Case 3:05-cv-01550-SI Document 66 Filed 07/07/2006 Page 1 of 20(cid:10)
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`YODLEE, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
` v.
`CASHEDGE, INC.,
`Defendant.
` /
`
`No. C 05-01550 SI
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER
`
`On April 26, 2006, the Court held a claim construction hearing in this case. Having considered
`the arguments of counsel and the papers submitted, the Court rules as follows.
`
`BACKGROUND
`Plaintiff Yodlee, Inc., has brought suit against defendant CashEdge, Inc., alleging infringement
`of nine patents: United States Patent Nos. 6,199,077 (“the ‘077 patent”), 6,633,910 (“ the ‘910 patent”),
`6,510,451 (“the ‘451 patent”), 6,802,042 (“the ‘042 patent”), 6,412,073 (“the ‘073 patent”), 6,594,766
`(“the ‘766 patent”), 6,317,783 (“the ‘783 patent”), 6,567,850 (“the ‘850 patent”), and 6,405,245 (“the
`‘245 patent”). Broadly speaking, the nine patents all deal with systems and methods to deliver personal
`information culled from multiple Internet sources to one central web site. For example, the technologies
`at issue allow for an end user to monitor information from several types of accounts held with different
`financial institutions on one website, without having to individually log into and navigate through each
`individual website associated with each financial institution with which the user has an account. The
`parties now seek to have the Court construe a number of claims from these patents.
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`For the Northern District of California
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`United States District Court
`
`1
`
`YODLEE 2010
`PLAID TECHNOLOGIES V. YODLEE, INC.
`IPR2016-00273
`
`

`
`Case 3:05-cv-01550-SI Document 66 Filed 07/07/2006 Page 2 of 20(cid:10)
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`Claim construction is a matter of law. Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 517 U.S. 370,
`372(1996). Terms contained in claims are “generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.”
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning
`of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
`question at the time of the invention.” Id. In determining the proper construction of a claim, a court
`begins with the intrinsic evidence of record, consisting of the claim language, the patent specification,
`and, if in evidence, the prosecution history. Id at 1313. “The appropriate starting point . . . is always
`with the language of the asserted claim itself.” Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d
`1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[T]he language of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of
`claim interpretation.” Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In the
`absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor’s claim terms take
`on their ordinary meaning. However, claims are always read in view of the written description. See
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
`The written description can provide guidance as to the meaning of the claims, thereby dictating
`the manner in which the claims are to be construed, even if the guidance is not provided in explicit
`definitional format. SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 242 F.3d
`1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In other words, the specification may define claim terms “by implication”
`such that the meaning may be “found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.” Vitronics,
`90 F.3d at 1584 n.6. Although claims are interpreted in light of the specification, this “does not mean
`that everything expressed in the specification must be read into all the claims.” Raytheon Co. v. Roper
`Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 957 (Fed. Cir. 1983). For instance, limitations from a preferred embodiment
`described in the specification generally should not be read into the claim language. See Comark, 156
`F.3d at 1187. However, it is a fundamental rule, that “claims must be construed so as to be consistent
`with the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Therefore, if the specification reveals an intentional
`disclaimer or disavowal of claim scope, the claims must be read consistent with that limitation. Id.
`Although not as persuasive as intrinsic evidence, a court may also rely on extrinsic evidence,
`which “consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`2
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case 3:05-cv-01550-SI Document 66 Filed 07/07/2006 Page 3 of 20(cid:10)
`
`inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises,” to determine the meaning of claim language.
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. All such extrinsic evidence should be evaluated in light of the intrinsic
`evidence. Id. at 1319.
`
`I.
`
`DISCUSSION
`Claim Terms From Yodlee Patents
`The Court construes the claims from the ‘077, ‘910 , ‘451, ‘042, ‘073, and ‘766 patents as
`follows.
`
`A.
`
`“Gatherer”/“Gathering Software Agents”/“Gathering Cycle” (‘077 and ‘910
`Patents)
`Generally speaking, the ‘077 claims a system and method for accessing a number of Internet
`sites on behalf of an end user, collecting information from those sites, and automatically downloading
`that information to the end user. The ‘910 patent is based on the same system, and claims a system and
`method for alerting end users when the information stored on those sites changes. For example, if a user
`has two bank accounts and is able to access those accounts from the Internet, the ‘077 patent describes
`a way to automatically retrieve the user’s account balances from the banks’ websites. The ‘910 patent
`provides a way of alerting the user when one of his bank account balances falls below a certain level.
`Both patents use the term “gather” to refer the process of collecting the personal information on the end
`user’s behalf.
`
`‘077 Patent
`1.
`“Gatherer” and “gathering software agents” appear in both independent claims (claims 1 and 7)
`of the ‘077 patent. Yodlee construes the terms to mean “a software component and/or related data that
`once processed can be employed to locate and retrieve information from Internet destinations based on
`user or enterprise request.” CashEdge propose that “gatherer” be construed to mean “a summarization
`agent that combines data such that summary is not just an aggregated restatement of the gathered
`material, is programmable and is an interactive software application adapted to run on a network
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`3
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case 3:05-cv-01550-SI Document 66 Filed 07/07/2006 Page 4 of 20(cid:10)
`
`server.” The Court finds that Yodlee’s construction accurately describes the function of the gatherer.
`CashEdge’s construction imports dependent claim 3 from the ‘077 patent, which deals with
`summarization, into claim 1; this would impermissibly render claim 3 superfluous. See TurboCare Div.
`of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. General Electric Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1123 (Fed. Cir.
`2001).
`
`“Gathering cycle” also appears in both independent claims of the ‘077 patent. CashEdge
`advances a construction for “gathering cycle” that would read “a cycle during which summarization
`agents, that combine data such that the summary is not just an aggregated restatement of the gathered
`material, gather and return summary information,” while Yodlee asserts that this term needs no
`construction. The dispute over this term is essentially the same as for “gatherer”/”gathering software
`agent,” for which the Court has determined summarization is not a required component. This term need
`not be construed.
`
`‘910 Patent
`2.
`The ‘910 patent uses the term “gatherer” in independent claim 1. CashEdge asserts that this
`element is written in means-plus-function form and is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(6). The element does
`not use the term “means,” creating a presumption that it is not subject to § 112(6). Lighting World, Inc.
`v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004). This presumption can be overcome
`if it is demonstrated “the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function
`without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Id. (internal quotation marks
`omitted). Whether the term brings to mind a particular structure is not dispositive; instead, what is
`important is whether the term is understood to indicate structure. Id. at 1360.
`Yodlee has submitted an expert declaration stating that, based upon the use of “gatherer” in the
`specification, it would have been apparent to someone skilled in the art at the time of this patent that the
`term “gatherer” referred to a software application. Papakonstantinou Decl. ¶¶ 16-18. The Court does
`not believe that this is sufficient. The Federal Circuit requires that “the term is one that is understood
`to describe structure, as opposed to a term that is simply a nonce word or a verbal construct that is not
`recognized as the name of structure.” Lighting World, 382 F.3d at 1360 (emphasis added). In fact, the
`
`4
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case 3:05-cv-01550-SI Document 66 Filed 07/07/2006 Page 5 of 20(cid:10)
`
`Federal Circuit implied that a “coined term” such as gatherer would be appropriate for means-plus-
`function analysis. Id. (“[T]he term ‘detector, although broad, is still structural for purposes of section
`112 ¶ 6 because it is not . . . a coined term lacking a clear meaning such as ‘widget’ or ‘ram-a-fram.’”)
`As it is undisputed that “gatherer” is a “coined term lacking clear meaning,” the Court finds that the
`above element is written in means-plus-function form.
`When a term is written in means-plus-function form, the claim “shall be construed to cover the
`corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” 35
`U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Accordingly, claim 1 is limited to the disclosures for “gatherer” in the ‘910 patent,
`col. 14, lines 34-44, and the ‘077 patent, col. 9, lines 54-64.
`
`B.
`
`“Gathering Software Agents With at Least One Gatherer Agent Dedicated to Each
`of the Internet Sites” (‘077 Patent)
`This term appears in independent claim 1 of the ‘077 patent. CashEdge argues that this phrase
`needs no construction once “gathering software agent” and “gatherer” have been construed, while
`Yodlee advances a construction that would read “in order to effectively locate and retrieve the desired
`information, a software agent is dedicated to each Internet site. This means an agent containing the
`necessary site logic or protocols needed to locate and retrieve the desired data from a given site is
`employed for each site or information provider.” Yodlee asserts that this is necessary to make clear that
`the term “dedicated” does not mean that one gatherer cannot be used for two separate sites if they use
`the same logic. CashEdge disputes this characterization of the term “dedicated” as being unsupported,
`and offers an alternate construction that would read “for the gathering software agents, there is at least
`one gathering agent that is specifically dedicated to each of the Internet sites being accessed.” While
`the term “dedicated” can certainly be read to indicate that each gatherer may only work for one site, the
`specification indicates otherwise. ‘077 patent col. 11, lines 55-60. The Court accepts Yodlee’s
`construction.
`
`“Extracts Data” (‘077 Patent)
`C.
`“Extracts data” appears in independent claim 1 of the ‘077 patent. Yodlee seeks to construe the
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`5
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case 3:05-cv-01550-SI Document 66 Filed 07/07/2006 Page 6 of 20(cid:10)
`
`term as meaning to “locate and retrieve data from a web site in a way that allows summarization and/or
`aggregation,” asserting that is necessary to clarify that “extract” means to “copy” data, rather than “to
`pull out” as would be consonant with the normal definition of the term “extract.” CashEdge asserts that
`this term needs no construction. The Court agrees with CashEdge that no reasonable person, and
`certainly not someone with ordinary skill in the art, would think that the term “extract” as used in the
`patent involves erasure. This term need not be construed.
`
`35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 6 Claims Made by CashEdge for the ‘910 Patent
`D.
`As with “gatherer” above, CashEdge argues that a number of terms in the ’910 patent are written
`in means-plus-function format and are therefore subject to 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 6.
`
`“Guard” (‘910 Patent)
`1.
`“Guard” appears in independent claim 1 of the ‘910 patent. As with the “gatherer” element as
`used in the ‘910 patent, the term “guard” is a “coined term” that was not known in the art. The Court
`therefore finds that it is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Accordingly, the Court finds that the above
`element is restricted to the disclosures in the specification of the ‘910 patent. See ‘910 patent, col. 14,
`lines 18-64, col. 16, lines 38-47.
`
`“Notification Alert System” (‘910 Patent)
`2.
`The ‘910 patent includes the term “notification alert system” in independent claim 1. The
`revised joint claim construction brief requests the Court to determine whether the term, which also does
`not use the word “means,” is subject to means-plus-function analysis, and Yodlee’s brief argues the
`point. However, neither CashEdge’s brief nor its expert address this term. There is also no admission
`from Yodlee’s expert that this term was coined, as there is for “gatherer.” See Papakonstantinou Decl.
`¶¶ 9, 18. Thus, there is no evidence before the Court that would rebut the presumption against means-
`plus-function construction. Accordingly, the Court finds that this term is not subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112
`¶ 6.
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`6
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case 3:05-cv-01550-SI Document 66 Filed 07/07/2006 Page 7 of 20(cid:10)
`
`“Data Changes” (‘910 Patent)
`E.
`“Data changes” appears in both independent claims of the ‘910 patent. CashEdge asserts that
`the inventors have acted as their own lexicographer, and expressly defined “data changes” as meaning
`“data from an Internet site not matching data last accessed from an Internet site,” while Yodlee contends
`that the term “data changes” needs no construction. The Court agrees with Yodlee; CashEdge’s
`proposed construction does not appreciably differ from the plain and ordinary meaning of “data
`changes,” as any “change” must consist of a difference from a previous state of affairs. This term need
`not be construed.
`
`“Communication Device Other Than an Internet-Connected Device” (‘910 Patent)
`F.
`This term appears in both independent claims of the ‘910 patent. CashEdge seeks to construe
`this to mean “a device for sending or receiving information that does not communicate with the Internet
`either by wireless or non-wireless means,” while Yodlee asserts that no construction is necessary.
`Alternatively, Yodlee advances a construction that would read “a device that is not connected to the
`Internet at the time the device receives the notification.” CashEdge asserts that the prosecution history
`shows that the applicants added this language to overcome prior art by excluding all devices that are
`capable of connection to the Internet, regardless of whether they are not connected at the time of
`notification. However, the cited file wrapper language does not indicate that any device that can
`connect to the Internet is not included, it only shows that notification via e-mail would constitute
`notification via an Internet-connected device. CashEdge Ex. 12 at CE 00003344-45, 00003355.
`Furthermore, dependent claim 6 covers wireless communication devices that are “incapable of Internet
`connection.” Where there are different words used in different claims, there is presumed to be
`difference in meaning. Tandon Corp. v. International Trade Com., 831 F.2d 1017, 1023 (Fed. Cir.
`1987). The CashEdge construction goes against this presumption by construing “other than an Internet-
`connected device” as meaning the same thing as “incapable of Internet connection.” The Court
`construes this term to mean “a device that is not connected to the Internet at the time the device receives
`the notification.”
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`7
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case 3:05-cv-01550-SI Document 66 Filed 07/07/2006 Page 8 of 20(cid:10)
`
`“Component Tasks”/“Multi-Component Tasks” (‘451 Patent)
`G.
`The ‘451 patent describes a system and method that allows for multiple tasks to be performed
`upon one command from the client, such as a broad user command to “plan a trip” which causes the
`system to make airline, hotel, and car reservations on its own and return the results of these completed
`tasks to the user.
`The patent uses the term “component tasks” in both its independent claims (claims 1 and 8).
`Yodlee construes “component tasks” to mean “individual tasks that make up a multi-component task,”
`while CashEdge construes it to mean “the distinct sub-tasks of the multi-component task.” The dispute
`thus centers around the word “distinct.” It is not clear to the Court how the addition of the word
`“distinct” clarifies the meaning of the term “component tasks.” The prosecution history cited by
`CashEdge does not support the addition of the word “distinct.” Accordingly, the Court adopts Yodlee’s
`definition.
`“Multi-component task” also appears in both independent claims of the ‘451 patent. Yodlee
`defines “multi-component task” as “an overall task that is made up multiple individual tasks.”
`CashEdge defines it as meaning “a task that is accomplished by performing two or more distinct sub-
`tasks in unrelated areas that is more than simply gathering information and presenting the information
`to the end user.” Again, CashEdge cites to prosecution history that does not support its addition of the
`words “unrelated areas that is more than simply gathering information and presenting the information
`the end user.” There is nothing in the intrinsic evidence to support the limiting language proposed by
`CashEdge. The Court adopts Yodlee’s definition.
`
`“Data Gathering System” (‘042 Patent)
`H.
`The ‘042 patent discloses a system and method for generating reports based on data gathered
`from multiple Internet sites. “Data gathering system” appears in both independent claims (claims 1 and
`8) of the ‘042 patent. CashEdge asserts in the joint claim construction statement that “data gathering
`system operating on the portal system, gathering data from multiple Internet sites specifically associated
`to, and storing secured information person to the requesting user” should be construed as being written
`in means-plus-function format, although its brief contains no argument on this. Yodlee asserts that it
`
`8
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case 3:05-cv-01550-SI Document 66 Filed 07/07/2006 Page 9 of 20(cid:10)
`
`is not written in means-plus-function form, and proposes that “data gathering system” be construed to
`mean “a gatherer or software gathering agents, which is a software component and/or related data that
`once processed can be employed to locate and retrieve information from Internet destinations based on
`user or enterprise request.” The presumption against means-plus-function analysis applies given that
`the language above is not written in means-plus-function language. In light of this presumption, the
`Court believes that there is sufficient structure in claim 1 of the ‘910 patent to establish that the “data
`gathering system” is software. Accordingly, the Court does not construe this claim in means-plus-
`function terms.
`Yodlee’s construction is similar to its construction for “gatherer” from the ‘077 patent. The
`Court agrees that the term “data gathering system” is used in this patent to mean the same thing as
`“gatherer” in the ‘077 patent. ‘042 patent, abstract. Accordingly, the Court adopts Yodlee’s definition.
`
`Terms Relating to Reports From the ‘042 Patent
`I.
`As mentioned above, the ‘042 patent claims a method and system of collecting data and
`presenting “reports” to an end user. CashEdge argues that a “report” must be construed to contain
`“calculated and solution-oriented results,” and may not consist of a restatement of the data collected.
`
` “Reports”/“Presenting Reports From the Data” (‘042 Patent)
`1.
`“Reports” and “presenting reports from the data” appear in both independent claims of the ‘042
`patent. Yodlee contends that these terms need no construction. Alternatively, Yodlee proposes that
`“reports” be construed to mean “presentation of user data to the end user,” while CashEdge seek to
`construe the phrase “presenting reports from the data” as “presenting calculated and solution-oriented
`results derived from data.”
`The specification describes the report that is presented to the end user as containing some kind
`of analysis as opposed to raw data. ‘042 patent col. 3, lines 18-27, 45-49. Furthermore, the applicant
`described the report as a “meta-summary” involving interpretation and calculation of data in order to
`report a solution-oriented result in order to distinguish it from prior art that merely presented data to the
`end user. CashEdge Ex. 14 at CE 00003509-00003510. The specification repeatedly refers to the report
`
`9
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case 3:05-cv-01550-SI Document 66 Filed 07/07/2006 Page 10 of 20(cid:10)
`
`as consisting of “metasummarized” and calculated data, doing so in descriptions of the invention as a
`whole, and not just in descriptions of the preferred embodiments. See, e.g., ‘042 patent abstract; col.
`1, lines 22-30. Accordingly, the Court adopts CashEdge’s construction.
` 2.
`“Report Algorithm” (‘042 Patent)
`“Report algorithm” appears in both independent claims of the ‘042 patent. Yodlee asserts that
`this term needs no construction, and alternatively proposes that it be construed to mean “a sequence of
`operations followed by the system in order to generate a requested report.” CashEdge asserts that this
`term should be defined to mean “the distinct algorithms for accessing Internet sites to extract raw data
`relating to the request and for defining the resulting report.” The Court agrees with Yodlee that
`CashEdge’s definition leads one to believe that the report algorithm performs data extraction, which is
`not the case; the claims make clear that the data gathering system extracts the data according to the
`needs of the report algorithm. ‘042 patent, col. 25, lines 34-43. Adoption of the term “distinct” is also
`redundant, as the claims make clear that each report request is associated with its own report algorithm.
`Id. at col. 25, lines 27-30; col. 26, lines 16-20. However, the Court agrees with CashEdge that definition
`of report algorithm should refer to its role in data extraction. In line with one of the dictionary
`definitions advanced by Yodlee, the Court construes “report algorithm” to mean “a set of rules followed
`by the system to determine what data is to be extracted by the data gathering system and how that data
`is to be processed by the report processor in response to a report request.”
`
`“Report Processor” (‘042 Patent)
`3.
`“Report processor” also appears in both independent claims of the ‘042 patent. Yodlee asserts
`that the term needs no construction, and alternatively proposes that the term be construed to mean “a
`computing device used to process the gathered data necessary to generate the requested report.”
`CashEdge asserts that the term should be defined as “a processor that processes raw data according to
`a report algorithm into meta-summarized information defined by the report algorithm.” CashEdge’s
`definition needlessly involves construing the term “report,” which the Court has already construed. The
`Court finds that the meaning of this term is clear in light of the surrounding claim language and the
`construction of “reports” and “report algorithm” and declines to construe “report processor.”
`
`10
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case 3:05-cv-01550-SI Document 66 Filed 07/07/2006 Page 11 of 20(cid:10)
`
`“Report Request”/“User Request” (‘042 Patent)
`4.
`“Report request” and “user request” appear in both independent claims of the ‘042 patent.
`Yodlee again asserts that no construction is needed, while CashEdge proposes a definition that would
`read “one of a plurality of possible requests each associated with an individual one of a plurality of
`report algorithms such that the user can request an array of completely different results.” The
`surrounding claim language makes clear that each report request is associated with one report algorithm.
`Id. at col. 25, lines 27-30; col. 26, lines 16-20. CashEdge’s construction is thus redundant; the Court
`declines to construe this term.
`
`J.
`
`“Personalized Page”/“Stored Personal Pages” (‘073 Patent and ‘766
` Patent)/“Personalized Web Page” (‘766 Patent)
`The ‘073 patent describes a system and method for providing an end user with a personalized
`page containing a list of links to the user’s accounts. The links allow the user instant access to each
`account through login credentials stored with the personalized page. The ‘766 patent contains similar
`claims to the ‘073 patent, with the addition of the concept of “user-defined functions,” which allow the
`user to, for example, set the system to update information on the user’s personalized page on a periodic
`basis.
`
`“Personalized page” and “stored personal pages” appear in both the ‘073 and ‘766 patents.1
`Yodlee believes that both terms are straightforward and require no construction. CashEdge disagrees,
`arguing that both terms should be limited to pages that “provide actual user access to Internet sites
`without being required to enter additional passwords or codes or other user input.” In other words,
`CashEdge argues that a “personalized page” or “stored personal page” must take the user to a secured
`site when the user clicks on the corresponding hyperlink.
`CashEdge’s proposed limitation has some support in the specification, which provides “[i]n step
`58 a user will, minimally, select a URL from his or her bookmarked destinations [in the personalized
`page], and as is known by hyperlink technology, the transparent URL will be invoked, and the user will
`
`1“Personalized page” appears in independent claims 1, 18, and 36 of the ‘073 patent and
`independent claims 1 and 21 of the ‘766 patent. “Stored personal page” appears in independent claims
`18 and 28 of the ‘073 patent, and independent claim 11 of the ‘766 patent.
`
`11
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case 3:05-cv-01550-SI Document 66 Filed 07/07/2006 Page 12 of 20(cid:10)
`
`navigate to that destination for the purpose of normal user interaction.” ‘073 patent at col. 9, lines 31-
`35 (emphasis added); ‘766 patent, col. 9, lines 38-42 (emphasis added). In addition, the specification
`also provides that “after transparent log-on to an invoked destination [from a personalized page], the
`page at the destination is conveyed to and displayed for the user.” ‘073 patent, col. 2, lines 60-62; ‘766
`patent, col. 2, lines 64-66.
`Both of these excerpts, however, are descriptions of embodiments of the invention. Because the
`claim terms themselves are not so limited, it would be inappropriate to “import[] limitations from the
`specification into the claims.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. Accordingly, the Court agrees with Yodlee
`that these terms need not be construed.
`
`“Internet Portal (System)”/“Portal Server” (‘077, ‘042, ‘451, ‘073, and ‘766 Patents)
`K.
`The concept of an “Internet portal” is central to Yodlee’s patents, and the term appears in one
`of the above forms in every independent claim of the above patents.
`
`‘077 Patent
`1.
`For the ‘077 patent, CashEdge construes “Internet portal” to mean “a website, requiring a
`username and password entered by the users for access, utilized as an entry point for other web sites,”
`while Yodlee construes it to mean “a website, requiring user authentication, used to connect with
`Internet destination on behalf of end users and retrieve personal information.” The term is described
`within Claim 1 as extracting personal information from other sites and presenting it to the end user, and
`not as an entry point for other sites. The Court adopts Yodlee’s construction.
`
`‘451 Patent
`2.
`For the ‘451 patent, Yodlee proposes that “Internet portal” be construed to mean “a website,
`requiring user authentication, used to connect with Internet destinations on behalf of end users and
`retrieve personal information and/or perform tasks specified by the user.” CashEdge proposes that it
`should mean “a web site utilized as an entry point for other web sites.” The components of the Internet
`portal system are described in claim 1 of each patent, and each involves retrieval of information from
`
`12
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case 3:05-cv-01550-SI Document 66 Filed 07/07/2006 Page 13 of 20(cid:10)
`
`other sites. ‘451 patent col. 9, line 50 - col. 10, line 3. The Court adopts Yodlee’s construction, as it
`is line with this description.
`
`‘042, ‘073, and ‘766 Patents
`3.
`For the ‘042, ‘073, and ‘766 patents, Yodlee proposes that the Court construe “Internet portal”as
`“a website, requiring user authentication, used to connect with Internet destinations on behalf of end
`users,” while CashEdge proposes “[a] website, requiring a username and password entered by the user
`for access, utilized as an entry point for other web sites.” The parties agree that their constructions are
`very similar; the main point of contention is over whether “Internet Portal” must involve “a username
`and password” or can involve the broader “user authentication.”
`The Court adopts Yodlee’s proposed construction. Claim 1 of the ‘073 patent refers only to a
`“log on by a user” and does not limit the manner in which the log on is conducted. Further, the patents
`refer to means of user authentication other than “a username and password entered by the user.” See
`‘073 patent, Abstract (referencing use of “a Smartcard or embedded password” for logging on); ‘042
`patent at col. 10, lines 14-21. Because the patents do not limit the manner in which as user may log on,
`the Court adopts Yodlee’s proposed construction.2
`
`“Upon Connection with the Destination” (‘073 and ‘766 Patents)
`L.
`This term appears in independent claims 1, 18, and 36 of the ‘073 patent and in every
`independent claim (claims 1, 11, and 21) of the ‘766 patent. Yodlee believes that the Court does not
`need to construe this term, while CashEdge proposes “[c]onnecting the user and the user’s appliance
`to the destination.” The difference between the two parties’ constructions is that CashEdge believes that
`end user’s computer must actually connect to the target website, while Yodlee believes that an
`intermediary computer may be the computer that actually connects.
`The Court agrees with Yodlee that this term need not be construed. The Court agrees with
`Yodlee that “upon connection to the destination” refers to the portal’s connection to the destination.
`
`2This construction is slightly different from the construction of “Internet Portal” in the ‘077 and
`‘451 patents.
`
`13
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case 3:05-cv-01550-SI