`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Entered: January 3, 2017
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________________
`
`PAR PHARMACEUTICAL, INC., BRECKENRIDGE PHARMACEUTICAL,
`INC., AND ROXANE LABORATORIES, INC.
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`NOVARTIS AG
`Patent Owner
`_______________________
`Case IPR2016-000841
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`_______________________
`
`Before LORA M. GREEN, CHRISTOPHER L. CRUMBLEY, and
`ROBERT A. POLLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ OPPOSITION TO
`PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`
`
`
`
`1 Breckenridge Pharmaceutical, Inc. was joined as a party to this proceeding via a
`Motion for Joinder in IPR2016-01023; Roxane Laboratories, Inc. was joined as a
`party via a Motion for Joinder in IPR2016-01102.
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`
`Table of Contents
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`Topic 1 – The Board should deny Novartis’s motion to exclude
`evidence and argument pointing to relevant applicant-admitted prior
`art ..................................................................................................................... 1
`
`Topic 2 – Novartis’s improper motion to consider its Lemke exhibits
`is moot because that evidence is already of record ......................................... 2
`
`III. Topics 3, 4, 7 – The Board should deny Novartis’s motion to exclude
`evidence that allegedly exceeds the scope of a permissible reply ................... 2
`
`A. Absent Board permission, a motion to exclude is not the proper
`vehicle for addressing Novartis’s contentions ...................................... 3
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`G.
`
`A petitioner may reply to the patent owner’s response ......................... 4
`
`Topic 3(a) – It is undisputed that Fiebig (Ex. 1034) was timely
`submitted in reply to Novartis’s arguments .......................................... 5
`
`Topic 3(b) – It is undisputed that Schwartz (Ex. 1117) was
`timely submitted in response to Novartis’s arguments ......................... 7
`
`Topic 4(a) – It is undisputed that Dr. Jorgensen’s supplemental
`declaration (Ex. 1118) timely replied to Novartis’s arguments ............ 7
`
`Topic 4(b) – It is undisputed that Dr. Ratain’s declaration (Ex.
`1119) timely replied to Novartis’s arguments ....................................... 9
`
`Topic 7 –Novartis’s catch-all fails to identify any objections or
`evidence or otherwise demonstrate anything should be excluded ...... 11
`
`IV. Topic 5 – The Board should deny Novartis’s motion to exclude
`relevant evidence rebutting its faulty unexpected results argument ............. 12
`
`V.
`
`Topic 6 – The Board should deny Novartis’s motion to exclude
`paragraphs and exhibits not cited in the Reply .............................................. 14
`
`VI. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 15
`
`i
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`The Board should deny Novartis’s procedurally and substantively deficient
`
`motion to exclude, which is largely a de facto sur-reply and motion to strike.
`
`Novartis failed to point to where it timely objected with the required specificity,
`
`and in many cases, it did not so object. Moreover, Novartis did not seriously
`
`attempt to demonstrate that any evidence should be excluded because it is not
`
`admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Instead, it alleges procedural
`
`defects or argues relevancy, contending that the Board should not give the cited
`
`evidence and argument any weight. Given Novartis’s repeated procedural
`
`violations and its frivolous motion, Petitioners reserve the right to seek sanctions
`
`under 37 C.F.R. § 42.12.
`
`I.
`
`Topic 1 – The Board should deny Novartis’s motion to exclude evidence
`and argument pointing to relevant applicant-admitted prior art
`
`In describing the known problems with rapamycin, the ’772 patent states
`
`“rapamycin is highly insoluble, making it difficult to formulate stable galenic
`
`compositions.” ’772 patent at 1:39-40. Novartis argues that it later added this
`
`information to its original disclosure in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 132 (forbidding
`
`addition of new matter) in an effort to maintain a priority date to which it was not
`
`entitled, and therefore Petitioners cannot rely on it as evidence of the state of the
`
`art as of that earlier, undeserved priority date. Mot. 3-4; see also POR 52 n.6.
`
`However, it does not matter when Novartis added the admission. “Admissions in
`
`the specification regarding the prior art are binding on the patentee for purposes of
`
`1
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`a later inquiry into obviousness.” PharmaStem Therapeutics v. ViaCell, 491 F.3d
`
`1342, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Nomiya, 509 F.2d 566, 571 & n.5 (CCPA 1975)
`
`(the admission is binding whether made “in the application or in other papers
`
`submitted during prosecution”). Moreover, this admission easily clears the “very
`
`low bar for relevance” because it corroborates Petitioners’ own evidence showing
`
`that rapamycin was known to be difficult to formulate because of its low solubility.
`
`Reply 6; United States v. Rodríguez-Soler, 773 F.3d 289, 293 (1st Cir. 2014).
`
`II. Topic 2 – Novartis’s improper motion to consider its Lemke exhibits is
`moot because that evidence is already of record
`
`Novartis seeks to admit Lemke Chapters 6 and 10-12 into evidence on the
`
`basis that Petitioners submitted Chapter 16, “Predicting Water Solubility.” Mot. 4-
`
`5 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 106). Novartis’s request is moot because those Lemke
`
`chapters are already of record and petitioners have not moved to exclude.
`
`Petitioners do not acquiesce that anything else is required out of “fairness” or for
`
`any other reason.
`
`III. Topics 3, 4, 7 – The Board should deny Novartis’s motion to exclude
`evidence that allegedly exceeds the scope of a permissible reply
`
`Novartis seeks to exclude as “untimely” two exhibits, multiple portions of
`
`two expert declarations, and “any evidence that does not appear in instituted
`
`Grounds 1 or 2” that Petitioners relied upon to establish obviousness. Mot. 5-12,
`
`15. As explained in the following paragraphs, Novartis’s improperly raised
`
`2
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`arguments fail because all of the complained-of evidence properly replies to
`
`Novartis’s response—a point that Novartis does not even bother to dispute.
`
`A. Absent Board permission, a motion to exclude is not the proper
`vehicle for addressing Novartis’s contentions
`
`As an initial matter, the Board should deny Novartis’ motion rather than
`
`reward Novartis’s repeated efforts to engage in self-help to garner additional
`
`briefing on the merits, encouraging future parties to do the same. To be clear,
`
`Novartis’s prima-facie arguments are addressing whether the evidence submitted
`
`with the petition is sufficient by itself to demonstrate obviousness and Novartis is
`
`impermissibly taking another shot at the merits of the petitions. Liberty Mutual Ins.
`
`v. Progressive Cas. Ins., CBM2012-00002, Paper 66 at 62 (Jan. 23, 2014) (motion
`
`to exclude “is not a mechanism to argue that a reply contains new arguments or
`
`relies on evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case.”).
`
`Thus, a motion to exclude is not the “proper vehicle” for addressing the
`
`scope of a reply or reply evidence, absent Board permission—permission Novartis
`
`lacks. Torrent Pharms. v. Novartis, IPR2014-00784, Paper 112 at 49 (Sept. 24,
`
`2015); Facebook v. Software Rights Archive, IPR2013-00479, Paper 54 at 37 (Feb.
`
`2, 2015) (citing cases); Corning v. DSM IP Assets, IPR2013-00052, Paper 88 at 22
`
`n.13 (May 1, 2014) (motion to exclude “not an appropriate vehicle,” but granting
`
`permission in that instance). Further, Novartis’s experienced counsel cannot claim
`
`that it is unaware of the requirement to seek Board permission before making such
`
`3
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`arguments in a filing. Ex. 1125 (email chain); see also 10X Genomics v. Univ. of
`
`Chicago, IPR2015-01157, Paper 51 at 10-11 (Nov. 15, 2016) (ordering parties to
`
`file lists of citations); Berk-Tek v. Belden, IPR2013-00057, Paper 46 at 43-44 (Mar.
`
`18, 2014) (granting permission to address issue in motion to exclude), aff’d, 805
`
`F.3d 1064, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. v. Biomarin
`
`Pharm., 825 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Belden).
`
`B. A petitioner may reply to the patent owner’s response
`Novartis argues that Petitioners should have sought to supplement the record
`
`after the POPR or presciently addressed all of Novartis’s arguments in the
`
`petitions. Mot. 5-12, 15. Novartis misstates the procedure. A petitioner sets forth
`
`its case in its petition, the patent owner responds, and then the petitioner replies to
`
`the arguments the patent owner raised in its response. 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b).
`
`What a reply cannot do is change the theory of unpatentability or otherwise
`
`re-do the petition. In re NuVasive, 841 F.3d 966, 969, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (relying
`
`on a new portion of the prior-art to teach a claim element); Corning at 11-13
`
`(permissible to defend data from original experiment, but not to amend procedure
`
`and re-perform); Toshiba v. Optical Devices, IPR2014-01447, Paper 34 at 40-41,
`
`44-45 (Mar. 9, 2016) (new evidence and theory to prove a publication date ).
`
`In contrast, a petitioner may respond to the patent owner’s criticisms even if
`
`those criticisms address the prima facie case. For example, petitioner Berk-tek—
`
`4
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`which did not file any expert declaration at all with its petition—properly
`
`submitted a reply declaration from Mr. Baxter explaining the factual bases for
`
`Berk-tek’s prima facie case of obviousness, including its motivation to combine
`
`and modify the prior art. Belden, 805 F.3d at 1067-72, 1074. Although patent
`
`owner Belden complained that “Mr. Baxter’s declaration contained arguments and
`
`evidence necessary for the prima facie case of obviousness,” the Board properly
`
`relied on Mr. Baxter’s testimony to reject Belden’s factual arguments, even using it
`
`“in stating the affirmative reasons to find the motivation required for a prima facie
`
`case.” Id. at 1071, 1079. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The prior art itself and the
`
`petition “sufficed to supply a prima facie case of obviousness—as confirmed by
`
`the Institution Decision.” Id. Mr. Baxter’s declaration properly responded Belden’s
`
`reply evidence and “confirm[ed] the prima facie case.” Id. As explained in the
`
`following sections, the same is true here.
`
`C. Topic 3(a) – It is undisputed that Fiebig (Ex. 1034) was timely
`submitted in reply to Novartis’s arguments
`
`The petitions established that a POSA, as a medicinal chemist, would be
`
`motivated to address the source of rapamycin’s poor solubility which limited its
`
`use in formulations: rapamycin itself. Pet. 4-9, 11, 16-18, 23-27, 32-34, 38-39, 41-
`
`42 (citing evidence including Ex. 1003, Dr. Jorgensen’s declaration). In response,
`
`Dr. Klibanov and Novartis attacked Petitioners’ prima facie case, arguing that
`
`rapamycin’s solubility was not a known problem or that POSAs would have
`
`5
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`instead limited themselves to a formulation approach. POR 51-55; Ex. 2092 ¶¶
`
`150-160.
`
`In reply to those arguments, Petitioners properly submitted additional
`
`evidence confirming that a “POSA—a medicinal chemist—would have sought to
`
`address the source of the problem—the compound itself—and chemically modified
`
`rapamycin.” Reply 5-6. Formulation solutions, especially when working with
`
`poorly soluble compounds, can be ineffective or introduce other problems. Id. at 6
`
`(citing Ex. 1034 (prior-art rapamycin formulation abandoned due to toxicity) and
`
`Ex. 1118); Ex. 1118 ¶¶ 9, 26, 33 (Dr. Jorgensen’s response to Dr. Klibanov’s
`
`arguments)).
`
`Novartis “cannot plausibly argue that it lacked notice” of this issue because
`
`Novartis itself raised it in its response. Genzyme, 825 F.3d at 1367; POR 29 (“Par’s
`
`case is premised on its assertion that rapamycin’s water solubility was sufficiently
`
`problematic to limit pharmaceutical utility, create formulation difficulties….”),
`
`POR 51-55. Petitioners are not obligated to predict Novartis’s factual disputes
`
`regarding Petitioners’ prima facie case or to seek to supplement the record. Rather,
`
`Petitioners properly submitted additional evidence in “rebuttal to contradict”
`
`Novartis’s “allegation[s[ and…to confirm the veracity of [Petitioners’] original”
`
`evidence that a medicinal chemist would be motivated to modify rapamycin itself.
`
`6
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`Corning at 11; Belden, 805 F.3d at 1079 (reply evidence “will commonly confirm
`
`the prima facie case”).
`
`D. Topic 3(b) – It is undisputed that Schwartz (Ex. 1117) was timely
`submitted in response to Novartis’s arguments
`
`As with Fiebig, Novartis cannot plausibly argue that it lacked notice because
`
`Petitioners permissibly relied on Schwartz when responding to Novartis’s
`
`arguments. The petitions established that Yalkowsky and Lemke together teach
`
`“improv[ing] the solubility of chemical compounds by adding flexible side chains
`
`with solubilizing substituents.” Pet. 7, 23-24, 32-34, 44-48. In response, Dr.
`
`Klibanov and Novartis argued that Yalkowsky’s teachings were limited to ideal
`
`solutions and therefore not applicable to rapamycin in water. E.g., POR 17-18. In
`
`reply to those arguments, Petitioners properly submitted additional evidence,
`
`including Ex. 1117 (Schwartz), confirming that a POSA would have applied
`
`Yalkowsky’s deviations from ideal solubility to a real system, as recognized in
`
`Yalkowsky itself. Ex. 1118 ¶¶ 96-99; Reply 15-16; Ex. 1007 (Yalkowsky stating
`
`“this type of approach could be used for the design of compounds having desired
`
`solubility properties”).
`
`E.
`
`Topic 4(a) – It is undisputed that Dr. Jorgensen’s supplemental
`declaration (Ex. 1118) timely replied to Novartis’s arguments
`
`Novartis similarly takes issue with several different portions of Dr.
`
`Jorgensen’s supplemental declaration. Novartis’s motion fails to point to (because
`
`7
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`it cannot) where it objected to these paragraphs on these specific grounds. Novartis
`
`merely provided two blanket objections that must now be combined to arrive at
`
`these paragraphs. Obj. 16. Moreover, Petitioners and Dr. Jorgensen were again
`
`permissibly responding to statements made by Novartis and its experts, confirming
`
`the prima facie case set forth with the petition. Novartis has no excuse for filing
`
`this frivolous motion, as Dr. Jorgensen expressly explained why he was opining on
`
`each topic.
`
`Specifically, ¶¶ 17 and 20 of Dr. Jorgensen’s supplemental declaration
`
`confirm his testimony submitted with the petition that a POSA would have selected
`
`rapamycin as a lead compound and expressly respond to Dr. Roush’s arguments at
`
`Ex. 2093 ¶¶ 161-164 and 171-175 on this issue. See also, e.g., Pet. 16-18, 26-27,
`
`39, 41-42; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52-55, 132-137.
`
`Likewise, ¶¶ 8-9, 25-26, and 32-33 confirm Dr. Jorgensen’s previous
`
`testimony that an ordinarily skilled medicinal chemist would have been motivated
`
`to improve rapamycin’s admittedly poor water solubility and expressly respond to
`
`Dr. Klibanov’s arguments at Ex. 2092 ¶¶ 116, 150-151, 156-157. See also Fiebig
`
`section above; Pet. 4-9, 11, 16-18, 23-27, 32-34, 38-39, 41-42; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52-57,
`
`75-76, 89, 134, 138-140.
`
`Similarly, ¶¶ 13-15, 82, 86-87, 89-99, and 101-102 confirm Dr. Jorgensen’s
`
`previous testimony addressing what a POSA would have understood from reading
`
`8
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`Yalkowsky and Lemke and expressly address Dr. Klibanov’s statements at Ex.
`
`2092 ¶¶ 30, 70-71-108, 111, 124. See also Schwartz section above; Ex. 1118 ¶ 82
`
`n.5 (explaining that opinion has not changed); Pet. 7, 23-24, 32-34, 44-48; Ex.
`
`1003 ¶¶ 56, 77-79, 84-88, 146-149, 153.
`
`Likewise, ¶¶ 10 and 53 confirm Dr. Jorgensen’s previous testimony that a
`
`POSA would have selected the C40 hydroxyl groups as among the first positions
`
`for modification and expressly address Dr. Roush’s testimony at Ex. 2093 ¶¶ 64-
`
`83, 114-130, 206-216. See also Pet. 7, 18, 21-22, 29-32, 34-35, 42-44; Ex. 1003 at
`
`¶¶ 52, 57, 62-66. 89-123, 141-145.
`
`Finally, ¶¶ 11, 16, 23, 104-105, 107-108, and 110 confirm Dr. Jorgensen’s
`
`previous testimony that a POSA would start by making small changes to have a
`
`reasonable expectation of improving solubility while not interfering with activity
`
`or introducing additional problems, and expressly addresses Dr. Roush’s testimony
`
`to the contrary at Ex. 2093 ¶¶ 64-83, 114-130, 192-196. See also Pet. 6, 22-23, 43-
`
`48; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52, 61, 65, 77-88, 101-104 122, 123, 135-136, 146-156, 168, 183.
`
`F.
`
`Topic 4(b) – It is undisputed that Dr. Ratain’s declaration (Ex.
`1119) timely replied to Novartis’s arguments
`
`Having realized that it (and its expert) had confused reasonable expectation
`
`of success with unexpected results, Novartis now seeks to re-argue both to further
`
`confuse the issues. Novartis also brazenly misstates the Petition, claiming that it
`
`“mentioned antitumor activity as part of an alleged motivation to select rapamycin
`
`9
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`as a lead compound.” Mot. 10-11 (citing Pet. 11, 44). Not true. Although the
`
`petition recognized that rapamycin has “antitumor and antifungal activity,” the
`
`petition relied on rapamycin’s well-known reputation as “an extremely potent
`
`immunosuppressant.” Pet. 11, 41 (A POSA “seeking to design an improved
`
`immunosuppressant would select a lead compound with the desired biologic
`
`activity.”), 44 (modifications “expected to result in a compound with
`
`immunosuppressant activity”).
`
`Apparently realizing that a POSA would indeed have had a reasonable
`
`expectation of success in improving rapamycin’s solubility while retaining
`
`immunosuppressant activity, Novartis now tries to set the bar higher by requiring a
`
`reasonable expectation of maintaining rapamycin’s antitumor activity, among other
`
`things. Mot. 10-11; POR 58-60. A patent owner’s response, however, is no more
`
`able to change the petition’s theory of obviousness than a petitioner’s reply. And
`
`here, Petitioners’ reply did not adopt or acquiesce to Novartis’s newly proposed
`
`motivation, but permissibly addressed the substance of Novartis’s factual
`
`assertions. Reply 17-18 n.6 (citing Ex. 1119 ¶¶ 32-36, 43, 101-106). Specifically,
`
`Dr. Ratain expressly responded to Dr. Burris’s testimony at Ex. 2095 ¶¶ 82-88, 95-
`
`97, explaining that Dr. Burris is wrong. A POSA would have expected everolimus
`
`to retain at least some of rapamycin’s known antitumor activity based on its nearly
`
`identical structure. Ex. 1119 ¶¶ 32-44, 56-61. Dr. Burris did not point to any
`
`10
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`references ruling out FKBP binding as rapamycin’s antitumor mechanism, and, if
`
`he had, those references would have been wrong. Everolimus, like rapamycin and
`
`the other “rapamycins,” indeed achieve antitumor effects by binding to FKBP and
`
`inhibiting the mTOR pathway. Ex. 1119 ¶¶ 101-106. Petitioners also used these
`
`paragraphs to respond to Novartis’s unexpected-results arguments, which are
`
`addressed in Topic 5.
`
`G. Topic 7 –Novartis’s catch-all fails to identify any objections or
`evidence or otherwise demonstrate anything should be excluded
`
`Without pointing to any specific exhibits, Novartis seeks to exclude “any
`
`evidence” that does not appear in grounds 1 and 2. The Board should deny
`
`Novartis’s flagrantly deficient motion because Novartis failed to meet any
`
`requirements for a motion to exclude: it failed to point to and explain any timely
`
`raised objections “identify[ing] the grounds for the objection with sufficient
`
`particularity to allow correction in the form of supplemental evidence” because
`
`there are none (37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1), (c)); it failed to include any explanation,
`
`much less the required detailed explanation, of any particular evidence and
`
`material facts at issue (37 C.F.R. §§ 42.20(c), 42.22(b)); and it failed to
`
`demonstrate that any of the unidentified evidence was not properly submitted in
`
`reply to Novartis’s own arguments.
`
`11
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`IV. Topic 5 – The Board should deny Novartis’s motion to exclude relevant
`evidence rebutting its faulty unexpected results argument
`
`Seeking to re-argue the merits under the guise of disputing the relevance of
`
`various portions of Dr. Ratain’s testimony and supporting exhibits, Novartis
`
`impermissibly argues for the first time in this proceeding that “after-acquired
`
`evidence cannot be used ‘to undercut what appeared at the time of the patent
`
`application to be unexpected results’” and that it would be unfair to use later
`
`knowledge to show what would have been expected. Mot. 12-13 (citing Takeda
`
`Chem. Indus v. Mylan Labs., 417 F. Supp. 2d 341, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). Again,
`
`Novartis does not (and cannot) identify where it timely objected to this evidence
`
`with the required specificity.
`
`Moreover, well-settled Federal Circuit law cited earlier by Novartis
`
`contradicts its own reading of Takeda district-court opinion. As Novartis
`
`acknowledged in its response, “[f]or chemical compounds, the structure of the
`
`compound and its properties are inseparable considerations in the obviousness
`
`determination” because “[r]elevant secondary considerations often are not manifest
`
`even until well after the issuance of a patent.” Genetics Inst. v. Novartis Vaccines,
`
`655 F.3d 1291, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391
`
`(CCPA 1963)); POR 63; Reply 22. To be sure, the earlier Takeda case cannot and
`
`did not overturn the long-settled law later enunciated in Genetics Institute. The
`
`Takeda district court did not cite any Federal Circuit law, and further stated that
`
`12
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`such after-acquired evidence could be used after a “careful analysis of relevance.”
`
`417 F. Supp. 2d at 386. The Federal Circuit affirmed without reaching the issue,
`
`instead pointing to substantial evidence supporting the district court’s findings. 492
`
`F.3d 1350, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“there was no reasonable expectation”
`
`pioglitazone would possess compound b’s properties because “it was not a
`
`homolog” (emphasis added)).
`
`To show unexpected results, Novartis must compare the actual properties of
`
`the compounds to show that there is a difference and then show that the difference
`
`would have been unexpected. Reply 20-22. Contrary to Novartis’s new arguments,
`
`later-acquired evidence is not a one-way street in the patentee’s direction. After
`
`surveying the cases, the Papesch court concluded that, because “homologous”
`
`compounds are presumed to have similar properties, the patentee must compare the
`
`actual properties of the closest prior-art and claimed compounds to show an actual
`
`difference is unexpected. 315 F.2d at 387-391. The Federal Circuit has not
`
`deviated from Papesch. E.g., Aventis Pharma Deutschland v. Lupin, 499 F.3d
`
`1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“One who claims a compound, per se, which is
`
`structurally similar to a prior art compound must rebut the presumed expectation
`
`that the structurally similar compounds have similar properties.”); In re Dillon, 919
`
`F.2d 688, 693-94 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (“appellant has made no showing
`
`overcoming the prima facie presumption of similar properties for those analogous
`
`13
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`compositions”). In other words, a patentee must compare the compounds’ actual
`
`properties because “[m]ere recognition of latent properties in the prior art does not
`
`render nonobvious an otherwise known invention.” In re Baxter Travenol Labs,
`
`952 F. 2d 388, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (comparing later-discovered properties of the
`
`prior art and claimed bags).
`
`V. Topic 6 – The Board should deny Novartis’s motion to exclude
`paragraphs and exhibits not cited in the Reply
`
`Novartis seeks to exclude portions of expert testimony and exhibits cited by
`
`Petitioners’ experts that are not directly cited in Petitioners’ Reply, contending that
`
`“it is apparent” that Petitioners improperly incorporated arguments by reference or
`
`failed to fully explain the cited evidence. Mot. 13-14. Novartis again did not
`
`attempt to meet the basic requirements for a motion to exclude. It did not (and
`
`cannot) point to where it timely objected to each of the cited exhibits and
`
`paragraphs. For example, it seeks to exclude Exs. 1041-1063, 1065-1113, 1120-
`
`1123, and Ex. 1118 ¶¶ 59-63, but it objected to only some of those. Obj. 2.
`
`More importantly, Novartis did not even attempt to allege any specific
`
`instance where the Reply improperly incorporated arguments, but merely states it
`
`must be so because the Reply brief’s word count is close to the limit. Mot. 13.
`
`Novartis cannot be allowed to abuse the process by filing a deficient motion in an
`
`attempt to require Petitioners to spend pages and pages justifying every citation in
`
`its Reply. Furthermore, there is no requirement to directly cite every exhibit used
`
`14
`
`
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`by expert witnesses to form their considered opinions or to cite each paragraph of
`
`an expert declaration, even those included for context such as the overall summary
`
`and conclusion (e.g., Ex. 1118 ¶¶ 5-16, 111), topic summaries and transitions (e.g.,
`
`Ex. 1118 ¶¶ 24, 30-31, 36, 45-46), and so forth.
`
`In addition, Novartis does not contend that any of the complained-of
`
`material is not admissible. Incorporation by reference is not grounds for excluding
`
`the evidence, but as demonstrated by the two institution decisions Novartis cites, it
`
`goes to the evidence’s weight. Mot. 14 (citing, e.g., Hamilton Beach Brands v.
`
`Courtesy Prods., IPR2014-01260, Paper 11 (Feb. 25, 2015) (refusing to give any
`
`weight to bare citations without any explanation)).
`
`VI. Conclusion
`For the above reasons, the Board should deny Novartis’s motion to exclude.
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/Daniel G. Brown/
`By:
`Daniel G. Brown (Reg. No. 54,005)
`Latham & Watkins LLP
`885 Third Avenue
`New York, NY 10022-4834
`212-906-1200; 212-751-4864 (Fax)
`
`Counsel for Petitioner
`Par Pharmaceutical, Inc.
`
`/Matthew L. Fedowitz/
`By:
`Matthew L. Fedowitz
`(Reg. No. 61,386)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`Dated: January 3, 2017
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Merchant & Gould P.C.
`1900 Duke Street, Ste. 600
`Alexandria, VA 22314
`703-684-2500; 703-684-2501 (Fax)
`
`Counsel for Petitioner
`Breckenridge Pharmaceutical, Inc.
`
`/Keith A. Zullow/
`By:
`Keith A. Zullow (Reg. No. 37,975)
`Goodwin Procter LLP
`The New York Times Building
`620 Eighth Avenue
`New York, NY 10018-1405
`212-813-8846; 646-558-4226 (Fax)
`
`Counsel for Petitioner
`Roxane Laboratories, Inc.
`
`IPR2016-00084
`U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`16
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), I certify that on this 3rd day of January,
`
`2017, a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONERS’ OPPOSITION
`
`TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE was served by electronic
`
`mail on Patent Owner’s lead and backup counsel at the following email address:
`
`Nicholas N. Kallas (Reg. No. 31,530)
`Raymond R. Mandra (Reg. No. 34,382)
`Peter J. Waibel (Reg. No. 43,228)
`Christina Schwarz (pro hac vice)
`Charlotte Jacobsen (pro hac vice)
`Susanne L. Flanders (pro hac vice)
`Jared L. Stringham (pro hac vice)
`Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & Scinto
`1290 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, NY 10104-3800
`ZortressAfinitorIPR@fchs.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`By: /Daniel G. Brown/
`
`Daniel G. Brown (Reg. No. 54,005)
`Latham & Watkins LLP
`885 Third Avenue
`New York, NY 10022-4834
`212-906-1200; 212-751-4864 (Fax)
`
`Counsel for Petitioner
`Par Pharmaceutical, Inc.