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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-00754
`Patent 8,559,635
`____________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: June 6, 2017
`____________
`
`
`
`
`Before KARL D. EASTHOM, TRENTON A. WARD, and GEORGIANNA
`W. BRADEN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
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`
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`Case IPR2016-00754
`Patent 8,559,635
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`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`
`MARCUS E. SERNEL, ESQ.
`JOEL R. MERKIN, ESQ.
`ALAN M. RABINOWITZ, ESQ.
`Kirkland & Ellis LLP
`300 North LaSalle Street
`Chicago, Illinois 60654
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF PATENT OWNER:
`
`
`DOUGLAS J. KLINE, ESQ.
`STEPHEN T. SCHREINER, ESQ.
`Goodwin Procter LLP
`100 Northern Avenue
`Boston, Massachusetts 02210
`
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Tuesday, June 6,
`
`2017, commencing at 9:00 a.m., at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
`600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
`
`
`
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`Case IPR2016-00754
`Patent 8,559,635
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`P R O C E E D I N G S
`- - - - -
`JUDGE WARD: Good morning. We are here this morning for
`oral argument in Case Numbers IPR2016-00754 and IPR2016-00755, in
`which Apple is the Petitioner and Personalized Media Communications,
`LLC, is the Patent Owner.
`Your Panel for the hearing today is my colleague, Judge Easthom,
`sitting here to my right, and myself, Judge Ward, and joining us from Dallas,
`Judge Braden. I understand our videoconferencing equipment is a little bit
`hindered today, but, Judge Braden, can you hear and see us clearly?
`JUDGE BRADEN: I can. Thank you.
`JUDGE WARD: I would like to start with appearances of counsel,
`starting with Petitioner.
`MR. SERNEL: Your Honor, I am Mark Sernel on behalf of
`Apple, the Petitioner, and with me today is Mr. Joel Merkin, Mr. Alan
`Rabinowtiz, and in-house counsel for Apple, Kim Moore.
`JUDGE WARD: Thank you, gentlemen.
`Who do we have on behalf of Patent Owner?
`MR. KLINE: Your Honor, I'm Doug Kline for Patent Owner,
`PMC. With me is Phong Dinh, Charles Li, Jennifer Albert, Steve Schreiner,
`and in-house counsel, Tom Scott.
`JUDGE WARD: Thank you.
`I would like to start with a few administrative details, essentially
`go over the format of the hearing today. Prior to our hearing, the parties
`agreed that 30 minutes of oral argument for each case, for each side, would
`be appropriate for this particular hearing today, and I understand that the
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`Patent Owner is not going to be addressing its motions to amend in either
`case.
`
`Is that true, Mr. Kline?
`MR. KLINE: That's correct, Your Honor. We are going to rest on
`our papers on that motion.
`JUDGE WARD: Thank you. Okay.
`Petitioners, I want to ask you, have the parties reached an
`agreement as to the order in which you would like to argue the cases today?
`Essentially, do you want to argue them in combination or separate?
`MR. SERNEL: I think the plan is to argue them separately, to go
`with the '635 patent, the '754 proceeding first, and then subsequently deal
`with the '091 patent, '755 proceeding.
`JUDGE WARD: Mr. Kline, do you agree with that?
`MR. KLINE: Yes, that's fine.
`JUDGE WARD: Okay, great.
`Okay. One administrative detail I want to mention to both parties
`just to keep in mind, and I will oftentimes be reminding you of this probably
`during the proceeding, but Judge Braden is going to be following along on
`your demonstratives. We have received your demonstratives. She will be
`following along, but we'll need you to reference specifically the particular
`demonstrative slide that you're referencing so that Judge Braden can follow
`along from Texas.
`And additionally, Judge Braden will not be able to hear you clearly
`unless you are at the microphone at the podium, so just make sure, to the
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`extent that you are giving us argument, that you are standing in front of that
`microphone. That's all I have.
`Any questions from the Petitioner?
`MR. SERNEL: No, Your Honor.
`JUDGE WARD: And Patent Owner?
`MR. KLINE: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
`JUDGE WARD: Petitioner, when you are ready, you may begin.
`Do you wish to reserve some time for rebuttal on the '754 case?
`MR. SERNEL: If I could reserve five minutes, Your Honor.
`JUDGE WARD: Five minutes?
`MR. SERNEL: I actually do have one questions. Would you like
`hard-copy slides?
`JUDGE WARD: Certainly. You may approach.
`MR. SERNEL: Thank you. I will hand up just the '635 patent
`ones first.
`JUDGE WARD: So, Mr. Sernel, I am going to put up 25 minutes
`up on our fancy NBA shot clock.
`MR. SERNEL: I was going to say, I hadn't seen the shot clock
`previously. Thank you.
`JUDGE WARD: So I will try to keep time there for you;
`otherwise, I will just be doing it with old-school pen and paper.
`You may begin when you are ready.
`MR. SERNEL: Thank you. May it please the Court, Mark Sernel
`on behalf of Apple, the Petitioner.
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`If we could turn to slide 1 in our slide deck, we are going to go
`over the instituted grounds for the '635 patent. There are two primary
`references for this patent. Guillou is the first reference we'll focus on, and
`Aminetzah is the second primary reference we'll focus on, and then in
`Aminetzah, there's a combination with Bitzer for a few of the claims.
`I'll note that claims 1 and 2 were disclaimed by PMC in their
`preliminary response, paper 7, and so I am not going to focus too much
`attention on those, but claims 4 and 7 do depend on claim 2, and so we will
`talk a little bit about claim 2.
`Now, there's been a lot of arguments made by PMC with respect to
`these grounds, and so I'm going to try to address most of them, but I am
`going to focus on the ones that I think are most important. Certainly, if the
`Panel has any particular questions or areas that you have particular interest
`in, I'd love to hear what those are so that I can focus my attention on those
`issues.
`
`If we could now turn to slide 2, this is just the '635 patent. I think
`the Board is very familiar with the PMC patent family. They are some of
`the last vestiges of pre-GATT filed patent applications. I think there was
`300-plus continuation patent applications filed on the final GATT date,
`dating back to 1980s disclosures.
`The key point for the '635 patent in this particular proceeding is
`that it's assumed for this IPR that we're dealing with a 1981 priority date,
`different than the next proceeding we are going to deal with, but we rely on
`all prior art that's pre-1981. I don't think there's any priority issues or issues
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`with respect to the prior art status of the prior art that we're relying on. 1981
`is the date.
`If we could turn to slide 3, these are the challenged claims that we
`will be dealing with. As I mentioned, claim 2 is disclaimed. Four and 7
`depend on claim 2. Then we will deal with claims 13, 21, and then 28
`through 30.
`Quickly turning on to slide 4, if we could, the disputed issues, and
`so there are a handful of claim construction issues that we'll spend some
`time on. Some of these claim construction issues this Board has dealt with
`in prior proceedings, and we'll talk a little bit about that. And then we'll get
`into the prior art. I do have a few motion to amend slides, but I don't plan to
`deal with those given that Patent Owner does not plan to address those
`issues.
`
`So turning now to slide 5, the first claim construction issue --
`JUDGE WARD: Mr. Sernel, just to remind you, you will not be
`able to address those motion to amend slides unless and until Patent Owner
`chooses to.
`MR. SERNEL: And I certainly don't plan to. Thank you, Your
`
`Honor.
`
`JUDGE WARD: Thank you.
`MR. SERNEL: Slide 5, this is the first claim construction issue,
`and it relates to the term "decrypt" and "encrypt." This Board is very
`familiar with that issue, and we have listed here the number of times that it's
`been dealt with in prior proceedings. The first one listed there is the
`institution decision in this proceeding, but then it's also been dealt with in
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`multiple prior proceedings where PMC has made this argument that the
`terms "decrypt" and "encrypt" are limited to all digital processes and would
`exclude descrambling.
`The Board has rejected that argument in all of these prior
`proceedings, and we suggest that the same result is appropriate here. This is
`a term that encompasses the concept of scrambling and descrambling and is
`not limited to only all digital processes.
`JUDGE WARD: Mr. Sernel, are we in any way -- is our decision
`with respect to the proper construction of decrypting affected at all by Judge
`Payne's decision in the Eastern District of Texas?
`MR. SERNEL: I don't think so at all, Your Honor, and Judge
`Payne himself acknowledged that what he was doing in that proceeding --
`and I disagree with the conclusion there -- but was certainly done under the
`Phillips standard, and Judge Payne specifically acknowledged that what he
`was finding under the Phillips standard was consistent with what you have
`found under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, finding that a
`broader interpretation was appropriate. Judge Payne acknowledged that
`there was a difference but said, hey, I find this, under Phillips, the BRI is
`different, and it's appropriately dictated by the evidence that you have
`looked at.
`JUDGE WARD: Can you point me specifically to the passage in
`that order that you are mentioning for Judge Payne? You can come back to
`it.
`
`MR. SERNEL: I can have my colleague maybe dig that up and get
`it to you, if you could wait 30 seconds.
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`JUDGE WARD: Certainly.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Just another quick question on a related
`topic. Is the IPR 2014-01532, that's been dismissed, is that a final decision
`now? Are we constrained by that, or how does that work?
`MR. SERNEL: I actually don't know the current status of the
`various Amazon proceedings. I believe they have filed appeals on most of
`them. I'm not sure if this one is currently pending on appeal or not. Maybe
`my colleague can also look that up. But for some of these, I know they have
`filed notices of appeal and they are currently pending. I think the Federal
`Circuit has them at this point.
`So if we could turn to slide 6, again, this is something you've seen
`previously, I don't want to spend a lot of time on it, but this is the passage
`from column 160 of the '635 patent that expressly acknowledges that
`decryptors known in the art may be the conventional descramblers and
`contemplates that descrambling and descramblers would be encompassed
`within the broadest reasonable interpretation of this concept of decryptors.
`If we could move along to slide 7, now, you have dealt with all of
`this evidence previously in these prior proceedings on the concept of
`"encrypt" and "decrypt." The one arguable piece of new evidence that PMC
`has presented with respect to the '635 patent is the concept of is there a
`disclaimer in that file history that would dictate a different result than the
`result that you found in these prior proceedings.
`The answer, when you look at the file history, is definitively, no,
`there is not any reason to deviate from what you've done previously, and we
`have listed out here in our slide 7 PMC's argument, and you can see the top
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`left of slide 7 -- this is from paper 15, their response at 12 -- and it quotes
`from the file history, which is Exhibit 2016 at 1330, and this is the statement
`that this they rely on from the '635 file history distinguishing the Davidson
`reference and stating the Davidson reference does not teach or suggest
`encryption.
`Their argument that we have then listed at the top right -- and this
`is, again, in PMC's response, paper 15 at 13 -- they suggested that this
`statement was a clear and unequivocal exclusion of descrambling from the
`scope of decryption terms that led the examiner to allow the claims at issue.
`So we then looked at -- and you can see it down below in Exhibit
`2016, this is the file history, at 1362, what, in fact, happened, and you can
`see that this is not what happened at all. The thing that they listed here as
`the alleged disclaimer, first of all, does not come close to rise to the level of
`a disclaimer, a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of claim scope. This is a
`distinction on a factual basis of a prior art reference.
`Two, it was listed under the heading -- and we have listed it here --
`"a previously asserted argument." This was them regurgitating an argument
`that they had made in prosecution, and then they moved on and made a new
`argument. The new argument amended the claims and, in fact, added
`limitations.
`You'll recall some of the claims that were not instituted on have
`this concept of "unaccompanied by any nondigital information," and so it
`was that amendment, adding that language to those claims, that then was
`argued to be the distinction for the claims that were then pending at that
`time. There were -- some of the claims were already allowed.
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`It was that argument that led to allowance, and you can see in the
`examiner's response that, specifically, the examiner did not buy the
`argument that there was any kind of disclaimer or that Davidson did not
`teach encryption or decryption, even though Davidson has this composite
`analog digital transmission. And so nothing that comes close to approaching
`a clear and unmistakable disclaimer in the '635 patent, no reason to deviate
`from what this Board has done on many multiple prior occasions with
`respect to the terms "decrypt" and "encrypt."
`JUDGE WARD: Mr. Sernel, I want to ask you about your
`previous slide, slide 6 --
`MR. SERNEL: Sure.
`JUDGE WARD: -- and the sentence that we've talked about, so
`lengthily. The statement, "the decryptors 107, 224, and 221 may be
`conventional descramblers, well known in the art," I understand the Patent
`Owner to be arguing that that is an alternative embodiment and, in fact, one
`particular alternative embodiment. Instead of being digital decryptors, those
`digital decryptors are replaced with conventional descramblers.
`How do you respond to that?
`MR. SERNEL: I think PMC has made that argument to the Board
`on multiple prior occasions. I think the proper straightforward reading of
`this is that decryptors within the spirit of the invention may be conventional
`descramblers. It's not an alternative embodiment. It's another way of doing
`decryption. That's the plain way to read this.
`And, in fact, when you look at the specification and it's got
`multiple composite signals and analog transmissions as well, the entire
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`patent dictates that this encompasses both digital as well as composite and
`analog transmissions. And so I think the plain reading of this, again, as
`you've found on multiple prior occasions, is that it encompasses this concept
`of scrambling.
`JUDGE WARD: And is that what Judge Payne -- do you
`understand Judge Payne to have accepted the argument that this is an
`alternative embodiment?
`MR. SERNEL: I think Judge Payne's decision, again, based on the
`Phillips standard, was that the totality of the evidence suggested that, you
`know, encryption dictated all digital. My colleague's now handed me Judge
`Payne's order, Exhibit 2025 at 17. He specifically noted that it would be
`expected, because of the different standards, that the PTAB's construction,
`the Board's construction, might be different than what Judge Payne was
`concluding. And so I think he acknowledged the difference in standard and
`sort of justified his different conclusion based on the different standard.
`JUDGE WARD: Thank you for that.
`MR. SERNEL: If we could now turn to slide 8, and, again, I don't
`want to spend too much on this because the Board --
`JUDGE WARD: Mr. Sernel, just before we move on, do you have
`an answer for us with respect to the 1532 case, 2014-1532?
`MR. SERNEL: We are going to see if we can dig that up and try
`to get you an answer on that. I apologize.
`JUDGE WARD: And you may address that in rebuttal if you want
`to wait until then.
`MR. SERNEL: Thank you.
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`So slide 8, again, there's also -- in addition to the '635 patent, they
`have also pointed to multiple prior file histories and re-exams and other
`things to try to argue a clear, unmistakable disclaimer. The Board has dealt
`with all of these in the prior proceedings and correctly found that there is no
`clear and unmistakable disclaimer. I think the same analysis applies. There
`is nothing new with respect to these other proceedings that the Board has to
`grapple with in this situation.
`The same thing for slide 9. I don't want to spend a lot of time on
`this, but, again, pointing to evidence from Mr. Weschselberger, our expert,
`where he has written articles in the past talking about how descrambling and
`encryption, these terms were sort of used interchangeably in the 1980s,
`suggesting that maybe there should be a distinction between the two, but not
`acknowledging that these terms were used interchangeably doesn't -- all of
`that evidence is the same evidence you have looked at previously, and so I
`think the same result here is appropriate. Encryption/decryption does not
`exclude descrambling, is not an all digital process, as PMC would suggest.
`Moving on to slide 10, this is a new claim construction issue, the
`second claim construction issue, and this one relates to encrypted video, and
`it's really about what does the term "video" mean. PMC seeks to exclude the
`concept of teletext from video. The reason they do that is because the
`Guillou system is a teletext system. The plain meaning of the term "teletext"
`is specifically -- sorry, the plain meaning of "video" is visual information,
`picture information, and you can see here that -- and we've got this -- paper
`23, our reply, from 4 to 5, lists out several different examples from the
`specification where the term "video" is being used really to distinguish
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`between audio and video, and that -- and video is information that's picture
`information, that's visually seen.
`If I could just --
`JUDGE WARD: Mr. Sernel, can two images make a video?
`Sequencing two images, would that constitute a video?
`MR. SERNEL: Absolutely. Absolutely, under the plain meaning
`of the term "video," and if you turn to slide 13 -- I am going to jump you
`ahead and I am going to show you -- PMC specifically has argued that in
`prior proceedings. You can see in slide 13, this is an argument that PMC
`made in a Zynga District Court litigation where they specifically argued that
`"video" refers to that which is visually perceivable.
`Video information in the patents is picture information, and the
`District Court adopted that construction in that case, again, under a Phillips
`standard. So we think that it's very clear that, again, based on the
`specification, based on PMC's prior positions, a video simply has to be
`visual -- electronically transmitted visual information, some kind of picture
`information. Two images would certainly qualify.
`If we could turn back --
`JUDGE WARD: Let me stop you there.
`MR. SERNEL: Sure.
`JUDGE WARD: You're telling me that video needs to be visual
`information. Is an image visual information?
`MR. SERNEL: I think so.
`JUDGE WARD: So one image qualifies as video.
`MR. SERNEL: I think arguably it would. I think arguably --
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`JUDGE WARD: A photograph is video.
`MR. SERNEL: I think -- again, I think display -- I think, arguably,
`that could qualify. Certainly, successive images would, and if you can turn
`back to slide 11, we'll see that -- I think what you're driving at, it doesn't
`really matter for purposes of what our references teach, because the Guillou
`system, you can see on side 11, specifically teaches a text
`video-transmission system, and so what PMC is trying to do is, via the
`construction of "video," exclude teletext.
`Guillou teaches teletext, but Guillou talks about itself as a text
`video-transmission system. If we then turn to 12, slide 12, you can see that
`the argument they're trying to make is that teletext is just textual data, and
`it's only text, would exclude even images, but if you look at the record,
`teletext is not so limited.
`And on slide 12, we have got a few examples of this. We have
`Exhibit 1001, the Wechselberger declaration, at paragraph 43, where he talks
`about teletext and this Guillou system, as it was implemented at the time and
`as it's contemplated in the Guillou reference, included nonstatic visuals,
`images, successive images. Generally the pages might be still, but certainly
`they could have the appearance of movement. And you can see here the
`Marti reference, Exhibit 1022 at 3, specifically talks about graphics that
`could be flashing, have flashing displays, nonstill images.
`And so I think it doesn't matter, even if it requires successive
`images or something more than simply a single image, the Guillou reference
`and the teletext system that it discloses certainly meets that.
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`If we could turn to slide 14 now, this is the definition of our
`construction of "processor." The plain meaning, the broadest reasonable
`interpretation of this is a device that operates on data. Again, this is another
`issue that the Board has dealt with in prior proceedings. It's also been dealt
`with in prior District Court proceedings. I don't think anything new has been
`presented with respect to the processor construction, and so I don't want to
`spend a lot of time on it.
`If we could turn just quickly to slide 15, this -- again, some
`citations from the specification here on slide 15. The '635 patent at column
`75, lines 49 to 50, talks about buffer comparators doing processing. Slide
`15, 135, 10 to 15 of the '635 patent talks about a signal decoder doing
`processing. Again, these can be sort of hard-wired devices that can process
`data. That's contemplated by the specification in the '635 patent. The
`broadest reasonable interpretation is a device that operates on data.
`If we move to slide 16, you can see, again, PMC in prior
`proceedings has argued this and has argued that a processor means any
`device capable of performing operations on data, and so PMC has argued
`that under the Phillips standard, it's certainly appropriate that under the
`broadest reasonable interpretation, as this Board has previously found, that
`it's simply a device that operates on data. No narrower construction is
`appropriate.
`Turning to slide 17, the final -- I think it's the final claim
`construction issue for the '635 patent is "executable instructions." The
`broadest reasonable interpretation of this is instructions that can be executed,
`that's by a controllable device, and so the dispute centers around PMC's
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`attempt to limit this to instructions of a computer program that cause a
`computer to carry out operations on the computer according to the
`instructions.
`And so they're trying to limit this very, very narrowly to requiring
`it to be essentially software-type instructions to a computer. That's not
`appropriate, not the broadest reasonable interpretation of this. And you can
`look to the claim language for the first hint to that where it talks about it
`simply being a controllable device.
`JUDGE WARD: And what would the Petitioner argue is the
`difference between what you call "software-type instructions" and
`"executable instructions"?
`MR. SERNEL: Well, you don't need to send like a computer
`program, as they are trying to contemplate, where you have actual specific
`instructions to a CPU-type de -- or that a CPU is then going to operate on.
`You can have a controllable device that's going to take command and control
`instructions or even just simply data that's packaged up in an instruction
`format that's then going to generate information or display or something like
`that.
`
`In the case of Guillou, what we have is we have individual data
`octets that are instructions to a character generator, that the character
`generator then generates characters or other display based on those
`instructions. And so those would certainly qualify. You don't need to be
`sending computer software-type instructions to a device to meet this, as they
`would try to require.
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`JUDGE WARD: So it seems the Petitioner's position is that data
`from a database that is to be operated on could constitute executable
`instructions. Is that correct?
`MR. SERNEL: I think it has to be a certain kind of data that can
`be understood and then generate a result from it, and so I think, you know,
`maybe it's a little bit more than what you said, but certainly --
`JUDGE WARD: Well, tell me how much more, then.
`MR. SERNEL: Well, certainly data to -- packaged-up data,
`individual octets that had a message that a character generator can then
`execute, operate on, and display characters or display, you know, other kind
`of display means, that would certainly qualify.
`JUDGE WARD: So how do the data octets in Guillou have this
`message that you are referencing?
`MR. SERNEL: Well, they are understood by the character
`generator to dictate, you know, put this character on the screen; put this
`image on the screen at this location. I mean, they have an understood
`message that is then executed to then -- to then display --
`JUDGE WARD: What provides that understanding, Counsel?
`MR. SERNEL: The instruction. The data octet is packaged up as
`a particular instruction that the character generator understands.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Are you trying to say that it's just in a
`certain format that's recognizable, so that octet, is that what you're saying,
`or...
`
`MR. SERNEL: I think that's part of it, yes. It's packaged up in a
`format that's understandable by the device that's going to then execute it.
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`JUDGE WARD: And is it not understandable because of the
`software that would be executing for the character generator to interpret and
`operate on that data?
`MR. SERNEL: Can you restate that? I'm not sure if I followed.
`JUDGE WARD: You're telling me that it's understood that the
`data octets that are received by the character generator in Guillou, it's
`understood how that data should be executed in order to generate the
`appropriate characters. Is that understanding -- does that understanding
`come from the software or set of instruction that's already resident at the
`character generator in order to appropriately operate on the data octets?
`MR. SERNEL: I think it's kind of both. I mean, you have an
`understanding of the controllable device that's going to execute the
`instructions. They have an understanding of, when receiving certain
`packages of information or instructions, what to do with them. And so I
`think, yeah, there is some preprogramming on the device side.
`And, in fact, if we turn to slide 18, we can see that that's expressly
`contemplated by the description in the patent itself. This is PMC's intrinsic
`support for executable instructions, and you can see here, this is column --
`this is the '490 patent, so this is going back to the 1981 disclosure, the '490
`patent, Exhibit 1004, at column 19, 42 to 43, and 60 to 65, it talks about a
`microcomputer is preprogrammed to respond in a predetermined fashion to
`instruction signals.
`So PMC has pointed to this as these instruction signals are
`executable instructions. There can be preprogramming on the device side
`that then understands what to do with this signal, and the computer is
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`preprogrammed to then perform an operation on the instruction signal. And
`so if these are --
`JUDGE WARD: Mr. Sernel, that sentence, that particular
`statement from the specification indicates that the microcomputer, in a
`predetermined fashion, is programmed to respond to instruction signals. It
`doesn't say data. It says instruction signals.
`MR. SERNEL: Sure, sure. And so --
`JUDGE WARD: So how is the data in Guillou's data octets
`instruction signals?
`MR. SERNEL: Well, they are instruction -- the data octets are
`certainly instruction signals. A preprogrammed controllable device, like the
`microcomputer contemplated here, knows what to do with them and
`generates characters based on that information. It's operating exactly the
`same way that's contemplated here, preprogrammed at the device with a
`package of information and instruction signal to tell it what to do.
`JUDGE WARD: So how do I distinguish between data that's
`simply just raw data and data that constitutes an instruction signal?
`MR. SERNEL: Because if it goes to a controllable device in a
`package that's understood by the controllable device to be used in the
`preprogrammed way, as is contemplated here, then it's executable
`instructions. You can execute that signal and generate information.
`JUDGE WARD: Thank you.
`MR. SERNEL: If we could jump ahead now to Guillou quickly,
`and I am going to jump ahead to some of their arguments, slide 22 -- I see
`my time is running somewhat down -- so slide 22, this is with respect to
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`encrypted video. This is principally -- it's not exclusively a claim
`construction argument, and, again, you know, their argument is to exclude
`teletext. Guillou is a teletext system. I have already explained to you why I
`think Guillou absolutely teaches video, it teaches flashing images, and some
`movement of images. So even if there's something more than simply picture
`information that's required, Guillou teaches that.
`If we could jump ahead to slide 24, another argument that PMC
`has made is that Guillou does not teach a second control signal portion used
`to decrypt the first control signal portion. This is claim 7. And the argument
`they make is that the subscription index or line number that's included as
`part of the access contr
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