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IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`ARGENTUM PHARMACEUTICALS LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`RESEARCH CORPORATION TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`Case No. IPR2016-00204
`Patent No. RE 38,551
`
`PATENT OWNER’S OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S MOTION TO
`COMPEL DISCOVERY AND TO FILE EXHIBIT 2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` DC: 6038549-9
`
`

`
`IPR2016-00204
`
`029819.0100-US03
`
`
`
`Petitioner’s Motion presents no reason to deviate from the Board’s prior
`
`Order (Paper 10) declining to compel routine or additional discovery. Petitioner’s
`
`Motion is based wholly on the erroneous premise that the Patent Owner
`
`Preliminary Response (“POPR”) contains “factual assertions” regarding the status
`
`of the LeGall Thesis as a printed publication. Mot. at 1. But Patent Owner has not
`
`taken any substantive position on whether the LeGall Thesis is a printed
`
`publication, challenging only the sufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence. Therefore,
`
`evidence alleged to address the substantive question of whether the LeGall Thesis
`
`is a printed publication cannot be “inconsistent information” under 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.51(b)(1)(iii). Moreover, there is no authority—and Petitioner cites to none—
`
`permitting Petitioner to file evidence beyond that in the petition prior to institution.
`
`
`
`In addition, Petitioner includes “material facts” addressing the merits of the
`
`printed publication question (Mot. at 1-2),1 in a transparent attempt to improperly
`
`supplement the petition in violation of the statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`
`I.
`
`
`
`Patent Owner Has Not Advanced a Substantive Position on Whether the
`LeGall Thesis Is a Printed Publication
`Petitioner has not—and cannot—point to any substantive position Patent
`
`Owner has advanced on whether the LeGall Thesis is a printed publication.
`
`Applying PTAB case law, page 20 of the POPR (see Mot. at 1, 4) explains that the
`
`1 Notably, Petitioner cites no support for alleged “material fact” “4.” See Mot. at 2.
`
`1
`
`

`
`IPR2016-00204
`
`029819.0100-US03
`
`trial stipulation, drafted to streamline the issues at trial, does not preclude the
`
`Board from assessing whether Petitioner’s evidence is sufficient, and that the
`
`conclusory language of the stipulation itself “is not probative of the underlying
`
`facts” concerning public accessibility of the LeGall Thesis. Page 22 of the POPR
`
`(see Mot. at 1) explains that the articles identified by Petitioner were authored by
`
`students (other than LeGall), or their advisors, providing a ready explanation for
`
`access to those students’ theses, confirming that the thesis citations “provide no
`
`evidence” “of how the LeGall Thesis was in fact indexed, cataloged or shelved.”
`
`
`
`The POPR’s challenge to the sufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence of public
`
`accessibility is not “tantamount to an affirmative argument that the [thesis is] not
`
`[a] printed publication[].” Nvidia Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., IPR2015-
`
`01316, Paper 9, p. 3 (PTAB Oct. 28, 2015) (internal quotations omitted); see also
`
`Hughes Network Sys., LLC v. Calif. Inst. of Tech., IPR2015-00059, Paper 34, p. 7
`
`(PTAB Dec. 30, 2015). “The distinction is important which, if not made, leads to
`
`an unreasonably broad scope of routine discovery.” Nvidia, Paper 9, p. 3.
`
`
`
`In Nvidia, the Board denied Petitioner’s request for authorization to file a
`
`motion to compel under 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii), seeking documents in patent
`
`owner’s possession allegedly “inconsistent” with patent owner’s position in its
`
`Preliminary Response on the issue of public accessibility. Nvidia, Paper 9, p. 2.
`
`The Preliminary Response asserted that “Petitioner . . . has not provided any
`
`2
`
`

`
`IPR2016-00204
`
`029819.0100-US03
`
`evidence” as to whether and how the references were made available to the public.
`
`Id., Paper 7, p. 6. The Board concluded that the Preliminary Response challenged
`
`the sufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence, and denied discovery on that basis: “the
`
`documents Petitioner seeks are not inconsistent with a position taken in the
`
`Preliminary Response and need not have been served as routine discovery.” Id.,
`
`Paper 9, p. 3. As in Nvidia, the POPR in the present proceeding does not take a
`
`substantive position on whether the LeGall Thesis is a printed publication,
`
`challenging only the sufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence. See POPR, pp. 17-23.
`
`Such “[a]rguments pointing to a deficiency in petitioner’s case do not impose an
`
`obligation on the part of [patent owner] to provide evidence supplementing that
`
`provided by [petitioner].” Hughes, Paper 34, p. 7.
`
`II. The Statute and Rules Preclude the Filing of Supplemental Information
`Prior to the Board’s Institution Decision
`
`
`
`The statute requires the Board to decide whether to institute trial based on
`
`“the information presented in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). A petitioner must,
`
`in its petition, present “credible evidence” to satisfy its burden of a threshold
`
`showing of public accessibility of an asserted reference. See Hughes, Paper 34, p.
`
`4; see also Apple Inc. v. DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc., IPR2015-00369, Paper 14, p. 5
`
`(PTAB Aug. 12, 2015). In light of this statutory requirement, the regulations
`
`provide only for service of routine discovery under 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii).
`
`The filing of evidentiary objections, supplemental evidence, and supplemental
`
`3
`
`

`
`IPR2016-00204
`
`029819.0100-US03
`
`information related to the merits is permitted only after institution. See 37 C.F.R.
`
`§§ 42.64(b), 42.123.
`
`
`
`Under this integrated statutory and regulatory framework, only where a
`
`petitioner has first satisfied its statutory burden in the petition, and only after trial
`
`institution, may a petitioner request to submit supplemental information regarding
`
`the public accessibility of an asserted reference. See Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v.
`
`Juniper Networks, Inc., IPR2013–00369, Paper 37, pp. 2-3 (PTAB Feb. 5, 2014)
`
`(granting motion to submit supplemental information regarding public accessibility
`
`of references when “the information presented in the Petition . . . made a threshold
`
`showing that [the references] are ‘printed publications’”); see also Apple Inc. v.
`
`Virnetx Inc., IPR2015-00810, Paper 17 (PTAB Nov. 2, 2015) (same). There is no
`
`reason, or authority, to deviate from this framework here.
`
`
`
`Consideration of “pre-institution discovery on . . . the issue of real party in
`
`interest” (Mot. at 4) is not to the contrary. In the Zerto case cited by Petitioner
`
`(Mot. at 3-4), the Board considered evidence obtained from such discovery prior to
`
`institution in conjunction with the Patent Owner Preliminary Response, a filing
`
`authorized by the statute and the regulations. 35 U.S.C. § 313; 37 C.F.R. § 42.107.
`
`Prior to institution, the Board properly considers information served under
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`discovery when filing the information is authorized by the regulations, and does
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`not otherwise violate the statute.
`
`4
`
`

`
`IPR2016-00204
`
`029819.0100-US03
`
`III. Petitioner Has Provided No Reason that the Information It Seeks Could
`Not Have Been Obtained Prior to Filing a Petition
`
`
`
`Unsurprisingly, Petitioner fails to address (Mot. at 5) “whether Petitioner
`
`could have obtained such documents before the filing [of] a Petition.” Paper 12, p.
`
`4. First, PACER confirms that the transcript from the November district court trial
`
`(which itself was open to the public) was available as of December 15, 2015:
`
`“Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the
`
`Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript
`
`Restriction.” Ex. 1044, p. 73 (emphasis added). Second, Petitioner was not in any
`
`way limited to the district court trial evidence (e.g., transcripts from depositions) to
`
`meet its burden to establish that the LeGall Thesis is a printed publication.
`
`Petitioner “could have adopted any number of strategies for establishing the fact of
`
`publication and the publication date,” Hughes, Paper 34, p. 8, but, instead, chose to
`
`file the Petition, and, on the very same day, to start its quest for the litigation
`
`documents to bolster its case. See Ex. 1038, p. 1 (email forwarding courtesy copy
`
`of Petition and 15 requests for production of litigation documents, requests the
`
`Board declined to consider as “premature” (see Ex. 2028)). Third, and most
`
`tellingly, Petitioner was at full liberty to postpone the filing of a petition until it
`
`was able to meet its threshold burden, as 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) presents no time bar.
`
`
`
`Petitioner’s request to file Exhibit 2025 and a motion to compel routine
`
`discovery of the litigation documents should be denied.
`
`5
`
`

`
`IPR2016-00204
`
`029819.0100—-US03
`
`Dated: April 18, 2016
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
`One CityCenter
`850 Tenth Street NW
`
`Washington, DC 20001
`(202) 662-6000
`
`
`
`Andrea G. Réister
`Registration No.: 36,253
`Jennifer L. Robbins
`
`Registration No.: 61,163
`Enrique D. Longton
`Registration No.: 47,304
`Attorneys for Patent Owner
`
`

`
`IPR2O16—00204
`
`‘
`
`029819.0100—US03
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to the Board’s April 6, 2016 Order (IPR2016—00204, Paper 12), I
`
`hereby certify that on this 18th day of April 2016, the foregoing Patent Owner’s
`
`Opposition to Petiti0ner’s Motion to Compel Discovery and to File Exhibit
`
`2025 was served by electronic mail, by agreement of the parties, on the following
`
`counsel of record for Petitioner:
`
`Matthew J . Dowd (MatthewDowd@andrewskurth.com)
`Justin W. Crotty (JustinCrotty@andrewskurth.com)
`Andrews Kurth LLP
`
`1350 I Street, NW, Suite 1100
`Washington DC 20005
`
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`
`Andrea G. Reister, Esq.
`Registration No. 36,253
`
`Dated: April 18, 2016

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