Case 1:12-cv-00499-WDQ Document 78 Filed 11/14/13 Page 1of 37
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
`BALTIMORE DIVISION
`
`PAICE LLC and THE ABELL FOUNDATION,
`INC.,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`V,
`
`C. A. No. WDQ-12-499
`
`HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY,
`HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, KIA
`MOTORS CORPORATION, and KIA
`MOTORS AMERICA, INC.
`
`Defendants.
`
`PLAINTIFFS PAICE LLC AND THE ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.’S
`OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 1:12-cv-00499-WDQ Document 78 Filed 11/14/13 Page 2 of 37
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`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV,
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`The Parties .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`Procedural Background ........................................................................................... 2
`
`Technology Background ......................................................................................... 3
`
`THE ASSERTED PAICE PATENTS ................................................................................ 3
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS OF CLAIM INTERPRETATION ............................................... 6
`
`PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS .............................. 9
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
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`"road load," "RL". ................................................................................................ 10
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`"setpoint," "SP". ................................................................................................... 13
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`"wherein SP is a setpoint expressed as a predetermined percentage of MTO" (e.g.,
`
`’672 patent, claim 16) ....................................................................................................... 15
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`D.
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`"road load (RL) and said setpoint SP, both expressed as percentages of the
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`maximum torque output of the engine when normally-aspirated (MTO)" (e.g., ’347,
`claims 1, 7) ........................................................................................................................ 16
`
`E.
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`"a second setpoint (SP2), wherein the SP2 is a larger percentage of the MTO than
`
`the SP" (e.g., ’634 patent, claims 39, 80) ......................................................................... 17
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`F.
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`"operating said internal combustion engine to provide torque to the hybrid vehicle
`
`when the torque required to operate the hybrid vehicle is between a setpoint SP and a
`
`maximum torque output (MTO) of the engine" (e.g., ’097 patent, claims 1, 11) ............. 17
`
`G.
`
`H.
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`"max torque output (MTO) of said engine" (e.g., ’347, claim 23) ....................... 19
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`"the state of charge of the battery is below a predetermined level" (e.g., ’347,
`
`claim 31) ........................................................................................................................... 20
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`"a rapid increase in the torque to be applied to the wheels of the vehicle as desired
`
`I.
`by the operator is detected" (e.g., ’347 patent, claim 10) ................................................. 22
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`J.
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`"wherein a rate of change of torque output of said engine is limited to a threshold
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`value" (e.g., ’388 patent, claim 1) ..................................................................................... 23
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont’d)
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`Page
`"motor(s)". ............................................................................................................ :24
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`"substantially less than the maximum torque output (MTO) of said engine" (e.g.,
`
`K.
`
`L.
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`’347 patent, claim 13) ....................................................................................................... 25
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`M. "a setpoint (SP) above which said engine torque is efficiently produced" (e.g.,
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`’347 patent, claim 1; ’634 patent, claim 1) ....................................................................... 27
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`N. "wherein the torque produced by said engine when operated at said setpoint (SP)
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`is substantially less than the maximum torque output (MTO) of said engine" (e.g., ’347
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`patent, claims 1, 23; ’634 patent, claim 1) ........................................................................ 29
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`V°
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`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 30
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`Case 1:12-cv-00499-WDQ Document 78 Filed 11/14/13 Page 4 of 37
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Pa~e(s)
`
`Cases
`
`3M Innovative Properties Co. v. Tredegar Corp.,
`
`725 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ................................................................................................. 21
`
`ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Comm ’n, Inc.,
`694 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................... 9
`
`Adv. Cardiovascular Sys. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
`
`265 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................... 7
`
`Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen GmbH & Co. KG v. Biocorp, Inc.,
`249 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................... 8
`
`Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec,
`
`CIV. WDQ-04-2607, 2013 WL 4587522 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2013) ........................................ 8, 9
`
`Comark Commc ’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,
`156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ................................................................................................... 7
`
`Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc.,
`417 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..................................................................................... 21, 27, 29
`
`Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
`226 F.3d 1334 (Fed.Cir.2000) ............................................................................................... 7, 27
`
`Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp.,
`599 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................. 21
`
`Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States,
`265 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................. 22
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,
`626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................... 9
`
`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.,
`
`381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................................... 6, 7
`
`Jonsson v. Stanley Works,
`903 F.2d 812 (Fed.Cir.1990) ..................................................................................................... 10
`
`°°°
`111
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`Case 1:12-cv-00499-WDQ Document 78 Filed 11/14/13 Page 5 of 37
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d)
`
`Pa~e(s)
`
`Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.,
`133 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ................................................................................................... 6
`
`02 Micro International Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed.Cir.2008) ..................................................................................................... 9
`
`02 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc.,
`
`467 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ................................................................... 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29
`
`Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc.,
`498 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................... 9
`
`Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al.,
`No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, Dkt. No. 91 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 28, 2005) ................................................. 13
`
`Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al.,
`No. 2:07-CV-180-DF, Dkt. No. 63 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2008) ............................................ 13, 15
`
`Phillips v. A WH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................................... 6, 7
`
`SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc.,
`415 F.3d 1278 (Fed.Cir.2005) ..................................................................... 21, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29
`
`SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
`242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................... 8
`
`St. Clair Intellectual Prop. Consultants, Inc. v. Canon Inc.,
`412 F. App’x 270 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .............................................................................................. 9
`
`Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
`537 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................. 22
`
`StemCells, Inc. v. Neuralstem, Inc.,
`08:06-CV-1877-AW, 2011 WL 3565246 (D. Md. Aug. 12, 2011) .......................................... 10
`
`Suffolk Techs. LLC, v. Google Inc. et al.,
`2013 WL 1700938 (E.D. Va. April 18, 2013) ............................................................................ 8
`
`U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
`103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ............................................................................................. 8, 16
`
`iv
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`Case 1:12-cv-00499-WDQ Document 78 Filed 11/14/13 Page 6 of 37
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d)
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
`
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ................................................................................................. 6, 7
`
`Wang Lab., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc.,
`197 F.3d 1377 (Fed.Cir.1999) ................................................................................................... 10
`
`Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co.,
`642 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ................................................................................................. 21
`
`Pa~e(s)
`
`v
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`Case 1:12-cv-00499-WDQ Document 78 Filed 11/14/13 Page 7 of 37
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`Plaintiffs Paice LLC ("Paiee") and the Abell Foundation, Inc., ("Abell") hereby submit
`
`their brief on the proper construction of certain disputed terms in:
`
`¯ U.S. Patent No. 6,209,672 (the "’672 patent," attached hereto as Exhibit 1);
`
`¯ U.S. Patent No. 7,104,347 (the "’347 patent" attached hereto as Exhibit 2);
`
`¯ U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634 (the "’634 patent" attached hereto as Exhibit 3);
`
`¯ U.S. Patent No. 7,559,388 (the "’388 patent" attached hereto as Exhibit 4); and
`
`¯ U.S. Patent No. 8,214,097 (the "’097 patent" attached hereto as Exhibit 5).1
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`For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court adopt their
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`proposed claim constructions in their entirety.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`A.
`
`The Parties
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`Since 1992, Paice has been engaged in developing innovative hybrid electric vehicle
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`technology to promote better fuel efficiency, lower emissions, and superior driving performance.
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`As a result of its inventive endeavors, Paice has a number of patents directed to hybrid vehicle
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`technology. Shortly after Paice was established, it was enrolled and accepted into the University
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`of Maryland’s incubator program, which was created to connect promising start-up companies
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`with the local business and technical community.
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`Abell is a non-profit charitable organization dedicated to fighting urban poverty and
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`enhancing the quality of life in Maryland. Over the past 60 years, Abell has contributed more
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`than $225 million to support worthwhile causes across Maryland. It traditionally focuses on
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`caring for the underserved through education, healthcare, and human services initiatives. In
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`addition, Abell is dedicated to promoting national social objectives, such as increasing energy
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`1 On June 7, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to add the ’097
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`patent.
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`1
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`efficiency and producing alternative energy, and invests in companies with innovative
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`technologies in these areas. Abell’s charitable model is unique in that it occasionally invests in
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`promising local companies -- including those focused on environmental issues -- with the goal
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`of reinvesting any earnings back into the communities it serves. In 1998, Abell was introduced
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`to Paice through the University of Maryland’s incubator program. Recognizing the future
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`promise and benefits of Paice’s technology, Abell has invested millions of dollars in support of
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`Paice’s innovative technology. As a result of Abell’s investment and involvement with Paice,
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`Abell is also an equity owner of Paice.
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`Defendants Hyundai Motor Company, Hyundai Motor America, Kia Motors Corporation,
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`and Kia Motors America, Inc. are in the business of manufacturing, marketing, and selling
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`automobiles worldwide, including hybrid electric vehicles within the United States, such as the
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`Hyundai Sonata Hybrid and the Kia Optima Hybrid.
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`B.
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`Procedural Background
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`Plaintiffs instituted this action for patent infringement against Defendants on February
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`16, 2012 and filed an amended complaint on June 13, 2012. (ECF Nos. 1 & 27). Hyundai
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`answered on April 11, 2013 and asserted counterclaims of non-infringement and invalidity. (ECF
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`No. 34). On June 7, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to allege
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`infringement of the ’097 patent.2 The Court entered a Scheduling Order on June 13, 2013 (ECF
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`No. 53) which, among other things, limited the number of proposed claim terms for construction
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`to l 5, and required the parties to file a Joint Claim Construction statement by October 15, 2013.
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`2 Although the Court has not yet ruled on the motion to amend, the parties have proceeded under
`the assumption that the ’097 patent is a part of the case (e.g. Plaintiffs’ infringement contentions
`and Defendants’ invalidity contentions both address the ’097 patent).
`2
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`C.
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`Technology Background
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`Hybrid electric vehicles are powered by both a traditional internal combustion engine
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`(ICE) and at least one electric motor. In hybrid electric vehicles, the wheels are driven using
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`torque supplied by the ICE, electric motor, or a combination of the two. By contrast, in a
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`conventional automobile, the wheels are driven using torque supplied only by the ICE. Hybrid
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`electric vehicles have become increasingly attractive alternatives to conventional automobiles
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`and straight electric vehicles because they combine the advantages from each and minimize their
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`shortcomings. Hybrid electric vehicles provide the potential for maximum fuel efficiency, lower
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`emissions, and increased drivability in a wide range of vehicles, without limiting travel distance
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`and performance based on the electric motor alone. Because hybrid electric vehicles are
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`equipped with more than one source of torque, a microprocessor is typically employed to control
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`the various components of the hybrid system and determine the source of torque in a given
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`driving condition.
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`II.
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`THE ASSERTED PAICE PATENTS
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`Paice and Abell are co-owners by assignment of each of the asserted patents. As
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`discussed in further detail below, each of these patents is directed to various aspects of hybrid
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`electric vehicle technology, including novel designs and control systems for hybrid electric
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`vehicles.
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`The ’672 patent, entitled "Hybrid Vehicle," issued on April 3, 2001 from an application
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`with a priority date of September 14, 1998. The ’672 patent discloses an embodiment of a
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`hybrid electric vehicle, with an internal combustion engine and two motors. One or both of the
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`motors may be used to recharge the battery. Additionally, a microprocessor is employed to
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`select different operating modes based on the vehicle’s instantaneous torque requirements, the
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`state of charge of the battery bank, and other variables. ’672 patent, col. 28:4-19.
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`3
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`Case 1:12-cv-00499-WDQ Document 78 Filed 11/14/13 Page 10 of 37
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`An embodiment of the hybrid vehicle disclosed in the ’672 patent is shown in Figure 3,
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`reproduced below:
`
`r-~.. -.
`
`~
`
`%!
`
`~ !. i---~-I
`,,,
`
`~
`
`- _~
`
`ka~.
`
`As shown, a traction motor 25 is connected to the road wheels 34 through a differential
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`32. A starter motor 21 is connected to the internal combustion engine 40. The motors 21 and 25
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`are functional as either motors or generators, depending on the operation of the corresponding
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`inverter/charger units 23 and 27, which connect the motors to the battery bank 22. See ’672
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`patent, col. 19:19-30.
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`These components are controlled by a microprocessor 48 or any controller capable of
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`examining input parameters and signals and controlling the mode of operation of the vehicle.
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`’672 patent, col. 18:65-col. 19:12. For example, control of engine 40 is accomplished by way of
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`control signals provided by the microprocessor to the electronic fuel injection (EFI) unit 56 and
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`electronic engine management (EEM) unit 55. Control of (1) starting of the engine 40; (2) use of
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`motors 21 and 25 to provide propulsive torque; or (3) use of motors as generators to provide
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`regenerative recharging of battery bank 22, is accomplished through control signals provided by
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`the microprocessor to the inverter/charger units 23 and 27. ’672 patent, col. 21:26-50; col. 22:40-
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`56.
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`The hybrid vehicle may be operated in a number of modes based on the vehicle’s
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`instantaneous torque requirements, the engine’s maximum torque output, the state of charge of
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`the battery, and other operating parameters. In an embodiment of the ’672 patent, the
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`microprocessor causes the vehicle to operate in various operating modes pursuant to its control
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`strategy.
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`For example, in mode I, the hybrid vehicle is operated as an electric car, with the traction
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`motor providing all torque to propel the vehicle. ’672 patent, col. 28:50-55; Fig. 8(a). As the
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`vehicle continues to be propelled in electric only mode, the state of charge of the battery may
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`become depleted, and need to be recharged. In this case, the hybrid vehicle may transition to
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`mode II to recharge the battery, in which the vehicle operates as in mode I, with the addition of
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`the engine running the starter/generator motor to provide electrical energy to operate the traction
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`motor and recharge the battery. ’672 patent, col. 28:58-col. 29:5; Fig. 8(b). When the internal
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`combustion engine can operate in its fuel efficient range, the hybrid vehicle operates in mode IV,
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`with the engine providing torque to propel the vehicle. ’672 patent, col. 29:6-22; Fig. 8(c). If the
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`vehicle requires additional torque, such as for acceleration or hill-climbing, the vehicle may enter
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`mode V, where the traction motor provides additional torque to propel the vehicle beyond that
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`provided by engine 40. ’672 patent, col. 29:23-30; Fig. 8(d).
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`The ’672 patent also discloses other various features relating to hybrid electric vehicles,
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`including, for example, a novel way to control a hybrid vehicle by controlling the rate of change
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`of torque of an engine such that the combustion of fuel within the engine occurs substantially at a
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`stoichiometric fuel/air ratio. ’672 patent, col. 32:17-37; Fig. 7(a). This limits the undesirable
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`emission of unburned fuel and improves the fuel economy of the vehicle. Id.
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`The other asserted patents--the ’347,’634,’388, and’097 patents--claim priority to two
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`provisional applications dated March 1, 1999, and September 14, 1998 and issued from a
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`common parent, U.S. Patent No. 6,554,088, which is a continuation-in-part of the ’672 patent.
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`Because the asserted claims of the other patents do not involve any new matter, the disclosure of
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`the ’672 patent is also applicable to the ’347,’634,’388, and’097 patents.
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`III.
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`LEGAL STANDARDS OF CLAIM INTERPRETATION
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`The Federal Circuit’s en banc opinion in Phillips v. A WH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
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`2005), sets forth the bedrock principles of claim construction.
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`First, and importantly, "the claim construction analysis must begin and remain centered
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`on the claim language itself" because a "bedrock principle" of patent law is that "the claims of a
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`patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude." Innova/Pure
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`Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115-16 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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`Accordingly, a court must "look to the words themselves.., to define the scope of the patented
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`invention." Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). And the
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`"words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning." Phillips, 415 F.3d
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`at 1312 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`The "ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would
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`have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of invention, i.e., as of the
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`effective filing date of the patent application." M. at 1313. A person of ordinary skill in the art
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`"is deemed to read the words used in the patent documents with an understanding of their
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`meaning in the field, and to have knowledge of any special meaning and usage in the field."
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`Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltdo, 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In the event
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`the ordinary meaning of a claim is not apparent, then a court--just as would a person of ordinary
`
`skill in the art--may look to "the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the
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`Case 1:12-cv-00499-WDQ Document 78 Filed 11/14/13 Page 13 of 37
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`specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific
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`principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art." Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d
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`at 1116. In general, courts engaging in claim construction follow a hierarchy of evidence: (i)
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`claim language, (ii) other intrinsic evidence-- i.e., the specification, the remainder of the patent,
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`and the prosecution history, and (iii) extrinsic evidence-- i.e., evidence that is external to the
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`patent and prosecution history, such as expert testimony, dictionaries, or treatises. See Adv.
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`Cardiovascular Sys. v. Medtronic, Inc., 265 F.3d 1294, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The claim
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`construction effort should focus on the intrinsic evidence, and only if that evidence does not
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`yield the answer, should a court proceed to extrinsic evidence. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.
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`Additionally, under the doctrine of claim differentiation, the difference between words or
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`phrases used in separate claims give rise to a presumption that those words or phrases have
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`different meanings. Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir.
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`1998) ("There is presumed to be a difference in meaning and scope when different words or
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`phrases are used in separate claims. To the extent that the absence of such difference in meaning
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`and scope would make a claim superfluous, the doctrine of claim differentiation states the
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`presumption that the difference between claims is significant.").
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`The Federal Circuit has recognized that the specification is "the single best guide to the
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`meaning of a disputed term" and is often "dispositive." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. Yet courts
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`must be cautious in using the specification to avoid limiting the scope of the claims by importing
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`limitations of such embodiments into the scope of the claims. A patentee is entitled to claim his
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`or her invention broadly and is not limited to a preferred embodiment disclosed in the
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`specification. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1341-42 (Fed.Cir.2000).
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`Courts have noted that "to read ’a limitation from the written description into the claims’ is a
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`’cardinal sin’ of patent claim construction." Suffolk Techs. LLC, v. Google Inc. et al., 2013 WL
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`1700938 at *4 (E.D. Va. April 18, 2013) (quoting SciMedLife Sys., Inc. v. Advanced
`
`Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
`
`Moreover, district courts are not required to construe every limitation present in a
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`patent’s asserted claims. See, e.g., Biotec Biologische Naturverpaekungen GmbH & Co. KG v.
`
`Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (application of the claim term was the
`
`proper disputed issue, not construction); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554,
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`1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim construction "is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy");
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`Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, CIV. WDQ-04-2607, 2013 WL 4587522, at *2
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`(D. Md. Aug. 27, 2013).
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`"Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to
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`clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the
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`determination of infringement." U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568. When the patent claim term is
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`clear and can be properly applied by a jury then a redundant construction is unnecessary. !d. at
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`1567 ("We doubt that Markman requires the trial judge to instruct as to an undisputed ’claim
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`construction’ for every term, by simply parroting the words of the claim .... "). "For instance,
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`terms that are commonplace or that a juror can easily use [ ] in her infringement fact-finding
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`without further direction from the court need not be construed because they are neither
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`unfamiliar to the jury, confusing to the jury, nor affected by the specification or prosecution
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`history." Classen Immunotherapies, 2013 WL 4587522 at *2 (internal quotations and citations
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`omitted).
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`The Federal Circuit has held that district courts can resolve a dispute over claim
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`construction by concluding that the terms have plain meanings that do not require additional
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`construction. See, e.g., ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Comm ’n, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312,
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`1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("The district court did not err in concluding that these terms have plain
`
`meanings that do not require additional construction. ActiveVideo’s proposed construction
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`erroneously reads limitations into the claims and the district court properly rejected that
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`construction and resolved the dispute between the parties."); Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing
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`Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding that district court had not violated
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`principles of 02 Micro International Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology Co., 521 F.3d 1351
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`(Fed.Cir.2008) by rejecting Defendant’s construction and adopting "plain and ordinary meaning"
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`for a disputed claim term); Classen Immunotherapies, 2013 WL 4587522 at * 15 (court relying
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`on plain and ordinary meaning and not adopting a construction because term itself is clear).
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`IV.
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`PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS
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`As noted above, each of the asserted patents shares a common disclosure. Although the
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`’634, ’347, ’097, and ’388 patents contain additional disclosures compared to the ’672 patent,
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`none of the new matter is the subject of any of the asserted claims in this case. Therefore,
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`because the asserted claims each involve the same matter as that disclosed in their common
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`portions of the specification, the terms discussed below should be given the same construction
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`for all asserted claims in all asserted patents in which they appear) See, e.g., St. Clair
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`Intellectual Prop. Consultants, Inc. v. Canon Inc., 412 F. App’x 270, 275 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
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`(construing claim terms from different patents with same meaning where patents shared same
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`specification and used similar or identical terms); Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 498 F.3d
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`1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (prosecution history from related familial patents relevant because
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`3 For purposes of clarity and ease of reference, Plaintiffs refer primarily to the ’672
`patent; similar and/or identical disclosures that are relied on may be found in the common
`portion of the specifications for each of the asserted patents.
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`15 of 122
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`FORD 1414
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`

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`Case 1:12-cv-00499-WDQ Document 78 Filed 11/14/13 Page 16 of 37
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`patents share the same subject matter); Wang Lab., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1384
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`(Fed.Cir. 1999) (same); Jonsson v. Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 818 (Fed.Cir. 1990) (same);
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`StemCells, Inc. v. Neuralstem, Inc., 08:06-CV-1877-AW, 2011 WL 3565246, at ’16 (D. Md.
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`Aug. 12, 2011) (same).
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`As set forth in the Joint Claim Construction statement dated October 15,2013, Plaintiffs
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`have identified two claim terms that they believe require construction--"road load" and
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`"setpoint." Defendants have identified 12 additional claim terms that allegedly require
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`construction. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Court need not construe all identified terms
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`because i) many of the terms are clear and should be given their plain and ordinary meaning; and
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`ii) Defendants are impermissibly using the claim construction process to rewrite claim
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`limitations that do not require construction, as well as improperly asserting invalidity arguments
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`that Defendants failed to timely raise in their invalidity contentions. Plaintiffs’ proposed
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`construction for each of the disputed terms is discussed in further detail below.
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`A.
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`"road load," "RL"
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`Plaintiffs’ Construction
`"the instantaneous torque required for
`propulsion of the vehicle, which may be
`positive or negative in value."
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`Defendants’ Construction
`"the amount of torque actually required to
`propel the vehicle on the road to maintain a
`given speed, which may be positive or negative
`in value."
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`The term "road load" or "ILL" can be found in asserted claims of each of the asserted
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`patents. See e.g. ’672 patent at claim 15; ’634 patent at claim 16; ’347 patent at claim 7; ’097
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`patent at claim 8; ’388 patent at claim 1. For example, claim 15 of the ’672 patent recites:
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`15. A method for controlling the operation of a hybrid vehicle operable in
`a plurality of differing modes, comprising the steps of:
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`providing a hybrid vehicle comprising an internal combustion engine for
`providing torque up to a maximum torque output (MTO), said engine
`being controllably coupled to road wheels of said vehicle by a clutch, a
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`10
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`16 of 122
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`FORD 1414
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`

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`Case 1:12-cv-00499-WDQ Document 78 Filed 11/14/13 Page 17 of 37
`
`traction motor being coupled to road wheels of said vehicle, a starting
`motor coupled to said engine, both said motors being operable as
`generators, a battery bank for providing electrical energy to and accepting
`energy from said motors, and a controller for controlling operation of said
`engine, clutch, and first and second motors, and controlling flow of
`electrical energy between said motors and said battery bank,
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`and operating said controller to control selection of the operational mode
`of said vehicle between a low-speed mode I, a cruising mode IV, and an
`acceleration mode V, wherein torque to propel said vehicle is provided by
`said traction motor, said engine, and both, respectively, in response to
`monitoring the instantaneous torque requirements required for
`propulsion of the vehicle (RL).
`
`The phrase "road load" is expressly defined in, for example, claim 15 of the ’672 patent,
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`and that definition must control. ’672 patent, claim 15. Additionally, the phrases "road load" and
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`the abbreviation "RL" are further defined in the specification and file history consistently with
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`the definition provided by claim 15. For example, the specification teaches that the instantaneous
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`torque required to propel the vehicle is compared to the engine’s maximum torque output to
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`determine whether to run the engine to propel the vehicle: "[w]hile operating at low speeds, e.g.,
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`when the vehicle’s torque requirements ("road load" or "RL ") are less than 30% of the engine’s
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`maximum torque output ("MTO"), engine 40 is run only as needed to charge battery bank 22."
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`’672 patent, col. 28:58-61 (emphasis added). During prosecution of U.S. Patent 6,554,088,4 the
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`applicant further explained that:
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`"’Road load’ as used herein is simply that amount of t