IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
`WESTERN DIVISION
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`No. 03-0831-CV-W-DW
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`RDER
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`YODLEE, INC.,
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`v.
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`Plaintiff,
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`BLOCK FINANCIAL CORPORATION
`and H&R BLOCK GROUP, INC.,
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`Defendants.
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`The parties in this patent case appeared before the Court for a Markman hearing on
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`July 12, 2004. See Markman v. Westview Inst., Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). After considering the
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`parties’ oral arguments as well as their extensive briefs, the Court orders that the claims involved
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`shall be constructed as follows.
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`I. Background
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`This case concerns United States Patent No. 6,317,783 (“the ‘783 patent”), which was
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`issued to Yodlee, Inc., in October 1998. The patented invention allows an end user to gather
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`personal electronic data from several sources across the Internet, hopefully streamlining the
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`overall process for the end user. In its complaint, Yodlee alleges that the Defendants (hereinafter
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`“Block”) are willfully infringing on the ‘783 patent by continuing to offer their “Auto-Entry”
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`feature on Block’s TaxCut and other on-line tax programs.
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`1
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`Case 4:03-cv-00831-DW Document 79 Filed 12/02/04 Page 1 of 11
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`YODLEE 2009
`PLAID TECHNOLOGIES V. YODLEE, INC.
`IPR2016-00273
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`II. Legal Standards
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`Although there are several parts of a patent, the claims of a patent “particularly point out
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`and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” Markman,
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`517 U.S. at 373. "Claim construction" is the judicial statement of what is and is not covered by
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`the technical terms and other words of the claims. In performing this function, claims are to be
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`construed from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
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`invention. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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`When construing a patent claim, deference must be given to intrinsic evidence, including
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`(1) the language of the claim; (2) the specification contained in the patent; and (3) the
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`prosecution history. Id. at 1582. Unless the intrinsic evidence is "genuinely ambiguous," a court
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`should not rely on extrinsic evidence, such as expert and inventor testimony, in construing
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`claims. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 189 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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`"Even within the intrinsic evidence, however, there is a hierarchy of analytical tools. The
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`actual words of the claim are the controlling focus." Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149
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`F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[T]he claims of the patent, not its specifications, measure the
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`invention.” Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1, 11 (1935). If the claim is unambiguous and clear on its
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`face, the Court need not consider the other intrinsic evidence. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa
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`per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248-49 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The language of the claims is given their
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`ordinary meaning. Indeed, the claims “bear a heavy presumption that they mean what they say
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`and have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words by persons skilled in the
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`relevant art.” SCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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`Assessing the ordinary meaning of a claim term is often determined by referring to its
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`dictionary definition. See, e.g., National Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys.,
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`Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Texas Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, 308 F.3d 1193, 1204
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`(Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding dictionaries may be the most meaningful information to aiding judges
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`in the claim construction process). Where a claim term has multiple dictionary definitions, some
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`having no relation to the claimed invention, the intrinsic record must always be consulted to
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`identify which of the different possible dictionary meanings of the claim terms in issue is most
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`consistent with the use of the words by the inventor. Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co.,
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`257 F.3d 1364, 1372-73, (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, if more than one dictionary definition is
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`consistent with the use of the words in the intrinsic record, the claim terms may be broadly
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`construed to encompass all such consistent meanings. Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d
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`1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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`In some instances the definition of a claim term is defined by the patentee. "[A] common
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`meaning, such as one expressed in a relevant dictionary, that flies in the face of the patent
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`disclosure is undeserving of fealty." Renishaw PLC, 158 F.3d at 1250; Desper Prods., Inc. v.
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`Osound Labs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1325, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the common meaning of
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`"prior to" as inconsistent with the specification and prosecution history). Accordingly, it is
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`proper and often necessary to review the intrinsic evidence to determine whether the patentee has
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`used the claim term in a manner inconsistent with the ordinary meaning or if the patentee, acting
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`as his or her own lexicographer, has clearly set forth an explicit definition of the term different
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`from its ordinary meaning. Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1204. However, if the intrinsic
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`evidence is consistent with the dictionary definition, and if there is nothing in the record to
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`suggest that a claim term has a meaning other than what its dictionary definition would suggest,
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`the dictionary definition will control. Id.
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`Claims must be read in light of the specification, but limitations from the specification
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`should not be read into the claims. Comark Communs. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186
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`(Fed. Cir. 1998). It is also improper to construe claims solely in view of the preferred
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`embodiment. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 805 F.2d
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`1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986). “That a specification describes only one embodiment does not
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`require that each claim be limited to that one embodiment.” SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec.
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`Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). "The general rule, of course, is that
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`the claims of a patent are not limited to the preferred embodiment, unless by their own
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`language." Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1999). If
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`an invention is disclosed in the written description in only one exemplary form, the risk of
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`starting with preferred embodiment is that the single form or embodiment so disclosed will be
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`read to require that the claim terms be limited to that single form or embodiment. Texas Digital
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`Sys., 308 F.3d at 1204 (citing Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp, 299 F.3d at 1328, 63
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`USPQ2d at 1383).
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`The final source of intrinsic evidence is a patent’s prosecution history. A patent’s
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`prosecution history may contain express representations as to claim meanings or may contain
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`limitations to the scope of the claims. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582
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`(Fed. Cir. 1996). In order to find that the prosecution history limits claim scope, the statements
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`of the applicant during prosecution must evidence a clear disavowal of claim scope using words
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`of manifest exclusion. Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1210. Absent a clear disavowal of claim scope
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`the ordinary meaning of the terms controls the definitions.
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`A patentee is not entitled to claim the same invention more than once. Accordingly,
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`claims of issued patents are presumed to refer to separate and distinct inventions. The doctrine
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`of claim differentiation states that there is a presumption that each claim in a patent has a
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`different scope. Comark Communs. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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`Indeed, the Federal Circuit recently “made clear that when a patent claim ‘does not contain a
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`certain limitation and another claim does, that limitation cannot be read into the former claim in
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`determining either validity or infringement.’” Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,
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`2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 118, *23 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing SRI Int'l, 775 F.2d at 1122, 227 USPQ
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`at 586).
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`III. Disputed Terms
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`A. Store
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`Yodlee proposes that “store” be defined as “a storage area.” Block’s main disagreement
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`with this proposed definition is that it also encompasses non-volatile storage of information,
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`which is “inconsistent with the purpose and novelty of the invention.” (Doc. 72 at 8). Yodlee
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`notes that although the examples highlighted by Block do suggest the usefulness of non-volatile
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`storage, Yodlee’s expert, Dr. Gordon K. Springer, also gave examples of possible embodiments
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`utilizing volatile storage. The Court agrees with Yodlee that non-volatile storage is not required
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`by the patent and thus, store shall be construed to mean
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`“A storage area.”
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`B. Personal Information Store
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`Yodlee proposes that “personal information store” be defined as “a storage area
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`accessible by a processor that contains an end user’s personal information.” Because it is
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`consistent with the definition of the term “store” previously adopted in this order, the Court
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`accepts Yodlee’s proposed definition. Therefore, personal information store shall be construed
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`to mean
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`“A storage area accessible by a processor that contains an end user’s personal
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`information.”
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`C. End User
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`Yodlee proposes that “end user” be defined as “an individual who is the ultimate
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`recipient of date, information or results produced by a processor.” Block’s proposed definition is
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`more specific and requires that the end user “own” the personal information that is being
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`collected. After reviewing the parties’ arguments and the evidence submitted during the hearing,
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`the Court believes that Yodlee’s definition more accurately supports the plain and ordinary
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`meaning of the term. As a result, end user shall be construed to mean
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`“An individual who is the ultimate recipient of data, information, or results
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`produced by a processor.”
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`D. End User Data
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`Based on the definition of “end user” supplied above and the ordinary meaning of the
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`term “data,” the Court believes there is no further construction necessary for the term “end
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`user data” as it is used in this context.
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`E. Non-Public Personal Information
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`Yodlee contends that the term “non-public personal information” does not need any
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`further construction because persons skilled in the art would understand its meaning without
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`further information. Block proposes that the term be defined as “information/data that is specific
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`to an end user and requires verification and access data for retrieval.” The Court notes that
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`during the prosecution history, Yodlee added the modifier “non-public” to clarify that the
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`information being retrieved was indeed specific to the end users. Verification of the identity of
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`the end user before collection of the information is therefore critical, and the Court believes it is
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`necessary to define the information being collected for the end user. As a result, the Court will
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`accept Block’s definition, and non-public personal information shall be construed to mean
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`“Information/data that is specific to an end user and requires verification and
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`access data for retrieval.”
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`F. Provider Data
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`Yodlee suggests that provider data be defined as “data identifying a specific information
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`provider as well as protocol data defining how to communicate with the provider.” Block
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`generally agrees with Yodlee’s definition but wants to add to the definition that the provider data
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`is kept “in a provider store.” The Court finds that the preferred embodiment does suggest that a
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`provider store is a necessary component but that the invention does not require its use.
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`Therefore, the Court believes that the definition need not be limited as suggested by Block and
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`thus, provider data shall be construed to mean
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`“Data identifying a specific information provider as well as protocol data defining
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`how to communicate with the provider.”
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`G. Selected End User
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`Yodlee suggests that no further construction is necessary on this term because the Court
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`has already defined “end user” and the term “selected” can be understood from its plain
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`meaning. Block believes it is critical that the term define who or what is “selecting” the end user
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`and therefore seeks to add the language “selected by the processor” to the proposed definition.
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`The Court finds, however, that the claims do not require that the selector be identified and thus
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`rejects Block’s request to include this information in the definition. As a result, selected end
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`user requires no further construction.
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`H. Protocol for Instructing the Processor
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`Yodlee suggests that no further construction on this term is necessary, but Block believes
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`that the definition must reference the “provider store” where it believes the protocol will be kept.
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`As discussed in Section F of this order, however, the Court has already determined that the
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`“provider store” language is not an essential component of the definition of “provider data.”
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`Similarly, here, the Court believes that protocol for instruction the processor needs no further
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`construction.
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`I. Monitoring for Changes
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`Yodlee proposes that “monitoring for changes” be defined as “the act of periodically
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`accessing information providers to identify any changes that may have occurred to the
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`information supplied or on how to access the information providers.” Block objects to this
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`definition, claiming that the term should also reference that “specified algorithms” are necessary
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`in the monitoring process. Upon reviewing the materials submitted by the parties, however, the
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`Court believes that Yodlee’s definition, which specifies that the system must monitor changes in
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`both the personal information as well as how that information is collected, more accurately
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`defines the term. As such, monitoring for changes shall be construed to mean
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`“The act of periodically accessing information providers to identify any changes
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`that may have occurred to the information supplied or on how access the information
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`providers.”
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`J. Provider Store
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`Yodlee suggests that “provider store” be defined as “a storage area accessible by a
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`processor that contains the protocol information needed to contact the information providers.”
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`Having already rejected Block’s notion that a store must include a mass storage area, the Court
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`accepts Yodlee’s proposed definition, which is most consistent with the rest of the disputed
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`terms. Therefore, provider store shall be construed to mean
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`“A storage area accessible by a processor that contains the protocol information
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`needed to contact the information providers.”
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`K. Executing a Transaction
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`Yodlee proposes that “executing a transaction” be defined as “the use of a processor to
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`make a request and receive a response according to a prescribed protocol to accomplish some
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`task.” The parties’ dispute rests with whether this term is more than accessing data, as Block
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`suggests, and actually involves manipulating the data for a specific operation. Review of the
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`claims and the testimony of the experts at the Markman hearing does not support Block’s
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`assertion that the transactions must be limited to actual use of the data collected. Thus, the Court
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`determines that executing a transaction shall be construed to mean
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`“The use of a processor to make a request and receive a response according to a
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`prescribed protocol to accomplish some task.”
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`L. Triggered According to Accessed End User Data
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`Yodlee proposes that no further construction is necessary with respect to this term.
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`Block suggests including language relating to where the end user data is kept, i.e. “in the user
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`store,” but the Court does not believe that this location information is essential to the
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`understanding of this term. As a result, the Court finds that triggered according to accessed
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`end user data needs no further construction.
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`M. Intermediary Website
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`Yodlee proposes that “intermediary website” be defined as “an aggregation point where
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`the personal information for an end user is collected from information providers so that an end
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`user can retrieve their information from a single location and which is formatted for viewing,
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`using a format generated by the intermediary website.” Block urges the Court to adopt a
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`definition that specifies that the intermediary website is remote from the personal information
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`host. Based on the specifications, however, the Court finds that the term should be defined with
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`respect to the purpose served by the intermediary website. Therefore, intermediary website
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`shall be construed to mean
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`“An aggregation point where the personal information for an end user is collected
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`from information providers so that an end user can retrieve their information from a single
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`location and which is formatted for viewing, using a format generated by the intermediary
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`website.”
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`N. User Store
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`Yodlee suggests that “user store” should be defined as “a storage area accessible by a
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`processor containing information identifying information providers that house personal
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`information for a given end user.” Consistent with the other disputed terms relating to the term
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`“store,” the Court rejects Block’s contention that this term must include reference to a “mass
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`storage area. Accordingly, user store shall be construed to mean
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`“A storage area accessible by a processor containing information identifying
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`information providers that house personal information for a given end user.”
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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` /s/ Dean Whipple
`Dean Whipple
`United States District Judge
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`Date 12/2/2004
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