IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________________________________________________________
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`TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION
`Petitioner
`v.
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`BLITZSAFE TEXAS, LLC
`Patent Owner
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`
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`Patent No. 8,155,342
`Issue Date: April 10, 2012
`Title: MULTIMEDIA DEVICE INTEGRATION SYSTEM
`__________________________________________________________________
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`BLITZSAFE TEXAS, LLC’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO PETITION
`FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW OF U.S. PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`Case No. IPR2016-00419
`________________________________________________________________
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`I.
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`II.
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`INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1
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`THE PETITION SHOULD NOT BE INSTITUTED BECAUSE
`PETITIONER’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS ARE INCORRECT IN
`LIGHT OF THE SPECIFICATION AND CLAIMS ........................................... 5
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`The Board Should Deny Institution in the Interest of Justice
`Because Petitioner’s Arguments Are an Abuse of Process ..................... 5
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`Petitioner Has Not Shown that the Term “Integration
`Subsystem” Invokes 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 6 ...................................................... 6
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`Even if the Term “Integration Subsystem” Is Found to Invoke
`35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 6, the ’342 Patent Describes Sufficient
`Structure. ......................................................................................................... 10
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`The Alleged Functions of the Integration Subsystem are
`not “Computer-Implemented” and Do Not Require an
`Algorithm ............................................................................................ 11
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`Even if the Functions Required an Algorithm, Figure 24
`is Sufficient ......................................................................................... 14
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`Petitioner Ignores the Voluminous Algorithms and
`Source Code Provided in the ’342 Specification ......................... 15
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`III.
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`PETITIONER HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED A REASONBLE
`LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS FOR ANY OF GROUNDS 1-7 AND
`THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED. ........................................................... 18
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`A.
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`B.
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`Requirements for Showing Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. §
`103.................................................................................................................... 18
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`Claims 49-52, 55-57, 62, 63, and 71 are not Obvious Over
`Ohmura in View of Berry (Ground 1) ....................................................... 21
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`1.
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`The Ohmura Reference Does Not Teach or Disclose the
`“Audio Generated by the Portable Device” Limitation .............. 22
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`Neither Ohmura nor Berry Teach or Disclose the “Device
`Presence Signal” Limitation (Claim 56) ........................................ 26
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`2.
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`3.
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`The Alleged Combination with Berry is Improper and
`Does Not Address the Deficiencies of Ohmura ........................... 29
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`C.
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`Claims 49-57, 62, 63, 66, 70, 71, 97, 99,100, 102, 103, 106,
`109, 110, 113, and 120 are not Obvious Over Ohmura in View
`of Berry and Marlowe (Ground 2) ............................................................. 31
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`5.
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`Ground 2 Fails as to Car Audio/Video System and
`Device Presence Signal Claims (claims 49-57, 62, 63, 66,
`70, 71, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 106, 109, 110, 113, and
`120) ....................................................................................................... 33
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`Ground 2 Fails as to Video Claims (claims 66, 70, and
`113) ....................................................................................................... 36
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`Ground 2 Fails as to Format Conversion Claims (claims
`53, 54, 70, 97, 99, 100, 106, 109, 110, 113, and 120) ................ 37
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`Ground 2 Fails as to the “Other” Claims (claims 99, 100,
`109, and 110, 54, 70, 97, 99, 100, 106, 109, 110, 113, and
`120) and “Voice Recognition” Claims (claims 55, 57,
`102, and 103) ...................................................................................... 38
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`Ground 2 Should be Denied Because it is an
`Impermissible “Catch-All” Ground................................................ 38
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`D.
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`Claims 64, 73-80, 94, 95, 101, and 111 are not Obvious Over
`Ohmura in View of Berry, Marlowe, and Kandler (Ground 3) ............ 39
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`1.
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`2.
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`Kandler does not disclose “audio generated by the
`portable device” ................................................................................. 39
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`Ground 3 Does Not Present a Proper Graham Analysis
`Because it Does Not Link the Actual Terms of the Claim
`Elements to Any Particular Teaching of the Asserted
`Prior Art References. ......................................................................... 41
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`E.
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`Claims 68 and 115 are not Obvious Over Ohmura in View of
`Berry, Marlowe, and Gioscia (Ground 4) ................................................. 45
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`F.
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`Claims 49-57, 62-64, 66, 68, 71, 73-80, 94, 95, 97, 99,
`100-103, 106, 109, 110, 111, 113, 115, and 120 are not
`Obvious Over Ohmura in View of Berry, Kandler, and
`Lau (Ground 5) ................................................................................... 48
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`Claims 66, 68, 94, 113, and 115 are not Obvious Over
`Ohmura in View of Berry, Kandler, Lau, and Gioscia
`(Ground 6) ........................................................................................... 49
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`Claim 70 Is Not Obvious Over Ohmura in View of Berry,
`Kandler, Lau, and Meyers (Ground 7) ........................................... 51
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`IV. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 52
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`Grounds 5, 6, and 7 Substitute the Lau reference for Marlowe,
`and Suffer From At Least the Same Deficiencies as Grounds 1-
`4 ........................................................................................................................ 46
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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` Page(s)
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`
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`Federal Cases
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`Apple, Inc. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00355, Paper 9 (PTAB June 26, 2015) .............................................. 19
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`Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
`757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ........................................................................ 14
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`Aristocrat Techs., Aus. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech.,
`521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ........................................................................ 11
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`C.B. Distributors, Inc. v. Fontem Holdings 1 B.V.
`IPR2013-00387, Paper 43 (PTAB, Dec. 24, 2014). ........................................ 20
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`Cisco Sys., Inc., v. C-Cation Techs., LLC,
`IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) ..................................... 20, 41
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`Google Inc. v. EveryMd.com LLC,
`IPR2014-00347, Paper 9 (PTAB May 22, 2014) .............................................. 18
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`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966)....................................................................................... passim
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`In re Kahn,
`441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .......................................................................... 19
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`Kinetic Concepts v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
`688 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ........................................................................ 18
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`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ................................................................................... passim
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`Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co.,
`CBM-2012-00003, Paper 7 (PTAB Oct. 25, 2012) ......................................... 19
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`Microsoft Corporation v. Bradium Techs., LLC,
`IPR2015-01435, Paper 15 (PTAB Dec. 23, 2015) ...................................... 42, 46
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`iv
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`Plant Science, Inc. v. The Andersons, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00939, Paper 8 (PTAB Dec. 17, 2014) .............................................. 20
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Imperium (IP) Holdings,
`IPR2015-01233, Paper 14 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2015) ............................................. 38
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`Space Exploration Techs. Corp. v. Blue Origin LLC,
`IPR2014-01378, Paper 6 (PTAB Mar. 3, 2015) ................................................. 5
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`Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.,
`713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ........................................................................ 41
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`Unified Patents Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC,
`IPR2015-01045, Paper 15 (PTAB Oct. 7, 2015) ..................................... 3, 6, 10
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`Whole Space Indus. v. Zipshade Indus.,
`IPR2015-00488, Paper 14 (PTAB July 24, 2015)................................. 18, 19, 20
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`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ...................................................................... 6, 7
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`Federal Statutes
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`35 U.S.C.
`§ 102 .................................................................................................................. 5
`§103 ............................................................................................................. 5, 18
`§ 112 ......................................................................................................... passim
`§ 311(b) ............................................................................................................. 5
`§ 314(a) ............................................................................................................. 4
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`Other Authorities
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) ................................................................................. 4, 20, 36
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.12(a)(7) ................................................................................. 3, 6, 10
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) ......................................................................................... 4, 5
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`On December 30, 2015, Toyota Motor Corporation, (“Petitioner” or
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`“Toyota”) submitted a Petition (the “Petition”) to institute inter partes review
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`(“IPR”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,155,342 (Ex. 1001, “the ’342 Patent”), challenging
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`claims 49-57, 62-64, 66, 68, 70, 71, 73-80, 94, 95, 97, 99-103, 106, 109-111, 113,
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`115, and 120 (“the Challenged Claims”). Petitioner on the same day also filed a
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`second petition alleging unpatentability of the ’342 patent over similar grounds.
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`(IPR2016-00418). The Petition is deficient for myriad reasons and should not be
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`instituted.
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`As a preliminary matter, the Petition should be denied in the interests of
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`justice because it represents improper gamesmanship by the Petitioner for two
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`reasons: (1) it takes claim construction positions contrary to those taken by Unified
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`Patents, Inc. (“Unified”) in a petition alleging unpatentability of several claims of
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`the ’342 Patent—a petition in which Petitioner should have been named as a real
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`party-in-interest; and (2) it seeks an improper advisory opinion by contending that
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`a key term of the ’342 Patent is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.
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`Unified, a company in the business of preparing and submitting petitions for
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`inter partes review for its members, filed a petition alleging unpatentability of
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`some of the same claims of the ’342 Patent as this Petition. See IPR2014-00118,
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`Paper 1 (“the -118 Petition”). As stated in the Preliminary Response to the -118
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`Petition of Patent Owner, Blitzsafe Texas, LLC (“Patent Owner”), Toyota is a real
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`party-in-interest to the -118 Petition because Toyota funded the -118 Petition by
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`paying money into a specific fund within Unified, which fund was ultimately used
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`to pay for the -118 Petition, including the accompanying expert declaration. In the
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`-118 Petition, Toyota, through Unified, advanced claim construction positions that
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`are irreconcilable with those advanced by Toyota here.
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`Specifically, in the case of the term “integration subsystem,” Unified
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`proposed a construction premised on Unified’s position that “integration
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`subsystem” connotes sufficient structure, but in this Petition, Toyota alleges that
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`the term is meaningless to one of ordinary skill in the art and should be governed
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`by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Then, Toyota contends that “integration subsystem” is
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`invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2, even though a finding of
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`indefiniteness would compel the Board to deny institution of this Petition.
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`The only plausible explanation for Toyota’s decision to take inconsistent
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`claim construction positions and to argue for the denial of its own Petition is to
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`take two bites at the apple with respect to the ’342 Patent by using Unified as its
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`shill, while also seeking an advisory opinion of invalidity for indefiniteness to
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`present to the District Court in litigation concerning the ’342 Patent. In view of
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`Toyota’s disingenuous use of the IPR process, Patent Owner asks the Board to
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`exercise its discretion to deny institution because the Petition unnecessarily
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`increases the cost of the proceedings and is being used for an improper purpose.
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`See Unified Patents Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2015-01045, Decision
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`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, Paper 15 at 3 (PTAB Oct. 7, 2015)
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`(holding that institution of inter partes review is discretionary); CFR § 42.12(a)(7).
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`The Petition should also be denied because it is not reasonably likely to
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`succeed on any of its seven grounds of unpatentability. Every claim of the ’342
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`Patent is directed to interfacing a portable device with a car audio/video system
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`using an integration subsystem. The claimed integration subsystem is structured to
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`either receive or transmit audio signals that are generated on a portable device.
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`Petitioner, like Unified in its -118 Petition, relies on one primary reference, U.S.
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`Publ. No., 2001/0028717 to Ohmura (“Ohmura”, Ex. 1102). The Ohmura
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`reference does not teach or disclose the requirement in every claim of the ’342
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`Patent that the audio signal is generated on a portable device. Petitioner, again like
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`Unified in its -118 Petition, does not address this deficiency. Thus, Petitioner has
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`failed to demonstrate how the alleged prior art teaches or discloses the claimed
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`system.
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`In addition to this fundamental deficiency, Petitioner’s request for inter
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`partes review should be denied for at least the following reasons addressed more
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`fully below in this Preliminary Response:
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`(1) The Petition fails to properly construe the claim term “integration
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`subsystem.”
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`(2) The Petition does not “specify where each element of the claim is found
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`in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon,” as required by 37
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`C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4), because each Ground has at least one of the following
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`deficiencies: (i) failing to map each claim term to a specific teaching from an
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`asserted reference; (ii) providing citations to the asserted references that do not
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`teach the claim elements against which such citations are applied; and (iii)
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`mischaracterizing the citations to the asserted references.
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`(3) The Petition fails to identify the difference(s) between the claims and
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`the asserted references as required by Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-
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`18 (1966).
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`(4) The Petition supports its assertions of obviousness with mere conclusory
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`statements and impermissible incorporation by reference of arguments from the
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`Matheson Declaration (Ex. 1120) in violation of 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3).
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`Due to at least these deficiencies, the Petition does not establish “a
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`reasonable likelihood that the Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one
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`of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Patent Owner
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`explicitly reserves the right to provide further distinctions between the prior art and
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`the challenged claims. The deficiencies of the Petition noted herein, however, are
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`sufficient for the Board to find that Petitioner has not met its burden to
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing
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`unpatentability of any of the challenged claims.
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`II. THE PETITION SHOULD NOT BE INSTITUTED BECAUSE
`PETITIONER’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS ARE INCORRECT IN
`LIGHT OF THE SPECIFICATION AND CLAIMS
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`A. The Board Should Deny Institution in the Interest of Justice
`Because Petitioner’s Arguments Are an Abuse of Process
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`35 U.S.C. § 311(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) make clear that petitions
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`for inter partes review may only advance grounds of invalidity based on 35 U.S.C.
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`§§ 102 and 103. See, e.g., Space Exploration Techs. Corp. v. Blue Origin LLC,
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`IPR2014-01378, Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, Paper 6 at
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`8-9 (PTAB, Mar. 3, 2015). As Petitioner implicitly acknowledges, the PTAB
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`cannot institute an inter partes review proceeding where the challenged claims are
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`indefinite and, therefore, not capable of being construed. Id. at 9. Nevertheless,
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`Petitioner spends a substantial portion of its limited space essentially arguing for
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`the denial of its own Petition by contending that the claim term “integration
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`subsystem” is indefinite. Pet. at 10-15. Petitioner’s expert also concludes that
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`“integration subsystem” is indefinite. Ex. 1016 ¶ 83. This argument amounts to an
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`overt and improper attempt to obtain an advisory opinion from the PTAB which
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`Petitioner would attempt to submit to the District Court in the pending
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`proceedings. Accordingly, because Petitioner has submitted the Petition for an
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`improper purpose that is unnecessarily increasing the cost of the proceeding, the
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`Board should exercise its discretion to deny the Petition. See Unified Patents Inc.
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`v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2015-01045, Paper 15 at 3; 37 C.F.R. § 42.12(a)(7).
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`B.
`Petitioner Has Not Shown that the Term “Integration
`Subsystem” Invokes 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 6
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`The term “integration subsystem” does not invoke 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 6 as
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`argued by Petitioner. Petitioner’s expert has not advanced any evidence, other than
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`mere conclusions, to demonstrate that the claim term “integration subsystem” lacks
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`sufficient structure such that it invokes 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 6. Thus, Petitioner’s claim
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`construction should be rejected.
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`Claim 49, which is representative for this purpose, recites: “an integration
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`subsystem in communication with a car audio/video system . . . wherein said
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`integration subsystem obtains . . . .” Ex. 1101, at claim 49. When a claim term
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`does not use the phrase “means for,” it is presumed that the claim does not invoke
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`35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 even though that presumption is no longer “strong.” See
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`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The
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`word “means” does not appear in claim 49 or any of the challenged claims.
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`Petitioner attempts to overcome the presumption by arguing that the term
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`“subsystem” is used interchangeably with the term “module” in the specification,
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`and that “module” has been considered a nonce term when used in claims. Pet. at
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`10. However, the claims do not recite a “module” or some other nonce or coined
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`term, and Petitioner cites no authority for the proposition that the term actually
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`appearing in the claims, “integration subsystem,” is considered a nonce term.
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`Moreover, even if the term “subsystem” were a nonce term, Dr. Matheson
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`advances no opinion as to whether the word “integration” itself has a recognizable
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`meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art as corresponding to a structure, such that
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`the term “integration subsystem” would therefore connote a known structure.
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`Without this evidence, Petitioner’s argument regarding the term “subsystem” in
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`isolation is inapposite.
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`Assuming for the sake of argument that the word “means” were recited in
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`claim 49 (i.e. “integration subsystem means”), the question would still remain as to
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`whether the term “integration subsystem” is defined solely by its function.
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`According to Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, “[t]he standard is whether the
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`words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a
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`sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” 792 F.3d at 1349.
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`Petitioner does not explain why the term “integration subsystem” is not clearly
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`understood by a person of ordinary skill to be the name of a structure. Pet. at 10.
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`Petitioner points only the declaration of Dr. Matheson, Ex. 1120 ¶ 72, which
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`contains a bare allegation, without support, that the term “has no recognizable
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`meaning.”1 However, upon deeper inspection, it is clear from Dr. Matheson’s
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`declaration that one of ordinary skill in the art, including Dr. Matheson himself,
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`understands that the term “integration subsystem” has a sufficiently definite
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`meaning as structure.
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`Dr. Matheson makes the following exemplary admissions regarding
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`integration systems and subsystems as understood by one of ordinary skill in the
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`art:
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`• “the concept of integrating a car stereo with an incompatible external
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`device was well known in the art.” (Ex. 1120 at ¶ 65) (emphasis
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`added)
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`• “use of a subsystem within a car audio/video system to wirelessly
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`integrate the car audio/video system with an external device was
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`known in the art” (Ex. 1120 at ¶ 66) (emphasis added)
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`• Ohmura “discloses wireless integration between a car audio/video
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`system.” (Ex. 1120 at ¶ 67) (emphasis added)
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`• “wireless integration and control between a car stereo and a portable
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`1 As Petitioner undoubtedly knows, Patent Owner does not have the opportunity to
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`present evidence from its own expert, or to include any additional testimony to
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`rebut Petitioner’s expert as it would in a District Court’s Markman proceeding.
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`device” was well-known in the art. (Ex. 1120 at ¶ 68) (emphasis
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`added).
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`Thus, although Dr. Matheson states that “integration subsystem” has no
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`recognizable meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art and is indefinite under
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`35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, he is somehow able to recognize the integration subsystems
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`allegedly disclosed in the prior art references. Dr. Matheson’s testimony is
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`internally inconsistent and therefore should be given no weight.
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`Additionally, Patent Owner notes that Petitioner’s position on the treatment
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`of “integration subsystem” under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 is inconsistent with the
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`position taken by Unified in a petition for inter partes review of some of the same
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`claims of the ’342 Patent—a petition where Toyota should have been named as a
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`real party-in-interest because fees it paid into Unified were used to fund the
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`petition. See Unified Patents, LLC v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC, IPR2016-00118, Paper
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`11 at 4-10 (Feb. 5, 2016). In that petition, Unified did not seek treatment of the
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`term “integration subsystem” under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Unified Patents, LLC v.
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`Blitzsafe Texas, LLC, IPR2016-00118, Paper 1 at 10 (Oct. 30, 2015). Thus,
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`Unified’s position that “integration subsystem” connotes a structure was also
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`Toyota’s position in the -118 Petition, and yet Toyota takes the contradictory
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`position in this Petition. Toyota should not be allowed to game the inter partes
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`review system by advancing arguments on both sides of the same issue. Therefore,
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`the Board should exercise its discretion to deny institution because the Petition
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`unnecessarily increases the cost of the proceedings and is being used for an
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`improper purpose. See Unified Patents Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2015-
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`01045, Paper 15 at 3 (Oct. 7, 2015) (holding that institution of inter partes review
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`is discretionary); CFR § 42.12(a)(7).
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`Alternatively, if the Board finds that “integration subsystem” connotes
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`sufficient structure such that it does not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, the Petition
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`must be denied because Petitioner advances no evidence of how any of the prior art
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`references should be applied to an appropriate construction of that term.
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`Accordingly, the Petition should be denied on all grounds.
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`C. Even if the Term “Integration Subsystem” Is Found to
`Invoke 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 6, the ’342 Patent Describes Sufficient
`Structure
`
`Petitioner’s conclusion that the term “integration subsystem” is indefinite
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`under 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 2 is incorrect because (1) the alleged functions of the
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`integration subsystem are not “computer-implemented” and thus do not require an
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`algorithm; (2) even if the functions required an algorithm, Figure 24 is sufficient;
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`and (3) Petitioner ignores the voluminous algorithms and source code provided in
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`the ’342 Patent specification that provide sufficient structure.
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`1.
`The Alleged Functions of the Integration Subsystem
`Are Not “Computer-Implemented” and Do Not Require an
`Algorithm
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`
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`An algorithm is required to demonstrate definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112
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`¶ 2 only when a means-plus-function claim is “computer implemented.” See, e.g.,
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`Aristocrat Techs., Aus. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2008). Thus, when the function does not require a general purpose computer
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`and can be accomplished by circuitry hardware, an algorithm is not required.
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`Petitioner takes liberties with the claim language by paraphrasing and
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`rewriting the claim elements of claims 49, 73, 97, and 120 as purported “functions”
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`beginning with gerunds that are not found in the claim language. See Pet. at 11-12.
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`The limitations at issue, without modification, are:
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`Alleged means-plus-function limitations of claim 49:
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`wherein said integration subsystem obtains, using said wireless
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`communication link, information about an audio file stored on the
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`portable device, transmits the information to the car audio/video
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`system for subsequent display of the information on a display of the
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`car audio/video system, instructs the portable device to play the audio
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`file in response to a user selecting the audio file using controls of the
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`car audio/video system, and receives audio generated by the portable
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`device over said wireless communication link for playing on the car
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`audio/video system.
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`Alleged means-plus-function limitations of claim 73:
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`wherein said integration subsystem obtains, using said wireless
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`communication link, information about an audio file received by the
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`portable device, transmits the information to the car audio/video
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`system for subsequent display of the information on a display of the
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`car audio/video system, instructs the portable device to play the audio
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`file in response to a user selecting the audio file using controls of the
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`car audio/video system, and receives audio generated by the portable
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`device over said wireless communication link for playing on the car
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`audio/video system.
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`Alleged means-plus-function limitations of claim 97:
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`wherein said integration subsystem channels audio generated by the
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`portable device to the car audio/video system using the wireless
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`communication link for subsequent playing of the audio on the car
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`audio/video system, the audio corresponding to an audio file played
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`by the portable device, and
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`wherein said integration subsystem receives a control command
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`issued by a user through one or more controls of the car audio/video
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`system in a format incompatible with the portable device, processes
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`the control command into a formatted command compatible with the
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`portable device, and dispatches the formatted command to the
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`portable device for execution thereby.
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`Alleged means-plus-function limitations of claim 120:
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`wherein said integration subsystem instructs the portable device to
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`play an audio file in response to a user selecting the audio file using
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`controls of the car audio/video system,
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`wherein said integration subsystem channels audio generated by the
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`portable device to the car audio/video system using the wireless
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`communication link for subsequent playing of the audio on the car
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`audio/video system, the audio corresponding to the audio file played
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`by the portable device, and
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`wherein said integration subsystem receives data generated by the
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`portable device in a format incompatible with the car audio/video
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`system, processes the data into formatted data compatible with the car
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`audio/video system, and transmits the processed data to the car
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`audio/video system for subsequent display of the processed data on a
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`display of the car audio/video system.
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`Ex. 1101 at claims 49, 73, 97, and 120.
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`Petitioner incorrectly concludes that the “integration subsystem” is computer
`
`implemented for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 because it overlooks the
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`structure disclosed in the specification. The portions of the specification cited by
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`Petitioner indicate that the integration subsystem is not limited to a
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`microcontroller, stating that “[t]he integration subsystem 932 contains circuitry
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`similar to the circuitry disclosed in the various embodiments of the present
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`invention discussed herein, and could include a PIC16F872 or PIC16F873
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`microcontroller.” Ex. 1101 at 34:63-66 (emphasis added).
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`Other circuitry for performing the functions attributed to the integration
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`subsystem includes a “wireless communication link” which is a structure known in
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`the art that does not require a microcontroller. For example, claim 49 states that
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`the integration subsystem “receives audio generated by the portable device over
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`13
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`said wireless communication link for playing on the car audio/video system.” Ex.
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`
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`1101 at claim 49. Similarly, claim 49 requires that the integration subsystem
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`“obtains, using said wireless communication link, information about an audio file.”
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`Id. In both cases, wireless receiver circuitry and other integrated circuit
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`components described in the specification can perform the alleged functions for
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`which an algorithm is not necessary. See e.g., id. at Cols. 15-25. The use of this
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`structure to perform the very functions that Petitioner claims are computer-
`
`implemented demonstrates that its claim construction is flawed and its Petition
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`must be denied.
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`2.
`Even if the Functions Required an Algorithm, Figure
`24 is Sufficient
`
`Even if an algorithm were required for the “integration subsystem,” Apple v.
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`Motorola stands for the proposition that source code is not necessary—the
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`algorithm can be understood as “an outline of an algorithm, a flowchart, or a
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`specific set of instructions or rules” disclosed in the specification. Apple Inc. v.
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`Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). Figure 24
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`is one such flowchart. The algorithm described in Figure 24 details the operation
`
`of the integration subsystem, and provides support for each limitation of the
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`claims. Petitioner begrudgingly acknowledges the flowchart of Figure 24 and
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`admits that the “integration subsystem” can be “programmed to perform the
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`14
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`method of FIG. 24.” Pet. at 14-15.
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`IPR2016-00419
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`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
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`3.
`Petitioner Ignores the Voluminous Algorithms and
`Source Code Provided in the ’342 Specification
`
` Finally, even if an algorithm were required to preserve the definiteness of
`
`the claims, and even if Figure 24 of the ’342 Patent were found to be deficient, the
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`specification is replete with algorithms, including detailed source code, and
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`“circuitry similar” to the integration subsystem, that provide structure to perform
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`the claimed functions.
`
`For exa