UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________________
`
`MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`BRADIUM TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
`Patent Owner
`____________________
`
`CASE IPR2016-00448
`Patent 7,908,343
`____________________
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER BRADIUM TECHNOLOGIES, LLC’S
`PRELIMINARY RESPONSE PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.107
`
`
`

`
`Table of Contents
`
`Page
`
`I.
`II.
`
`V.
`
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................ 3
`A.
`The Requirements to Institute an Inter Partes Review ......................... 3
`B.
`Petitioner Proposes a Single Obviousness Challenge to Claims
`1–20 ...................................................................................................... 5
`III. THE BOARD SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO
`REJECT THE PETITION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 325(D) ............................... 6
`A.
`The Second Petition Was Improperly Filed to Cure the
`Deficiencies of Microsoft’s Rejected Original Petition ....................... 7
`Petitioner Does Not Present Any Reason that It Could Not
`Have Previously Presented the Art and Arguments in the
`Petition ................................................................................................ 11
`The Petition Should Be Rejected Because Its Arguments Are
`Substantially the Same as Those Denied in the First Petition ........... 12
`IV. THE PETITION DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT REDDY IS
`PRIOR ART .................................................................................................. 16
`THE PETITION DOES NOT IDENTIFY DIFFERENCES
`BETWEEN THE CLAIMS AND THE ASSERTED REFERENCES
`AS REQUIRED FOR THE GRAHAM OBVIOUSNESS ANALYSIS ...... 21
`A.
`Claim 1 ............................................................................................... 24
`B.
`Claim 13 ............................................................................................. 25
`VI. THE PETITION DOES NOT EXPLAIN WHY A POSITA WOULD
`COMBINE REDDY WITH HORNBACKER IN THE MANNER
`ALLEGED .................................................................................................... 25
`A.
`Petitioner’s Conclusory Reasons for Combining the Asserted
`References Are Insufficient ................................................................ 26
`The Petition Fails to Analyze the References as a Whole ................. 30
`B.
`VII. THE PETITION DOES NOT MATCH ACTUAL CLAIM
`LANGUAGE TO THE DISCLOSURES OF THE ASSERTED
`REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 37
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`i
`
`

`
`C.
`
`Claim 13 ........................................................................................... ..54
`
`A.
`
`Claim 1 ............................................................................................. ..37
`
`Claim 1 ............................................................................................... 37
`A.
`B. Dependent Claims 2–12 ..................................................................... 44
`B.
`Dependent Claims 2-12 ................................................................... ..44
`C.
`Claim 13 ............................................................................................. 54
`D. Dependent Claims 14–20 ................................................................... 56
`D.
`Dependent Claims 14-20 ................................................................. ..56
`E.
`Claims 15, 16, and 20 ......................................................................... 59
`E.
`Claims 15, 16, and 20 ....................................................................... ..59
`VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 59
`
`
`
`VIII. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... ..59
`
`ii
`
`

`
`Table of Authorities
`
`Cases
` 
`ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.,
`694 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................... 26, 28, 47
`
`Page(s)
`
`Apple Inc. v. DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc.,
`IPR2015-00369, Paper 14 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2015) ................................... 16, 20
`
`Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`No. IPR2015-01710, Paper 7 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 16, 2016) ...................................... 11
`
`Butamax Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00581, Paper 8 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 14, 2014) ............................................... 9
`
`Conopco, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
`IPR2014-00506, Paper 25 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 10, 2014) ............................................ 4
`
`Conopco, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
`IPR2014-00628, Paper 21 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 20, 2014) ........................................... 12
`
`CustomPlay, LLC v. ClearPlay, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00783, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 7, 2014) ......................................... 9, 14
`
`Dish Network L.L.C. v. Dragon Intellectual Prop., LLC,
`IPR2015-00499, Paper 7 (P.T.A.B. July 17, 2015) ................................ 17, 19, 20
`
`Ericsson v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
`IPR2014-00527, Paper 41 (P.T.A.B. May 18, 2015) ........................................... 21
`
`Google, Inc. v. ART+COM Innovationpool GmbH,
`IPR2015-00788, Paper 7 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 2, 2015) .............................................. 18
`
`Google, Inc. v. Everymd.com LLC,
`IPR2014-00347, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. May 22, 2014) ............................................. 22
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) .................................................................................... 22, 23, 38
`
`Hopkins Mfg. Corp. v. Cequent Performance Prods., Inc.,
`IPR2015-00613, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 7, 2015) ......................................... 3, 28
`
`iii
`
`

`
`In re Gurley,
`27 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ................................................................................ 31
`
`In re Kahn,
`441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .............................................................................. 27
`
`In re Lister,
`583 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .................................................................... passim
`
`Infobionic, Inc. v. Braemer Mfg., LLC,
`PR1015-01704, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 16, 2016). ........................................... 47
`
`Jiawei Tech Ltd. v. Richmond,
`IPR2014-00937, Paper 22 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 16, 2014) ............................ 46, 48, 49
`
`Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
`688 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 23
`
`Kinetic Techs., Inc. v. Skyworks Solutions, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00529, Paper 8 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 23, 2014) ............................................ 27
`
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) .................................................................................. 4, 26, 38
`
`Liberty Ammunition, Inc. v. United States,
`119 Fed. Cl. 368, 396 (Fed. Cl. 2014) ................................................................. 29
`
`Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
`CBM-2012-00003, Paper 7 (Order) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 26, 2012) .................... 22, 23
`
`Micron Tech., Inc. v. Limestone Memory Sys. LLC,
`IPR2016-00094, Paper 8 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 12, 2016) ................................ 25, 27, 28
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Bradium Techs., LLC,
`IPR2015-01434, Paper 15 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 23, 2015) ................................... vii, 37
`
`Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH,
`139 F.3d 877, 881 (Fed. Cir.1998) ....................................................................... 29
`
`NetApp Inc. v. Crossroads Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2015-00772, Paper 12 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 3, 2015) .............................................. 8
`
`iv
`
`

`
`Nora Lighting v. Juno Mfg.,
`IPR2015-00601, Paper 13 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2015) .......................................... 15
`
`Norman Int’l, Inc. v. Hunter Douglas Inc.,
`IPR2014-01173, Paper 7 (P.T.A.B. February 10, 2015) ..................................... 28
`
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP,
`IPR2015-00114, Paper 14 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 28, 2015) ............................................ 12
`
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP,
`IPR2014-00518, Paper 4 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 28, 2015) .............................................. 12
`
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP,
`IPR2015-00555, Paper 20 (P.T.A.B. June 19, 2015) ........................................... 11
`
`Toyota Motor Corp. v. Cellport Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2015-01422, Paper 8 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 16, 2015) ..................................... 10, 11
`
`Travelocity.com LP v. Cronos Techs., LLC,
`CBM2015-00047, Paper 7 (P.T.A.B. June 15, 2015) ..................................... 5, 13
`
`Unigene Labs, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.,
`655 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ................................................................. 4, 25, 26
`
`Unilever, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
`IPR2014-00506, Paper 17 (P.T.A.B. July 7, 2014) ...................................... 11, 13
`
`Valeo N. Am., Inc. v. Magna Elecs., Inc.,
`IPR2014-01208, Paper 49 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 21, 2015) .......................................... 21
`
`Valeo N. Am., Inc. v. Magna Elecs., Inc.,
`IPR2015-01413, Paper 12 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 12, 2015) ............................................ 9
`
`W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.,
`721 F.2d 1540, 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983) .................................... 30, 31, 34
`
`Whole Space Indus. Ltd. v. Zipshade Indus. (B.V.I.) Corp.,
`IPR2015-00488, Paper 14 (P.T.A.B. July 24, 2015) ................................ 3, 22, 26
`
`
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`
`Statutes 
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ................................................................................................... 4, 16
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) ............................................................................................ 23, 59
`
`35 U.S.C. § 311(b) .............................................................................................. 4, 16
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) .................................................................................................3, 4
`
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ........................................................................................... passim
`
`Other Authorities 
`
`PATENT TRIAL & APPEAL BD.,
`STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 2 (REVISION 9) (2014) ................................ 21
`
`Rules 
`
`FED. R. EVID. 702 (a) & (b) ............................................................................... 18, 19
`
`Regulations 
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ................................................................................. 37, 46, 52
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) ................................................................................. 2, 3, 37
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) .......................................................................................... 18
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c) ............................................................................................ 3, 16
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2) .............................................................................................. 3
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(1)(i) ........................................................................................ 30
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) ....................................................................................... 30, 43
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65 .............................................................................................. 18, 19
`
`77 Fed. Reg. 48,680 (Aug. 14, 2012) ....................................................................5, 6
`
`81 Fed. Reg. 18,750 (Apr. 1, 2016) ........................................................................... 5
`
`
`
`
`
`vi
`
`

`
`Exhibit List
`
`Exhibit No.
`
`Exhibit Description
`
`Bradium Tech 2001
`
`Scheduling Conference Transcript, Bradium Techs., LLC
`
`v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. 15-cv-031 (D. Del.) (Feb. 3,
`
`2016)
`
`Bradium Tech 2002
`
`Arjun S. Prasad, Accelerating SIFT Feature extraction
`
`with a vector DSP (Master Thesis, Eindhoven University
`
`of Technology), available at
`
`http://alexandria.tue.nl/extra1/afstversl/wsk-
`
`i/Prasad_2014.pdf
`
`
`
`vii
`
`

`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`A mere two-and-a-half weeks after the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“the
`
`Board”) rejected every asserted ground of Petitioner Microsoft Corporation’s
`
`(“Petitioner”) petitions for inter partes review of U.S. Patent 7,908,343 (the “’343
`
`patent,” IPR2015-01434) and related U.S. Patent 8,924,506 (IPR2015-01335), and
`
`just before the § 315(b) statutory one-year bar would have precluded the filing of
`
`this Petition, Petitioner filed a second round of IPR petitions attacking both patents.
`
`See IPR2016-00448 (’343 patent) and IPR2016-00499 (’506 patent).
`
`The IPR2016-00448 petition (and also, separately, the IPR2016-00499
`
`petition) should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). These petitions are nothing
`
`but second-chance do-overs that attempt to fix the deficiencies of the initial
`
`petitions, imposing additional and unnecessary burdens on both the Board and the
`
`Patent Owner. Petitioner has admitted in pending patent litigation between the
`
`parties to using the Board’s first rejections as “instructions as to how [Microsoft]
`
`could do something differently” in this second attack on the same patent. See
`
`Ex. 2001 at 12:24–13:1. This serial IPR approach abuses the process, wastes
`
`scarce Board resources, and harasses the Patent Owner. The Board has repeatedly
`
`held such do-overs to be improper.
`
`The Petition should also be rejected under § 325(d) because Petitioner’s
`
`arguments are “substantially the same” as those presented in Petitioner’s first,
`
`1
`
`

`
`failed petition. Although Petitioner seeks to mask this similarity by using a “new”
`
`substitute reference, Reddy, Petitioner has not asserted that Reddy was not known
`
`or available to it at the time it filed its earlier petition. Indeed, as discussed in
`
`Section III, Reddy is related to a reference discussed in the declaration submitted
`
`with the first petition.
`
`Further, on its merits, the Petition fails to establish a reasonable likelihood
`
`that the Petitioner would prevail with respect to any of the challenged claims.
`
`First, the Petition fails to establish that the purported “new” reference is prior art.
`
`Second, this “do-over” petition suffers from the same deficiencies as Microsoft’s
`
`first attempt. For example, the Petition does not “specify where each element of
`
`the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon,” 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4), and fails to map each actual term of the claims to a specific
`
`teaching from an asserted reference. Further, Petitioner cites portions of the
`
`asserted references that do not in fact disclose the claim elements for which they
`
`are cited. In addition, the Petition fails to articulate a motivation to combine the
`
`asserted references in the manner asserted by Petitioner, and often does not state
`
`specifically how and why the references are being combined. The declaration
`
`submitted by petitioner, for many claim elements, is identical to the Petition and
`
`thus equally as conclusory.
`
`Patent Owner urges the Board to exercise its discretion to reject the Petition
`
`2
`
`

`
`as improper under § 325(d), or alternatively to decline to institute a trial because
`
`the obviousness argument asserted in the Petition is deficient.
`
`II. BACKGROUND
`A. The Requirements to Institute an Inter Partes Review
`Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to relief. 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.20(c). No relief will be granted unless the arguments in the Petition
`
`itself support granting such relief. Whole Space Indus. Ltd. v. Zipshade Indus.
`
`(B.V.I.) Corp., IPR2015-00488, Paper 14 at 8 (P.T.A.B. July 24, 2015) (“We
`
`address only the basis, rationale, and reasoning put forth by the Petitioner in the
`
`Petition, and resolve all vagueness and ambiguity in Petitioner’s arguments against
`
`the Petitioner.”); Hopkins Mfg. Corp. v. Cequent Performance Prods., Inc.,
`
`IPR2015-00616, Paper 9 at 7 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 7, 2015.
`
`The Petition must show “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the
`
`petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the
`
`petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The petition, for example, “must specify where
`
`each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications
`
`relied upon,” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4), and must contain a “full statement of the
`
`reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance
`
`of the evidence including material facts, and the governing law, rules, and
`
`precedent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2).
`
`3
`
`

`
`Further, the Petition must show that each asserted reference qualifies as prior
`
`art. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 311(b). For a printed publication, Petitioner must
`
`show the reference was “publicly accessible” prior to the critical date, meaning that
`
`it “has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons
`
`interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable
`
`diligence, can locate it.” In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
`
`To show obviousness, a Petition must provide more than “a mere showing
`
`that the prior art includes separate references covering each separate limitation in a
`
`claim under examination.” Unigene Labs, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352,
`
`1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Petition must prove “a reason that would have
`
`prompted a [POSITA] to combine the elements in the way the claimed new
`
`invention does.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007);
`
`Unigene, 655 F.3d at 1360–61.
`
`The Board has discretion to reject an improper follow-on petition filed after
`
`an initial petition is rejected by the Board. Section 314(a) gives the Board broad
`
`discretion to deny institution of an IPR even when other statutory conditions are
`
`met. See Conopco, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., IPR2014-00506, Paper 25 at 4
`
`(P.T.A.B. Dec. 10, 2014) (designated informative) (holding that under § 314(a)
`
`institution is “discretionary, not mandatory”). The Board may properly “take into
`
`account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or
`
`4
`
`

`
`substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the
`
`Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d); see 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680 at 48,702 (Aug. 14, 2012)
`
`(“The Office . . . will exercise its authority under 35 U.S.C. 325(d), where
`
`appropriate, to deny petitions that submit the same or substantially the same prior
`
`art or arguments previously presented to the Office.”); see also 81 Fed. Reg.
`
`18,750 at 18,759 (Apr. 1, 2016) (35 U.S.C. 325(d) provides protection “for patent
`
`owners to guard against potential harassment through the filing of multiple
`
`petitions”). The Board exercises its discretion to deny review under § 325(d) on a
`
`case-by-case basis. Travelocity.com LP v. Cronos Techs., LLC, CBM2015-00047,
`
`Paper 7 at 2, 10 (P.T.A.B. June 15, 2015) (denying a second-filed Petition for
`
`review “[i]n view of the substantially similar arguments presented and . . .
`
`references applied in an earlier Petition” that was denied).
`
`B. Petitioner Proposes a Single Obviousness Challenge to
`Claims 1–20
`
`Petitioner alleges that claims 1–20 of the ’343 patent are unpatentable as
`
`obvious based on the combination of PCT Publication No. WO 99/41675 to Cecil
`
`V. Hornbacker, III (“Hornbacker”) (Ex. 1003), which was previously presented in
`
`failed IPR2015-01434, and Reddy et al., “TerraVision II: Visualizing Massive
`
`Terrain Databases in VRML,” IEEE Computer Graphics and Applications
`
`(“Reddy”) (Ex. 1004), which is related to a reference that Microsoft included in the
`
`failed IPR2015-01434, as explained in Section III.
`
`5
`
`

`
`III. THE BOARD SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO REJECT
`THE PETITION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 325(D)
`
`The Board should exercise its discretion to reject Microsoft’s Petition under
`
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because Microsoft improperly used its first, rejected petition as
`
`an advisory opinion in drafting this second, “do-over” petition. See 77 Fed. Reg.
`
`48,680 at 48702. The Petition also fails under § 325(d) because the arguments
`
`contained in the “do-over” petition are substantially the same as in Microsoft’s first
`
`petition, although Microsoft has substituted a “new” purported prior art reference
`
`(Reddy) to replace some of its previously-submitted art in an attempt to gloss over
`
`these similarities. The Board should reject Microsoft’s Petition because Microsoft
`
`fails to explain why Reddy was not available to Microsoft at the time of its first
`
`petition.
`
`Tellingly, in the do-over Petition Microsoft has submitted a reference
`
`(Reddy (TerraVision II)) that is related to a reference submitted with its first
`
`petition (Fuller (the “TerraVision I” reference)). IPR2015-01434, Ex. 1009,
`
`Appendix E (Fuller et al., The MAGIC Project: From Vision to Reality, IEEE
`
`asserted date May/June 1996). As background, TerraVision I was developed as
`
`part of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (Darpa)
`
`Multidimensional Applications GigaBit Internet Consortium (MAGIC) project. Ex.
`
`1004 ¶ 38; Fuller at 15. TerraVision II was developed as part of Darpa’s MAGIC
`
`II subcontract 1265SRI. Ex. 1004 at p. 37 (“Acknowledgments”). TerraVision II
`
`6
`
`

`
`is referenced in the TerraVision I reference. Fuller mentions the MAGIC II project
`
`by name, noting that “ARPA recently approved funding for a three-year follow-on
`
`effort, MAGIC II, which will build on the technology developed in the original
`
`MAGIC project.” Fuller at 25. Fuller goes on to state that “[s]pecific work to be
`
`done in MAGIC-II includes augmenting the MAGIC internetwork . . . to create a
`
`nation-wide, high-speed, wide-area testbed. . . . A new version of TerraVision
`
`that . . . will permit near-real-time visualization of raw imagery . . . .” Id.
`
`Comparing Fuller and Reddy, it is clear that the two articles concern the same
`
`project: “Figure 5 shows TerraVision II, a real-time, distributed terrain
`
`visualization system that we have been developing over the past five years.
`
`TerraVision was designed to enable interactive visualization of massive terrain
`
`databases that can be distributed over a high-speed wide-area network.” Ex. 1004
`
`¶ 38.1 Microsoft should not be allowed to game the system by presenting another
`
`MAGIC project article as a “new” reference.
`
`A. The Second Petition Was Improperly Filed to Cure the
`Deficiencies of Microsoft’s Rejected Original Petition
`
`Microsoft has improperly consumed the Board’s scarce resources to obtain a
`
`
`1 Reddy uses “TerraVision II” and “TerraVision” interchangeably when referring
`
`to Reddy’s custom VRML data browser. Reddy uses “TerraVision I” when
`
`referring to the prior version of TerraVision. E.g., Ex. 1004 ¶ 38.
`
`7
`
`

`
`Board opinion on its first, unsuccessful petition and to use the Board opinion as a
`
`set of “instructions” on how to file a second round of petitions. See Decision
`
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, IPR2015-01434, Paper 15 (Dec. 23,
`
`2015) (’343 Pat.).
`
`Petitioner has admitted using the Board’s first decision as a roadmap to
`
`preparing a “better” IPR petition. During a scheduling conference in Bradium
`
`Techs., LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 15-cv-031-RGA (D. Del.), in which the ’343
`
`and ’506 patents are asserted against Microsoft, the Honorable Richard G.
`
`Andrews asked Petitioner why it had filed a second set of inter partes review
`
`petitions, rather than advancing all of its arguments in a single petition. Bradium,
`
`No. 15-cv-031-RGA, Rule 16 Conference Tr. at 12:14–20 (D. Del. Feb. 3, 2016)
`
`(Ex. 2001) (“[W]hy do you do these seriatim? . . . Why don’t you put all of your
`
`arguments in the first go-round?”). Petitioner responded, “the PTAB gave us
`
`instructions, or in their order not instituting the two IPRs they gave us, or we
`
`believe they gave us instructions as to how we could do something differently, and
`
`so that’s what we did.” Id. at 12:21–13:1.
`
`The Board has regularly declined to institute a second IPR where, as here,
`
`the Petitioner exploits the Board’s decision in a first proceeding as an advisory
`
`opinion for a second Petition. See, e.g., NetApp Inc. v. Crossroads Sys., Inc.,
`
`IPR2015-00772, Paper 12 at 7 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 3, 2015) (NetApp I) (“Petitioner’s
`
`8
`
`

`
`use of the guidance in the 1233 Institution Decision to improve the present Petition
`
`weighs in favor of exercising our discretion to deny the Petition.”); CustomPlay,
`
`LLC v. ClearPlay, Inc., IPR2014-00783, Paper 9 at 9 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 7, 2014)
`
`(denial of institution decision “should not act as a how-to guide for the same
`
`Petitioner filing a second petition for inter partes review challenging claims that it
`
`unsuccessfully challenged in the first petition or claims that it reasonably could
`
`have challenged in the first petition”); Butamax Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo,
`
`Inc., IPR2014-00581, Paper 8 at 12–13 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 14, 2014) (rejecting a
`
`petition that used “our prior decision as a roadmap to remedy [the petitioner’s]
`
`prior deficient challenge,” and noting that “[a]llowing similar, serial challenges to
`
`the same patent, by the same petitioner, risks harassment of patent owners and
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`frustration of Congress’ intent in enacting the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act”).
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`Further, the timing of Microsoft’s Petitions—filing the first so as to get an
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`initial Board decision prior to the expiration of the one-year statutory period for
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`petitions, and then filing the second Petition a mere two-and-a-half weeks
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`following the Board’s rejection of Petitioner’s first petition and one day before the
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`§ 315(b) statutory bar date—also shows that Microsoft used the Board’s first
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`rejections as a guide to drafting a second set of petitions. See, e.g., Valeo N. Am.,
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`Inc. v. Magna Elecs., Inc., IPR2015-01413, Paper 12 at 9 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 12, 2015)
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`(noting that the fact that a second petition’s filing occurred twelve days after the
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`9
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`Board’s denial of prior petition is “a factor which weighs against [its] institution”
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`and ultimately declining review); NetApp Inc. v. Crossroads Sys. Inc., IPR2015-
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`00777, Paper 12 at 7 (NetApp II) (rejecting a petition that was filed less than a
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`month after, and clearly guided by, a decision declining to institute IPR on the
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`same patent); see also Toyota Motor Corp. v. Cellport Sys., Inc., IPR2015-01422,
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`Paper 8 at 21 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 16, 2015) (“[T]he timing of the second Petition raises
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`the potential for gamesmanship. . . . [because it] gave Petitioner the opportunity to
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`preview the arguments set forth [by] the Patent Owner . . . .”).
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`Microsoft’s use of serial petitions to harass Bradium is an abuse of the inter
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`partes review process. Microsoft has now filed five petitions against Bradium’s
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`family of patents, two of which have already been denied institution. IPR2015-
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`01432; IPR2015-01434 (denied institution); IPR2015-01435 (denied institution);
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`IPR2016-00448 (pending); IPR2016-00449 (pending). These multiple proceedings
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`are expensive and burdensome. Although Microsoft is a large company with the
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`resources to file repeated petitions, it would be unfair to small entities and to
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`individual inventors to allow serial IPR filings on each of several of an inventor’s
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`patents, each with substantially similar grounds to a prior petition, a mere six
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`months apart from filing to filing. This is especially true where Microsoft treats its
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`previous petitions as nothing more than an opportunity to obtain “instructions” on
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`to how to file the next ones. See Ex. 2001 at 12:21–13:1.
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`10
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`B. Petitioner Does Not Present Any Reason that It Could Not Have
`Previously Presented the Art and Arguments in the Petition
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`The Board also has the discretion to deny Microsoft’s second petition
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`because Microsoft has not shown that the Reddy reference was not known or
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`available when it filed its prior petition. See, e.g., Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco
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`Sys., Inc., IPR2015-01710, Paper 7 at 11 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 16, 2016) (declining to
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`institute review in part because Petitioner failed to argue that the newly cited
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`references were not known or available to it at the time of filing of the first
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`petition); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP, IPR2015-00555,
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`Paper 20 at 7–8 (P.T.A.B. June 19, 2015) (same); Unilever, Inc. v. Procter &
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`Gamble Co., IPR2014-00506, Paper 17 at 6 (P.T.A.B. July 7, 2014) (same); see
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`also NetApp II, at 6–7 (“[W]e agree with Patent Owner that those different or new
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`arguments could have been submitted in the ’1197 proceeding.”). Petitioner is
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`silent as to the date and circumstances under which it located Reddy. See Toyota,
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`IPR2015-01422, Paper 8 at 21 (“Petitioner does not state when and under what
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`circumstances, during the 4½ months that preceded the filing of the current
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`Petition, it became aware of Cao. . . . [I]t is not clear on this record why Petitioner
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`was unable to locate Cao at an earlier date.”).
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`The Board has previously rejected a petitioner’s serial petition under similar
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`circumstances. For example, in Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Techs.,
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`LP, the Board denied institution of six claims challenged as obvious over two
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`11
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`

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`references—APA and Boer. IPR2014-00518, Paper 16 at 14–15 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 28,
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`2015) (Samsung I). In Samsung II, Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless
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`Techs., LP, IPR2015-00114, Paper 14 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 28, 2015), Samsung tried
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`again to challenge the same six claims using the same two references but with
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`different arguments. The Samsung II Board denied institution because Samsung
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`“present[ed] arguments . . . that it could have made [in an earlier petition], had it
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`merely chosen to do so” and noted that “[p]ermitting second chances in cases like
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`this one ties up the Board’s limited resources.” Samsung II, Paper 14 at 7–8.
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`Likewise here, the Board should reject Microsoft’s second attempt to
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`invalidate the ’343 patent. Microsoft has admittedly used the Board’s decision as a
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`guide to drafting its second attempt. Further, Microsoft’s second petition contains
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`substantially similar argument to its first petition, and, although Microsoft has
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`substituted a “new” reference, Reddy, Microsoft has not explained why it could not
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`have included Reddy in the first petition, where it already included a related
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`reference.
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`C. The Petition Should Be Rejected Because Its Arguments Are
`Substantially the Same as Those Denied in the First Petition
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`The Board should also deny institution of review because the current petition
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`advances substantially the same argument as the original petition. Conopco, Inc. v.
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`Procter & Gamble Co., IPR2014-00628, Paper 21 at 10 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 20, 2014)
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`(“[S]ubstantial similarity of argument, standing alone, is sufficient for a denial
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`12
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`under § 325(d).”). The presentation of Reddy as “new art” is not itself sufficient to
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`salvage the petition, which is otherwise a renewal of substantially similar grounds
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`rejected in Microsoft’s prior petition. See Unilever, IPR2014-00506, Paper 17 at 6
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`(rejecting under § 325(d) all obviousness grounds raised in a second petition that
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`were based on the combination of previously presented art and new art); see also
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`Travelocity.com, CBM2015-00047, Paper 7 at 11 (P.T.A.B. June 15, 2015)
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`(denying review because “Petitioner simply recasts the facts in the context of the
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`same legal arguments”). This is especially the case where Petitioner previously
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`submitted Fuller (TerraVision I), which is related to Reddy (TerraVision II), with
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`the first petition. IPR2015-01434, Ex. 1009, Appendix E (Fuller).
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`Microsoft asserts Reddy as a substitute for Potmesil and Lindstrom.
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`Potmesil and Lindstrom were previously combined with Hornbacker in the
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`IPR2015-1434 petition. See Petition, IPR2015-1434, Paper 2 at 11 (Ground 1,
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`Potmesil and Hornbacker); id. at 27 (Ground 2, Potmesil and Hornbacker and
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`Lindstrom). Now, Microsoft combines Reddy with Hornbacker in the same role.
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`Microsoft asserts Reddy as covering substantially the same matter for which
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`it previously asserted Potmesil and Lindstrom. Microso