throbber
111111
`
`1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
`US 20070042755Al
`
`(19) United States
`(12) Patent Application Publication
`Singhal
`
`(10) Pub. No.: US 2007/0042755 Al
`Feb. 22, 2007
`(43) Pub. Date:
`
`(54) SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR
`lWO-FACTOR REMOTE USER
`AUTHENTICATION
`
`(76)
`
`Inventor: Tara C hand Singhal, Torrance, CA
`(US)
`
`Correspondence Address:
`Tara Chand Singhal
`PO Box 5075
`Torrance, CA 90510 (US)
`
`(21) Appl. No.:
`
`11/503,825
`
`(22) Filed:
`
`Aug. 13, 2006
`
`Related U.S. Application Data
`
`(60) Provisional application No. 601709,955, filed on Aug.
`20, 2005.
`
`Publication Classification
`
`(51)
`
`Int. C t.
`H04M 1166
`
`(2006.01)
`
`(52) U.S. Cl. .......................... .. .. .. .. .. ............ 455/411
`
`(57)
`
`ABSTRAC T
`
`This invention discloses a system of remote user authenti(cid:173)
`cation to an authentication server, with a telephone interface
`to the authentication server that only receives routed calls
`that have originated from a cell phone in a cellular network
`and a call handling logic function which routs only those
`calls to the authentication server over the interface that have
`originated from a cell phone with a subscriber identity
`module (SIM) card and for which the cellular company
`maintains an individual subscriber identification data. In a
`different embodiment a remote user authentication system
`has different interfaces and different authentication pro(cid:173)
`cesses that correspond with a telephone network interface
`and with a cellular telephone company network interface,
`enabling the authentication system to have different methods
`of authentication depending upon which interface a remote
`user connection authentication request originated from. The
`method uses the SIM card of a cell phone as a "something
`you have" factor as part of a two-factor authentication
`mechanism to an authentication server. The telephone net(cid:173)
`work uses a call back feature.
`
`Authentication Server 30
`
`Authentication
`Process
`
`I
`v
`R
`System
`33
`
`1
`Authentication
`database 34
`
`32
`
`Voi P ~
`t-_ Cellular 20
`
`Telephone
`Company#1
`
`-
`
`Gateway 35A
`
`\35
`
`Cellular 20
`-
`Telephone
`Company#2
`
`Cellular 20
`Telephone
`Company#3
`
`-
`
`-
`
`-
`
`,?-
`
`Cell
`
`I Cellular Network 40
`phone 12 /1
`"o
`-u DOD
`
`SIM
`13
`
`CCC
`ODD
`
`User 14
`
`TWILIO INC. Ex. 1012 Page 1
`
`

`
`DOA
`
`Authentication Server 30
`
`32
`
`~
`
`VoiP
`Gateway 35A
`
`I
`v
`R
`System
`33
`
`Authentication
`Process
`
`Cellular Network 40
`~
`
`r--
`
`Cel
`
`pho~12 j I
`D
`
`DOD
`13
`SIM
`DOD
`~ DOD
`
`t
`
`Authentication
`database 34
`
`\35
`
`Cellular 20
`Telephone
`Company #1
`
`Cellular 20
`Telephone
`Company #2
`
`Cellular 20
`Telephone
`Company #3
`
`-
`
`-
`
`-
`
`Figure 1
`
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`.... 0 =
`
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`
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`
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`
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`> ....
`
`TWILIO INC. Ex. 1012 Page 2
`
`

`
`Adapting a server to receive only those incoming telephone calls from a service
`52
`customer that are originated by the customer on a cellular network
`
`Forwarding, by the cellular network only those calls that have been verified by the
`cell service provider having a customer identity verified account with the cell company. 54
`
`Matching the caller id of the incoming call with a caller id that is pre-stored in
`database 34, as an equivalent to a "what you have" factor of remote user authentication. 56
`
`Annunciating an "unauthorized call" message if not matched, otherwise a greeting
`58
`message for the service.
`
`Prompting by the IVR 33, for entry of PIN as a second factor of "what you know" of
`60
`remote user authentication.
`
`Verifying the service customer by entry of a personal identification number
`62
`matching it in the stored database before authenticating the user.
`
`Providing a service to the service customer.
`
`64
`
`-~
`
`Figure 2
`
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`.... 0 = '"= = 0" -....
`.... 0 =
`
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`
`~ .....
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`
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`.....
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`> ....
`
`TWILIO INC. Ex. 1012 Page 3
`
`

`
`1osD
`
`Telephone
`H Company42
`
`Line #1
`
`User14
`
`PBX originated,
`IP Originated,
`Or Unknown
`Originated call,
`Where caller
`inserts own caller
`id and it is merely
`passed through
`by the telephone
`company
`
`Authentication Server 30
`
`I
`v
`R
`System
`33
`
`Authentication
`Process A 31
`
`Authentication
`Process B 32
`
`Line #2
`
`Gateway 35A
`
`VoiP~
`
`1
`
`Authentication
`database 34
`
`~ 35
`
`Cellular Network 40
`
`t-r---
`
`Cellular 20
`Telephone t--(cid:173)
`Company #1
`
`SIM 13
`
`[J[J[J
`D [J D
`
`-..o [J [J [J
`
`User 14
`
`r---
`
`Cellular 20
`I - -
`Telephone
`Company#2
`
`Cellular 20
`Telephone t--(cid:173)
`Company#3
`
`' - -
`
`Figure 3
`
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`
`~ .....
`
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`~ 'e -....
`.... 0 = '"= = 0" -....
`.... 0 =
`
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`
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`
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`?'
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`N
`
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`
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`.....
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`0
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`
`> ....
`
`TWILIO INC. Ex. 1012 Page 4
`
`

`
`Authentication Process A 31
`
`Prompting by an interactive response system of the authentication
`system, for entry of a PIN-1.
`31A
`
`Verifying PIN-1 in an authentication database and delivering a message of
`an "To hang up now" otherwise a message of "an unauthorized call". 318
`
`Calling back by the system on a caller id that is present for this PIN-1 in
`the database immediately after step 31 B.
`31 C
`
`Prompting for entry of PIN-2, and checking it in database to Authenticate
`to authenticate the remote user.
`31 D
`
`Authentication Process B 32
`
`Verifying and Checking the incoming caller id for a match in an
`authentication system database.
`32A
`
`Prompting by an interactive response system of the system, if caller id is
`in database for entry of a PIN, otherwise delivering a message of an
`unauthorized call.
`328
`
`Verifying the PIN in the database to authenticate the remote user. 32C
`
`Figure 4
`
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`.... 0 = '"= = 0" -....
`.... 0 =
`
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`
`~ ......
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`~ ......
`
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`?'
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`N
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`
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`
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`......
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`
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`0
`0
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`
`> ....
`
`TWILIO INC. Ex. 1012 Page 5
`
`

`
`Cell Company call handling logic 44
`
`Database A
`
`Account Number 70
`
`SIM ld 1
`
`75
`
`encryption key 76
`
`SIM id 2
`
`78
`
`customer class 74
`
`account status 72
`
`Caller ID
`
`77
`
`•.............
`
`Database B
`Account Number 70
`
`Database C
`Account Number
`
`70
`
`Social Security # 80
`
`Destination Number 90
`
`Driver License
`
`82
`
`Destination Tag
`
`Name
`
`Address
`
`DOB:
`
`82
`
`84
`
`86
`
`Time date
`
`Geographic cell #
`
`92
`
`94
`
`96
`
`I Prior Art Logic 44 I
`
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`.... 0 =
`
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`
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`
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`
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`
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`?'
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`N
`
`~
`
`Logic 44 Adaptation
`IF (destination number::: private number for line #2)
`AND
`IF (customer class 44 = individual subscriber),
`THEN route call to line #2
`ELSE
`Deliver a message of unauthorized call.
`
`Cell phone 12 ~- • ••• • ••• ••• ""¥ ··· ···· · ··· · ··· ···· ··· ··· · ··· · ·· · ··· · ···· ··
`•
`I Cell phone logic 35 I
`
`SIM card
`13~
`
`568776
`568776
`568776
`568776
`
`t =n ---- 568776
`
`Figure 5
`
`Line#2
`
`IVR
`System
`33
`
`Authentication
`Server 30
`
`-
`
`~
`1thentication Database
`
`-
`
`Caller id 77
`
`PIN 98
`
`i
`
`I
`
`310 686 3345
`323 334 6677
`
`3456
`6673
`
`N
`0
`0
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`
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`
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`Ul
`
`> ....
`
`TWILIO INC. Ex. 1012 Page 6
`
`

`
`US 2007/0042755 AI
`
`Feb.22,2007
`
`1
`
`SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR TWO-FACTOR
`REMOTE USER AUTHENTICATION
`
`access to banks where the number of such customers is in
`hundreds of thousands if not in millions.
`
`CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED
`APPLICATIONS
`
`[0001] This application claims priority on Provisional
`Application Ser. No. 60/709,955, entitled "Method And
`Apparatus For Two-Factor Remote User Authentication"
`filed on Aug. 20, 2005, by Tara Chand Singhal. The contents
`of the Provisional Application Ser. No. 60/709,955 are
`incorporated herein by reference.
`
`FIELD OF THE INVENTION
`
`[0002] The present invention is directed to systems and
`methods for two-factor remote user authentication that does
`not use a security token of prior art and uses certain features
`of the telephone network.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`[0003]
`In the science of remote user authentication, there
`are three different factors by which a remote user to a system
`such as a server on an Internet or computer network may be
`authenticated. These three factors are: (i) "what you know",
`which could be a personal identification number, an alpha(cid:173)
`numeric password or a phrase; (ii) "what you have", which
`could be a smart card or a security token in the personal
`possession of a user, that is given to the user by the business
`which owns or manages the network; and (iii) "what you
`are", which is a biometric measure of the user such as
`fingerprint, retina print, handprint etc. requiring a biometric
`sensor.
`
`[0004] For the "what you have" factor, companies such as
`RSA Data security and ActivCard, to name a few, make
`security tokens. These security tokens may be and usually
`are hardware and software devices embedded with logic and
`codes that are personalized for the remote user. Such tokens
`may have an interface by which they are read by an interface
`device to the computer network, or they may generate a
`code, which is then used by the user to enter in a device or
`screen as part of "what you have" factor. Or they may be
`static cards such as an ATM card with a magnetic strip.
`
`[0005]
`In each of these factors, each factor has its own
`issues of reliability and security that are well described in the
`industry news and publications. The information security
`industry considers the use of any one of these factors as a
`one-factor authentication or as a weak form of remote user
`authentication and considers the use of any two-factors as a
`two-factor authentication or a strong form of remote user
`authentication.
`
`[0006] Where ever a two-factor authentication is used or
`required, the use of "what you know" and "what you have"
`are the factors of choice that are used. The "what you have"
`factor requires the use of a security token, as described
`above, and that requires the purchase, personalization and
`distribution of such tokens to the users at a considerable
`cost. For this reason, such security tokens are mostly used by
`employees of a business and are not distributed or given to
`the customers of a business. There are many business
`applications where the access to the application over the
`Internet needs to be given to the business's customers. A
`classic example is online access to business data or online
`
`[0007]
`In light of the above, it is an objective of the present
`invention to have systems and methods that enables two(cid:173)
`factor remote user authentication without a security token
`and biometrics and that would be easy to scale up to large
`number of users and customers of a business.
`
`SUMMARY
`
`[0008]
`In prior art, depending upon where a telephone call
`originates, a caller has the freedom to set up and make his
`own caller id. For example, for calls that originate in a
`Private Branch Exchange (PBX), the caller id is pro(cid:173)
`grammed by the PBX owner and may be set up to be any
`number. In calls originating in an Internet Protocol (IP)
`based phone, the caller id is made up by the call originator
`and it is merely forwarded by the telephone network. Hence,
`in prior art, at the call destination, such as at computer
`system that may be a part of a remote authentication system,
`there is no assurance that the caller id is reliable and can be
`relied upon to uniquely identify and authenticate a caller.
`
`[0009] The current invention discloses that the Subscriber
`Identity Module (SIM) card of a cell phone may be used and
`would work equally well as a "what you have" factor of
`remote user authentication with added features of this inven(cid:173)
`tion and that may replace the prior art security tokens. GSM
`based cell phones use a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)
`card. The SIM card provides identity verification and
`authentication as well as confidentiality of the communica(cid:173)
`tion to the cell phone company.
`
`[0010] When a call originates over a cell phone, the cell
`service provider generates the caller id that is mapped from
`the SIM. The SIM, a personalized and coded physical card,
`is embedded in the phone and the phone is in the personal
`possession of the caller. Hence, when the call destination
`system is assured with the features of this invention that the
`call originates on the cell phone via a cell network, the caller
`id is relied upon by the destination system. This invention
`discloses features and different embodiments that assure a
`call destination system that the caller id can be relied upon
`as an equivalent "what you have" factor for identification
`and authentication.
`
`BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
`
`[0011] The novel features of this invention, as well as the
`invention itself, both as to its structure and its operation, will
`be best understood from the accompanying drawings, taken
`in conjunction with the accompanying description, in which
`similar reference characters refer to similar parts. The draw(cid:173)
`ings are:
`
`[0012] FIG. 1 is a block diagram that illustrates a version
`of the current invention of a two-factor authentication sys(cid:173)
`tem.
`
`[0013] FIG. 2 is a flow diagram that illustrates a version of
`the current invention of a two-factor authentication system.
`
`[0014] FIG. 3 is a block diagram that illustrates another
`version of the current invention of a two-factor authentica(cid:173)
`tion system.
`
`[0015] FIG. 4 is a flow diagram that illustrates a version of
`the current invention of a two-factor authentication system.
`
`TWILIO INC. Ex. 1012 Page 7
`
`

`
`US 2007/0042755 AI
`
`Feb.22,2007
`
`2
`
`[0016] FIG. 5 is a version of the block diagram of call
`handling logic of the current invention of a two-factor
`authentication system that may be used by a cellular net(cid:173)
`work.
`
`DESCRIPTION
`
`[0017] This invention discloses two embodiments of a
`two-factor remote user authentication system. FIGS. 1 and 2
`describe the system and method of the first embodiment and
`FIGS. 3 and 4 describe the system and method of the second
`embodiment. FIG. 5 describes the features of a call handling
`logic in the cell network that is used by these embodiments.
`
`[0018] The embodiment lOA, as in FIG. 1, discloses a
`system of remote user authentication to an authentication
`server 30 that has a telephone interface 32 to the authenti(cid:173)
`cation server 30 that only receives routed calls that have
`originated from a cell phone 12 in a cellular network 40 by
`a user 14.
`
`[0019] The cellular network 40 operated by the cell com(cid:173)
`panies 20 has a call handling logic function 44 (described
`later with reference to FIG. 5), which routes only those calls
`to the authentication server 30 over the interface 32 that have
`originated from a cell phone with a subscriber identity
`module (SIM) card 13 and for which the cellular company
`maintains an individual subscriber identification data.
`
`[0020] The authentication server 30 may be adapted with
`an IVR system 33 and may receive routed calls from all the
`companies 20 via a private landline 35. To handle large
`volume of calls simultaneously, a VoiP gateway 35A may
`also be used. The authentication server 30 may use an
`authentication database 34, which maintains authentication
`data including the caller id data of the users.
`
`[0021] With reference to FIG. 2, a method of remote user
`authentication to a service system on a global computer
`network has the following steps. Not all the steps may be
`needed and used in the order specified herein.
`
`[0022] At Step 52, adapting a server to receive only those
`incoming telephone calls from a service customer that are
`originated by the customer on a cellular network. This is
`done by interfacing the server with a private line corre(cid:173)
`sponding to a private number managed by a cell network for
`receiving cellular network originated calls.
`
`[0023] At step 54, forwarding only those calls, by the
`cellular networks, that have been verified by the cell service
`provider having a customer identity verified account with
`the cell company.
`
`[0024] At step 56, matching the caller id of the incoming
`call with a caller id that is pre-stored in database 34, as an
`equivalent to a "what you have" factor of remote user
`authentication.
`
`[0025] At step 58, annunciating an "unauthorized call"
`message if not matched, otherwise a greeting message for
`the service.
`
`[0026] At step 60, prompting by the IVR 33, for entry of
`PIN as a second factor of "what you know" of remote user
`authentication.
`
`[0028] At step 64, providing a service to the service
`customer. The service may by delivery of information such
`as, pass code to a system enabling the customer to have a
`service from the service system, or providing an access code
`to gain entrance to a facility, or providing an access code to
`gain entry to an automated teller machine, or providing
`access code to gain access to a computer network.
`
`[0029] Alternatively the authentication server coupled
`with a service system may directly deliver services the
`service customer is authorized to receive such as, a banking
`transaction via the phone, and other similar services.
`
`[0030] The embodiment lOB described with reference to
`FIG. 3 uses two different interfaces line #1 and line #2 for
`remote user authentication. One of these interfaces, line #2
`is the one described in embodiment lOA with the help of
`FIG. 1 and the other interface line #1 is for those calls that
`do not originate on a cell network 40.
`
`[0031] The embodiment lOB includes an authentication
`server 30 with an authentication database 34 that pre-stores
`data used for authentication, two different telephone line
`interfaces, line # 1 and line #2 that are handled by two
`different authentication processes, and processes A 31 and B
`32 respectively in the authentication server 30. The server 30
`also has an interactive voice response (IVR) system 33 that
`may be part of server 30 or it may be a separate server.
`
`[0032] The authentication process A 31 handles telephone
`calls from user 14, over line #1 originating from devices and
`networks and may include phone calls that originate via a
`private branch exchange (PBX) or via a world phone that
`originates calls via the IP protocol and use the Internet, or
`from the other parts of a public switched telephone network,
`such as line from a home or business. In all these methods
`or devices or networks, the user 14 may be able to insert or
`may be in control of creating or inserting a caller id of
`his/her own choosing. Such originated calls are merely
`forwarded to the destination by the prior art telephone
`company 42 network without verifying the caller id.
`
`[0033] The authentication process B 32 handles telephone
`calls originating over a cellular telephone network 40 from
`user 14 with a cell phone 12 embedded with a SIM card 13
`via one or more different cellular telephone companies 20
`over a private line #2. The line # 2 is a private line to
`authentication server 30 and handles or delivers only those
`calls to the server 30 that originate over the cellular network
`40. The private line #2 may be equipped with a VoiP
`gateway to be able to handle a large volume of simultaneous
`calls over line #2.
`
`[0034] FIG. 4 describes the steps of these two authenti(cid:173)
`cation processes, the process A 31 and process B 32.
`
`[0035]
`In the authentication process A 31, at step 31A,
`prompting by the interactive voice response (IVR) 33 sys(cid:173)
`tem of the authentication server 30, for entry of a PIN-1.
`
`[0036] At step 31B, first verifying PIN-1 in the authenti(cid:173)
`cation database 34, then delivering a voice message of either
`"hang up now" or a message of "an unauthorized call",
`depending upon the verification of PIN -1.
`
`[0027] At step 62, verifYing the service customer by
`matching the entered personal identification number with
`what is stored in the database before authenticating the user.
`
`[0037] At step 31C, calling back by the server 30, imme(cid:173)
`diately after step 31B, on a caller id that is present for this
`PIN-1 in the database 34. The call back to a caller id that is
`
`TWILIO INC. Ex. 1012 Page 8
`
`

`
`US 2007/0042755 AI
`
`Feb.22,2007
`
`3
`
`pre-stored, to caller by server 30 serves as an equivalent of
`"what you have" factor of authentication.
`
`[0038] The PIN-1 may be the caller id of the caller, or it
`may be the caller id plus a secret number pre-stored in the
`authentication database 34. As an illustration, the database
`34 may store multiple caller ids, called primary caller id and
`one or more secondary caller ids. For example, the primary
`caller id is of a primary phone, and the secondary caller ids
`are of other phones to which the user has control or access
`to such as home phone, office phone etc. The PIN-1 may be
`the primary caller id plus the four digits of the secondary
`caller id. When a PIN-1 is used as described here, the
`primary caller id may be used to identity caller in the
`database 34, and the four digits of the secondary caller id
`may be used to identity which of one of the secondary caller
`id numbers the caller should be called back in step 31C.
`
`[0039] At step 31D, prompting for entry of PIN-2 by the
`IVR 33 and then checking the entered PIN-2 in database 34
`to authenticate the remote user with a "what you know"
`factor of remote user authentication.
`
`[0040] PIN-2 as described here is a secret number known
`only to the caller and the authentication database 34. The last
`four digits ofPIN-1 may also be a secret number like PIN-2,
`and PIN-1 and PIN-2 may be the same.
`
`[0041] Alternatively, at step 31A, the authentication pro(cid:173)
`cess A may advise all callers to call on a cellular network.
`Cell phones are used by masses, are available to everyone,
`and are very economical to own.
`
`In the authentication process B 32, the user 14 uses
`[0042]
`a cell phone 12, and the cellular network 40. Then at step
`32A, the server 30 checks the incoming caller id for a match
`in the authentication system database 34 as a "what you
`have" factor of authentication. If there is no match, deliv(cid:173)
`ering the message "unauthorized call, please hang-up".
`Otherwise proceeding with step 32B.
`
`[0043] At step 32B, prompt by the interactive voice
`response system 33 of the server 30, for entry of a PIN and
`receiving an entry of a PIN.
`
`[0044] At step 32C, verifying the entered PIN in the
`authentication database 34 to authenticate the remote user as
`a "what you know" factor of authentication.
`
`In the authentication system lOB, either authenti(cid:173)
`[0045]
`cation process A is used or authentication process B is used
`depending upon how the call originated. If the call origi(cid:173)
`nated on a cell phone, then the SIM card of the cell phone
`maps to the caller id of an individual person. If the call
`originated from a phone other than the cell phone, the caller
`id is not reliable as there are many instances where the
`telephone company does not originate or verifY the caller id
`but passes through the caller id as it is entered by the caller.
`
`[0046] System lOB allows the user the flexibility to use
`any phone such as cell phone, home phone, or office phone
`for remote user authentication. Once a caller is authenticated
`via either process A orB to the server 30, the server then can
`deliver any number of services. Such services may include
`creation and delivery of a temporary password for access to
`a system, delivery of other services such as routing the
`connection to an online bank telephone network for banking
`transaction via the phone.
`
`[0047] Additional services may also be delivered by the
`server 30, which a caller is authorized to receive. Such
`services may be from a group that includes, providing an
`access code to gain entrance to a facility and providing an
`access code to gain access to an automated teller machine.
`
`[0048] FIG. 5 illustrates the call handling logic 44 pro(cid:173)
`vided by the cell companies 20 of the cellular network 40
`and an adaptation of that logic 44 of this invention that
`assures the authentication server 30 the reliability of caller
`id, for the calls that originate on a cell phone 12.
`
`[0049] The cell phone 12 has a SIM card 13 and a cell
`phone logic 35 that interfaces to a cell company call han(cid:173)
`dling logic 44 via wireless, using radio frequency waves.
`
`[0050] The logic 44 may have three different databases A,
`B and C to facilitate logic 44. The database A may maintain
`data fields such as account number 70, account status 72,
`customer class 74, SIM id 175, encryption key 76, caller id
`77, and SIM id 278. The database B may maintain subscriber
`personal data such as account number 70, social security
`number 80, driver license 82, name 82, address 84, and date
`of birth 86. The database C may maintain data such as
`account number 70, destination number 90, destination tag
`92, time and date 94 and geographic cell at time of call
`origination 96.
`
`[0051] The logic 44, when it receives a request for con(cid:173)
`nection from a cell phone 12, identifies the caller via SIM
`idl75 in its database A. Then the logic 44 finds the corre(cid:173)
`sponding encryption key 76 of SIM and decrypts a second(cid:173)
`ary SIM id 278 as the serial number SIM Id 278 is encrypted.
`It is verified in the database A after decryption using the key
`76.
`
`[0052] The logic 44 having verified the origin of the call
`from the SIM card 13, as described above, then checks the
`account status 72 by account number 70. The account status
`72 enables the phone company to restrict the routing of the
`call to the destination. For example, if the payment is
`overdue or the minutes on a prepaid phone have expired, or
`call is to an outside area, the call routing to the destination
`is disabled and a message is delivered to the caller about the
`status of the account.
`
`[0053] The logic 44 also creates a log of all calls as shown
`in database C. The log may include, destination tags 92,
`based on destination number. For example, mobile-to-mo(cid:173)
`bile (MTM) calls are tagged as MTM. Other type of calls
`such as mobile to land line call are also tagged if different
`rate schemes are applicable. Other log items are, destination
`number 90, time and date 94 of the call, and geographic cell
`location 96 of call origination.
`
`[0054] The logic 44 as described above is prior art. The
`current invention provides for an adaptation to logic 44. This
`adaptation provides for a function that enables the cell phone
`company 20 to forward or route only those calls to a
`destination number for line #2 that have an individual
`subscriber identity in database B and block all other calls
`from being routed to line #2.
`
`[0055] The adaptation to logic 44 checks the customer
`class 74. The customer class 74 represents types of custom(cid:173)
`ers such as, (i) individuals who have been individually
`registered and whose identity has been established and
`checked by various means, (ii) business owners, who may
`
`TWILIO INC. Ex. 1012 Page 9
`
`

`
`US 2007/0042755 AI
`
`Feb.22,2007
`
`4
`
`distribute the phone to different employees at different times
`and (iii) prepaid phones, where the identity of phone user is
`not relevant as he/she has prepaid for a fixed number of
`minutes of phone.
`
`[0056]
`If the customer calls from an individually sub(cid:173)
`scribed phone, the phone company maintains and has veri(cid:173)
`fied the subscriber's personal identity data such as social
`security number, driver license number, name and address in
`database B.
`
`[0057] The adaptation forwards only those calls that are
`from individually subscribed cell phones and excludes other
`cell phone calls to the server 30 on line #2.
`
`[0058] With the adaptation of logic 44, when a call is
`received over line #2, it would have an assured caller id that
`has been mapped from an individual subscriber whose
`identity has been verified by the cell phone company. With
`this assurance of traceability from the SIM card to the cell
`company account and then to the caller's caller id, coupled
`with the fact, that a detailed log is kept of the call to include
`the geographic cell, the adaptation converts a SIM of a cell
`phone as a "what you have" factor of authentication of this
`invention and is able to exclude other calls on line #2.
`
`[0059] This adaptation to prior art logic 44 may also
`include a check for an account type and for certain account
`types would proceed to route the call to the destination
`number assigned to line #2 and for other types of accounts
`provide a message of "unauthorized call" to the caller.
`
`[0060]
`In prior art, the telephone companies track different
`types of calls based on origination and destination numbers,
`such as Mobile To Mobile or land line to mobile. The
`adaptation of this feature enables those calls that are directed
`to line #2 to server 30 to be processed through a more
`stringent or different process then prior art logic 44 alone.
`
`[0061] The adaptation to logic 44 may also be stated as:
`
`IF (destination number~ private number for line #2)
`AND
`IF (customer class 74 ~ individual subscriber),
`THEN route call to line #2
`ELSE
`Deliver a message of unauthorized call.
`
`[0062] Hence, when the authentication server 30 receives
`a call from user 14 over cellular network 40 over line #2, the
`cellular company 20 has processed the call via the adapted
`logic 44 of this invention.
`
`[0063] This provides an assurance that the caller id is
`reliable because it maps to a SIM card 13 that is in the cell
`phone 12 in personal possession of a person 14 and that SIM
`maps to an account number 70 and account status 72 and that
`account maps to an individual subscriber person in the
`phone company databases B, a person which the company
`has identified by personal data verification as in database B.
`The cell companies 20 may also employ many methods and
`procedures that are not described above to establish the
`identity and verification of calls that their networks handle.
`
`[0064] These features, as described above enable a SIM
`card 13 to act in the manner of a "something you have"
`factor. Supplementing that with using a PIN 98 to verifY the
`
`caller acts in mauner of "something you know" factor.
`Hence a two-factor authentication is achieved by this inven(cid:173)
`tion without the user having to physically carry a security
`token, and without an authentication business entity having
`to purchase, provision, initialize and distribute such tokens
`to the users and potential users desiring authentication to a
`remote server.
`
`[0065] SIM may change when changing phones or com(cid:173)
`panies, but caller id stays same across telephone companies
`and across phones if phones are replaced. Hence this form
`of caller id that originates via cell phone company is a stable
`number that serves to identify a person by a "what you have"
`factor to an authentication server 30.
`
`[0066] As a second factor of authentication, the entry of
`data such as PIN 98 in the cell phone is protected by SIM
`based encryption during transmission of PIN and SIM data
`between the cell phone and the cell tower.
`
`In brief, the systems lOA or lOB serve to authen(cid:173)
`[0067]
`ticate the user 14 to server 30 via a two-factor remote user
`authentication that does not use prior art security tokens,
`instead use a SIM card as one of the factors, that is the SIM
`card of the cell phone acts as a "something you have factor"
`of a two factor remote user authentication process. In
`another alternate method, a call back feature by the server 30
`to a pre-stored telephone number acts to server as a "what
`you have factor" of a two factor remote user authentication
`process.
`
`[0068] While the particular method and apparatus as illus(cid:173)
`trated herein and disclosed in detail is fully capable of
`obtaining the objective and providing the advantages herein
`before stated, it is to be understood that it is merely
`illustrative of the presently preferred embodiments of the
`inve

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