`Tel: 571-272-7822
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`Paper 10
`Entered: June 8, 2016
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`PLAID TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`YODLEE, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`Case IPR2016-00273
`Patent 6,317,783 B1
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, MICHAEL R. ZECHER, and
`JOHN A. HUDALLA, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`HUDALLA, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`Petitioner, Plaid Technologies Inc. (“Plaid”), filed a Petition (Paper 1,
`“Pet.”) requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–36 of U.S. Patent No.
`6,317,783 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’783 patent”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–
`19. Patent Owner, Yodlee, Inc. (“Yodlee”), filed a Preliminary Response.
`Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314.
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Director may not authorize an inter
`partes review unless the information in the petition and preliminary response
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`“shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail
`with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the
`reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–36 of
`the ’783 patent on the asserted ground of unpatentability presented.
`
`
`
`I. BACKGROUND
`
`Related Proceedings
`A.
`Both parties identify the following proceeding related to the ’783
`
`patent (Pet. 1–2; Paper 7, 2): Yodlee, Inc. v. Plaid Technologies, Inc., Case
`No. 1:14-cv-01445-LPS-CJB (D. Del. filed Dec. 1, 2014). Plaid was served
`with the complaint in this case on December 2, 2014. See Pet. 2 (citing
`Ex. 1002).
`Plaid also filed another petition for inter partes review of U.S. Patent
`No. 6,199,077 B1 (“the ’077 patent”), which also is owned by Yodlee, in co-
`pending Case IPR2016-00275. See Pet. 2. Plaid additionally filed a petition
`for covered business method patent review of the ’077 patent in Case
`CBM2016-00037.
`
`The ’783 patent
`The ’783 patent is directed to the “automated aggregation and delivery
`of electronic personal information or data (PI).” Ex. 1001, 1:23–25. Figure
`2 of the ’783 patent is reproduced below.
`
`B.
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`2
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`Figure 2 depicts end user 210, who accesses client computer 220 running
`client software 270 such as a web browser. Id. at 4:27–32. Client computer
`220 accesses PI engine 240 running on PI host 290 via Internet 230, and
`client computer 220 can display PI accessed from PI engine 240 to end user
`210 using client software 270. Id. at 4:33–34, 4:39–43. PI engine 240
`includes PI store 280, which is examined for “freshness” and can be
`“refreshed by directly reacquiring the PI from the particular information
`provider’s Web site 250 running on the provider’s computer system 260
`accessed across the Internet 230.” Id. at 4:34–47.
`Figure 3 of the ’783 patent is reproduced below.
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`Figure 3 depicts a block diagram of the components of PI engine 240. Id. at
`4:52–53. PI engine 240 can include PI access/transact component 340,
`which supports the update, acquisition, and transaction functionality of PI
`engine 240. Id. at 9:30–32. Access/transact component 340 utilizes “the
`access procedure and information needed for the particular PI” from
`provider store 310 along with “verification and access data” found in user
`store 360 for processing PI transactions. Id. at 9:48–58.
`
`Claim 1
`Claims 1, 18, and 20 of the ’783 patent are independent. Claims 2–17
`directly or indirectly depend from claim 1; claim 19 directly depends from
`
`C.
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`claim 18; and claims 21–36 directly or indirectly depend from claim 20.
`Claim 1 is illustrative of the challenged claims and recites:
`1.
`A method for delivering non-public personal information
`relating to an end user via a wide-area computer network to an
`end user from at least one of a plurality of information providers
`securely storing the personal information under control of a
`processor located remotely from the information providers and
`the end user, the method comprising the steps of:
`(a) the processor connecting with at least one information
`provider;
`(b) for a selected end user, the processor retrieving
`personal information for the selected end user from the
`connected at least one information provider based on end user
`data associated with the selected end user and information
`provider data associated with the connected one or more
`information providers, the end user data including information
`identifying the plurality of information providers securely
`storing the personal information relating to the end user, the
`provider data including a protocol for instructing the processor
`how to access the securely stored personal information via the
`network, the information accessible to the processor using the
`protocol also being accessible by the end user via the network
`independently of the system for delivering personal information;
`and
`
`(c) the processor storing the retrieved personal information
`in a personal information store for access by the selected end
`user.
`Ex. 1001, 10:62–11:9.
`
`The Prior Art
`Plaid relies on the following prior art:
`Sugiarto et al., U.S. Patent No. 6,287,449 B1, filed Sept.
`3, 1998, issued Aug. 21, 2001 (Ex. 1004, “Sugiarto”);
`
`D.
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`E.
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`Brandt et al., U.S. Patent No. 5,892,905, filed Dec. 23,
`1996, issued Apr. 6, 1999 (Ex. 1005, “Brandt”); and
`Chow et al., U.S. Patent No. 6,029,175, filed June 7, 1996,
`issued Feb. 22, 2000 (Ex. 1006, “Chow”).
`
`The Asserted Grounds
`Plaid challenges claims 1–36 of the ’783 patent on the following
`grounds (Pet. 9):
`References
`
`Basis
`
`Claims Challenged
`
`Sugiarto and Brandt
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 1, 3–20, and 22–36
`
`F.
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 2 and 21
`
`Sugiarto, Brandt, and
`Chow
`
`Claim Interpretation
`In an inter partes review, we construe claims by applying the broadest
`reasonable interpretation in light of the specification. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b);
`see also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1275–78 (Fed. Cir.
`2015), cert. granted sub nom. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct.
`890 (mem.) (2016). Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard,
`and absent any special definitions, claim terms are given their ordinary and
`customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the
`art in the context of the entire disclosure. See In re Translogic Tech. Inc.,
`504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definitions for claim
`terms or phrases must be set forth “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness,
`and precision.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`For purposes of this Decision, and based on the current record, we
`construe certain claim terms or phrases as follows.
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`“non-public personal information” (All Claims)
`1.
`Plaid does not provide an express construction for “non-public
`personal information,” but Plaid does contend that, based on statements in
`the prosecution history for the ’783 patent, “‘non-public’ information recited
`in the ’783 Patent claims covers information secured by Web sites that
`require user log on (e.g., with a user name and password).” Pet. 11–12
`(citing Ex. 1002, 168). Yodlee counters that Plaid makes an “incorrect
`assumption that any information for which a login is required is ‘non-public
`personal information.’” Prelim. Resp. 2. Instead, Yodlee highlights that the
`Specification of the ’783 patent states that personal information is “all of the
`data that companies, information providers, have that is specific or unique to
`each person such as monthly bills, bank account balances, investments
`information, health care benefits, email, voice and fax messages, 401(k)
`holdings or potentially any other information pertinent to a particular end
`user.” Id. at 3 (quoting Ex. 1001, 4:15–21). Yodlee also highlights a
`statement made by the patent applicants during prosecution that “the essence
`of personal information is that it is not accessible to the general public, i.e.,
`other end users.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Ex. 1002, 168).
`Accordingly, Yodlee asserts “non-public personal information” should be
`construed to mean “information relating to a specific end user that is not
`intended for access by persons other than that end user or those authorized
`by that end user.” Id. at 5.
`The parties’ proposed constructions relate to the type of information
`that is manipulated in claims 1–36. Yet neither party addresses whether we
`should accord “non-public personal information” patentable weight under
`the printed matter doctrine (also known as “non-functional descriptive
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`material”). As explained below, we observe that no recitation in claims 1–
`36 is functionally or structurally dependent on the content of the recited
`“non-public personal information.” Rather, the claims relate to delivering
`such information by retrieving it from a place where it is stored.
`Accordingly, we consider the recitation “non-public personal information”
`under the printed matter doctrine.
`The first step in determining whether a claim limitation is non-
`functional descriptive material is assessing whether the “printed matter [is]
`matter claimed for what it communicates.” In re DiStefano, 808 F.3d 845,
`850 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In this case, the limitation “non-public personal
`information” refers to a particular type of information, which the
`Specification states is information “that is specific or unique to each
`person.” Ex. 1001, 4:15–21. Accordingly, the claims’ retrieval and storage
`of such “personal information” reflects that “personal information” is
`claimed for the type of information it communicates.
`Next, we determine “if the claimed informational content has a
`functional or structural relation to the substrate” that holds the content.
`DiStefano, 808 F.3d at 850. In this case, claims 1–36 recite nothing more
`than “retrieving,” “storing,” and “outputting” the “non-public personal
`information.” Ex. 1001, 16:47–17:6, 17:18–23, 17:28–37, 17:50–60. The
`information content is not modified in the claims; rather, the information is
`moved without modification, according to the claims. Thus, the
`informational content is neither functionally related to the performance of
`the claimed methods nor structurally related to the claimed systems. Indeed,
`any information content, and not just “non-public personal information,”
`could be subject to the same recitations in the claims.
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`Accordingly, we consider the words “non-public” and “personal” in
`the recitation “non-public personal information” to be non-functional
`descriptive material that is “owed no patentable weight.” DiStefano, 808
`F.3d at 851. Thus, for purposes of this Decision, we decline to interpret
`“non-public personal information” as meaning anything beyond merely
`“information.”
`
`
`“intermediary web site” (Claims 14–17 and 33–36)
`2.
`Plaid argues the “’783 Patent mainly describes intermediary [web
`sites] as being themselves information providers,” though Plaid
`acknowledges “‘the intermediary’ is not required to be an information
`provider.” Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:17–21, 12:25–28). Plaid further
`argues intermediary web sites “are served by Web servers [that] are not
`running on the end user’s computer or on the computer running the personal
`information engine.” Id. at 13. Plaid, therefore, contends “intermediary web
`site” should be interpreted as “a Web site that is served by a Web server
`running on a computer that is not the end user’s computer and is not the
`‘processor.’” Id.
`Yodlee argues “the intermediary Web site is directly in contact with
`the PI engine and directly receives information from the PI provider, which
`are both running on the claimed ‘processor’ – the intermediary Web site is
`‘served’ by the ‘processor’ itself.” Prelim. Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:18–
`21). Yodlee, therefore, contends “intermediary web site” should be
`construed to mean “a Web site that obtains an end user’s personal
`information from the ‘processor’ for display to that end user.” Id. at 6.
`Figure 5 of the ’783 patent is reproduced below.
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`Figure 5 depicts an embodiment of the ’783 patent that utilizes an
`intermediary web site, which is labeled 510. Ex. 1001, 12:12–15. In this
`embodiment,
`[a]n end user 210 utilizes a client computer 220 to access an
`intermediary Web site 510 across the Internet 230. The end user
`210 logs into the intermediary Web site 510. The intermediary
`Web site 510 contacts the PI engine 240 across the Internet 230
`and directly receives the end user’s PI updated as required from
`the PI provider Web sites 250. The intermediary Web site 510
`receives the PI, incorporates it into pages according to its
`particular formatting style and graphical user interface and
`delivers these pages to the end user 210. The use of the PI engine
`240 is transparent to the end user 210. Further, an intermediary
`Web site 510 serving aggregate PI to an end user 210 may, and
`most likely will, simultaneously serve as a PI provider.
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`Id. at 12:15–27. Thus, based on this description, the intermediary web site is
`separate from PI engine 240 and end user 210/client computer 220.1
`None of the independent claims 1, 18, and 20 recites a “PI engine,”
`but each of these claims recites a “personal information store,” which is part
`of the PI engine. Id. at 4:39–46, 4:53–60. Therefore, to capture the notion
`of an intermediary web site being separate from the PI engine, we refer to
`the recited “personal information store” in our construction. For purposes of
`this Decision, we interpret “intermediary web site” as “a web site served
`from a location other than the personal information store and the end user’s
`computer.” We do not agree with Yodlee’s proposed construction because it
`does not reflect the interposition of the intermediary web site between the
`user’s computer and the personal information store.
`
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`We now consider Plaid’s asserted grounds and Yodlee’s arguments in
`its Preliminary Response to determine whether Plaid has met the “reasonable
`likelihood” threshold standard for institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`Plaid’s unpatentability contentions are supported by the testimony of Todd
`C. Mowry, Ph.D. See Ex. 1008.
`
`
`1 In contrast, the Specification describes an embodiment without an
`intermediary web site where “[t]he PI engine 240 . . . delivers the PI to a
`selected destination, in this instance across the Internet 230 to the client
`computer 220 which displays the information to the end user 210 using the
`client software 270.” Ex. 1001, 4:39–43.
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`A.
`
`Obviousness Ground Based on Sugiarto and Brandt
`Plaid contends claims 1, 3–20, and 22–36 would have been obvious
`over the combination of Sugiarto and Brandt. Pet. 13–56. Yodlee disputes
`Plaid’s contention. Prelim. Resp. 6–15.
`
`Sugiarto
`1.
`Sugiarto is directed to “the customizing of information for retrieval
`over a computer network.” Ex. 1004, 1:7–9. Figure 1 of Sugiarto is
`reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 1 depicts an “information retrieval system” having system server 2
`coupled to computer network 4, which may be the Internet. Id. at 3:12–15,
`47–49. System server 2 includes software modules 14, 16, 18, and 20, of
`which modules 14, 16, and 18 are “request-servicing modules” and module
`20 is a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) daemon. Id. at 3:58–66.
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`Desktop computer system 9 may access system server 2 through
`network 4. Id. at 4:3–7. Via desktop computer system 9, users may
`“generate any number of configuration files” that “specif[y] what
`information the user would like to retrieve and how the retrieved information
`is to be formatted.” Id. at 4:7–19. These configuration files are stored in
`database server 8. Id. User access device 6 is “equipped for communication
`with system server 2” and has display screen 10 for “display[ing]
`information retrieved from the network through system server 2,” among
`other things. Id. at 3:18–20, 24–26, 33–36. Alternatively, users may initiate
`information requests through desktop computer system 9 rather than user
`access device 6. Id. at 8:34–36.
`As an example of retrieving and formatting information in accordance
`with a configuration file, Sugiarto describes a personalized page that
`incorporates content from the CNN, ESPN, and NASDAQ web pages. Id. at
`4:19–53.
`
`
`Brandt
`2.
`Brandt is directed to “providing access to software applications via the
`world-wide web.” Ex. 1005, 1:27–30. Figure 3 of Brandt is reproduced
`below.
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`Figure 3 depicts a system that allows access to a software application over
`the world-wide web from a standard web browser. Id. at 4:30–34. “[A]
`typical transaction between a standard web browser 212 running on a client
`workstation 210 and a web server application 222 running on a web server
`computer system 220 occurs over a connection 216.” Id. at 5:38–41. In
`addition, Internet/application gateway 332 includes a plurality of
`Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) designed to facilitate the
`interaction between web browser 212 and software application 342. Id. at
`17:56–58.
`To access certain software applications via the Internet, a user of web
`browser 212 may submit authenticating data, such as a userID, a password,
`and a key, to web server application 222. Id. at 11:51–58. Once
`authentication is successful at web server application 222, the userID and
`key are passed to Internet/application gateway 332, which compares these
`data to data stored in user library 620. Id. at 12:3–5. User library 620
`“contains the authentication data needed to access the corresponding
`software applications for each authorized user.” Id. at 12:15–18.
`
`Claims 1 and 3–13
`3.
`Claim 1 is unpatentable “if the differences between the subject matter
`[claimed] and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
`have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
`ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C.
`§ 103(a).2 In its obviousness analysis for claim 1, Plaid maps system
`
`
`2 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
`(2011) (“AIA”), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. Because the ’783 patent has an
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`server 2 of Sugiarto to the recited processor. Pet. 30–31 (citing Ex. 1004,
`3:60–62; Ex. 1008 ¶ 81). Plaid proposes “modify[ing] one or more of
`Sugiarto’s content gathering modules 14, 16, and 18” within system server 2
`“to incorporate the automatic authentication functionality of Brandt’s
`Application Gateway 332.” Id. at 21 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 60). Plaid’s analysis
`is reflected in its modified version of Sugiarto’s Figure 1, which is
`reproduced below.
`
`
`In this modified version of Sugiarto’s Figure 1, “[t]he annotations in blue
`illustrate [Plaid]’s proposed modification of Sugiarto in view of Brandt, and
`the annotations in red illustrate [Plaid]’s mapping of the ’783 [patent] claims
`onto the proposed combination.” Id. at 14.
`
`
`effective filing date before the effective date of the applicable AIA
`amendment, throughout this Decision we refer to the pre-AIA version of 35
`U.S.C. § 103.
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`Plaid states that, in the modified system, “content gathering modules
`14, 16, and 18 would obtain non-public information over the Web from
`Secure Content Providers” by “access[ing] storage having APIs particular to
`each secure content provider, which would specify how interactions with the
`secure content providers would take place.” Id. at 21 (citing Ex. 1008
`¶¶ 60–61). Considering Plaid’s analysis and submitted evidence, and the
`arguments presented in Yodlee’s preliminary response, we are satisfied there
`is a reasonable likelihood that Plaid would prevail in showing claim 1 would
`have been obvious over the combination of Sugiarto and Brandt. We add
`the following for additional explanation.
`Yodlee’s arguments against this asserted ground relate to its
`contention that Plaid “has wholly failed to establish that ‘non-public
`personal information’ is disclosed by the combination” of Sugiarto and
`Brandt. Prelim. Resp. 8–14. Rather, Yodlee contends these references only
`teach the manipulation of public information. Id. at 9–10. But, as we state
`above in Section I.F.1, the “non-public” and “personal” limitations are
`construed as non-functional descriptive material because the type of
`information that is processed in claim 1 has no functional relationship to the
`recited method. Because non-functional descriptive material “will not
`distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patentability,” In re
`Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983), we are not persuaded by
`Yodlee’s arguments.
`We now turn to the merits of Plaid’s unpatentability contentions.
`Although Sugiarto teaches gathering information via HTTP requests to the
`Internet, see Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1004, 8:34–36, 8:61–9:1), Plaid’s
`combination relies on Brandt for teaching access to what Plaid calls “secure
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`content providers.” See id. at 21. This relates to the recitation in claim 1
`regarding “information providers securely storing the personal information.”
`Ex. 1001, 16:50–51. In particular, Brandt teaches “access to a protected
`software application 342 [that] is only granted after gateway 332 supplies
`the user’s user name and password.” Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1005, 12:15–36;
`Ex. 1008 ¶ 78). Plaid also cites Brandt’s teachings on user library 620,
`which “stores the user information for a plurality of software applications
`that are to be accessed through gateway 332” and “contains the
`authentication data needed to access the corresponding software applications
`for each authorized user.” Id. at 33 (citing Ex. 1005, 12:5–7, 12:15–18).
`We are satisfied based on the current record that the information in user
`library 620 teaches “end user data including information identifying the
`plurality of information providers securely storing the personal information
`relating to the end user,” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 33.
`Regarding the recited “protocol for instructing the processor how to
`access the securely stored personal information via the network,” Plaid maps
`Brandt’s APIs in internet/application gateway 332, which “facilitate the
`interaction between web browser 212 and software application 342.” Pet. 20
`(citing Ex. 1005, 17:56–61). According to Dr. Mowry, “Brandt explains that
`the application APIs specify how the Application Gateway [332] initially
`logs on to software applications, creates a process instance of the software
`application, and starts the process to process the end user’s request.”
`Ex. 1008 ¶ 90 (citing Ex. 1005, 20:60–67); see also Pet. 35–36 (citing the
`same). Considering Internet/application gateway 332’s use of authentication
`data in user library 620 as discussed above, and gateway 332’s use of APIs,
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`we are satisfied based on the current record that Plaid has presented
`sufficient evidence that Brandt teaches the recited “protocol” of claim 1.
`Based on the current record, we additionally determine that Plaid
`articulates sufficient reasons for combining Sugiarto and Brandt that would
`support a conclusion of obviousness. As supported by the testimony of Dr.
`Mowry, Plaid contends an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized
`the need for automatic aggregation of public data and private data that
`requires authentication to access. Pet. 22–24 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 63–64).
`Thus, Plaid establishes that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had
`reason to apply Brandt’s application gateway and APIs to Sugiarto’s
`software modules 14, 16, and 18. Id. at 24–25 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 65–66).
`The combination also results in applying the authentication data of Brandt’s
`user library 620 in Sugiarto’s database server 8, which has configuration
`files specifying how a user’s retrieved data is to be formatted. Id. at 33–34
`(citing Ex. 1004, 3:44–46; Ex. 1005, 12:15–18; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 85–88). We
`also are persuaded by Plaid’s showing, for purposes of this Decision, that an
`ordinarily skilled artisan would have expected success in this combined
`approach. Id. at 25–27 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 68–73).
`For these reasons, and based on the current record, we are persuaded
`that Plaid has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its
`obviousness challenge of claim 1 based on the combination of Sugiarto and
`Brandt. Yodlee either relies on the same arguments from claim 1 or does not
`present separate arguments for claims 3–13, which depend from claim 1.
`See Prelim. Resp. 14. Thus, based on the same reasons, and because we find
`Plaid’s obviousness showing sufficient at this stage, see Pet. 41–47, we also
`conclude there is a reasonable likelihood that Plaid would prevail in showing
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`that claims 3–13 would have been obvious over the combination of Sugiarto
`and Brandt.
`
`
`Claims 14–17
`4.
`Claims 14–17 all ultimately include the recitation “outputting the
`retrieved personal infonmation [sic] to an intermediary web site.” Ex. 1001,
`17:46–60. Regarding the outputting to a web site, Plaid cites Sugiarto’s
`teachings on making an HTTP request to system server 2, which delivers a
`customized web page (e.g., HTTP://access.domain/pir) to an end user. Pet.
`46–47 (citing Ex. 1004, 8:37–44, 9:30–50).3 Plaid contends that, to the
`extent the customized web page is not an “intermediary web site,” such a
`limitation would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at
`47 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 107). Plaid supports its contention by noting that
`Sugiarto states system server 2 could be implemented in multiple computers
`connected via the Internet, and that such an arrangement was known to be
`useful for server load balancing. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 3:58–62; Ex. 1008
`¶¶ 107–08). Based on the testimony of Dr. Mowry, Plaid contends such a
`multiple-computer arrangement would allow for one of the computers to
`serve an “intermediary web site.” Id. (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 108). This
`comports with our construction of “intermediary web site” above, see supra
`Section I.F.2, because one computer of system server 2 could receive PI
`from a separate computer of server 2 that contains the personal information
`store; the receiving computer could then serve the PI via a web page (i.e., the
`intermediary web site) to the end user’s computer. See Pet. 21, 24–25, 39–
`
`
`3 This analysis also applies to the “outputting” limitations in claims 6–12.
`See Pet. 44–47.
`
`19
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`40 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 61, 66, 96–97). On the present record, Dr. Mowry’s
`testimony provides support for Plaid’s contention about how an ordinary
`skilled artisan would have understood Sugiarto’s teachings (as combined
`with Brandt’s teachings), and is supported by evidence in the record.
`Yodlee recapitulates its argument regarding “personal information”
`from claim 1, see Prelim. Resp. 14, so we do not find it persuasive for the
`same reasons mentioned above. Therefore, based on the current record,
`Plaid’s evidence is sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of
`prevailing on its assertion that claims 14–17 would have been obvious over
`the combination of Sugiarto and Brandt, but the ultimate assessment of that
`evidence, including Dr. Mowry’s testimony, will be based on the complete
`record at the end of trial.
`
`Claims 18 and 19
`5.
`Claim 18 recites a “computer-readable, digital storage device storing
`executable instructions which cause a processor to deliver non-public
`personal information,” and the recited steps performed by the processor are
`nearly identical to the method steps of claim 1. Ex. 1001, 17:61–18:17.
`Claim 19 depends from claim 18 and recites steps identical to claim 13. Id.
`at 18:18–27. Yodlee repeats its argument related to “personal information”
`for claim 18, but Yodlee does not present a separate argument for claim 19.
`Prelim. Resp. 14. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Yodlee’s argument
`for the same reasons stated above with respect to claim 1. Therefore,
`because we find Plaid’s obviousness showing sufficient at this stage of the
`proceeding, see Pet. 50–51, we conclude there is a reasonable likelihood that
`
`20
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`Plaid would prevail in showing that claims 18 and 19 would have been
`obvious over the combination of Sugiarto and Brandt.
`
`Claims 20 and 22–36
`6.
`Claim 20 recites a “system for delivering non-public personal
`information relating to an end user” that is similar in scope to claim 1.
`Ex. 1001, 18:27–61. As we explained previously, claims 22–36 all
`ultimately depend from claim 20. Id. at 18:65–20:28. Differently from the
`other independent claims, claim 20 recites “a user store for storing end user
`data associated with each user.” Id. at 18:33–34. Plaid maps Sugiarto’s
`database server 8 to the recited “user store.” Pet. 55 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 112).
`Plaid contends that, when Sugiarto’s database server 8 is modified to include
`the contents of Brandt’s user library 620 (e.g., “user names and passwords
`associated with each user”), it contains “end user data.” Pet. 33–34 (citing
`Ex. 1004, 3:44–46; Ex. 1005, 14:25–30; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 86–87), 55 (citing
`Ex. 1008 ¶ 112).
`Yodlee again recapitulates its argument related to “personal
`information” for claims 20, 25, 26, 28–31, and 33–36, see Prelim. Resp. 15,
`but this argument is not persuasive for the same reasons stated above with
`respect to claim 1. Yodlee does not make separate arguments for claims 22–
`24, 27, and 32. Therefore, because we determine that Plaid’s obviousness
`showing is sufficient at this stage of the proceeding, see Pet. 51–56, we
`conclude there is a reasonable likelihood that Plaid would prevail in showing
`that claims 20 and 22–36 would have been obvious over the combination of
`Sugiarto and Brandt.
`
`
`
`21
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`B.
`
`Obviousness Ground Based on Sugiarto, Brandt, and Chow
`Plaid contends claims 2 and 21 would have been obvious over the
`combination of Sugiarto, Brandt, and Chow. Pet. 56–60. Yodlee relies on
`the same arguments against the combination of Sugiarto, Brandt, and Chow
`as it did for the combination of Sugiarto and Brandt. Prelim. Resp. 15.
`
`Chow
`1.
`Chow is directed to a software agent, known as a “revision manager,”
`that “automatically retriev[es] changed documents previously accessed from
`network and internetwork servers.” Ex. 1006, 3:60–64. When a user
`“specifies an interest in being alerted on updates” to a document that has
`been retrieved from a server, the document is cached and then the revision
`manager “subsequently spontaneously monitors the server to notice if the
`document has been modified.” Id. at 5:64–6:4. This can be accomplished
`by “periodically querying the document’s server to determine if the
`document has changed since it was last retrieved.” Id. at 6:4–7.
`
`Claims 2 and 21
`2.
`Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and further recites “the step of
`monitoring information providers for changes.” Ex. 1001, 17:7–8. Claim 21
`depends from claim 20 and includes a similar limitation. Id. at 18:62–64.
`Building on its obviousness analysis for claim 1 based on the combination of
`Sugiarto and Brandt, Plaid cites Chow’s revision manager for teaching the
`monitoring of a server for changes to a web-based document. Pet. 56–57
`(citing Ex. 1006, 3:65–4:1, 5:64–6:4). As supported by the tes