IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`ARGENTUM PHARMACEUTICALS LLC, MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS
`INC., BRECKENRIDGE PHARMACEUTICAL, INC., AND ALEMBIC
`PHARMACEUTICALS, LTD.,
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
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`RESEARCH CORPORATION TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
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`Case No. IPR2016-002041
`Patent No. RE 38,551
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`PATENT OWNER’S OPPOSITION TO PETITIONERS’
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`1 Case IPR2016-01101, Case IPR2016-01242, and Case IPR2016-01245 have been
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`joined with this proceeding.
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`
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`ARGENTUM PHARMACEUTICALS LLC, MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS
`INC., BRECKENRIDGE PHARMACEUTICAL, INC., AND ALEMBIC
`PHARMACEUTICALS, LTD.,
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`RESEARCH CORPORATION TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`Case No. IPR2016-002041
`Patent No. RE 38,551
`
`PATENT OWNER’S OPPOSITION TO PETITIONERS’
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`
`
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`
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`
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`1 Case IPR2016-01101, Case IPR2016-01242, and Case IPR2016-01245 have been
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`joined with this proceeding.
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`IPR2016-00204
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`I.
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`Introduction
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`In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.64 and the Scheduling Order (Paper No.
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`20), Patent Owner Research Corporation Technologies, Inc. opposes Petitioners’
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`Motion to Exclude (Paper No. 72) Patent Owner’s Exhibits 2125, 2141-70 and
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`2174-82. For the reasons stated below, Petitioners’ motion should be denied.
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`II. Argument
`A. The Board Should Deny Petitioners’ Motion to Exclude Because
`the Objections Failed to Comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1)
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`Petitioners’ Objections to Patent Owner’s Evidence (Paper No. 41) did not
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`provide “sufficient particularity to allow correction” by the Patent Owner, as
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`required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1). Instead, Petitioners’ objections were copied
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`and pasted—grammatical mistakes and all—from one exhibit to the next. For
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`example, every authenticity objection referenced in Petitioners’ motion simply
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`states, “Exhibit [#] is lacks [sic] authentication and is therefore inadmissible under
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`FRE 901.” Petitioners never identified with particularity why an exhibit failed to
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`satisfy FRE 901 or the sorts of supplemental evidence sufficient to prove
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`authenticity. Similarly, every hearsay objection for every exhibit challenged in
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`Petitioners’ motion states nothing more than “Exhibit [#] is hearsay under FRE 801
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`and is inadmissible under FRE 802.” No hearsay objection particularly identifies
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`an alleged hearsay statement contained in any exhibit. Consequently, the Board
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`1
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`IPR2016-00204
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`should deny Petitioners’ motion to exclude evidence because the underlying
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`objections failed to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1).
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`B.
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`Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 Relate to Objective Indicia of
`Nonobviousness, Including the Failure of Others and Industry
`Skepticism, and Are Admissible
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`Petitioners move to exclude Exhibits 2125 (a letter from Eli Lilly explaining
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`the termination of its license to Dr. Kohn’s FAA compounds) and 2141-70 (letters
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`from other companies declining to pursue licenses to the FAA compounds)
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`because the exhibits allegedly (i) lack authentication under FRE 901, (Paper No.
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`72 pp. 2-4); (2) are hearsay under FRE 801 and 802, (id. at 4-5); and (3) are
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`incomplete under FRE 106 or 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii), (id. at 5-7).
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`Petitioners’ Motion to Exclude (Paper No. 72), however, does not mention
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`the multiple instances of Petitioners themselves relying on some of the same
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`exhibits they now seek to exclude. For example, Dr. McDuff cited Exhibits 2145-
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`46, 2152-53, 2159 and 2168-69 to argue that lacosamide represented a poor
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`business opportunity. Ex. 1086 ¶ 41. Dr. McDuff also cited Exhibit 2155 to argue
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`that the industry as a whole was generally disinterested in epilepsy treatments, and
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`Exhibit 2141 to argue that there was general disinterest in lacosamide. Id. To the
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`extent the Board excludes any of these exhibits, the Board should also disregard
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`Petitioners’ arguments relying on the same evidence. See Reply p. 26 (citing in
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`2
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`IPR2016-00204
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`part Ex. 1086 ¶ 41). Regardless, for the reasons described below, Petitioners’
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`motion to exclude Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 should be denied.
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`Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 Are Sufficiently Authenticated
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`1.
`Petitioners correctly observe that FRE 901’s standard for admissibility is
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`“slight.” Paper No. 72 p. 2 (citing United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 232 (3d
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`Cir. 2013)). An exhibit is excluded under FRE 901 only when record evidence is
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`insufficient “to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”
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`Petitioner’s motion to exclude Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 under FRE 901 should
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`be denied because the evidence in this case strongly supports the conclusion that
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`Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 are genuine letters from pharmaceutical companies
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`detailing a general lack of interest in Dr. Kohn’s FAA compounds—just as Patent
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`Owner maintains.
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`First, Petitioners’ Motion to Exclude (Paper No. 72) ignores Patent Owner’s
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`evidentiary declarations, timely served as Supplemental Evidence on September 6,
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`2016 (see Ex. 2197 pp. 1-2) and filed herewith as Exhibits 2185 and 2187,2 and
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`2 As noted on page 12 of Patent Owner’s Updated Exhibit List (Paper No. 69) and
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`in Exhibit 2197 (Patent Owner’s service emails), Patent Owner timely served three
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`other evidentiary declarations (Exhibits 2184, 2186, and 2188). Because
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`Petitioners have not moved to exclude the documents referenced in Exhibit 2186,
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`(continued…)
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`3
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`IPR2016-00204
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`falsely claims that Patent Owner does not “provide testimony from a witness with
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`knowledge of what the exhibits are.” See Paper No. 72 p. 3. In fact, Patent Owner
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`served the declaration of its President, Shaun Kirkpatrick (Ex. 2185), and the
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`declaration of Paul Petigrow (Ex. 2187), the Vice President and General Counsel
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`of Harris FRC Corporation (previously known as Federal Research Consultants), a
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`licensee of Dr. Kohn’s FAA technology that was working to license the technology
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`to pharmaceutical companies in the late 1990s. See Paper No. 69 (Patent Owner’s
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`Updated Exhibit List) p. 12; see also Ex. 2197 pp. 1-2. Mr. Kirkpatrick’s
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`testimony confirms that Exhibits 2125 and 2141-50 are authentic letters from
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`various pharmaceutical companies that were made and filed during the ordinary
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`course of business. Ex. 2185 ¶¶ 11, 13-22. Mr. Petigrow’s testimony similarly
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`authenticates Exhibits 2151-70. Ex. 2187 ¶¶ 5-26.
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`Second, “[t]he appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, [and] other
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`distinctive characteristics of
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`the [exhibits],
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`taken
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`together with all
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`the
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`circumstances” strongly support a finding that Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 satisfy
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`the authentication requirement. See FRE 901(b)(4). For example, Exhibit 2125
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`this exhibit has not been filed. Because Petitioners have not moved to exclude
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`Exhibits 2174-2180 on authenticity grounds, Exhibits 2184 and 2188 have not
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`been filed.
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`4
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`IPR2016-00204
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`has the same letterhead, the same font, the same page format, the same author with
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`the same distinctive signature, the same salutation with a familiar reference to
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`“Bernie” and the same closing as Exhibit 2069, whose authenticity Petitioners
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`accept. Exhibit 2069 even refers to Exhibit 2125, further supporting the
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`authenticity of Exhibit 2125. See Exhibit 2069 p. 1 (“Further to my letter of
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`November 7, 1991 … ”).
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`Third, Exhibits 2125 and 2141-50 also satisfy
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`the authentication
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`requirements as ancient documents under FRE 901(b)(8). These exhibits are more
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`than 20 years old, were properly kept as business records by Patent Owner, and
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`Petitioner has identified no condition issues that would create suspicion about their
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`authenticity. See FRE 901(b)(8). Thus, Petitioners’ authenticity objections to
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`Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 should be denied.
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`Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 Are Not Hearsay
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`2.
`Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 comprise evidence on which Patent Owner’s
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`experts, Drs. Roush and Vellturo, have relied in forming their opinions that
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`objective indicia support the nonobviousness of the claimed invention. See Ex.
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`2036 (“after discovering that its lead compound demonstrated ‘sever[e] toxicity,’
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`Eli Lilly terminated its FAA program”) (citing Ex. 2125); Ex. 2132 (Vellturo
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`Declaration) ¶¶ 41-45 (“This consistent and extensive rejection of interest in
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`lacosamide throughout this period is of material economic significance as to the
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`5
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`IPR2016-00204
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`skepticism that prevailed in the industry … .”) (citing Exs. 2141-70). Under FRE
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`703, an expert “may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has
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`been made aware of.” Moreover, “[i]f experts in the particular field would
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`reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the
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`subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.”
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`In this case, the Federal Circuit mandates that experts opining on matters
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`of nonobviousness fully consider evidence relating to objective indicia of
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`nonobviousness, such as the failure of others and industry skepticism, in order to
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`“help inoculate the obviousness analysis against hindsight.” See, e.g., InTouch
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`Technologies, Inc. v. VGO Communications, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1347-49 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2014) (criticizing expert who “did not even factor the objective evidence of
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`nonobviousness into her obviousness analysis.”). Drs. Roush and Vellturo did
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`what they were supposed to do—they considered and relied upon the record
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`evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. This is precisely the type of
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`evidence that FRE 703 was designed to permit and the Board may consider it.
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`Moreover, Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 are specifically excepted from the
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`hearsay rule (i) as business records of regularly conducted activity under FRE
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`803(6), and (ii) as statements in documents that affect an interest in property under
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`FRE 803(15). The challenged exhibits are business records because such letters
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`are regularly made by pharmaceutical companies during the normal course of
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`6
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`IPR2016-00204
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`business, and they were recorded at or near the time of the companies’ decisions
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`not to pursue a license to Dr. Kohn’s FAA compounds. See FRE 803(6). The
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`challenged exhibits also decline Patent Owner’s offers of licenses, and thus, affect
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`a property interest in Dr. Kohn’s FAA compounds. See FRE 803(15).
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`Petitioners’ Motion to Exclude (Paper No. 72) ignores Patent Owner’s
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`evidentiary declarations in support of Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70, timely served as
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`Supplemental Evidence on September 6, 2016 (see Ex. 2197 pp. 1-2) and filed
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`herewith as Exhibits 2185 and 2187, and falsely claims that “there is no indication
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`that the record[s] [were] a regular practice of a regularly conducted activity of
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`business.” See Paper No. 72 p. 5. In fact, Patent Owner served the declaration of
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`its President, Shaun Kirkpatrick (Ex. 2185), and the declaration of Paul Petigrow
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`(Ex. 2187), the Vice President and General Counsel of Harris FRC Corporation
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`(previously known as Federal Research Consultants), a licensee of Dr. Kohn’s
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`FAA technology that was working to license the technology to pharmaceutical
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`companies in the late 1990s. See Paper No. 69 (Patent Owner’s Updated Exhibit
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`List) p. 12; see also Ex. 2197 pp. 1-2. Mr. Kirkpatrick’s testimony in Exhibit 2185
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`describes the general business practices of Patent Owner in the early 1990s and
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`verifies the specific details of Patent Owner’s relationship with Eli Lilly. See Ex.
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`2185 ¶¶ 3-8. This testimony confirms that Exhibits 2125 and 2141-50 were made
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`and filed during the ordinary course of business. Ex. 2185 ¶¶ 11, 13-22. Mr.
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`7
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`IPR2016-00204
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`Petigrow’s testimony similarly shows that Exhibits 2151-70 were made and filed
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`during the ordinary course of business. Ex. 2187 ¶¶ 5-26. Thus, Petitioners’
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`hearsay objections to Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 should be denied.
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`3.
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`Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 Are Not Incomplete and Are
`Admissible
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`Petitioners’ finally argue that Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 should be excluded
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`as incomplete documents under FRE 106, or alternatively, as a violation of the
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`Board’s discovery rules under 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii). See Paper No. 72 pp.
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`5-7. These arguments lack merit at least because (1) Petitioners failed to file
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`timely objections on these grounds, and (2) Petitioners have failed to identify with
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`particularity the allegedly inconsistent evidence, much less establish that it is
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`“inconsistent.”
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`First, Petitioners failed to file timely objections to Exhibits 2125 and 2141-
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`70 under either FRE 106 or 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii) (see Paper No. 41 pp. 23-
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`24, 27-38), and these objections cannot first be presented in a motion to exclude.
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`See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c) (“The motion must identify the objections in the record
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`in order and must explain the objections.”) (emphasis added). Any objection to
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`Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 on “completeness” grounds should have been filed
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`within five business days of service of those exhibits, i.e., by August 22, 2016. See
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1). Because Petitioners did not timely object, Petitioners’
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`8
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`IPR2016-00204
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`motion to exclude Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 on “completeness” grounds should
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`be denied.
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`Petitioners should have, and could have, objected to Exhibits 2125 and
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`2141-70 under FRE 106 or 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii) by August 22, 2016, but
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`they chose not to do so. Patent Owner served Petitioners with the complete trial
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`testimony on March 17, 2016. See Paper No. 16 (Patent Owner’s Updated Exhibit
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`List) p. 3 (noting the service date of Ex. 2025). Petitioners themselves explained
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`that Patent Owner’s allegedly withheld evidence was “evidence that was presented
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`at trial, which is in a public forum … .” Ex. 2193 at 176:2-5 (emphasis added);
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`see also Paper No. 72 p. 6 (citing in part Ex. 2193 at 176:2-5). The Petition even
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`cited evidence from the same district court proceeding. See Pet. p. 1 (citing Ex.
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`1004). Thus, Petitioners cannot reasonably maintain that “evidence adduced
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`during the trial proceeding demonstrates that Patent Owner failed to comply with
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`the discovery rules” (see Paper No. 72 p. 6 (emphasis added)), when Petitioners
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`were fully aware of the trial evidence by no later than March 17, 2016, and failed
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`to timely object on those grounds. The Board should not consider “completeness”
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`objections that Petitioners failed to make. Because the “completeness” objections
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`were not timely made, the Board need not reach the question of whether 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.51(b)(1)(iii) can form the basis of an objection for a motion to exclude
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`evidence.
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`9
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`IPR2016-00204
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`In addition, a party moving for the inclusion of evidence under FRE 106
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`cannot satisfy its burden of proof without identifying evidence that should be
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`included in the record and describing the evidence’s relevance. McCoy v. Augusta
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`Fiberglass Coatings, Inc., 593 F.3d 737, 747 (8th Cir. 2010). It follows that a
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`party seeking to exclude evidence under the same rule should also identify
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`inconsistent evidence and explain the inconsistency. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c)
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`(“The moving party has the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the
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`requested relief.”).
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`Here, Petitioners have not identified any inconsistent evidence from the
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`district court trial and have not explained how that evidence is inconsistent with
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`Patent Owner’s positions in this proceeding. Patent Owner cannot be expected to
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`divine the inconsistent evidence from Petitioners’ vague references to “the larger
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`correspondence that Patent Owner has withheld.” See Paper No. 72 p. 6. Rather
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`than identify the allegedly inconsistent evidence with particularity (see 37 C.F.R. §
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`42.64(b)(1)), Petitioners instead cite over 100 pages of deposition and declaration
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`testimony. See Paper No. 72 p. 6 (citing Ex. 2193 pp. 176-186; Ex. 1086 pp. 26-27
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`n.40; Ex. 1049 pp. 90-197). This testimony, however, refers only to economic
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`evidence that is wholly consistent with Patent Owner’s position that Eli Lilly
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`terminated its license to Dr. Kohn’s FAA compounds due to “sever[e] toxicity”
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`(Exhibit 2125), and that dozens of other pharmaceutical companies rejected Patent
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`10
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`IPR2016-00204
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`Owner’s offers for a license to the same technology (Exhibits 2141-70). Without
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`more, Petitioners have not satisfied their burden under 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c) to
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`demonstrate that any “inconsistent evidence” has not been served.
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`For the reasons stated above, Petitioners’ objections to Exhibits 2125 and
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`2141-70 are untimely, unsupported and erroneous. Petitioners’ motion to exclude
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`Exhibits 2125 and 2141-70 should be denied.
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`C. Exhibits 2174-80 Are Not Incomplete and Are Admissible
`Petitioners move to exclude Exhibits 2174-80 as incomplete documents
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`under FRE 106, or alternatively, as a violation of the Board’s discovery rules under
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii). See Paper No. 72 pp. 7-10. These arguments lack
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`merit at least because (1) Petitioners failed to file timely objections on these
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`grounds, and (2) Petitioners have failed to identify with particularity the allegedly
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`inconsistent evidence, much less establish that it is “inconsistent.”
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`First, as discussed in Section II.B.3 above, Petitioners could have objected to
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`Exhibits 2174-80 under FRE 106 or 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii) by August 22,
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`2016 (i.e., within 5 days of service of the exhibits as required by 37 C.F.R. §
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`42.64(b)(1)), but they declined to do so. Petitioners again rely on “evidence
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`adduced during the trial proceeding” (see Paper No. 72 p. 9), but Petitioners never
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`mentioned this public evidence in their filed objections. See Paper No. 41 pp. 39-
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`41. It makes no difference that “discovery subsequent to the filing of the Patent
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`11
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`IPR2016-00204
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`Owner Response confirms the existence of additional documents … .” Paper No.
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`72 p. 7 (emphasis added). The Petition’s citation to evidence from the district
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`court trial, as well as Patent Owner’s service of the complete trial testimony on
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`March 17, 2016, clearly demonstrate that Petitioners were already aware of the
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`trial evidence. See Pet. p. 1 (citing Ex. 1004); Paper No. 16 (Patent Owner’s
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`Updated Exhibit List) p. 3 (noting the service date of Ex. 2025). The Board should
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`not consider arguments under FRE 106 or 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii) since
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`Petitioner failed to timely object on these grounds. Because the “completeness”
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`objections were not timely made, the Board need not reach the question of whether
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii) can form the basis of an objection for a motion to
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`exclude evidence.
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`Second, Petitioners have not satisfied their burden of proof since they have
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`not identified and explained the allegedly inconsistent trial evidence. See Section
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`II.B.3 above. In this instance, Petitioners extensively quote Dr. McDuff’s out-of-
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`scope redirect testimony (see Ex. 2193 at 176:19-20), but Dr. McDuff’s main
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`complaint appears to be that “there were counter-arguments that I made in my
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`testimony at trial and information supporting those counter-arguments was not
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`provided in this proceeding.” Paper No. 72 p. 9 (quoting Ex. 2193 at 180). Patent
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`Owner served the complete trial testimony to Petitioners on March 17, 2016,
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`nearly eight months prior to the November 14, 2016 due date for Petitioners’ reply.
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`12
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`IPR2016-00204
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`Moreover, Petitioners have not shown that trial testimony related to off-label
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`Vimpat® sales or UCB’s sales expectations is in any way inconsistent with the
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`actual Vimpat® sales data provided in Exhibits 2174-80. Thus, Petitioners have not
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`satisfied their burden under 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c) to demonstrate that any
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`“inconsistent evidence” has not been served. Petitioners’ motion to exclude
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`Exhibits 2174-80 should be denied.
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`D. Exhibits 2181 and 2182 Are Relevant
`Petitioners move to exclude Exhibits 2181 (District Court Order) and 2182
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`(District Court Opinion) as lacking relevance. See Paper No. 72 p. 10. As
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`described in Section II.A above, Petitioners copied and pasted objections verbatim
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`from one exhibit to the next. See Paper No. 41. As a consequence of this approach,
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`Petitioners never objected to Exhibit 2182 on relevance grounds. See Paper No. 41
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`p. 41 (objecting twice to Exhibit 2181). Ironically, Petitioners now must rely on
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`their careless copying and pasting to maintain that an objection to Exhibit 2182
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`was timely filed in the first place. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1). The Board should
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`not reward Petitioners for their carelessness and should not consider an unfiled
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`objection to Exhibit 2182.
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`Even if the Board considers the objections to Exhibits 2181 and 2182, both
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`should be denied on the merits. The Board has already described the district court
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`trial as “a relevant case.” Paper No. 19 p. 8. Indeed, the Board adopted the district
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`13
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`IPR2016-00204
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`court’s claim construction of the term “therapeutic composition” in this
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`proceeding. Id. Exhibits 2181 and 2182 are therefore clearly relevant to claim
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`construction, especially since Petitioners plan to argue that the Board should
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`reconsider its construction of “therapeutic composition.” See Ex. 2182 p. 64, n.19;
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`Paper No. 67 (Petitioners’ Request for Oral Argument) p. 2. The district court
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`opinion is also relevant because the district court considered and rejected the
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`obviousness of lacosamide over Compound 3l from Kohn 1991. See, e.g., Ex.
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`2182 pp. 87-89. In addition, the objective indicia in this proceeding were
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`previously considered by the district court and were found to support its ruling of
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`nonobviousness. See, e.g., id. at 89.
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`Petitioners themselves consider the commercial success arguments from the
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`district court trial to be relevant to their commercial success arguments in this
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`proceeding. See, e.g., Reply p. 18 (citing in part Ex. 1086 ¶ 28 (citing Ex. 1170)).
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`For example, Dr. McDuff relied on Exhibit 1170—the transcript of his trial
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`testimony from the district court—to support his argument that UCB’s sales
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`projections over-estimated actual Vimpat® sales. Ex. 1086 ¶ 28. By Petitioners’
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`logic, the district court order and opinion (i.e., Exhibits 2181 and 2182) should also
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`be relevant to Vimpat®’s commercial success in this proceeding, just like Exhibit
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`1170.
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`14
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`IPR20 1 6—00204
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`Moreover, Petitioners’ argument (Paper No. 72 p. 10) regarding the prior art
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`status of the ’301 patent (Ex. 1019) is not only irrelevant, but legally erroneous.
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`The instituted grounds do not include the ’301 patent (see Paper No. 19 pp. 23-24),
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`and Petitioners’ reply arguments based on the ’301 patent are beyond the scope of
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`a proper reply (see Pet. pp. 42-48; Paper No. 57 pp. 1-2). Regardless, it is clear
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`from the ’301 and ’551 patents themselves that
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`the ’301 patent cannot be
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`considered in an obviousness analysis. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)(1). Even if the ’301
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`patent did qualify as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e),
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`it cannot preclude
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`patentability because both patents were, “at the time the claimed invention was
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`made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the
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`same person.”
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`35 U.S.C.
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`§ 103(c)(1); see Ex. 1001 at 1; EX. 1019 at 1.
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`Petitioners’ motion to exclude Exhibits 2181 and 2182 should be denied.
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`Date: January 6, 2017
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`By
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`<>€’€»«"““’
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`,
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`/9
`%\‘*
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`COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
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`Andrea G. Reister /’
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`One CityCenter, 850 Tenth Street, NW Registration No.: 36,253
`Washington, DC 20001
`Jennifer L. Robbins
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`(202) 662-6000
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`Registration No.: 61,163
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`Enrique D. Longton
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`Registration No.: 47,304
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`Attorneys for Patent Owner
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`15
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`IPR20 1 6—00204
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6, I hereby certify that on this 6th day of January
`
`2017, the foregoing Patent Owner’s Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion to Exclude
`
`was served by electronic mail, by agreement of the parties, on the following
`
`counsel of record for petitioners.
`
`PETITIONER (IPR2016—00204)
`Matthew J. Dowd (1njdowd@dowdpl1c.com)
`DOWD PLLC
`
`William G. Jenks (wjenks@jenksiplaw.com)
`JENKS IP LAW
`
`PETITIONER (IPR2016-01 101)
`Steven W. Parmelee (spar1nelee@wsgr.com)
`Michael T. Rosato (1nrosato@wsgr.com)
`Jad A. Mills (j1nills@wsgr.com)
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
`
`PETITIONER (IPR2016—01242)
`Matthew L. Fedowitz (mfedowitz@merchantgould.com)
`Daniel R. Evans (devans@merchantgould.com)
`MERCHANT & GOULD P.C.
`
`PETITIONER (IPR20l6-01245)
`Gary J . Speier (gspeier@carlsoncaspers.co1n)
`Jeffer Ali (ja1i@carlsoncaspers.com)
`CARLSON, CASPERS, VANDENBURGH, LINDQUIST & SCHUMAN, P.A.
`
`Date: January 6, 2017
`
`/5!
`
`;
`
`1/
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`Vi;
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