UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`ASUSTEK COMPUTER, INC. and ASUS COMPUTER INTERNATIONAL,
`
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`AVAGO TECHNOLOGIES GENERAL IP (SINGAPORE) PTE. LTD.,
`
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2016-00646
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,870,087
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITION
`
`FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW OF U.S. PATENT NO. 5,870,087
`
`

`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 2
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 3
`A.
`Procedural History ................................................................................. 3
`B.
`The ’087 Patent ..................................................................................... 4
`C.
`Petitioners’ Cited References ................................................................ 7
`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ............................................................................ 7
`A.
`Legal Standard ....................................................................................... 7
`B.
`Each of Petitioners’ Identified Claim Terms Has a Plain and
`Ordinary Meaning and Need Not Be Construed ................................... 8
`
`“memory” / “first unified memory” ............................................ 8
`
`“demultiplexing one or more multimedia data streams” /
`“demultiplexes one or more multimedia data streams” ............ 12
`IV. LEGAL STANDARDS ................................................................................. 13
`A.
`Inter Partes Review............................................................................. 13
`B. Anticipation ......................................................................................... 13
`C. Obviousness ......................................................................................... 14
`PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATIONS FAIL FOR LACK OF SUPPORT ........ 17
`A. ANTICIPATION ................................................................................. 17
`
`Count 2: Fujii Does Not Disclose Each and Every Limitation of
`the Challenged Independent Claims and Thus Does Not Render
`any of Claims 1, 7, 10, 11, or 16 Unpatentable Under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 102(e) ..................................................................................... 17
`(a)
`Independent Claims 1, 10, and 16 .................................. 17
`(b) Dependent Claim 7 ......................................................... 25
`
`V.
`
`i
`
`

`
`(c) Dependent Claim 11 ....................................................... 28
`B. OBVIOUSNESS ................................................................................. 29
` Motivation to Combine ............................................................. 29
`
`Count 3: Claims 1, 5, 7-11, and 16 of the ’087 Patent Are Not
`Unpatentable Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Over Fujii in View of
`Lam ........................................................................................... 32
`(a)
`Independent Claims 1, 10, and 16 .................................. 32
`(b) Dependent Claim 7 ......................................................... 37
`(c) Dependent Claim 8 ......................................................... 38
`(d) Dependent Claim 11 ....................................................... 41
`Count 5: Dependent Claims 7-9 of the ’087 Patent Are Not
`Unpatentable Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Over Fujii in View of
`Cloutier ...................................................................................... 42
`Count 6: Dependent Claims 7-9 of the ’087 Patent Are Not
`Unpatentable Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Over Fujii in View of
`Lam and Further in View of Cloutier ....................................... 45
`VI. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 48
`VII. CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R § 42.24(d) ........................... 48
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp.,
`72 F.3d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ............................................................................ 14
`Cisco Sys., Inc. v. AIP Acquisition, LLC,
`IPR2014-00247, Paper No. 17 (PTAB June 26, 2014) ........................................ 7
`Commerce Bancshares v. Intellectual Ventures II,
`IPR 2014-00793, Paper No. 7 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2014) ......................................... 30
`In re CSB-System Int’l, Inc.,
`832 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ........................................................................ 7, 8
`Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc.,
`807 F.2d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ............................................................................ 15
`In re Dembiczak,
`175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds, In re
`Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000) .................................................... 14, 16
`Dominion Dealer Solutions, LLC v. AutoAlert, Inc.,
`IPR 2013-00222, Paper No. 12 (PTAB Aug. 12, 2013) ..................................... 29
`Edmund Optics, Inc. v. Semrock, Inc.,
`Case IPR2014-00599, Paper No. 72 (PTAB Sept. 16, 2015) ....................... 43, 46
`Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC,
`582 F. App’x 864 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ....................................................................... 8
`In re Fritch,
`972 F.2d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1992) .......................................................................... 43
`Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co.,
`242 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .......................................................................... 13
`Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
`688 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................................................................... 16
`
`iii
`
`

`
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ...................................................................................... 15, 29
`In re Kubin,
`561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .......................................................................... 15
`In re Lee,
`277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .......................................................................... 15
`Leo Pharm. Prods. Ltd. v. Rea,
`726 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .......................................................................... 15
`Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L.,
`437 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .......................................................................... 16
`Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc.,
`679 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................................................................... 16
`NetMoneyIn, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc.,
`545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .................................................................... 13, 14
`Norman Int’l, Inc. v. Andrew J. Toti Testamentary Trust,
`IPR2014-00286, 2014 WL 2859641 (PTAB June 20, 2014) ............................. 31
`In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation,
`281 F. App’x 974 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ..................................................................... 13
`Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.,
`810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1987) .......................................................................... 14
`In re Paulsen,
`30 F.3d 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1994) .............................................................................. 8
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ........................................................................ 7, 8
`Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.,
`868 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1989) .......................................................................... 14
`Schott Gemtron Corp. v. SSW Holding Co., Inc.,
`IPR2014-00367, Paper No. 62 (PTAB May 26, 2015) ...................................... 31
`
`iv
`
`

`
`SIBIA Neurosciences v. Cadus Pharm. Corp.,
`225 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) .......................................................................... 14
`Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp.,
`299 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .......................................................................... 15
`Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc.,
`200 F.3d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .............................................................................. 8
`Webasto Roof Sys., Inc. v. UUSI, LLC,
`IPR2014-00650, Paper No. 14 (PTAB Oct. 17, 2004) ......................................... 7
`ZTE v. ContentGuard,
`IPR2013-00134, Paper No. 12 (PTAB June 19, 2013) ................................ 13, 14
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ........................................................................................................ 14
`35 U.S.C. § 316 ........................................................................................................ 13
`Other Authorities
`
`37 C.F.R. § 1.68 ......................................................................................................... 5
`37 C.F.R. § 42.1 ....................................................................................................... 13
`37 C.F.R. § 42.23 ....................................................................................................... 1
`37 C.F.R § 42.24 ...................................................................................................... 48
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100 ................................................................................................. 7, 8
`37 C.F.R. § 42.120 ..................................................................................................... 2
`Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 46,756, 48,763 (Aug.
`14, 2012) ............................................................................................................. 13
`
`
`v
`
`

`
`1001
`
`1002
`
`1003
`
`1004
`
`1005
`
`1006
`
`1007
`
`1008
`
`1009
`
`1010
`
`1011
`
`1012
`
`1013
`
`2001
`
`LIST OF EXHIBITS
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,870,087 (“the ’087 Patent”)
`
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent No. 5,870,087
`
`Declaration of Richard Kramer (“Kramer Decl.”)
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,960,464 (“Lam”)
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,898,695 (“Fujii”)
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,847,771 (“Cloutier”)
`
`ITU-T Recommendation H.222.0, approved July 10, 1995, available at
`http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-H.222.0-199507-S/en (“07/95 H.222.0”)
`
`Excerpts from Academic Press Dictionary of Science and Technology
`(Academic Press, Inc., 1992)
`
`Excerpts from Jack, Keith, Video Demystified, Second Edition, 1996
`
`VESA Unified Memory Architecture (VUMA) Standard Hardware
`Specification, Version 1.0, March 8, 1996
`
`Datasheet for Samsung KM416S1120AT
`
`Excerpts from August 12, 2015 Joint Claim Construction Statement,
`Avago Technologies General IP (Singapore) PTE Ltd. v. ASUSTeK
`Computer, Inc. et al., Case No. 2:15-cv-00239, Dkt. 46 (E.D. Tex.,
`prior to transfer to N.D. Cal.)
`
`Excerpts from February 5, 2016 Joint Claim Construction and
`Prehearing Statement, Avago Technologies General IP (Singapore)
`PTE Ltd. v. ASUSTeK Computer, Inc. et al., Case No. 3:15-cv-04525,
`Dkt. 170 (N.D. Cal., transferred from E.D. Tex.)
`
`Excerpts of In re Certain Audiovisual Components and Products
`Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-837, Initial Determination
`(Public Version) (Aug. 13, 2013).
`
`vi
`
`

`
`2002
`
`2003
`
`2004
`
`2005
`
`2006
`
`Excerpts of Rebuttal Witness Statement of Scott T. Acton, Ph.D.,
`Submitted March 18, 2013, Inv. No. 337-TA-837.
`
`Declaration of Scott Acton, Ph.D. Under 37 C.F.R. §1.68 (“Acton
`Decl.”)
`
`Deposition Transcript of Richard Kramer dated November 21, 2016
`
`Chia-Hsing Lin et al., Low Power Design for MPEG-2 Video Decoder,
`42 IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics 513 (1996).
`
`Sung-Chul Han et al., An ASIC Implementation of the MPEG-2 Audio
`Decoder, 42 IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics 540 (1996).
`
`vii
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`

`
`STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
`
`Petitioners ASUSTeK Computer, Inc. and ASUS Computer International
`
`(collectively, “Petitioners”) did not submit statements of material facts in their
`
`petition for inter partes review. Accordingly, no response is due pursuant to 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.23(a), and no facts are admitted.
`
`
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`- 1 -
`
`

`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.120, Patent Owner Avago Technologies General
`
`IP (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. (“Avago”) hereby respectfully submits this Patent
`
`Owner’s Response to the Petition seeking inter partes review in this matter
`
`(“Petition”).
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The Board instituted inter partes review on four grounds sought by
`
`Petitioners:
`
`(1) whether claims 1, 7, 10, 11, and 16 are unpatentable under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 102(e) over Fujii (Count 2);
`
`(2) whether claims 1, 5, 7-11, and 16 are unpatentable under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 103(a) over Fujii in view of Lam (Count 3);
`
`(3) whether claims 7-9 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
`
`over Fujii in view of Cloutier (Count 5); and
`
`(4) whether claims 7-9 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
`
`over Fujii in view of Lam in further view of Cloutier (Count 6).
`
`Institution Decision (“ID”), Paper No. 11 at 31. The Petition was denied as to all
`
`other grounds, and trial is accordingly limited to these four grounds.
`
`The Board should find that these remaining four grounds are defective and
`
`deny the Petition in its entirety. Petitioners’ primary prior art reference, Fujii, fails
`
`to disclose that the transport logic retrieves data from the memory during
`
`- 2 -
`
`

`
`demultiplexing operations. As this is a requirement of all challenged claims, Fujii
`
`fails to anticipate any challenged claim. The Board has already correctly found
`
`that Lam does not disclose accessing or using main memory during demultiplexing
`
`operations, ID at 11, and Petitioners do not allege that Cloutier remedies this
`
`deficiency of Fujii and Lam by teaching or suggesting that the transport logic is
`
`operable to retrieve data during demultiplexing operations. Thus, even if a person
`
`of ordinary skill in the art would have reason to combine the teachings of Fujii
`
`with the teachings of Lam and/or Cloutier, which he or she would not, Petitioners
`
`have failed to identify a combination of references that discloses all limitations of
`
`the challenged claims, and the combinations asserted by Petitioners fail to render
`
`obvious any challenged claim. For these and the following additional reasons, the
`
`Petition should be denied.
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`Procedural History
`
`Petitioners make, import, offer for sale, and sell products that infringe the
`
`’087 Patent. Patent Owner has filed two lawsuits against Petitioners for
`
`infringement of the ’087 Patent and six other patents owned by Avago. See Avago
`
`Technologies General IP (Singapore) Pte. Ltd., v. ASUSTeK Computer Inc. et al.,
`
`No. 3:15-cv-04525-EMC (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 20, 2015) (“ASUS I”) and Avago
`
`Technologies General IP (Singapore) Pte. Ltd., v. ASUSTeK Computer Inc. et al.,
`
`- 3 -
`
`

`
`No. 3:16-cv-0451-EMC (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 26, 2016) (“ASUS II”) (collectively
`
`the “Litigation”). The Board instituted inter partes review as to claims 1, 5, 7-11,
`
`and 16 of the ’087 Patent, all of which are asserted against Petitioners in the
`
`Litigation.
`
`B.
`
`The ’087 Patent
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,870,087 was filed on November 13, 1996, and issued on
`
`February 9, 1999. Exhibit 1001 at 1. The ’087 Patent discloses and claims
`
`structures, functions, and methodologies for decoding an encoded multimedia data
`
`stream. Specifically, the ’087 Patent describes novel video decoder systems and
`
`methods for performing video decoding that efficiently utilize memory. See id.
`
`Video decoder systems include several components such as a channel
`
`receiver that receives an encoded multimedia data stream, transport logic to
`
`demultiplex the multimedia data stream into separate audio and video elementary
`
`data streams, a video decoder, a system controller that controls operations within
`
`the video decoder system, and memory. See id. at 4:65-5:28. The video decoder
`
`systems and methods for performing video decoding disclosed in the ’087 Patent
`
`improve video (MPEG) decoding by utilizing what is alternately referred to in the
`
`’087 Patent as “unified memory,” “single memory,” or “single unified memory.”
`
`See id. at 5:6-6:27. For simplicity, Patent Owner refers to the memory structure of
`
`the ’087 Patent as “unified memory.”
`
`- 4 -
`
`

`
`The ’087 Patent discloses that the unified memory may be comprised of one
`
`or more memory chips. For example, Figure 3 of the ’087 Patent, reproduced
`
`below, depicts a 16 Mbit SDRAM (item 212). Exhibit 1001 at 4. The depiction of
`
`the memory 212 is consistent with a memory configuration of four ranks (i.e.,
`
`chips). Exhibit 2003, Declaration of Scott Acton, Ph.D. Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.68
`
`(“Acton Decl.”), ¶ 37.
`
`In addition, Figure 4, which is reproduced below, depicts frame store memory 212.
`
`Exhibit 1001 at 6. The depiction of the memory 212 is consistent with a memory
`
`having more than one memory chip or bank. Acton Decl. ¶ 38.
`
`
`
`- 5 -
`
`

`
`
`
`Compared to the prior art systems, the unified memory structure disclosed in
`
`the ’087 Patent reduces the total memory needed and simplifies the system design.
`
`Exhibit 1001 at 17:2-6. Prior art MPEG decoder systems generally used a frame
`
`store memory for the MPEG decoder motion compensation logic which stores the
`
`reference frames or anchor frames as well as the frame being reconstructed. Id. at
`
`4:29-32. Additionally, the prior art systems would generally also include a
`
`separate memory for the transport and system controller functions because size
`
`limitations prevented the memories from being combined. Id. at 4:33-35. These
`
`additional memories added to the overall cost of the system. Id. at 4:42-43. The
`
`unified memory disclosed in the ’087 Patent unifies the memory structure, thereby
`
`reducing the total number and amount of memory needed, as well as simplifies the
`
`video decoder design and reduces overall cost. See id. at 17:2-6.
`
`- 6 -
`
`

`
`C.
`
`Petitioners’ Cited References
`
`Petitioners rely on the following three references as alleged prior art:
`
` U.S. Patent No. 5,960,464 (“Lam”) (Exhibit 1004);
`
` U.S. Patent No. 5,898,695 (“Fujii”) (Exhibit 1005); and
`
` U.S. Patent No. 5,847,771 (“Cloutier”) (Exhibit 1006).
`
`For at least the reasons explained below, none of the above-listed references, either
`
`alone or in combination, renders unpatentable any of the challenged claims of the
`
`’087 Patent.
`
`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`A.
`
`Legal Standard
`
`Because the ’087 Patent expired in November 2016, the applicable claim
`
`construction standard is that set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2005), rather than 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Webasto Roof Sys., Inc. v.
`
`UUSI, LLC, IPR2014-00650, Paper No. 14 at 6 n.1 (PTAB Oct. 17, 2004); Cisco
`
`Sys., Inc. v. AIP Acquisition, LLC, IPR2014-00247, Paper No. 17 at 3 (PTAB June
`
`26, 2014); In re CSB-System Int’l, Inc., 832 F.3d 1335, 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2016). Under the Phillips standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and
`
`customary meanings, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the
`
`art at the time of the invention, having taken into consideration the language of the
`
`claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Phillips, 415 F.3d
`
`- 7 -
`
`

`
`1303. “In many cases, the claim construction will be the same under the Phillips
`
`and [Rule 42.100(b) broadest reasonable interpretation] standards.” CSB-System,
`
`832 F.3d at 1341; see also Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 F. App’x
`
`864, (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim term may
`
`be the same as or broader than the construction of a term under the Phillips
`
`standard.”). Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth with
`
`reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475,
`
`1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Only those terms that are in controversy need to be
`
`construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid
`
`Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
`
`B.
`
`Each of Petitioners’ Identified Claim Terms Has a Plain and
`Ordinary Meaning and Need Not Be Construed
`“memory” / “first unified memory”
`
`
`The Petition identifies “memory” / “first unified memory” as terms that
`
`require construction. Specifically, the Petition alleges that the broadest reasonable
`
`construction of the terms “memory” / “first unified memory” is “a single memory
`
`for use by transport, decode, and system controller function.” Petition at 10.
`
`Petitioners’ expert has opined that the phrase “single memory” in Petitioners’
`
`proposed construction of “memory” / “first unified memory” limits the scope of
`
`the term to a single memory chip. Exhibit 2004, Deposition Transcript of Richard
`
`Kramer dated November 21, 2016 (“Kramer Dep.”) at 47:13-47:15. However,
`
`- 8 -
`
`

`
`Petitioners’ expert has admitted that Petitioners’ proposed construction of
`
`“memory” / “first unified memory” had no bearing on his patentability analysis.
`
`Kramer Dep. at 47:16-47:23 (“Q. What bearing, if any, did your proposed
`
`construction of memory and first unified memory have on your invalidity analysis?
`
`. . . [A. T]he simple answer is none.”).
`
`For the purposes of the ID, the Board did not find it necessary to construe
`
`“memory” / “first unified memory.” ID at 6. Patent Owner agrees that the Board
`
`need not resolve the parties’ dispute with respect to this term, and requests that the
`
`Board decline to do so. Should the Board decide that this term should be construed
`
`for purposes of its final decision, the term should be construed to mean “memory
`
`functioning as a unit.”
`
`Petitioners’ proposed construction improperly imports limitations. In
`
`particular, Petitioners’ proposed construction attempts to improperly limit the
`
`scope of the term to a single structure—i.e., a “single memory [chip]”—when there
`
`is nothing in the claims or in the specification of the ’087 Patent that explicitly or
`
`implicitly defines or limits the scope of the term “memory” / “first unified
`
`memory” in this manner. Acton Decl. ¶¶ 43-46. As such, the Board should
`
`decline to import this limitation into the construction of “memory” / “first unified
`
`memory,” and simply afford the term its plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`- 9 -
`
`

`
`The ordinary and customary meaning of “memory” / “first unified memory”
`
`as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art having taken into
`
`consideration the intrinsic evidence is “memory functioning as a unit.” Id.
`
`¶¶ 43-47. The terms “memory” and “first unified memory” are used throughout
`
`the specification to indicate that the memory of the video (e.g., MPEG) decoder
`
`system functions as a unit. Id. ¶ 43. The ’087 Patent, however, does not limit the
`
`“memory” or “first unified memory” to a single structure. As seen in Figure 3 of
`
`the ’087 Patent, shown below, the 16 Mbit SDRAM identified by reference
`
`number 212 is depicted as four rectangles coupled together.
`
`The memory 212 depicted in FIG. 3 is consistent with four ranks (i.e. chips) of
`
`memory coupled together to form a 16 Mbit SDRAM that functions as a unit. Id.
`
`
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`- 10 -
`
`

`
`Indeed, the specification of the ’087 Patent does not limit the memory to any
`
`particular configuration so long as the resulting memory functions as a unit.
`
`The fact that the memory is not limited to a single structure is further
`
`confirmed by Figure 4, reproduced below, which depicts Frame-store Memory 212
`
`as being composed of two memory chips functioning as a unit. Id. ¶ 44.
`
`As with the memory 212 in Figure 3, if the memory of the ’087 Patent was limited
`
`to a single memory chip or structure, the Frame-store Memory 212 in Figure 4
`
`would have been depicted with a single block, rather than the two blocks shown.
`
`
`
`Id.
`
`The prosecution history of the ’087 Patent is in accord. Id. ¶ 45.
`
`Throughout the application process, the patentee’s correspondence with the U.S.
`
`Patent and Trademark Office with respect to the memory was consistent with how
`
`the memory is referenced in the specification. Id. The patentee did not ascribe a
`
`- 11 -
`
`

`
`specific definition to the terms “memory” and/or “first unified memory” that would
`
`impart to those terms a meaning different from the plain and ordinary meaning—
`
`“memory functioning as a unit.” Id. Thus, the ordinary and customary meaning of
`
`“memory” / “first unified memory” as would be understood by a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention is “memory functioning as a
`
`unit.” Id. ¶ 47.
`
`
`
`“demultiplexing one or more multimedia data streams” /
`“demultiplexes one or more multimedia data streams”
`The Petition identifies “demultiplexing one or more multimedia data
`
`streams” / “demultiplexes one or more multimedia data streams” as terms that
`
`require construction. Specifically, the Petition alleges that the broadest reasonable
`
`construction of the terms is “separate the multiplexed encoded stream into one or
`
`more individual streams.” Petition at 11. These terms have a plain and ordinary
`
`meaning that would have been readily know by a person of ordinary skill in the art.
`
`Accordingly, no construction of these terms is necessary. For purposes of the ID,
`
`the Board adopted Petitioners’ proposed construction, “separate the multiplexed
`
`encoded stream into one or more individual streams.” Without adopting or
`
`accepting any of Petitioners’ accompanying arguments, Patent Owner does not
`
`object to construing this terms to mean “separate the multiplexed encoded stream
`
`into one or more individual streams” for purposes of these proceedings only.
`
`- 12 -
`
`

`
`IV. LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`A.
`
`Inter Partes Review
`
`In an inter partes review, “[t]he default evidentiary standard is a
`
`preponderance of the evidence.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d); see also Office Patent Trial
`
`Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 46,756, 48,763 (Aug. 14, 2012). In particular, “the
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`petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a
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`preponderance of the evidence.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). “A preponderance of the
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`evidence means such evidence which, when considered and compared with that
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`opposed to it, produces a belief that what is sought to be proved is more likely true
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`than not.” In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation, 281 F. App’x 974, 979 (Fed. Cir.
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`2008); see also Federal Circuit Bar Association Model Patent Jury Instruction A.5
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`(Feb. 2012) (“A preponderance of the evidence means that the fact that is to be
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`proven is more likely true than not, i.e., that the evidence in favor of that fact being
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`true is sufficient to tip the scale, even if slightly, in its favor.”).
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`B.
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`Anticipation
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`“To establish anticipation, each and every element in a claim, arranged as is
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`recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference.” ZTE v.
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`ContentGuard, IPR2013-00134, Paper No. 12 at 24 (PTAB June 19, 2013) (citing
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`Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
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`NetMoneyIn, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). “The
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`identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the . . .
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`claim.” Id. (quoting Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1989)). “[U]nless a reference discloses within the four corners of the
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`document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations
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`arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim, it cannot be said to
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`prove prior invention of the thing claimed and, thus, cannot anticipate under 35
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`U.S.C. § 102.” Id. (quoting NetMoneyIn, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359,
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`1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
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`C. Obviousness
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`Patentability requires that the claimed invention would not have been
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`obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See,
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`e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1565-68 (Fed. Cir.
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`1987). The relevant factual inquiries include: (1) the level of ordinary skill in the
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`pertinent art; (2) the scope and content of the prior art; (3) the differences between
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`the claimed invention and the prior art; and (4) objective secondary considerations
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`of non-obviousness, if any. See, e.g., SIBIA Neurosciences v. Cadus Pharm.
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`Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 998
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`(Fed. Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds, In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2000); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 1582
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`(Fed. Cir. 1996). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person
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`who is presumed to know the relevant prior art. See Custom Accessories, Inc. v.
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`Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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`Additionally, “a patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious
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`merely by demonstrating that each element was, independently, known in the prior
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`art.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Rather, to establish
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`prima facie obviousness, the cited references must be shown to disclose or suggest
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`each claimed element and it must be shown that it would have been obvious to
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`combine the teachings in the references together to arrive at the claimed invention.
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`See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2002). There must be an apparent
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`reason to combine the cited references to create the specific invention.
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`In addition, a showing that the reason to combine stems from the nature of
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`the problem to be solved must be “clear and particular, and it must be supported by
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`actual evidence.” Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1334 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2002). The combined art must narrow the scope of the inventor’s task to the
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`point where it would have been obvious to try the particular invention claimed. If
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`the particular invention lies hidden in a multitude of other options suggested by the
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`art, the invention is not obvious. See, e.g., Leo Pharm. Prods. Ltd. v. Rea, 726
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`F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he breadth of the[] choices [disclosed in the
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`art] and the number combinations indicate that these disclosures would not have
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`rendered the claimed invention obvious to try.”); In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351,
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`1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating that what is “obvious to try” is erroneously
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`equated with obviousness where “what would have been ‘obvious to try’ would
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`have been to vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible choices until one
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`possibly arrived at a successful result, where the prior art gave either no indication
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`of which parameters were critical or no direction as to which of many possible
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`choices is likely to be successful”) (internal citations omitted); Medichem, S.A. v.
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`Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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`Hindsight is forbidden in an obviousness analysis. See Dembiczak, 175 F.3d
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`at 998; See also Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342,
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`1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). This means that the reasons for combining references or
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`modifying the teachings of a reference must be apparent at the time of the
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`invention and thus apparent without the use of hindsight. A telltale sign of an
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`impermissible hindsight analysis is that the analysis “use[s] the invention to define
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`the problem that the invention solves.” Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d
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`1372, 1376-78 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (reversing a district court that conducted its
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`analysis using hindsight because the district court’s obviousness finding was
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`improperly based on art directed to the solution as opposed to art directed to the
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`problem).
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`V.
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`PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATIONS FAIL FOR LACK OF SUPPORT
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`A.
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`ANTICIPATION
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`
`
`Count 2: Fujii Does Not Disclose Each and Every
`Limitation of the Challenged Independent Claims and Thus
`Does Not Render any of Claims 1, 7, 10, 11, or 16
`Unpatentable Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
`Independent Claims 1, 10, and 16
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`(a)
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`Fujii does not disclose the limitations of claims 1, 10, or 16 of the ’087
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`Patent—the three independent claims challenged in the Petition. In particular,
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`Fujii fails to disclose that the transport logic retrieves data from a unified memory
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`during demultiplexing operations, as required by claims 1, 10, and 16.
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`Independent claim 1 of the ’087 Patent includes the feature “wherein the
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`transport logic is operable to access the memory to store and retrieve data during
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`demultiplexing operations.” Independent claim 10 includes the feature “wher