`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`There are two cases wherein Marlowe alleges that several entities infringed upon the ’786
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`
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`patent. One is this case, and the other is Marlowe Patent Holdings, LLC v. Dice Electronics,
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`LLC, No. 10-01199 (D.N.J.) (“Dice Electronics”). As a result, a Markman1decision is rendered
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`in each case. On July 31, 2014, the Court conducted a Markman hearing for disputed claim
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`terms in U.S. Patent No. 7,489,786, titled “Audio Device Integration System” filed December
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`11, 2002 (“the ’786 Patent”), between Marlowe Patent Holdings LLC (hereinafter “Marlowe”)
`
`and Ford Motor Company (hereinafter “Ford”). Marlowe Patent Holdings, LLC v. Ford Motor
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`Co., No. 11-07044 (D.N.J.) (“Ford Motor”), ECF No. 98. Thereafter, a draft opinion of the
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`Markman Ruling was issued to the parties, and a telephone conference was conducted. Based
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`upon all of the proceedings, the Court finalizes its Markman Ruling as follows.
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`In Ford Motor, Marlowe and Ford have filed the appropriate Markman claim
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`construction briefs, presenting the disputed claim language and the meaning that one of ordinary
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`skill in the art should employ in light of the specification, custom and usage. (Ford Motor, ECF
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`No. 90 and 93.) In Dice Electronics, LTI Enterprises, Inc. (hereinafter “LTI”), has filed
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`1 Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
`1
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`
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`Case No. 3:11-cv-07044-PGS-DEA
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`
`
`OPINION
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`
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`MARLOWE PATENT HOLDINGS LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
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`Defendant.
`
`
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`Petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Exhibit 1112
`1112.0001
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`
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`Case 3:11-cv-07044-PGS-DEA Document 109 Filed 01/20/15 Page 2 of 41 PageID: 2231
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`supplemental Markman brief that disputes additional claim language in the ’786 Patent. (Dice
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`Electronics, ECF No. 221.)
`
`The ’786 Patent, issued to inventor Ira Marlowe, pertains to an audio device integration
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`system that enables after-market audio products such as a CD player, a CD changer, an MP3
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`player, and other auxiliary sources to be connected to, operate with, and be controlled from, an
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`existing stereo system in an automobile. (Ford Motor, ECF No. 93, Exhibit A).
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`This Court has considered the claim construction briefs filed by the parties, and made
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`claim construction determinations for the claim terms that remain in dispute in light of the
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`evidence and arguments presented.
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`I.
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`STANDARDS FOR CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`There is a two-step analysis for determining patent infringement: “first, the court
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`determines the meaning of the disputed claim terms, then the accused device is compared to the
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`claims as construed to determine infringement.” Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800,
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`804 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). When the court engages in claim construction to
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`determine the meaning of disputed claim terms, it is decided as a matter of law. Markman, 517
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`U.S. at 372. It is well established that “the construction of a patent, including terms of art within
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`its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.” Id. When construing claims, the court
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`must focus on the claim language. As explained by the Federal Circuit:
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`It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a
`patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled
`the right to exclude. Attending this principle, a claim
`construction analysis must begin and remain centered on
`the claim language itself, for that is the language the
`patentee has chosen to particularly point out and distinctly
`claim the subject matter which the patentee regards as his
`invention.
`
`
`
`
`2
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`Petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Exhibit 1112
`1112.0002
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`
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`Case 3:11-cv-07044-PGS-DEA Document 109 Filed 01/20/15 Page 3 of 41 PageID: 2232
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`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115-16 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
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`(citations omitted). When looking at the words of a claim, the words “are generally given their
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`ordinary and customary meaning,” which has been defined as “the meaning that the term would
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`have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the
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`effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13
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`(Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006). The Federal Circuit has counseled:
`
`It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention
`through whose eyes the claims are construed. Such person
`is deemed to read the words used in the patent documents
`with an understanding of their meaning in the field, and to
`have knowledge of any special meaning usage in the field.
`The inventor’s words that are used to describe the
`invention—the
`inventor’s
`lexicography—must
`be
`understood and interpreted by the court as they would be
`understood and interpreted by a person in that field of
`technology. Thus the court starts the decision making
`process by reviewing the same resources as would that
`person, viz., the patent specification and prosecution
`history.
`
`Id. at 1313 (quoting Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1998)). Those resources, called intrinsic evidence, include the claim language, the specification,
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`and the prosecution history. See id. at 1314.
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`However, when intrinsic evidence alone does not resolve the ambiguities in a disputed
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`claim term, extrinsic evidence—evidence that is outside the patent and prosecution history—may
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`also be used to construe a claim. See id. at 1317; Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
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`1576, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “[E]xtrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles,
`
`the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art” may be consulted; for example, expert
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`testimony, dictionaries, and treatises. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. However, when a court relies on
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`extrinsic evidence to construe a claim, it is guided by the principle that extrinsic evidence may
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`never conflict with intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1319. Courts “have viewed extrinsic evidence in
`3
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`
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`Petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Exhibit 1112
`1112.0003
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`
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`Case 3:11-cv-07044-PGS-DEA Document 109 Filed 01/20/15 Page 4 of 41 PageID: 2233
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`general as less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read
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`claim terms.” Id. Thus, a court should take care to “attach the appropriate weight to be assigned
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`to those sources.” Id. at 1322-24.
`
`II.
`
`THE DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS – ’786 PATENT
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`A.
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`“Interface”
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`The ’786 Patent relates to an audio device integration system, wherein one or more after-
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`market audio devices such as CD player, CD changer, MP3 player, satellite receiver, digital
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`audio broadcast (DAB) receiver, or the like, (hereinafter “after-market audio device”), can be
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`integrated with factory-installed or after-market car stereo systems. (’786 Patent, col. 1, ll. 5-12;
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`col. 4, ll. 26-32.) The ’786 Patent explains that the whole objective of the invention is to
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`“achieve[] integration of various audio devices that are alien to a given OEM2 or after-market
`
`stereo system.” (’786 Patent, col. 1, ll. 60-64; Ford Motor, Def. Br. at 11.) The disputed claim
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`term is described in all independent device claims, which provides “an interface” connected
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`between said first and second electrical connectors.
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`an interface connected between said first and second
`electrical connectors for channeling audio signals to the car
`stereo from the after-market audio device, said interface
`including a microcontroller in electrical communication
`with said first and second electrical connectors, said
`microcontroller pre-programmed to execute
`
`
`
`(’786 Patent, claim 1, l. 8; claim 25, l. 5; claim 44, l. 10; claim 57, l. 5; claim 66, l. 5; claim 76, l.
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`5; claim 86, l. 6; claim 92, l. 4; claim 99, l. 7 (emphasis added).) The disputed term is also
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`found in the method claims, which recites the step of “providing an interface having a first
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`electrical connector connectable to a car stereo…” (’786 Patent, claim 33, l. 3; claim 49, l. 4.)
`
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`2 Original Equipment Manufacturers (“OEM”), ’786 Patent, col. 1, ll. 22-23.
`4
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`
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`Petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Exhibit 1112
`1112.0004
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`
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`Case 3:11-cv-07044-PGS-DEA Document 109 Filed 01/20/15 Page 5 of 41 PageID: 2234
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`Marlowe’s proposed construction for the disputed term is—“a device including a
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`microcontroller.” (Ford Motor, Pl. Br. at 5.) Ford’s proposed construction for the disputed term
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`is—“a device separate from the vehicle and car stereo.” (Ford Motor, Def. Br. at 7 (emphasis
`
`added).) The main dispute between the parties as to this term is whether the interface can be part
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`of the OEM or after-market stereo system, or whether it is separate. (Ford Motor, Def. Br. at 8.)
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`Marlowe argues that if an interface is integrated to a car stereo, the interface becomes a
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`part of the “car stereo,” based on the definition of the “car stereo” of the ’786 Patent. (Ford
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`Motor, Pl. Br. at 6 (emphasis added).) The “car stereo” of the ’786 Patent is defined such that its
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`configuration determines whether an interface is part of the car stereo. The ’786 Patent defines
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`“car stereo” as follows:
`
`Also, as used herein, the terms “car stereo” and “car radio”
`are used interchangeably and are intended to include all
`presently existing car stereos and radios, such as physical
`devices that are present at any location within a vehicle,
`in addition to software and/or graphically-or display-
`driven receivers. An example of such a receiver is a
`software-driven receiver that operates on a universal LCD
`panel within a vehicle and is operable by a user via a
`graphical user interface displayed on the universal LCD
`panel. Further, any future receiver, whether a hardwired or
`a software/graphical receiver operable on one or more
`displays, is considered within the definition of the terms
`“car stereo” and “car radio,” as used herein, and is within
`the spirit and scope of the present invention.
`
`
`
`(’786 Patent, col. 5, ll. 1-14 (emphasis added); see also Supp. Joint Claim Construction at 2.)
`
`From this disclosure, it is evident that “car stereo” is a physical device present within a vehicle
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`that is a software-driven receiver operating on a universal LCD panel and is operable by a user
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`via a graphical user interface displayed on the universal LCD panel.
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`
`
`5
`
`Petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Exhibit 1112
`1112.0005
`
`
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`Case 3:11-cv-07044-PGS-DEA Document 109 Filed 01/20/15 Page 6 of 41 PageID: 2235
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`
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`In further support of its position that the after-market device becomes a part of the car-
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`stereo, Marlowe points to the definition of “integration” or “integrated” discussed in the
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`specification:
`
`As used herein, the term “integration” or “integrated” is
`intended to mean connecting one or more external devices
`or inputs to an existing car radio or stereo via an
`interface, processing and handling signals and audio
`channels, allowing a user to control the devices via the
`car stereo, and displaying data from the devices on the
`radio. Thus, for example, integration of a CD player with a
`car stereo system allows for the CD player to be remotely
`controlled via the control panel of the stereo system, and
`data from the CD player to be sent to the display of the
`stereo.
`
`
`
`(’786 Patent, col. 4, ll. 47-56 (emphasis added).) From this disclosure, it is evident that upon
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`connecting one or more after-market devices to a car stereo, the after-market device becomes
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`part of the car stereo, or integrated with the car stereo, as it allows a user to control the devices
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`via the car stereo. In essence, connecting the after-market device to the car-stereo results in an
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`extension of car radio, as a user can operate the after-market device using the car stereo.
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`
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`Ford argues that the disputed term “interface” is not part of the “car stereo” because
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`independent claim 1 recites said terms as different terms, as they are physically separated by
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`“first” and “second” “connectors.” (Ford Motor, Def. Br. at 8 (emphasis added).) In support of
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`its argument, Ford cites to Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572,
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`1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996), which held that it was improper to construe two different terms in the
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`same claim as synonyms.
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`
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`Ford further asserts the point that “interface” is separate from “car stereo” by relying on
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`Figure 2A of the ’786 Patent. Ford argues that because Figure 2A of the specification illustrates
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`the “interface” and the “car stereo” in different blocks, the “interface” represented by block (20)
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`
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`6
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`Petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Exhibit 1112
`1112.0006
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`Case 3:11-cv-07044-PGS-DEA Document 109 Filed 01/20/15 Page 7 of 41 PageID: 2236
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`and the “car stereo” as block (10), the two components represent different structural elements
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`that are separate from each other. (Ford Motor, Def. Br. at 9.) As a result of such structural
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`separation, Ford argues that the “interface” is not integrated into the “car stereo.” (Id.)
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`Ford draws such inference by relying in particular upon the continuation-in-part
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`application filed by Marlowe, Application No. 11/071,667, filed Mar. 3, 2005, (hereinafter “
`
`‘667 CIP”), where Figure 10 of said ’667 CIP application has interface, represented by block
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`630, integrated or built into the car stereo system, represented by block 610. (Ford Motor, Def.
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`Br. at 9; see also PG Pub ¶ [0127] of ‘667 CIP; Ford Motor, LeRoy Dec., ECF No. 90, Exhibit
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`B.) Ford alleges that “[t]he fact that Marlow added an example in which the interface is part of
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`the car stereo in a later patent application confirms that such a configuration was not part of the
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`earlier ’786 Patent.” (Ford Motor, Def. Br. at 9-10.)
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`
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`Ford has also brought to this Court’s attention the PCT application prosecuted in
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`Singapore, which has the same disclosure as the ’786 Patent, where during examination in order
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`to overcome a rejection, Marlowe argued that the PCT application did not disclose positioning
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`the interface within the car stereo system. (Ford Motor, Def. Br. at 10-11.)
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`
`
`
`
`Claim Construction
`
`The Court adopts the claim construction for the disputed term “interface” to be construed
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`as “a microcontroller that is a functionally and structurally separate component from the car
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`stereo, which integrates an after-market device with a car stereo.” The primary purpose and
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`objective of the ’786 Patent is to achieve integration of various after-market devices with the car
`
`stereo system such that information can be exchanged between the after-market device and the
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`car stereo. (’786 Patent, col. 1, ll. 5-12; col. 1, ll. 60-64; col. 4, ll. 26-32; see also Ford Motor,
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`Def. Br. at 11.)
`
`
`
`7
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`Petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Exhibit 1112
`1112.0007
`
`
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`Case 3:11-cv-07044-PGS-DEA Document 109 Filed 01/20/15 Page 8 of 41 PageID: 2237
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`In construing the claims of a patent, the Court must look to three sources known as the
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`“intrinsic evidence”: the claim language, the patent specification and the prosecution history of
`
`the patent. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517
`
`U.S. 370 (1996); Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2001).
`
`The claim terms are to be given their ordinary meaning as would be apparent to a person
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`of ordinary skill in the art unless it is clear from the patent itself that the inventor intended to use
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`certain terms differently. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (citing Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582).
`
`The inventor’s words that are used to describe the invention—the inventor's lexicography —
`
`must be understood and interpreted by the court as they would be understood and interpreted by
`
`a person in that field of technology. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (citing Multiform Desiccants, Inc.,
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`133 F.3d at 1477). The specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the
`
`patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor's
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`lexicography governs. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
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`288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
`
`
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`Here, the intrinsic evidence of claim language, clearly illustrates the “interface” to be
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`defined as: a microcontroller, functionally separate from the car stereo, that integrates an after-
`
`market device with the car stereo.3 From the specification, it is evident that “interface” is
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`synonymous with “integration,”4 as the interface, represented by block 20 in Fig. 1A, integrates
`
`
`3 ’786 Patent, col. 1, ll. 60-64 (“It would be desirable to provide an integration system that not only achieves
`integration of various audio devices that are alien to a given OEM or after-market stereo system, but also allows for
`information to be exchanged between the after-market device and the car stereo.”); col. 2, ll. 28-32 (“The integration
`system connects to and interacts with the car stereo at any available port of the car stereo, such as a CD input port, a
`satellite input, or other known type of connection.”); col. 5, ll. 38-41 (“Fig. 2 a is a block diagram of an alternate
`embodiment of the audio device interface system of the present invention, wherein a CD player/changer 15 is
`integrated with an OEM or after-market car radio 10.”); see also Claims 1, 25, 57, & 66, for instance, where the
`preamble recites “integration system.”
`4 ’786 Patent, col. 5, ll. 15-17 (“FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the audio device integration (or interface) system
`of the present invention, generally indicated at 20.”(emphasis added)).
`8
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`
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`Petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Exhibit 1112
`1112.0008
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`
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`Case 3:11-cv-07044-PGS-DEA Document 109 Filed 01/20/15 Page 9 of 41 PageID: 2238
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`the after-market devices with the car stereo form a “device integration system.” (’786 Patent,
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`col. 5, ll. 17-19.) As noted above, the inventor, being his own lexicographer, has defined and
`
`given special meaning to the term integration: “connecting one or more external devices or
`
`inputs to an existing car radio or stereo via an interface, processing and handling signals and
`
`audio channels, allowing a user to control the devices via the car stereo, and displaying data from
`
`the devices on the radio.” (’786 Patent, col. 4, ll. 47-56.)
`
`
`
`As noted from Figures 1, 2A, and 2B, for instance, the “interface” (20), acts as an
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`extension to the car radio or car stereo’s (10) circuitry such that an after-market device can be
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`connected and integrated to the car stereo (10) via the interface. After all, the ’786 Patent clearly
`
`states “it would be desirable to provide an integration system that . . . achieves integration of
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`various audio devices that are alien to a given OEM or after-market stereo system.” (’786 Patent,
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`col. 1, ll. 60-63.) As a result, the after-market device in connection with the car stereo via the
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`interface, results in a “device integration system.” (’786 Patent, Claim 1 preamble.)
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`Therefore, based on the intrinsic evidence provided in the’786 Patent, Marlowe’s
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`argument that the interface becomes a part of the “car stereo” is found to be persuasive, as the
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`connecting of the after-market device with the car stereo, via the interface, forms an extension to
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`the car stereo as said after-market devices are inter-operable with the car stereo, and capable of
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`exchanging commands and data via the interface. (’786 Patent, col. 3, ll. 1-5.)
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`A further question to consider regarding “interface” is whether it is: (i) physically
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`separate; and/or (ii) functionally separate from the car stereo. Here, based on the intrinsic
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`evidence, “interface” is considered functionally separate, rather than physically separate from
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`the car stereo.
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`The “interface” is used as a communicator or signal converter between the car stereo and
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`the after-market device. (’786 Patent, col. 5, ll. 41-45.) The “interface” allows a user to control
`9
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`
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`Petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Exhibit 1112
`1112.0009
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`Case 3:11-cv-07044-PGS-DEA Document 109 Filed 01/20/15 Page 10 of 41 PageID: 2239
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`the after-market device from control panel buttons (14) on the car stereo (10), and accordingly
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`process and format information from the after-market device and send it to the car stereo (10).
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`(’786 Patent, Figure 2A col. 5, ll. 45-55; see also Ford Motor, Def. Br. at 4-5 (“[T]he ’786 patent
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`discloses and claims an interface which outputs to the car stereo a CD player ‘presence signal’
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`that the car stereo understands. Upon receiving this ‘presence signal,’ the car stereo enters the
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`CD player mode, enabling control of the after-market CD player using the car stereo”).)
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` Representing the “car stereo” and “interface” in separate blocks in Figure 2A illustrates
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`two components that represent different structural elements that perform different function; and
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`not necessarily physical separation per se. (Ford Motor, Def. Br. at 9-10.) Figure 2A of ’786
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`Patent is directed to “audio device interface system,” wherein the different structural components
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`comprise: “car stereo,” “interface,” “CD player,” “display,” and “control panel buttons.” (’786
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`Patent, col. 5, ll. 38-41.) All the different structural components are integrated together to form
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`an “audio device interface system.” (Id.)
`
`Taking Ford’s position that “interface” and “car stereo” are two components that are
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`physically separated, or separated by distance, from each other would be contrary to the
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`understanding and interpretation by a person in this field of technology. If this Court takes Ford’s
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`interpretation of structural separation with regards to “interface” and “car stereo,” then
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`interpretation of display (13) and control panel buttons (14), would run afoul, as persuasively
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`argued by Marlowe. (Ford Motor, Pl. Br. at 6-7.)
`
`Therefore, the block diagram represented in Figure 2A, illustrating car stereo as (10) and
`
`interface as (20), represents different structural components that perform different function,
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`which therein work together in unison to form an “audio device integration system.” The block
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`diagram of Figure 2A should not be construed to interpret physical separation from each other.
`
`
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`10
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`Petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Exhibit 1112
`1112.0010
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`
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`Case 3:11-cv-07044-PGS-DEA Document 109 Filed 01/20/15 Page 11 of 41 PageID: 2240
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`Rather, it should be inferred as the representation of the “audio device interface system” as
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`collectively formed by the different components. (’786 Patent, col. 5, ll. 38-40.)
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`Ford’s argument as to structural separation between “interface” and “car stereo” based
`
`upon the ‘667 CIP application is persuasive in light of the claim construction of “interface”
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`adopted by this Court. Figure 10 of ‘667 CIP application has “interface,” represented by block
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`630, integrated or built into the car stereo system, as represented by block 610. The specification
`
`of the ‘667 application recites:
`
`is a block diagram showing an alternate
`FIG. 10
`embodiment of the multimedia device integration system of
`the present invention, indicated generally at 600, wherein
`the interface 630 is incorporated within a car stereo or car
`video system 610. The interface 630 is in electrical
`communication with the control panel buttons 620, display
`615, and associated control circuitry 625 of the car stereo
`or video system 610. The
`interface 630 could be
`manufactured on a separate printed circuit board positioned
`within the stereo or video system 610, or on one or more
`existing circuit boards of the stereo or video system 610.
`An after-market device 635 can be put into electrical
`communication with the interface 630 via a port or
`connection on the car stereo or video system 610, and
`integrated for use with the car stereo or video system 610.
`
`
`
`(PG Pub ¶ [0127] of ‘667 CIP application; Ford Motor, LeRoy Dec., ECF No. 90, Exhibit B.)
`
`Based on the disclosure of the ‘667 CIP application it would be evident to one of ordinary skill in
`
`this field of technology that during manufacturing process the interface (630) could be placed on
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`a separate or an existing circuit board of the car stereo or video system (610).
`
`This Court acknowledges the distinction between Figure 10 of the ‘667 CIP application,
`
`and Figure 2A of ’786 Patent. Figure 10 of the ‘667 CIP application explicitly illustrates the
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`interface being built-in or manufactured into the car stereo system, making the system a single
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`physical entity, wherein physical separation between “interface” and “car stereo” has been
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`
`
`11
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`Petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Exhibit 1112
`1112.0011
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`
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`Case 3:11-cv-07044-PGS-DEA Document 109 Filed 01/20/15 Page 12 of 41 PageID: 2241
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`eliminated or reduced to none. In contrast, Figure 2A of ’786 Patent illustrates the unified
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`functioning of the different structural components—“interface” (20), “car stereo” (10), “CD
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`player” (15), “display” (13), and “control panel buttons” (14)—to form an “audio device
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`integration system.” Figure 2A does not illustrate the physical separation or placement of the
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`“interface” with respect to the “car stereo.” Interpreting Figure 2A as illustrating distance or
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`separation between the different components would be contrary to the understanding and
`
`interpretation of the specification by a person in this field of technology. Figure 2A, instead,
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`illustrates the integration of an after-market device with a car stereo, via an interface, which
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`therein collectively forms an “audio device integration system.” (’786 Patent, col. 5, ll. 38-55.)
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`As to the issue of physical and/or structural separation between the interface and the car
`
`stereo, based upon the claim language presented in independent claim 1 along with the response
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`to Patent Office action, it is evident to one of ordinary skill in the art that the interface is a
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`structurally separate device from the car stereo. (Ford Motor, ECF No. 102, Exhibit 2,
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`Amendment to Claims & Remarks, 29-30.) In order to overcome prior art reference, Miyazaki et
`
`al. (U.S. Patent No. 6,613,079 (filed Dec. 19, 2000)), Mr. Marlowe amended the claim language
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`to add, inter alia, a first connector, a second connector, and a third connector, wherein said
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`connectors electrically connected the after-market device to the car stereo via the interface. (Ford
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`Motor, ECF No. 102, at 2, 9, and 31.) Moreover, in its remarks, Mr. Marlowe differentiated the
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`patented invention over the prior art reference by stating:
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`wherein a code portion is executed by the microcontroller
`for receiving an incompatible control command issued a car
`stereo through a first electrical connector connected to the
`interface, processing the incompatible control command
`into a formatted control command compatible with an after-
`market audio device, and transmitting the formatted control
`command to an after-market audio device through a second
`electrical connector connected to the interface, as required
`by Claim 1.
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`12
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`
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`Petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Exhibit 1112
`1112.0012
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`Case 3:11-cv-07044-PGS-DEA Document 109 Filed 01/20/15 Page 13 of 41 PageID: 2242
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`
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`(Id. at 32.) Having such first, second, and third electrical connectors between the interface, car
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`stereo, and an after-market device indicates to one of ordinary skill in this field of technology the
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`physical and structural separation between the interface and the car stereo.
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`Marlowe’s argument as to Ford’s attempt to confusing the issue in bringing Miyazaki
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`reference, used by examiner during prosecution, is not found to be persuasive. (Ford Motor, ECF
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`No. 106, at 1-2.) In construing the claims of a patent, the Court must look to three sources known
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`as the “intrinsic evidence”: the claim language, the patent specification and the prosecution
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`history of the patent. Markman, 52 F.3d at 977. Here, the reference to the Miyazaki patent was
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`applied by the examiner during prosecution, is part of the file wrapper and prosecution history,
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`and is therefore considered intrinsic evidence. Thus, it is imperative for the Court to consider the
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`Miyazaki reference, and the remarks and claim amendments made by Mr. Marlowe in his
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`applications in order to define its claimed invention over the prior art reference.
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`As noted above, and persuasively pointed out by Ford, Mr. Marlowe amended the claim
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`language to add separate structural features, inter alia, a first connector, a second connector, and
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`a third connector, wherein said connectors electrically connected the after-market device to the
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`car stereo via the interface.
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`Therefore, based on the intrinsic evidence presented, “interface” is interpreted as a device
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`containing a microcontroller that is a functionally and structurally separate component from a
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`“car stereo.” Upon connecting an after-market device with the “car stereo,” via the “interface,”
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`the “interface” becomes part of the “car stereo,” as the “interface” is used as a communicator or
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`signal converter between the “car stereo” and the after-market device. (’786 Patent, col. 5, ll. 41-
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`45.)
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`13
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`Petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Exhibit 1112
`1112.0013
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`Case 3:11-cv-07044-PGS-DEA Document 109 Filed 01/20/15 Page 14 of 41 PageID: 2243
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`B.
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` “Device Presence Signal”
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`The disputed term, “device presence signal” is recited in claims of the ’786 Patent, for
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`maintaining the car stereo in a state responsive to processed data and audio signals.
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`The apparatus of claim 1, wherein said interface generates a
`device presence signal for maintaining the car stereo in a
`state responsive to processed data and audio signals.
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`
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`(’786 Patent, claim 6 (emphasis added); see also claims 49, 57, 66, 76, 86, 92, and 99.)
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`This Court construes the disputed term “Device Presence Signal” as “transmission of a
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`continuous signal indicating an audio device is present.” The specification of the ’786 Patent
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`states, when a patented interface is connected to the car stereo’s CD input port, the car stereo
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`sends out a signal to the patented interface through the CD input port and the patented interface
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`sends a CD changer device presence signal back to the car stereo to maintain the car stereo in an
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`operational state and responsive to external data and signals.5 (Ford Motor, Pl. Br. at 9 n.9.)
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`When an after-market device is connected to the interface, the interface generates an audio
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`device presence signal and continuously transmits such presence signal to the car stereo6.
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`In order for the device presence signal to be continuously transmitted, as illustrated in
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`box 110 in Figure 4A, box 140 in Figure 4B, and box 170 in Figure 4C, a preliminary
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`determination is first made by the interface. Such determination pertains to whether the car radio
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`is powered on and in “CD player mode”, as illustrated by boxes 106, 136, and 166 in Figures
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`4A-C. (’786 Patent, col 12, ll. 26-30.) Once a positive determination is made that the car radio
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`5 “The integration system connects to and interacts with the car stereo at any available port of the car stereo, such as
`a CD input port, a satellite input, or other known type of connection. If the car stereo system is an after-market car
`stereo system, the present invention generates a signal that is sent to the car stereo to keep same in an operational
`state and responsive to external data and signals.” (’786 Patent, col. 2, ll. 29-35 (emphasis added).)
`
` 6
`
` “Beginning in step 110, a signal is generated by the present invention indicating that a CD play/changer is present,
`and the signal is continuously transmitted to the car stereo.” (’786 Patent, col. 12, ll. 29-32; see also col 13, ll. 15-
`18; col 13, ll. 62-66; col 14, ll. 49-51; col 15, ll. 35-38; col 16, ll. 12-15; col 16, ll. 57-60.)
`14
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`Petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Exhibit 1112
`1112.0014
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`Case 3:11-cv-07044-PGS-DEA Document 109 Filed 01/20/15 Page 15 of 41 PageID: 2244
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`is powered on, a “CD player presence signal” is generated and continuously transmitted in order
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`to prevent the car stereo from shutting off, entering sleep mode, or otherwise being unresponsive
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`to signals and/or data from an external source. (’786 Patent, col 12, ll. 32-35.) However, said
`
`“