Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
` Paper 12
`
`Entered: September 30, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`PAICE LLC & THE ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.,
`Patent Owner
`____________
`
`Case IPR2014-00571
`Patent 7,104,347 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, and
`CARL M. DEFRANCO, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`DEFRANCO, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`Page 1 of 17
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`FORD 1215
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`571-272-7822
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` Paper 12
`
`Entered: September 30, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`PAICE LLC & THE ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.,
`Patent Owner
`____________
`
`Case IPR2014-00571
`Patent 7,104,347 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, and
`CARL M. DEFRANCO, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`DEFRANCO, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`Page 1 of 17
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`I. INTRODUCTION
`Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) filed a Petition requesting an inter
`partes review of claims 1, 6, 7, 9, 15, 21, 23, and 36 of U.S. Patent No.
`7,104,347 B2 (“the ’347 patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). The owner of the ’347
`patent, Paice LLC & The Abell Foundation, Inc. (“Paice”), filed a
`Preliminary Response. Paper 11 (“Prelim. Resp.” ).1 We have jurisdiction
`under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may
`not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the
`petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in
`the petition.” After considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response,
`we conclude that Ford has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it
`would prevail in showing unpatentability of all the challenged claims. Thus,
`we authorize institution of an inter partes review of claims 1, 6, 7, 9, 15, 21,
`23, and 36 of the ’347 patent.
`II. BACKGROUND
`
`The ’347 Patent 2
`A.
`The ’347 patent describes a hybrid vehicle with an internal
`
`combustion engine, two electric motors (a starter motor and a traction
`motor), and a battery bank, all controlled by a microprocessor that directs
`
`
`1 Paice filed both redacted and unredacted versions of its Preliminary
`
`Response. Papers 7, 11. Our decision cites to the redacted version, i.e.,
`Paper 11, which is marked “Public.”
`2 The ’347 patent is also the subject of a co-pending case, Paice, LLC
`v. Ford Motor Company, No. 1-14-cv-00492, filed Feb. 19, 2014, in the U.S.
`District Court for the District of Maryland. Pet. 1.
`2
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`torque transfer between the engine, the motors, and the drive wheels of the
`vehicle. Ex. 1001, 17:5–45, Fig. 4. The hybrid vehicle features a hybrid
`control strategy that runs the engine only under conditions of high
`efficiency, typically when the vehicle’s instantaneous torque demand (i.e.,
`the amount of torque required to propel the vehicle at a desired speed) is at
`least equal to 30% of the engine’s maximum torque output (“MTO”)
`capability. Id. at 20:52–60, 35:5–14; see also id. at 13:47–61 (“the engine is
`never operated at less than 30% of MTO, and is thus never operated
`inefficiently”).
`
`Running the engine only under efficient operating conditions leads to
`improved fuel economy and reduced emissions. Id. at 13:47–51. To achieve
`such efficiency, the hybrid vehicle includes different operating modes that
`depend on the vehicle’s instantaneous torque demand, the battery’s state of
`charge, and other operating parameters. Id. at 19:53–55. For example, the
`hybrid vehicle operates in: (1) an all-electric mode, where only the traction
`motor provides the torque to propel the vehicle, whenever operation of the
`engine would be inefficient (i.e., stop-and-go city driving); (2) an engine-
`only mode, where only the engine provides the torque to propel the vehicle,
`whenever the engine can run at an efficient level (i.e., highway cruising);
`(3) a dual-operation mode, where the traction motor provides additional
`torque to propel the vehicle beyond that already provided by the engine,
`whenever the instantaneous torque demand exceeds the maximum torque
`output of the engine (i.e., while accelerating, passing, and climbing hills);
`and (4) a battery recharge mode where the engine operates a generator to
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`recharge the battery while the traction motor drives the vehicle. Id. at
`35:66–36:58, 37:26–38:55.
`B.
`Challenged Claims
`Ford challenges independent claims 1 and 23. It also challenges
`dependent claims 6, 7, 9, 15, and 21, which depend directly or indirectly
`from claim 1, and dependent claim 36, which depends from claim 23.
`Claim 1 is illustrative:
`1.
`A hybrid vehicle, comprising:
`
`an internal combustion engine controllably coupled to
`road wheels of said vehicle;
`
`a first electric motor connected to said engine [a]nd
`operable to start the engine responsive to a control signal;
`
`a second electric motor connected to road wheels of said
`vehicle, and operable as a motor, to apply torque to said wheels
`to propel said vehicle, and as a generator, for accepting torque
`from at least said wheels for generating current;
`
`a battery, for providing current to said motors and
`accepting charging current from at least said second motor; and
`
`a controller for controlling the flow of electrical and
`mechanical power between said engine, first and second
`motors, and wheels,
`
`wherein said controller starts and operates said engine
`when torque require[d] to be produced by said engine to propel
`the vehicle and/or to drive either one or both said electric
`motor(s) to charge said battery is at least equal to a setpoint
`(SP) above which said engine torque is efficiently produced,
`and wherein the torque produced by said engine when operated
`at said setpoint (SP) is substantially less than the maximum
`torque output (MTO) of said engine.
`
`Ex. 1001, 58:13–37.
`
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`Independent claim 23 is directed to a “method” of controlling a hybrid
`
`vehicle. Id. at 60:22. Like claim 1, it requires an “internal combustion
`engine capable of efficiently producing torque at loads between a lower level
`[setpoint] SP and a maximum torque output MTO.” Id. at 60:23–25. Unlike
`claim 1, however, claim 23 does not require two motors. Claim 23 simply
`requires “one or more electric motors” for providing output torque and
`generating electrical current. Id. at 60:25–27 (emphasis added).
`C.
`Evidence of Record
`
`Ford relies upon the following prior art as its basis for challenging the
`claims of the ’347 patent, and it also proffers the Declaration of Dr. Gregory
`W. Davis (Ex. 1005).
`
`Patents/Printed Publications
`U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970
`U.S. Patent No. 5,586,613
`
`Exhibit
`Date
`1003
`Sept. 6, 1994
`Dec. 24, 1996 1004
`
`References
`Severinsky
`Ehsani
`
`D.
`
`Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`Ford challenges the patentability of claims 1, 6, 7, 9, 15, 21, 23, and
`36 of the ’347 patent based on the following specific grounds:
`
`Ground
`
`§ 103
`
`§ 103
`
`Basis
`
`Challenged Claims
`
`Severinsky
`
`23 and 36
`
`Severinsky and Ehsani
`
`1, 6, 7, 9, 15, and 21
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`III. ANALYSIS
`
`Standing
`A.
`Paice contends that Ford is “barred or estopped” under 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.104(a) from requesting inter partes review of the ’347 patent due to an
`alleged breach of an arbitration agreement between the parties. Prelim.
`Resp. 5–12. According to Paice, the arbitration agreement includes
`“unambiguous terms” that purportedly limit Ford’s ability to “challeng[e]
`the patent claims of the ’347 patent.” Id. at 7, 9–10. Postulating that Ford is
`in breach of those terms, Paice asserts that Ford has failed to demonstrate the
`requisite standing to file the instant petition. Id. at 11.
`
`The purported “standing” argument raised by Paice, however, relates
`to a disputed contractual matter that falls outside the purview of our
`authority under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29,
`125 Stat. 284 (2011). Indeed, the question of whether Ford has breached the
`arbitration agreement by requesting inter partes review of the ’347 patent is
`currently the subject of a preliminary injunction motion filed by Paice in the
`co-pending district court action, and yet to be decided. Prelim. Resp. 11 n.4.
`As such, we reject Paice’s attempt to frame this unresolved breach-of-
`contract issue as a standing issue ripe for our review. Based on the current
`record, Paice has not demonstrated that Ford is barred or estopped from
`challenging the ’347 patent.
`B.
`Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
`their broadest reasonable construction in the context of the patent in which
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`they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Ford contends that five claim
`limitations are in need of construction, namely, “road load (RL),” “setpoint
`(SP),” “low-load mode I,” “highway cruising mode IV,” and “acceleration
`mode V.” Pet. 13–17. We construe the relevant limitations as follows.
`1.
`“road load (RL)”
`The term “road load” or “RL” is found in independent claim 23 and
`dependent claims 7, 9, 15, and 36. The specification defines “road load” as
`“the vehicle’s instantaneous torque demands, i.e., that amount of torque
`required to propel the vehicle at a desired speed,” and further notes that it
`“can be positive or negative, i.e., when decelerating or descending a hill, in
`which case the negative road load . . . is usually employed to charge the
`battery.” Ex. 1001, 12:40–57. We see no reason to deviate from the
`specification’s express definition. Thus, consistent with the specification,
`we construe “road load” as “the amount of instantaneous torque required to
`propel the vehicle, be it positive or negative.”
`2.
`“setpoint (SP)”
`Independent claims 1 and 23 recite that the internal combustion
`
`engine efficiently produces torque at loads between a “setpoint (SP)” and a
`“maximum torque output (MTO).” Paice seeks to construe the term
`“setpoint” as “a definite, but potentially variable value at which a transition
`between operating modes may occur.” Prelim. Resp. 13. Ford, on the other
`hand, asserts that “setpoint” means a “predetermined torque value.” Pet. 16.
`
`The specification of the ’347 patent states that the value of a setpoint
`“may vary somewhat” or be “reset” in response to repetitive driving patterns
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`or other monitored variables. Ex. 1001, 40:37–59. But, just because a
`setpoint may change under certain circumstances does not foreclose it from
`being “set” or “determined” at a prior point in time. Any other construction
`would defeat the purpose of it being “set,” which the ’347 patent admits is
`for comparison sake. For instance, the specification states that “the
`microprocessor tests sensed and calculated values for system variables [such
`as road load (RL)] . . . against setpoints, and uses the results of the
`comparisons to control the mode of vehicle operation.” Ex. 1001, 40:22–31
`(emphasis added). That description makes clear that the microprocessor is
`comparing a just-derived value against a previously-defined value. As such,
`we construe the term “setpoint” to mean at least a “predetermined value that
`may or may not be reset.” The inquiry does not end there, however.
`
`Next, Paice takes issue with Ford’s construction of “setpoint” as being
`limited to a “torque value.” Prelim. Resp. 13–15. According to Paice, the
`specification describes setpoint as both a “torque value” and a “battery
`charge status.” Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1115 at 10). We agree that the
`specification provides that either “torque output” or “state of charge of the
`battery bank” can be compared against setpoints. Ex. 1001, 40:28–31. The
`claim language, however, is not so broad. Although the specification is an
`important tool in claim construction, it is the claim language itself—and the
`manner in which a disputed term is used in the context of the claim—that
`controls the ultimate determination.
`Here, contrary to Paice’s assertion, the claim language consistently
`refers to a “setpoint” in terms of a “torque” value. For example, claim 1
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`recites that the “torque require[d] . . . is at least equal to a setpoint (SP)
`above which said engine torque is efficiently produced, and wherein the
`torque produced by said engine when operated at said setpoint (SP) is
`substantially less than the maximum torque output (MTO) of said engine.”
`Nowhere does the claim refer to “setpoint” or “SP” in the context of a
`battery’s “state of charge.” Likewise, although claim 23 includes the step of
`“monitoring the state of charge of said battery,” the claim never makes a
`comparison between the battery’s “state of charge” and a “setpoint.”
`Instead, claim 23 consistently references a “setpoint” or “SP” in terms of
`“torque,” e.g., “producing torque at loads between a lower level SP and a
`maximum torque output”; “when the torque RL required to do so is less than
`said lower level SP”; “using the torque between RL and SP to drive said at
`least one electric motor”; and “the torque produced by said engine when
`operated at said setpoint (SP) is substantially less than the maximum torque
`output.” Ex. 1001, 60:22–54 (emphasis added). Thus, given the claim
`language’s clear correlation of a “setpoint” or “SP” to a torque value, we
`construe the terms “setpoint” and “SP” to mean “a predetermined torque
`value that may or may not be reset.”
`3.
`“low-load mode I,” “highway cruising mode IV,” and
`
`
`
`“acceleration mode V”
`Claim 7 expressly defines the terms “low-load mode I,” “highway
`cruising mode IV,” and “acceleration mode V,” within the body of the claim.
`Ex. 1001, 58:58–59:8. As such, for purposes of institution, no further
`construction of these terms is necessary at this time.
`
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`C.
`
`
`Asserted Grounds
`1.
`Claims 23 and 36 – Obviousness over Severinsky
`Ford challenges claims 23 and 36 on the ground that the claimed
`invention would have been obvious over Severinsky. Pet. 17–19. In support
`of this ground, Ford provides a detailed claim chart explaining how each
`limitation of claims 23 and 36 is met by Severinsky and why a skilled artisan
`would have found the claimed invention obvious in view of the teachings of
`Severinsky and the general knowledge of skilled artisans. Id. at 19–32.
`Claim 23 recites a method of controlling a hybrid vehicle having an
`engine “capable of efficiently producing torque at loads between a lower
`level SP [i.e., setpoint] and a maximum torque output MTO.” Ex. 1001,
`60:22–25 (emphasis added). First, Paice asserts that Severinsky does not
`teach “efficiently” producing engine torque at “a lower level SP,” as
`required by claim 23. Prelim. Resp. 17. But Severinsky expressly defines
`the engine’s “most efficient operational point” to be in the range of “60–
`90% of its maximum torque.” Ex. 1003, 20:63–67. Crediting the testimony
`of Ford’s declarant, Dr. Davis, we are persuaded that a skilled artisan would
`have understood the low end of Severinsky’s range, i.e., 60%, to be a “lower
`level setpoint.” See Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 201–204).
`Although Paice appears not to dispute that the lower end of
`Severinsky’s “60-90%” range is a torque value, it nonetheless takes issue
`with Severinsky’s failure to indicate how such torque value “can be varied”
`or is “potentially variable.” Prelim. Resp. 17–18. Paice’s argument,
`however, is premised on an incorrect construction of “setpoint.” As properly
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`construed above, “setpoint” simply requires that the torque value be
`“predetermined,” not that it be variable. Although the claim language does
`not preclude the “setpoint” from being reset (e.g., based on driver
`tendencies), nothing in the claim language requires that it be “variable,” as
`Paice contends.
`Next, Paice contends that Severinsky fails to disclose that the engine
`“efficiently” produces torque up to a “maximum torque output.” Prelim.
`Resp. 18. According to Paice, Severinsky’s disclosure of maintaining
`engine efficiency “up to 90% of its maximum torque” does not equate to
`“the full maximum torque as recited in claim 23.” Id. at 18–19. Paice
`mischaracterizes Severinsky, which merely discloses the “most efficient”
`operation to be at 90% of maximum torque. That disclosure of an ideal
`upper limit does not preclude the engine’s operation above the 90% limit
`from still being “efficient,” which is all claim 23 requires. Indeed, the ’347
`patent admits that Severinsky’s engine can operate at “100% of its maximum
`torque output, for efficient charging of the battery bank.” Ex. 1001, 11:2–7;
`see also Ex. 1005 ¶ 211. Thus, we are persuaded that Severinsky teaches a
`hybrid engine that efficiently produces torque “at a maximum torque
`output.”
`
`Paice also disputes Ford’s position that Severinsky discloses the
`battery charge limitation of claim 23, namely,
`employing said engine to propel said vehicle when the torque
`RL required to do so is less than said lower level SP and using
`the torque between RL and SP to drive said at least one electric
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`motor to charge said battery when the state of charge of said
`battery indicates the desirability of doing so.
`
`Prelim. Resp. 20–22. As described in Severinsky, the microprocessor
`monitors vehicle performance to determine if “excess engine torque is
`available . . . [that] can be transformed into electrical energy in motor 20 and
`stored by battery 22.” Ex. 1003, 13:65–14:21 (emphasis added). Severinsky
`further discloses that “when the vehicle starts down a hill, and the operator
`lifts his foot from the accelerator pedal, the kinetic energy of the vehicle and
`the engine’s excess torque may be used to drive the motor 20 as a generator
`so as to charge the batteries.” Id. at 10:32–36 (emphasis added). Those
`disclosures by Severinsky are similar to the specification support for claim
`23 that “excess engine torque is used to charge the batteries” when the
`vehicle’s torque requirements “are less than the torque then being produced
`by the engine, e.g., during coasting, on downhills or during braking.” Ex.
`1001, 38:22–28. Nonetheless, Paice argues that Severinsky does not use
`engine torque to propel the vehicle when the battery is being recharged.
`Prelim. Resp. 21–22. But Ford’s declarant, Dr. Davis, points to Figure 9 of
`Severinsky as illustrating a mode “where the engine provides torque to the
`wheels to propel the vehicle and motor for battery recharging.” Ex. 1005
`¶¶ 301–304. We are persuaded by Dr. Davis’s testimony that Severinsky
`teaches the battery charge limitation of claim 23.
`
`Having considered the information presented in the Petition and the
`Preliminary Response, we determine that Ford has demonstrated a
`reasonable likelihood of showing that a skilled artisan would have found the
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`subject matter of claim 23 obvious over Severinsky. Also, we have
`considered Ford’s challenge of dependent claim 36. Pet. 33–34. Paice does
`not argue this dependent claim separately from independent claim 23. See
`Prelim. Resp. 16–22. Based on our review of the detailed claim chart and
`reasoning presented in the petition, we are persuaded that Ford has shown
`sufficiently that the dependent limitation of claim 36 also would have been
`obvious over Severinsky.
`2.
`Claims 1, 6, 7, 9, 15, and 21 – Obviousness Over Severinsky
`
`
`
`and Ehsani
`
`Ford challenges independent claim 1, as well as dependent claims 6,
`7, 9, 15, and 21, on the ground that the claimed invention would have been
`obvious over the combined teachings of Severinsky and Ehsani. Pet. 34–51.
`Claim 1 recites a hybrid vehicle having two electric motors, one acting as a
`starter motor for the engine and another acting as a generator for the battery.
`Ex. 1001, 58:16–22. Acknowledging that Severinsky discloses simply a
`single electric motor having the dual functionality of both a starter motor
`and a generator, Ford points to the long history of starter motors in the
`automotive industry (dating back to 1912) as evidence that equipping
`Severinsky with a separate starter motor would have been nothing more than
`an obvious design choice in the eyes of skilled artisans at the time of the
`claimed invention. Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 329–333). Indeed,
`Severinsky recognizes as much, explaining that the decision to eliminate a
`separate starter motor was a function of “convenience” in terms of “cost,
`weight, and manufacturing.” Ex. 1003, 21:39–55; see also id. at 6:36–39.
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`Additionally, Ford points to Ehsani as teaching the use of two electric
`
`motors in a hybrid vehicle, namely, starter/generator motor 50 and electric
`propulsion motor 51. Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1004, Fig. 5, 3:24–25, 8:32–34).
`We are persuaded by Dr. Davis’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have
`known (and been able) to modify the “one motor” hybrid vehicle of
`Severinsky to add a separate starter motor, as taught by Ehsani, so that
`“noise vibration and harshness (NVH) issues would be greatly minimized.”
`Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 366–68. We do not find credible Paice’s argument that “adding
`back a feature that was intentionally removed” by Severinsky evinces a lack
`of motivation to combine with Ehsani. See Prelim. Resp. 22–24.
`
`Paice also faults the combination of Severinsky and Ehsani as failing
`to suggest “a setpoint (SP) above which said engine torque is efficiently
`produced,” as recited in claim 1. Prelim. Resp. 25. As discussed above,
`Severinsky discloses that the engine runs at “its most efficient operational
`point [when] it produces 60-90% of its maximum torque whenever
`operated.” Ex. 1003, 20:63–66 (emphasis added). That disclosure evinces
`that a skilled artisan would have understood Severinsky’s lower limit of 60%
`to be the “setpoint” for efficient operation. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 398–402.
`Again, however, Paice faults Severinsky for failing to indicate how its lower
`limit of 60% “may be varied in any way.” Prelim. Resp. 25. As discussed
`above, Paice misconstrues “setpoint” to require variation when nothing in
`the claim language suggests such a construction. Thus, we are persuaded
`that Severinsky’s lower limit of 60% of maximum torque for achieving
`efficient operation of the engine meets the “setpoint” language of claim 1.
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`Also, we have considered Ford’s challenge of dependent claims 6, 7,
`
`9, 15, and 21. Pet. 44–51. Based on our review of the information presented
`in the Petition, we are persuaded that Ford has shown sufficiently that these
`dependent limitations are taught by Severinsky and Ehsani. See id. (citing
`Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 410–506). For instance, Paice argues that the combination of
`Severinsky and Ehsani fails to suggest the limitation of claim 9, which
`recites a “low-speed battery charging mode II” in which the engine and a
`first electric motor are disengaged from the wheels and the vehicle is
`propelled by a second electric motor. Prelim. Resp. 25–26. Although
`Severinsky discloses a single motor for charging the battery, Ehsani teaches
`utilizing two electric motors in which generator 50 (i.e., first electric motor)
`charges battery 24 while the engine is “disengaged from the drive shaft 21
`by clutch 51” and electric motor 51 (i.e., the second motor) is used to propel
`the vehicle. Ex. 1004, 8:28–34. We are persuaded that it would have been
`obvious to modify Severinsky’s single-motor battery charging mode with
`Ehsani’s dual-motor battery charging mode so that the engine can be
`operated at its most efficient range while still allowing the second motor to
`drive the vehicle. See Ex. 1003, 2:43–54; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 486–489.
`3.
`Ford’s Purported Additional Ground
`
`Ford further contends that claims 1, 6, 7, 9, 15, and 21 are
`unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over “Ehsani and
`Severinsky.” Pet. 51–59. As part of this challenge, Ford elaborates on
`Ehsani’s teaching of “alternative control techniques” to assert that a skilled
`artisan would have been motivated to combine the hybrid control strategies
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`of Ehsani and Severinsky to arrive at a hybrid vehicle that adjusts the output
`of the engine based on torque requirements.3 Pet. 53–54. But that additional
`discussion of Ehsani does not rise to the level of a meaningfully distinct
`ground. Rather, it simply amounts to additional support for combining the
`two references. As such, we exercise our discretion under 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.108 to view Ford’s challenge based on “Ehsani and Severinsky” not as
`a different ground, but simply as additional support for the ground of
`“Severinsky and Ehsani” on which we institute trial.
`IV. CONCLUSION
`Based on the arguments and evidence presented in the Petition, we
`determine that Ford has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would
`prevail in establishing that the subject matter of claims 1, 6, 7, 9, 15, 21, 23,
`and 36 would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
`V. ORDER
`For the foregoing reasons, it is
`ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review
`of challenged claims 1, 6, 7, 9, 15, 21, 23, and 36 of the ’347 patent is
`instituted on the asserted ground of obviousness over Severinsky and
`Ehsani;
`
`FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and
`37 C.F.R. § 42.4, inter partes review of the ’347 patent shall commence on
`
`
`
`
`3 Ford also repeats many of the same points it made with respect to the
`
`ground based on “Severinsky and Ehsani.” See, e.g., Pet. 56–59.
`16
`
`Page 16 of 17
`
`FORD 1215
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00571
`Patent 7,104,347 B2
`
`the entry date of this Order, and notice is hereby given of the institution of a
`trial; and
`FURTHER ORDERED that all other grounds presented in Ford’s
`Petition are denied, and no ground other than that specifically listed above is
`authorized for inter partes review of the ’347 patent.
`
`FOR PETITIONER:
`
`Frank Angileri
`John Nemazi
`John Rondini
`BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C.
`FPGP010IPR2@brookskushman.com
`jrondini@brookskushman.com
`
`Kevin Greenleaf
`Lissi Mojica
`DENTONS US LLP
`kevin.greenleaf@dentons.com
`lissi.mojica@dentons.com
`
`
`
`FOR PATENT OWNER:
`
`Timothy W. Riffe
`Kevin E. Greene
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`riffe@fr.com
`IPR36351-0011IP1@fr.com
`
`
`17
`
`Page 17 of 17
`
`FORD 1215
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