal into a TV signal.
`
`The output of the TVRO contains (at
`baseband) encrypted video and audio signals
`and address data. This signal is fed into
`the decoder at standard TV baseband inter(cid:173)
`face levels. After decoding it is
`distributed to the TV monitors, or cable
`system modulators, as required.
`
`PRINCIPLES OF THE ENCRYPTION SYSTEM
`
`The principle behind the TV signal en(cid:173)
`cryption system is based on the fact that
`television signals are quite redundant
`and portions of the waveform follow a
`given pattern.
`If these patterns are
`modified, a standard TV receiver will
`become confused and will try to lock on
`maximum video (which never occurs). With(cid:173)
`in the decoder, a circuit extracts a
`hidden and encrypted digital message and
`uses it to restore the normal patterns to
`the scrambled signal, restoring the origi(cid:173)
`nal video. Before this circuit can be
`activated, the decoder must recognize its
`unique address and decoding data. Since
`the digital messages are time varied in
`a pseudo-random fashion, decryption of the
`signal is essentially impossible by a non(cid:173)
`authorized decrypter.
`
`The digitized broadcast-quality audio
`signal consists of two bytes sampled at
`a 31KHz rate. To improve sound quality,
`the audio is compressed from 12 to 8 bits
`per sample. The 8 bit signal is encrypted,
`inserted in the video signal. The orig(cid:173)
`inal audio subcarrier in the satellite
`channel is unused and open for other
`applications. The optional 14 bit network(cid:173)
`quality audio signal, however, requires
`the use of the subcarrier in the satellite
`channel.
`It is digitized using 14 bits
`per sample and is encrypted for security.
`FSK modulation of the subcarrier is used
`to transmit this digitized encrypted
`audio signal.
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`IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics, Vol. CE-27, No.4, November I 98 I
`
`Orest J. Hanas is Vice President, Satellite Systems,
`Oak Communications Inc. He is a graduate in electrical
`engineering (BSEE), 1960 from the University of Mary(cid:173)
`land and communications engineering (MSEE, 1964) from
`Drexel University.
`
`Prior to joining Oak, he was Manager of RF Engineering
`at RCA Astra-Electronics Division engaged in advanced
`development projects for SATCOM and other satellites.
`Before that, he was a participant with Ail Systems and
`Satellite Communications Inc. where he was involved in
`developing satellite communications earth stations and
`systems at L-band and C-band. Presently he is respon(cid:173)
`sible for Oak's satellite signal encryption and decryp(cid:173)
`tion systems.
`
`Mr. Hanas is a member of IEEE. He has co-authored
`three articles in the area of satellite communications
`systems. He holds 2 U.S. and international patents.
`
`Ir. Pieter den Toonder is Managing Director, Oak
`Research and Engineering Center, Dordrecht, Holland.
`He is a graduate in electrical engineering (1946)
`from the Netherland Radio Society and holds the IR.
`Degree (1956) from the Delft Institute of Technology.
`He is currently a lecturer at the Technical College
`of Dordrecht.
`
`Ir. den Toonder has authored two books, "Basic
`Electronics for Control Engineering" and "RF Technology"
`and written eight college outlines in the field of
`communications, control engineering and electronics.
`He is a member of IEEE, the Royal Dutch Institute of
`Engineers, the Dutch Society of Radio Engineers and
`the Society of Cable Engineers (England). He holds
`7 U.S. and international patents.
`
`Frank C. Pennypacker is Manager, Satellite Systems
`Engineering, Oak Communications Inc. He is a graduate
`in electrical engineering (BSEE, 1963) from the
`University of Pennsylvania. Prior to joining Oak,
`he was Assistant to the President at Lindsay Specialty
`Products, engaged in the design of CATV products and
`manufacturing management. Before that he was chief
`engineer at Triple Crown Electronics and system
`engineer of Metro Cable TV in Toronto.
`
`Presently Mr. Pennypacker is responsible for performance
`integrity and implementation for Oak's satellite signal
`encryption and decryption systems.
`
`He is a member of IEEE. He has co-authored a paper in
`the area of CATV equipment design. He holds 3 U.S. and
`international patents.
`
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