Case 1:03-cv-00440-WY-DLM Document 207 Filed 08/13/08 Page 1 of 22 PageID #: 2200
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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
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`NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
`JUDGMENT ACCOMPANIED BY OPINION
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`OPINION FILED AND JUDGMENT ENTERED: 08/07/08
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`AUG 12 l"",
`us: DISTRICT
`DTSTliicrofft.VIrr
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`The attached opinion announcing the judgment ofthe court in your case was filed and judgment was
`entered on the date indicated above. The mandate will be issued in due course.
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`Information is also provided about petitions for rehearing and rehearing en bane. The questions and
`answers are those frequently asked and answered by the Clerk's Office.
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`No costs were taxed in this appeal.
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`Regarding exhibits and visual aids: Your attention is directed to FRAP 34(g) which states that the
`clerk may destroy or dispose of the exhibits if counsel does not reclaim them within a reasonable time after
`the clerk gives notice to remove them. (The clerk deems a reasonable time to be IS days from the date the
`final mandate is issued.)
`
`JAN HORBALY
`Clerk
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`cc:
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`Paul J. Hayes
`Frank E. Scherkenbach
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`UNILOC USA Y MICROSOFT, 2008-1121
`DCT - RI, 03-CY-440
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`PETITIONERS EX. 1008
`Page 1
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`

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`Case 1:03-cv-00440-WY-DLM Document 207 Filed 08/13/08 Page 2 of 22 PageID #: 2201
`NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
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`United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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`2008-1121
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`UNILOC USA INC.
`and UNILOC SINGAPORE PRIVATE LIMITED,
`
`v.
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`MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
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`Plaintiffs-Appellants,
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`Defendant-Appellee.
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`Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island in case no.
`03-CV-440, Judge William E. Smith.
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`DECIDED: August 7,2008
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`Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, LINN and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
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`Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge MOORE. Opinion dissenting in part filed by
`Chief Judge MICHEL.
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`MOORE, Circuit Judge.
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`Plaintiff-appellants Uniloc USA Inc. and Uniloc Singapore Private Limited
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`(collectively, Uniloc), the exclusive licensee and owner respectively of U.S. Patent No.
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`5,490,216 (the '216 patent). base their appeal on two grounds . Uniloc appeals the
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`denial of their motion to recuse the district court judge on the basis that an intern he had
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`hired to assist with the case allegedly had ties to Microsoft
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`that would cause a
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`reasonable person to question the judge 's impartiality. Uniloc also appeals the
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`summary judgment of noninfringment entered in favor of defendant-appellee Microsoft
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`PETITIONERS EX. 1008
`Page 2
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`Case 1:03-cv-00440-WY-DLM Document 207 Filed 08/13/08 Page 3 of 22 PageID #: 2202
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`by the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. We affirm the district
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`court's denial of Uniloc's motion for recusal as Uniloc has failed to establish how the
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`denial was an abuse of discretion, but reverse and remand the district court's grant of
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`summary judgment as Uniloc has pointed to evidence submitted below that would
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`create a genuine issue of material fact.
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`BACKGROUND
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`The '216 patent is directed to a software registration system wherein a particular
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`piece of software may run on a platform in use mode if and only if a specified licensing
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`procedure has taken place. See '216 patent Abstract. Uniloc sued Microsoft, alleging
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`that Microsoft's Product Activation system, an anti-piracy registration system used to
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`reduce unlicensed use of its software products,
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`infringed sixteen claims of the '216
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`patent under eight different infringement theories over twenty-four different disputed
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`claim terms. See generally Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 447 F. Supp. 2d 177
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`(D.R.1. 2006).
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`After having construed all disputed claim terms, the district judge indicated that
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`he was inclined to appoint an independent expert or special master to assist in deciding
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`the motions given the complicated subject matter of this dispute. Ultimately, the district
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`court hired an evening law student who was finishing his Ph.D. in computer science as
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`an unpaid judicial
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`intern to work on the case.
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`Uniloc objected to the intern's
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`involvement with the case, alleging that the intern had numerous ties to Microsoft. At a
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`hearing to address Uniloc's objections, the judge informed Uniloc that it had no "veto
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`power" over his hiring of chambers staff and that Uniloc's only recourse was to move for
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`2008-1121
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`PETITIONERS EX. 1008
`Page 3
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`recusal of the judge himself. Uniloc filed a motion for recusal of the judge, which was
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`denied.
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`On the merits of Uniloc's claims for infringement,
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`the district court granted
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`summary judgment of noninfringement concluding that Product Activation did not
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`infringe any of the independent claims of the '216 patent. The district court concluded
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`that the '216 patent claims at issue required the same algorithm on both the client and
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`server side to generate licensee unique IDs.
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`If these licensee unique IDs match, the
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`registration authority validates the registration and the intending licensee is then able to
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`use the software. After determining that Uniloc had failed to offer proof that Microsoft's
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`Product Activation software employed the same algorithm on both the client and server
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`side to generate licensee unique IDs that could then be compared to determine
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`authorization,
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`the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement.
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`Subsequently, the district court granted the parties' subsequent joint motion to dismiss
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`all remaining claims and counterclaims without prejudice.
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`Uniloc timely filed their appeal. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
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`28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
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`I.
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`Denial of Motion for Recusal
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`DISCUSSION
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`We start by examining the district court's denial of Uniloc's motion for recusal.
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`As it does not involve issues unique to our exclusive subject matter jurisdiction, we
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`follow regional circuit law in reviewing a denial of a motion for recusal. 28 U.S.C. §
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`455(a) provides that "[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall
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`disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
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`2008-1121
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`Page 4
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`questioned." The key to the analysis is perception, not reality; a judge may be required
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`to be recused, even in the absence of an actual bias. See Liteky v. United States, 510
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`U.S. 540, 548 (1994). Despite the statute's catch-all nature, the First Circuit has held
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`that a judge is required to step down "only if the charge against her is supported by a
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`factual foundation and 'the facts provide what an objective, knowledqeablemernber of
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`the public would find to be a reasonable basis for doubting the judge's impartiality.'''
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`!D.
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`re United States, 158 F.3d 26,30 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting In re United States, 666 F.2d
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`690,695 (1st Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original)). And, since in many cases reasonable
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`deciders may disagree, the district judge is allowed a range of discretion. As a
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`reviewing court, therefore, we do not ask whether we would have decided as the trial
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`court did, but only whether the trial court's decision can be defended as a rational
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`conclusion supported by a reasonable reading of the record.
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`In re United States, 666
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`F.2d at 695.
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`Uniloc contends that the district judge should have recused himself because the
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`intern he hired to assist with this case possessed "financial and contractual
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`relationships" with Microsoft. These connections, as characterized by the district court,
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`include: 1) the receipt of royalty payments by Microsoft Press pursuant to publishing
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`contracts for four programming guides co-authored by the intern and published 9-11
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`years ago; 2) the assignment of copyrights for his books to Microsoft; 3) a generic
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`expression of thanks to certain Microsoft and Microsoft Press employees in his books;
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`4) an expression of admiration for Microsoft products in articles written and published by
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`him in Microsoft journals ; and 5) indirect financing for his graduate studies from a
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`2008-1121
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`Microsoft research grant scheduled to expire before the start of his summer internship
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`with the district court.
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`Although reasonable minds could very well differ over the propriety of hiring this
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`intern to work on the case given his financial ties, no matter how small the monetary
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`amount, to one of the parties involved, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
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`denying the motion for recusal. Uniloc emphasized below in their recusal brief that they
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`were not questioning the impartiality of the judge himself. Rather, Uniloc argues that it
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`was the intern's connections with Microsoft that objectively created an appearance of
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`partiality. As the district court's thorough analysis indicates,
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`its conclusion to the
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`contrary is rationally based on a reasonable reading of
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`the record. The intern's
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`connections to Microsoft do not create a conflict of interest under the Code of Conduct
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`for Judicial Employees. The intern has never worked for Microsoft himself, and none of
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`his publications related to Microsoft's Product Activation technology such that he might
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`have personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts in this case. Additionally, the
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`district court concluded that an objective, knowledgeable member of the public would
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`not find reasonable basis in doubting the judge's impartiality given that the intern had no
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`financial stake in the outcome of the case. Further, the district court found that the
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`outcome of the case would not affect the intern's royalty payments or the research
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`funding that had been distributed completely before the intern started his internship with
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`the district court. Finally , we cannot ignore that it was the district judge, not the intern,
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`who was the ultimate decision maker in this case. Although law clerks have been said
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`to be capable of exerting substantial
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`influence over the judges for whom they work, ct.
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`In re Allied-Signal, Inc., 891 F.2d 967,970 (1st Cir. 1989), the same cannot necessarily
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`2008-1121
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`Page 6
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`be said of interns.
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`In this case, the district judge explicitly made that point in noting the
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`limited and indirect role that the intern would play in the court's decision-making in this
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`case. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 47, 59-60 (D.R.1. 2007).
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`Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that
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`the district court abused its
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`discretion in finding that no reasonable member of
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`the public could question his
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`impartiality.
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`Uniloc also argues that the district court committed legal error by requiring Uniloc
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`to treat the intern and judge as one by filing a motion for recusal of the judge, and by
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`applying an incorrect conflict of interest standard under § 455. We do not agree. The
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`district court made clear that it was not predicating its denial of Uniloc's motion on
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`whether the intern had a conflict of interest. Rather, the district court was analyzing
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`whether a conflict of interest existed such that an objective, knowledgeable member of
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`the public would have reasonable basis to doubt the judge's impartiality. We thus
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`conclude that Uniloc has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
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`denying the motion for recusal.
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`II.
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`Summary Judgment of Noninfringement .
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`We review a district court's grant of summary judgment without deference,
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`viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolving all
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`doubts in favor of that party. See Bus. Objects, S.A. v. Microstrategy, Inc., 393 F.3d
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`1366,1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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`On summary judgment, the district court determined that none of independent
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`claims 1, 12, 17, 19, or 20 were infringed. Uniloc limits its appeal to claims 12 and 19,
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`contending that the district court erred in concluding that Microsoft's Product Activation
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`2008-1121
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`PETITIONERS EX. 1008
`Page 7
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`system lacked a remote licensee unique 10 generating means that
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`includes "the
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`identical algorithm used by the local licensee unique 10 generating means to produce
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`the [remote]
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`licensee unique 10," or what Microsoft called the "same algorithm"
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`requirement. Uniloc is correct. The district court erred by concluding that:
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`Once again Uniloc misses the point: the '216 Patent calls for the same
`algorithm to be used on both sides as the generating means of matching
`licensee unique IDs. That is simply not the case in Microsoft's system; its
`values that might qualify as licensee unique IDs are produced by different
`algorithms, using different inputs, and hence the resulting licensee unique
`IDs do not match.
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`Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., C.A. No. 03-440 S, slip op. at 24 (O.R.1. Oct. 19,
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`2007) (emphasis in original) .
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`Microsoft itself conceded at oral argument that the district court erred in failing to
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`note that Uniloc had indeed pointed to statements from Microsoft's affiants that the
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`same hashing algorithm was, in fact, used both locally and remotely. Oral Arg. at
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`19:29-31, available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/mp3/2008-1121.mp3 ('The
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`district court did make that small error."). As pointed out in Uniloc's summary judgment
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`opposition brief and summary judgment hearing arguments, Microsoft's affiants
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`confirmed that the same hashing algorithms are used on both the client and server side
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`of the Product Activation system. See Joint App'x at 1188; 1203. Microsoft also
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`asserted in its statement of undisputed facts that the hashing algorithms in question are
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`used to hash license data, which is created from a combination of the Hardware 10 and
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`the Product 10, which is in turn created from the Product Key. Moreover, Uniloc
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`presented evidence that these hash algorithms are used to produce matching license
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`2008-1121
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`PETITIONERS EX. 1008
`Page 8
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`digests based upon the testimony of both its expert and Microsoft's afflants.' Given the
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`presence of this evidence, which was extensive and by no means conclusory, summary
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`judgment of noninfringement was improper.
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`III.
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`Other Theories of Noninfringement
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`On appeal, Microsoft presents several alternative grounds for affirming the
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`summary judgment beyond those which were reached by the district court. We have
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`considered these arguments and . conclude they are without merit.
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`For example,
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`Microsoft argues that the district court erred in construing the term "licensee unique 10,"
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`contained in all of the claims of the '216 patent," as "[a] unique identifier associated with
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`a licensee." Uniloc USA,
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`Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 477 F. Supp. 2d 177, 189 (DR. I.
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`2006). We review the district court's claim construction de novo. Cybor Corp v. FAS
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`Techs.! Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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`Microsoft argues the "licensee unique 10" should be "based on information
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`personal to the user, with the proviso that information personal to the user is distinct
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`from information about the computer hardware." Appellee Br. at 45. Microsoft would
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`require the licensee unique 10 to contain personally identifiable information, such as
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`credit card numbers, names, and addresses. Further, Microsoft argues, the licensee
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`unique 10 is not to be based on any vendor-provided information, such as the Product
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`Uniloc also produced evidence that the results of the hashing algorithms
`qualify as unique values. For example, Uniloc cited to the declaration of Dr. Wallach,
`Microsoft's witness, stating that "it is computationally infeasible to find a message which
`corresponds to a given message digest, or to find two different messages which
`produce the same digest." Microsoft disputes Uniloc's interpretation of this testimony(cid:173)
`another factual dispute best left to the jury.
`The parties agree that the claim limitations "licensee unique 10," "security
`2
`key," "registration key," and "enabling key" are synonymous. We therefore refer to
`these limitations collectively as "licensee unique 10."
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`2008-1121
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`" f ' " "; "
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`Key, because Uniloc disclaimed during prosecution the use of any such information to
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`generate the licensee unique 10. Thus, Microsoft argues that summary judgment of
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`noninfringement was proper because Product Activation does not
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`rely on such
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`personally identifying inputs to compose its registration key.
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`We agree with the district court that the licensee unique 10 does not require
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`personal information about the user. While it is true that the preferred embodiments in
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`the '216 patent contemplate a licensee unique ID being generated from personally
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`identifiable information,
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`there is no support in the claims, the specification, or the
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`prosecution history for requiring that the licensee unique 10 must be generated from at
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`least one item of personally identifiable information. The specification, of course, makes
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`ample reference to the licensee unique 10 being generated from information unique to
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`the user." But this unique user information is not limited to personally identifiable
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`information, such as credit card numbers, addresses, or names. Construing "licensee
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`unique 10" otherwise would improperly import
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`limitations from the preferred
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`embodiments. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
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`("[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of
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`the
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`invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those
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`embodiments."); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad. Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir.
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`2004) (noting that it is inappropriate to import limitations from the specification to limit
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`facially broad claims "unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the
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`claim scope using 'words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction"') (citations
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`omitted).
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`3
`There is no dispute over the district court's construction of "unique," with
`which we agree.
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`2008-1121
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`Indeed, some of these very same embodiments countenance the licensee unique
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`10 being generated from inputs other than personally identifiable information, so long as
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`the input value is unique and non-platform-related. For example, the first preferred
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`embodiment generally states that the disclosed invention provides for a "registration
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`number which can be 'unique' if the information provided by the intending licensee upon
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`which the algorithm relies when executed upon the platform is itself 'unique."
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`'216
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`patent col.6 11.18-22. This sweeping statement about the type of unique input for
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`generating licensee unique IDs, as distinguished from platform-related values like serial
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`numbers, see '216 patent col.6 11.23-66 (describing the inclusion of serial numbers in the
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`registration number generation algorithm that
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`introduces an additional
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`level of
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`uniqueness in the calculation of the registration number), in no way restricts the input to
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`personally identifiable information. Though the embodiment does list details like name,
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`company, address, state, or contact number to describe the type of input of details
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`unique to a prospective user, this list is prefaced with the phrase, "for example," leaving
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`room for other types of inputs.
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`'216 patent col.? 11.9-10. While a name, address, or
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`contact number may be considered "personal
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`information," details like the user's
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`company or state are more remote.
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`If the name of the licensee's company or their state
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`is sufficient, nothing in the specification or prosecution history would exclude other
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`indicia, such as the name of a club or church to which the licensee belongs or an
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`identifier provided to the licensee by a vendor. As another example,
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`the second
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`embodiment describes a "key file" as simply containing information comprising "user
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`registration details" along with platform-related details.
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`'216 patent col.S 11.59-65.
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`2008-1121
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`Nowhere does the embodiment constrain "user
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`registration details " to personally
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`identifiable information."
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`Microsoft is, however, correct that the licensee unique ID cannot be based solely
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`on platform-related user information.
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`The specification distinguishes the disclosed
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`invention from U.S. Patent No. 4,796,220 (the '220 patent) stating :
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`"U.S. Pat. No.
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`4,796,220 does not contemplate or disclose utilization of information which is unique to
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`the user or
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`intended licensee as part of
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`the registration process which is to be
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`distinguished from identification of the platform upon which the software is proposed to
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`be run." '216 patent col. 1 11.60-65.
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`The specification distinguishes U.S. Patent No. 4,688,169 (the '169 patent) from
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`the disclosed invention in the same manner "in that it discloses a computer software
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`security system which relies for its security on a 'machine identification code unique to
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`the machine' upon which the software to be protected is to be run. Again,
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`the
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`disclosure is limited to identitication of the platform and there is no suggestion or
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`contemplation of linking platform identification with unique user identification."
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`'216
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`patent col.2 11.5-7. This, too, is an emphasis on a distinction between platform-related
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`unique inputs and non-platform-related unique inputs. These statements clearly and
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`unmistakably disavow the use of hardware information alone to supply the licensee
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`unique ID.
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`They nonetheless leave open the possibility that vendor-provided
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`information, like Microsoft's Product Key, could be the basis for a "licensee unique ID."
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`4
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`the use of vendor-provided
`The specification certainly does allow for
`information to generate a licensee unique ID. See '216 patentfig.4; col.12 11.54-57, 61(cid:173)
`64.
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`We do not read these distinctions as requiring that this information be uniquely about
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`the user instead of just unique to the user.
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`The district court correctly construed the "licensee unique 10" as a unique
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`identifier associated with a licensee that can be, but
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`is not
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`limited to, personally
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`identifiable information about the licensee or user. This definition of the non-platform-
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`related unique user information needed to generate the licensee unique 10 could
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`encompass vendor-supplied lnformation." Uniloc has raised a genuine issue of material
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`fact as to infringement given that
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`it proffered evidence that Microsoft's Product
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`Activation system inputs non-platform-related information unique to a user, such as the
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`Product Key, to generate what might qualify as a licensee unique 10, the hash value.
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`Uniloc has pointed to statements made in Microsoft's own documents describing the
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`Product 10 generated from the Product Key as "a way to help Microsoft identify its
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`customers." Uniloc also identified statements describing the resulting hash value as a
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`"fingerprint" in an exhibit attached to Dr. Wallach's declaration. Drawing all reasonable
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`inferences in favor of the Uniloc requires that this factual question be submitted to the
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`jury.6
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`5
`We are unconvinced by Microsoft's argument that, during prosecution,
`Uniloc clearly and unmistakably disavowed the use of vendor-provided information,
`such as the Product Key, to generate the licensee unique 10. We agree with the district
`court that the single sentence, when read in context, does not preclude the vendor(cid:173)
`provided inputs for the generation of licensee unique IDs.
`Even if we agreed with Microsoft that the "licensee unique 10" required
`6
`personal customer information, such as names or social security numbers, the district
`court's grant of summary judgment would still require reversal because there would still
`be a factual question as to whether the Product Key is an equivalent of a personally
`identifiable input under the doctrine of equivalents.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Uniloc has presented a genuine
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`issue of material fact as to whether Microsoft uses the same algorithm on the client and
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`server side of the Product Activation system to generate licensee unique IDs. We
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`reverse and remand the district court's summary judgment of noninfringment. We affirm
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`the district court's denial of Uniloc's motion for recusal.
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`2008-1121
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`Case 1:03-cv-00440-WY-DLM Document 207 Filed 08/13/08 Page 15 of 22 PageID #: 2214
`NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
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`United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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`2008-1121
`
`UNILOC USA, INC. and UNILOC SINGAPORE PRIVATE LIMITED,
`
`v.
`
`MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
`
`Plaintiffs- Appellants,
`
`Defendant-Appellee.
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island in case no.
`03-CV-00440, Judge William E. Smith.
`
`MICHEL. Chief Judge , dissenting in part:
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`I agree with the analysis in Sections I and II of the majority opinion, but not with
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`the majority's claim construction in Section III. Although some may disagree, I think it
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`clear that the '216 patent requires the "licensee unique 10" to be generated from inputs
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`including at
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`least one item of personal
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`information. Because it
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`is undisputed that
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`Microsoft's license digests are generated from information about the user's computer
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`and the purchased software , and not from information that personally identifies the user,
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`I would affirm the grant of summary judgment on this alternative ground (at least as to
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`the absence of literal infringement).
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`I.
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`Claim Construction
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`While if divorced from context the phrase "licensee unique 10" could mean any
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`identification sufficient
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`to discriminate between licensees , this phrase is not used in
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`such a broad sense in the context of the '216 patent specification, "the single best guide
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`to the meaning of [this] disputed term." Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 90 F.3d 1576,
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`1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Rather, the specification makes clear that the claimed "licensee
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`unique 10" must be generated , at least in part, from personal information and not merely
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`computer-related or software-related information.
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`First, the specification distinguishes two prior-art patents on the ground that one
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`patent "does not contemplate or disclose utilization of information which is unique to the
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`user or intended licensee as part of the registration process which is to be distinguished
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`from identification of the platform upon which the software is proposed to be run," Col.
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`1:60-65 (emphases added), while the other patent's disclosure similarly "is limited to
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`identification of
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`the platform." Col. 1:66-2:8. As the majority concedes,
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`these
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`statements make clear that
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`the "licensee unique 10" of the '216 patent cannot be
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`generated from just any old inputs-at the least, inputs concerning the user's computer
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`are not sufficient. Maj. Op. at 10-11 .
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`Even beyond this disclaimer of computer-related information, the "Summary of
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`the Invention" section of the specification provides that
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`the "licensee unique 10" is
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`preferably generated from inputs including "prospective licensee credit card number,
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`date of birth and full name and address." Col. 3:50-53 (emphases added). Although
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`the word "preferably" leaves room for other inputs to be used, the listed inputs clearly
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`suggest that at least some data personally identifying the user is required. By contrast,
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`non-personal data such as "hard disk information and/or other computer hardware or
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`firmware information" is preferably used to create a "platform unique ID." See col. 3:56(cid:173)
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`59 (emphasis added).
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`Similarly, the specification distinguishes between "information entered by a
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`prospective registered user unique to that user," on the one hand, and "a serial number
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`generated from information provided by the environment in which the software to be
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`protected is to run," on the other hand, and provides that both kinds of information are
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`preferably fed into the "registration number algorithm." Col. 4:6-12. Thus , it is clear that
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`the "registration number" or "licensee unique 10" must be composed at least in part from
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`information unique to the user-in other words, as the patent abstract explains and the
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`specification repeats, from "information supplied by the licensee which characterizes the
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`licensee," i.e., personal information.
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`'216 patent abstract; Col. 3:1-2.
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`Finally, all of
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`the specific embodiments described in the specification are
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`consistent with the requirement that some information that personally identifies the user
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`is input to create the "licensee unique 10." The First Embodiment explains that "[t]he
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`registration dialogue box C (in Fig. 2b) prompts the user for details unique to that user
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`(including, for example, name, company, address, state, contact number) ," which details
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`are "passed through a registration number algorithm" along with a serial number to
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`"generate[] a registration number or security key.. .." Col. 7:8-19 (emphasis added).
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`All of the "details unique to [the] user" listed here are personal details about the user,
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`not details about the user's computer or about the software purchased by the user.
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`The majority writes that by virtue of the words "for example," the specification
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`leaves room for "other ~ of inputs." Maj. Op. at 9-10 (emphasis added).
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`I disagree.
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`The words "for example" are most naturally read to leave room for other inputs of the
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`same type as the listed examples, Le., personal details other than the combination of
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`name, company, address, state, and contact number. The majority also writes that if a
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`user's company or state is a sufficient input (rather than, say, her name),
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`then the
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`patent must allow a vendor-provided input to be sufficient for generation of a "licensee
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`unique 10." Maj. Op. at 10. But the majority's premise is incorrect-the example given
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`here by the patent is "name, company, address, state, contact number" (i.e., all of them,
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`together serving to personally identify the user, e.g. John Smith of Widgets Inc. at 123
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`Arbor Lane, Cleveland OH, (216) 555-5555), not "name, company, address , state, or
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`contact number" (i.e., anyone of them, by itself likely insufficient to identify the user).
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`My understanding is confirmed by the "registration dialogue box C" in Figure 2b, which
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`corresponds to this Embodiment and provides that the "user must enter details in the
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`specified fields in order to register the product
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`including: name, company, address,
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`contact number
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`(phone and credit card details or corporate account number)"
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`(emphasis added).' This Figure allows alternatives for the type of contact number, but
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`requires the user to enter each of her name, company , address, and contact number, so
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`that the user is personally identified.
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`The Second Embodiment
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`is no different.
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`The majority writes that
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`this
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`embodiment re fers only to "user registration details" and does not constrain these
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`details in any way. But the Second Embodiment does not purport to differ from the First
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`Embodiment with respect to the registration inputs. Rather, the "distinction as against
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`the [F]irst [E]mbodiment" is that "a duplicate key file" is created at the time of registration
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`and stored on the user's computer. Col. 8:49-55 . Thus the Second Embodiment, like
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`the First, requires input of details like the user's name, address, and contact number.
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`the Figure recites "address " where the specification
`I recognize that
`recites "address, state," but I do not think this discrepancy matters because a request
`for one's "address" typically includes the state where "sta