throbber
Paper No. 43
`Filed: November 9, 2016
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`___________________
`
`NEPTUNE GENERICS, LLC,
`APOTEX INC., APOTEX CORP.,
`TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.,
`and FRESENIUS KABI USA, LLC,
`
`PETITIONERS,
`
`V.
`
`ELI LILLY & COMPANY,
`
`PATENT OWNER.
`___________________
`Case IPR2016-002401
`
`Patent 7,772,209
`
`PETITIONERS’ MOTION TO CROSS-EXAMINE DR. NIYIKIZA BY
`DEPOSITION2
`
`
`1 Cases IPR2016-01191 and IPR2016-01343 have been joined with the instant
`
`proceeding.
`
`2 Identical copies of this motion have been filed in Sandoz Inc. v. Eli Lilly &
`
`Company, IPR2016-00318, and Neptune Generics, LLC v. Eli Lilly & Company,
`
`IPR2016-00237, IPR2016-00240.
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`Petitioners Sandoz Inc. (“Sandoz”) and Neptune Generics, LLC
`
`(“Neptune”)3 hereby request the deposition of inventor Dr. Clet Niyikiza
`
`pursuant to either routine discovery under 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(ii), or
`
`alternatively, additional discovery under 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(2). Should the
`
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board”) not compel Dr. Niyikiza’s
`
`deposition, then according to prior Board decisions, Exhibit 2116, which is Dr.
`
`Niyikiza’s direct testimony at a prior district court trial, should be given no
`
`weight because Sandoz and Neptune would not have had the opportunity to
`
`cross-examine Dr. Niyikiza about that testimony in the present inter partes
`
`review (“IPR”) proceeding.
`
`I.
`
`Background
`
`Exhibit 2116 consists of 102 pages from the August 22, 2013 direct trial
`
`testimony of Dr. Clet Niyikiza, who is the sole inventor listed on the face of the
`
`patent at issue in these IPRs. This testimony was given in the litigation, to which
`
`neither Sandoz nor Neptune was a party, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral
`
`Meds., Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1376 (S.D. Ind.) (“Teva Litigation”). Patent Owner
`
`
`3 The parties joined in IPR2016-00318, IPR2016-00237, and IPR2016-00240
`
`join this motion.
`
`1
`
`
`

`
`
`
`Eli Lilly and Company (“Lilly”) relies on 37 pages of Exhibit 2116 in its Patent
`
`Owner Responses, citing to the exhibit nine times in each response.
`
`On October 4 and 10, respectively, Neptune and Sandoz each requested
`
`the availability of Dr. Niyikiza to sit for his deposition. Lilly responded that it
`
`did not intend to make Dr. Niyikiza available. Subsequently, Lilly served
`
`supplemental evidence, which included the deposition transcript and the entire
`
`direct, cross, redirect, and re-cross trial testimony of Dr. Niyikiza in the Teva
`
`Litigation. The parties met and conferred on October 21 and 26, and then
`
`participated in a call with the Board on October 31. During that call, the Board
`
`authorized the parties to brief the issue of whether Dr. Niyikiza should be
`
`deposed. (Ex. 1042, Tr. at 4:18-5:4, 16:12-18.)
`
`II. Dr. Niyikiza Should Be Deposed Because His Deposition Is Routine
`Discovery Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(ii)
`
`In an IPR, “[u]ncompelled direct testimony must be submitted in the form
`
`of an affidavit,” 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(a), and a declarant or affiant must be made
`
`available for cross-examination, as the deposition is routine discovery, 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.51(b)(1)(ii). A patentee cannot circumvent this requirement by relying on
`
`some other form of sworn testimony. For example, the Board has held that, if
`
`substantively relied on by the patent owner, a declaration from another
`
`proceeding, such as prosecution of a patent application, is also considered
`
`2
`
`
`

`
`
`
`“affidavit testimony,” in which case the declarant’s deposition is routine
`
`discovery. See Altaire Pharm., Inc. v. Paragon Bioteck, Inc., PGR2015-00011,
`
`Paper 29 at 1-2 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 1, 2016); see also Ikaria, Inc. v. Geno LLC,
`
`IPR2013-00253, Paper 20 at 2 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 1, 2014) (noting deposition
`
`required notwithstanding the argument that the declaration was submitted during
`
`prosecution and thus “was not prepared for the purposes of this proceeding”).
`
`There is no reason to treat sworn trial testimony, submitted in place of an
`
`affidavit, any differently. In both cases, an individual makes arguments
`
`regarding validity, and the Board can only properly weigh those arguments after
`
`he or she has been cross-examined in the IPR.
`
`Lilly’s Patent Owner Responses repeatedly rely on Dr. Niyikiza’s trial
`
`testimony to support substantive allegations including alleged skepticism about
`
`the claimed invention, alleged industry praise, and Lilly’s own version of the
`
`invention story. (IPR2016-00318, Paper 36 at 10-12, 57, 59; IPR2016-00237,
`
`Paper 33 at 11-12, 55-56; IPR2016-00240, Paper 32 at 11-13, 55-56.) Dr.
`
`Niyikiza’s testimony and Lilly’s extensive reliance on this testimony is
`
`equivalent to a party relying on “affidavit testimony” in an IPR. Lilly’s reliance
`
`on this testimony in this IPR mandates the cross-examination of Dr. Niyikiza as
`
`routine discovery. See Altaire, PGR2015-00011, Paper 29 at 1-2.
`
`3
`
`
`

`
`
`
`Additionally, Lilly’s reliance on Dr. Niyikiza’s trial testimony, from a
`
`matter to which Sandoz and Neptune were not parties, is an improper attempt to
`
`circumvent the Board’s rules, which make clear that cross-examination of a
`
`declarant is an essential component to IPR proceedings. See 37 C.F.R.
`
`§§ 42.51(b)(1)(ii), (b)(2). Lilly cannot avoid cross-examination by using
`
`testimony from a prior proceeding. Moreover, Lilly’s production of Dr.
`
`Niyikiza’s cross-examination trial testimony does not excuse Lilly’s failure to
`
`make Dr. Niyikiza available for a deposition in these proceedings, particularly
`
`here where lead petitioners never had the opportunity to examine Dr. Niyikiza at
`
`trial. By heavily relying on Dr. Niyikiza’s trial testimony as if it were an
`
`affidavit, Lilly injected Dr. Niyikiza into these IPRs and must make him
`
`available for deposition under both the letter and spirit of 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.51(b)(1)(ii), or suffer the consequences for failing to do so. See Section
`
`IV, infra, at 10.
`
`III. Alternatively, Dr. Niyikiza’s Deposition Should Be Ordered As
`Additional Discovery Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(2)
`
`If the Board finds that the deposition of Dr. Niyikiza is not routine
`
`discovery, then Sandoz and Neptune move for his deposition as additional
`
`discovery that is “necessary in the interest of justice” under the Garmin factors.
`
`See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5); Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC,
`
`4
`
`
`

`
`
`
`IPR2012-00001, Paper 26 at 6-7 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2013). All five Garmin
`
`factors support granting petitioners an opportunity to depose Dr. Niyikiza.
`
`A. Garmin Factor 1: There is more than a mere possibility
`that Dr. Niyikiza’s deposition will uncover useful
`information
`
`Sandoz and Neptune are already in possession of a threshold amount of
`
`evidence showing that information useful to petitioners will be uncovered by Dr.
`
`Niyikiza’s deposition. Lilly’s Patent Owner Responses rely on Dr. Niyikiza’s
`
`trial testimony as evidence of alleged secondary considerations and also to tell
`
`the alleged invention story. Dr. Niyikiza thus has knowledge pertinent to these
`
`issues and there is more than a “mere possibility” that his deposition will
`
`uncover information useful to petitioners. See Garmin, IPR2012-00001, Paper
`
`26 at 6.
`
`B. Garmin Factor 2: Sandoz and Neptune will not be asking
`for Lilly’s litigation positions via Dr. Niyikiza’s deposition
`
`Sandoz and Neptune do not seek Lilly’s litigation positions and their
`
`underlying bases, which Lilly has already disclosed in its Patent Owner
`
`Responses.
`
`5
`
`
`

`
`
`
`C. Garmin Factor 3: A deposition is the only way for
`Petitioners to obtain the information sought
`
`Sandoz and Neptune lack an “ability to generate equivalent information by
`
`other means” besides the deposition of Dr. Niyikiza. See Garmin, IPR2012-
`
`00001, Paper 26 at 6. Sandoz and Neptune were not parties to the litigation
`
`where Dr. Niyikiza gave the testimony in Exhibit 2116. Sandoz and Neptune are
`
`competitors of the parties to the Teva Litigation and had no role in that litigation.
`
`Thus, neither Sandoz nor Neptune had an opportunity to cross-examine Dr.
`
`Niyikiza previously. The fact that Teva and Fresenius are joined in these IPRs
`
`does not change these facts, particularly here where Teva and Fresenius are
`
`simply silent understudies. (IPR2016-00318, Paper 33, ¶ 3; IPR2016-00237 & -
`
`00240, Paper 29, ¶ 3.)
`
`
`
`Introducing the transcript of Dr. Niyikiza’s prior cross-examination cannot
`
`cure the lack of a deposition for several reasons. First, it does not fill the gaps
`
`Sandoz and Neptune would seek to fill by taking Dr. Niyikiza’s deposition.
`
`Although Teva and Fresenius certainly obtained useful admissions from Dr.
`
`Niyikiza on cross-examination, their questioning did not cover all the topics
`
`covered in the 37 pages of testimony cited by Eli Lilly. By way of example,
`
`Lilly’s Patent Owner Response quotes a statement that was purportedly made by
`
`a principal investigator “prais[ing] Dr. Niyikiza’s contribution to pemetrexed’s
`
`6
`
`
`

`
`
`
`development [and] stating that ‘[i]f you didn’t do it, the drug would probably be
`
`dead.’” (IPR2016-00318, Paper 36 at 59; IPR2016-00237, Paper 33 at 56;
`
`IPR2016-00240, Paper 32 at 56.) The questioning on cross-examination in the
`
`Teva Litigation does not touch on this statement, which is the primary allegation
`
`on which Lilly's assertion of skepticism is based in these IPRs.4 Likewise, the
`
`recently produced Teva Litigation exhibits and deposition transcripts – taken
`
`before trial – leave this issue, and others, unaddressed and are not substitutes for
`
`cross-examination on the specific topics raised in Dr. Niyikiza’s direct
`
`testimony.
`
`
`
`Second, during the parties’ meet-and-confers, Lilly attempted to justify its
`
`reliance on Dr. Niyikiza’s testimony by characterizing it as narrowly limited to
`
`issues related to skepticism that were already covered in the Teva Litigation.
`
`This claim is belied by Lilly’s extensive citations to Dr. Niyikiza’s transcript and
`
`the content of Exhibit 2116 itself. Lilly explicitly relies on 37 pages of Dr.
`
`Niyikiza’s trial testimony in its Patent Owner Responses to tell the alleged
`
`invention story and provide his own purported reasons for not adding vitamin B-
`
`
`4 This issue is exemplary. Petitioners are not obligated to explain in advance
`
`every issue in Exhibit 2116’s 102 pages on which they may question Dr.
`
`Niyikiza.
`
`7
`
`
`

`
`
`
`12 to the pemetrexed treatment – topics that are not related to its allegations of
`
`skepticism by experts in the relevant field. (IPR2016-00318, Paper 36 at 10-12,
`
`57, 59; IPR2016-00237, Paper 33 at 11-12, 55-56; IPR2016-00240, Paper 32 at
`
`11-13, 55-56.) For example, Lilly relies on Dr. Niyikiza to suggest that Dr.
`
`Niyikiza’s published data did not support the addition of vitamin B12 – not
`
`skepticism by others. (IPR2016-00318, Paper 36, at 10.) Further, Dr. Niyikiza’s
`
`tale of how he got the idea for the claimed invention at a Kroger pharmacy has
`
`no bearing on whether the claimed invention was met with any skepticism of
`
`experts. (Ex. 2116, Niyikiza at 744-45.) Yet, Exhibit 2116 includes a large
`
`amount of content like this that has nothing to do with skepticism.
`
`
`
`
`
`In addition, the invalidity positions in these IPRs are not the same as the
`
`Teva Litigation. Among the differences are: (i) all instituted grounds in both the
`
`Sandoz and Neptune IPRs include European Patent Application No. 0 595 005,
`
`which was not even a trial exhibit in the Teva Litigation; (ii) the instituted
`
`grounds for Neptune’s IPR2016-00240 rely on an article by Rusthoven, which
`
`was not relied on by Teva and Fresenius for their obviousness positions; and (iii)
`
`Petitioners rely on expert testimony as well as a number of secondary references
`
`not raised in the Teva Litigation. Given the breadth of Niyikiza’s testimony and
`
`the differences between the grounds in these IPRs and the Teva litigation,
`
`8
`
`
`

`
`
`
`Petitioners should have an opportunity to question Dr. Niyikiza’s testimony in
`
`light of the particular art and the allegations raised in his testimony.
`
`D. Garmin Factor 4: Sandoz and Neptune’s deposition
`request is easily understandable
`
`There is nothing complex about Sandoz and Neptune simple deposition
`
`request per 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(ii), or alternatively, 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(2).
`
`E. Garmin Factor 5: Sandoz and Neptune’s deposition
`request is not overly burdensome
`
`There is nothing overly burdensome regarding the requested deposition.
`
`The Board’s rules contemplate depositions will be taken on request for any
`
`affiant under 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(ii). While the parties have conducted
`
`separate depositions in these two sets of related IPRs, Petitioners are willing to
`
`agree to a single 1-day deposition for Dr. Niyikiza to further reduce any burden.
`
`Although Dr. Niyikiza is no longer a Lilly employee, it should not be
`
`overly burdensome for him to sit for his deposition in this matter. Dr. Niyikiza
`
`was a Vice President at Merrimack Pharmaceuticals in Boston at the time he
`
`voluntarily traveled to DC and Indianapolis to testify at deposition and trial in
`
`the Teva Litigation and may be contractually obligated to assist Lilly in future
`
`matters involving the ‘209 patent – a common practice in the pharmaceutical
`
`industry. (Dkt. 2116, Niyikiza at 712.) Lilly has identified no reason why Dr.
`
`9
`
`
`

`
`
`
`Niyikiza could not be available to sit for his deposition in these proceedings at a
`
`location convenient to him. Further, to Sandoz and Neptune’s knowledge, Lilly
`
`has not even tried to arrange for Dr. Niyikiza’s deposition.5
`
`IV. The Board Should Give No Weight To Dr. Niyikiza’s Testimony If He
`Cannot Be Cross-Examined
`
`If Lilly does not make Dr. Niyikiza available for a deposition, then Dr.
`
`Niyikiza’s testimony should be given no weight. See Coalition for Affordable
`
`Drugs V LLC v. Biogen MA Inc., IPR 2015-01993, Paper 34 at 3 (P.T.A.B. Apr.
`
`19, 2016) (explaining that in order for a declaration submitted during patent
`
`prosecution to “be given any weight” in an IPR, the declarant/affiant must be
`
`made available for cross-examination in the manner specified in 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.51(b)(1)(ii)). In Organik Kimya AS v. Rohm & Haas Co., the petitioner
`
`submitted a declaration in the IPR that had been originally submitted in a prior
`
`International Trade Commission (“ITC”) proceeding. IPR2014-00185, Paper 42
`
`at 2 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2014). The patent owner had deposed the declarant in
`
`the ITC proceeding but still sought a deposition in the IPR. Id. Even though the
`
`Board did not grant a deposition in the IPR as routine discovery, the Board held
`
`5 Given Dr. Niyikiza’s past cooperation with Lilly, Sandoz expects that it will
`
`not be necessary to subpoena Dr. Niyikiza under 35 U.S.C. § 24 should the
`
`Board order Lilly to make Dr. Niyikiza available.
`
`10
`
`
`

`
`
`
`that the declaration would be “entitled to little or no weight, as it has not been
`
`subject to cross-examination as it pertains to the instant proceeding.” Id. at 3.
`
`Similarly, if Dr. Niyikiza is not deposed in the present IPRs, his trial testimony
`
`should be given no weight, especially because Sandoz and Neptune never had
`
`the opportunity to cross-examine him.
`
`The Board has also held that a declaration should be given no weight
`
`when it was originally submitted in a re-examination proceeding, Mexichem
`
`Amanco Holdings S.A. de C.V. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., IPR2013-00576, Paper
`
`36 at 2-3 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 5, 2014) (Bonilla, J.), or during prosecution of a related
`
`patent, Amneal Pharm., LLC v. Endo Pharm. Inc., IPR2014-00360, Paper 39 at
`
`3-4 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 3, 2014) (Bonilla, J.). The Board’s decisions are clear: if a
`
`witness is not cross-examined in the IPR, then it is given no weight.
`
`V. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, petitioners respectfully request that the Board
`
`order Lilly to provide Dr. Niyikiza to sit for his deposition. In the event that Dr.
`
`Niyikiza is not produced for a deposition, petitioners request that his testimony
`
`be given no weight.
`
`11
`
`
`

`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`/Sarah E. Spires/
`Sarah E. Spires (Reg. No. 61,501)
`SKIERMONT DERBY LLP
`2200 Ross Ave., Ste. 4800W
`Dallas, Texas 75201
`P: 214-978-6600/F: 214-978-6601
`Lead Counsel for Petitioner
`
`Dr. Parvathi Kota (Reg. No. 65,122)
`Paul J. Skiermont (pro hac vice
`requested)
`SKIERMONT DERBY LLP
`2200 Ross Ave., Ste. 4800W
`Dallas, Texas 75201
`P: 214-978-6600/F: 214-978-6621
`
`Mieke K. Malmberg (pro hac vice
`requested)
`SKIERMONT DERBY LLP
`800 Wilshire Boulevard
`Los Angeles, CA 90017
`P: 213-788-4500/F: 213-788-4545
`Back-Up Counsel for Petitioner
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`
`November 9, 2016
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), I certify that I caused to be served on the
`
`counsel for Patent Owner a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petitioners’
`
`Motion to Cross-Examine Dr. Niyikiza by Deposition, by electronic means on
`
`November 9, 2016 at the following addresses of record:
`
`Dov P. Grossman (Reg. No. 72,525)
`WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
`725 Twelfth St. NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Direct Phone: 202-434-5812
`Facsimile: 202-434-5029
`dgrossman@wc.com
`Lead Counsel for Patent Owner
`
`Adam L. Perlman (pro hac vice)
`WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
`725 Twelfth St. NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Direct Phone: 202-434-5244
`Facsimile: 202-434-5029
`aperlman@wc.com
`Back-Up Counsel for Patent Owner
`
`John C. Demeter (Reg. No. 30,167)
`ELI LILLY AND COMPANY
`Lilly Corporate Center
`Indianapolis, IN 46285
`Direct Phone: 317-276-3785
`Facsimile: 317-276-3861
`demeter_john_c@lilly.com
`Back-Up Counsel for Patent Owner
`
`
`
`David M. Krinsky (Reg. No. 72,339)
`WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
`725 Twelfth St. NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Direct Phone: 202-434-5338
`Facsimile: 202-480-8302
`dkrinsky@wc.com
`Back-Up Counsel for Patent Owner
`
`James P. Leeds (Reg. No. 35,241)
`ELI LILLY AND COMPANY
`Lilly Corporate Center
`Indianapolis, IN 46285
`Direct Phone: 317-276-1667
`Facsimile: 317-277-6534
`leeds_james@lilly.com
`Back-Up Counsel for Patent Owner
`
`John D. Polivick (Reg. No. 57,926)
`RAKOCZY MOLINO
`MAZZOCHI SIWIK LLP
`6 West Hubbard Street, Suite 500
`Chicago, Illinois 60654
`Tel: 312-527-2157
`Fax: 312-527-4205
`jpolivick@rmmslegal.com
`Lead Counsel for Petitioner Apotex
`
`
`
`

`
`Patrick C. Kilgore (Reg. No. 69,131)
`RAKOCZY MOLINO
`MAZZOCHI SIWIK LLP
`6 West Hubbard Street, Suite 500
`Chicago, Illinois 60654
`Tel: 312-527-2157
`Fax: 312-527-4205
`pkilgore@rmmslegal.com
`Back-Up Counsel for Petitioner Apotex
`
`Mark D. Schuman (Reg. No. 31,197)
`CARLSON, CASPERS, VANDENBURGH,
`LINDQUIST AND SCHUMAN
`225 South Sixth Street, Suite 4200
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`Tel: 612-436-9600
`Fax: 612-436-9605
`mschuman@carlsoncaspers.com
`Back-Up Counsel for Petitioner Teva
`
`
`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`/Sarah E. Spires/
`Sarah E. Spires (Reg. No. 61,501)
`
`Lead Counsel for Petitioner
`
`
`
`Deanne M. Mazzochi (Reg. No. 50,158)
`RAKOCZY MOLINO
`MAZZOCHI SIWIK LLP
`6 West Hubbard Street, Suite 500
`Chicago, Illinois 60654
`Tel: 312-527-2157
`Fax: 312-527-4205
`dmazzochi@rmmslegal.com
`Back-Up Counsel for Petitioner Apotex
`
`Gary J. Speier (Reg. No. 45,458)
`CARLSON, CASPERS, VANDENBURGH,
`LINDQUIST AND SCHUMAN
`225 South Sixth Street, Suite 4200
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`Tel: 612-436-9600
`Fax: 612-436-9605
`gspeier@carlsoncaspers.com
`Lead Counsel for Petitioner Teva
`
`Cynthia Lambert Hardman
`(Reg. No. 45,458)
`GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
`The New York Times Building
`620 Eighth Avenue
`New York, New York 10018-1405
`Tel: 212-813-8800
`Fax: 212-355-3333
`chardman@goodwinprocter.com
`Back-Up Counsel for Petitioner Teva
`
`Dated: November 9, 2016

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket