`Tel: 571-272-7822
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`Paper 20
`Entered: April 25, 2016
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`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`
`COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`ROBERT BOSCH LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2016-00041
`Patent 8,099,823
`_______________
`
`
`
`Before PHILLIP J. KAUFFMAN, WILLIAM V. SAINDON, and
`BARRY L. GROSSMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`SAINDON, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
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`Case IPR2016-00041
`Patent 8,099,823
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`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner requests an inter partes review of claims 1, 6, 9, and 10 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,099,823 (Ex. 1001, “the ’823 patent”). Paper 9 (“Pet.”).
`Patent Owner filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 19
`(“Prelim. Resp.”).
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that
`an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable
`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the
`claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, we institute an inter partes review on
`all challenged claims of the ’823 patent.
`Our factual findings and conclusions at this stage of the proceeding
`are based on the evidentiary record developed thus far. This is not a final
`decision as to the patentability of claims for which inter partes review is
`instituted. Our final decision will be based on the record as fully developed
`during trial.
`
`A. Related Matters
`
`The parties represent that the ’823 Patent is asserted in Robert Bosch
`LLC v. Alberee Products Inc. et al., cv-12-574-LPS (D. Del) (consolidated
`with cv-14-142-LPS). Pet. 1; Paper 5, 1. In addition, Petitioner has filed
`petitions against several other of Patent Owner’s patents: U.S. Patent Nos.
`6,973,698 (IPR2016-00034), 6,836,926 (IPR2016-00035), 6,944,905
`(IPR2016-00036), 6,292,974 (IPR2016-00038), 7,228,588
`(IPR2016-00039), 7,484,264 (IPR2016-00040), and 8,544,136
`(IPR2016-00042). Pet. 1; Paper 5, 1.
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`Patent 8,099,823
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`B. Wiper Blade Background
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`There are two main types of windshield wiper structures: beam and
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`yoke. The conventional yoke-style structure includes a series of flexible
`rails that distribute force along the wiper blade. Ex. 1014 ¶ 19. Figure 1 of
`U.S. Patent 3,418,679 is reproduced below:
`
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`Figure 1 depicts a yoke-style wiper structure, having a large main rail
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`4 connected to two smaller rails 5 and 6, which in turn are connected to the
`wiper blade.
`In contrast to the yoke style wiper is the beam, or flat, style of wiper.
`This type of wiper uses metal strips adjacent the wiper blade to distribute the
`load along the length of the wiper blade rather than the yokes. Id. ¶ 22.
`Figure 1 of the ’823 patent is reproduced below:
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`Figure 1 of the ’823 patent depicts a beam-style wiper structure, in
`which the beam is attached along the entire length of the wiper.
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`C. The ’823 Patent
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`The ’823 patent is directed to an automobile windshield wiper blade.
`
`Ex. 1001, Abstract. The wiper is made of three main components: elastic
`rubber wiper strip 24, resilient support element 12, and wind deflection strip
`42. Id. These three components are illustrated in Figure 2 of the ’823
`patent, reproduced below with added coloration:
`
`Figure 2 of the ’823 patent depicts a cross-sectional view of a windshield
`wiper blade embodiment, with elastic rubber wiper strip 24 highlighted in
`blue, resilient support element 12 in red, and wind deflection strip 42 in
`green. As shown in Figure 2 of the ’823 patent, wind deflection strip 42 has
`two sides (48, 50) that diverge from common point 46, such that, in
`conjunction with wall 58, wind deflection strip 42 is generally triangular in
`cross section and has a hollow interior.
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`D. Challenged Claims
`
`Petitioner challenges claims 1, 6, 9, and 10, of which claim 1 is
`independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below.
`1. A wiper blade (10) for an automobile windshield
`(14), with an elongated belt-shaped, flexible
`resilient support element (12) having a longitudinal
`axis, on a lower belt surface (22) of which that faces
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`Patent 8,099,823
`the windshield is located an elastic rubber wiper
`strip (24) sitting against the windshield that extends
`parallel to the longitudinal axis, and on an upper belt
`surface (16) of which a wind deflection strip (42 or
`112) is located that has an incident surface (54 or
`140) facing a main flow direction of a driving wind
`(arrow 52), said deflection strip extending in the
`longitudinal direction of the support element,
`characterized in that the wind deflection strip has
`two sides (48, 50 or 136, 138) that diverge from a
`common base point (46 or 134) as seen in a cross
`section, wherein connected between the two sides
`of the wind deflection strip there is at least one
`support means located at a distance from their
`common base point that stabilizes the sides, and that
`the incident surface (54 or 140) is located at the
`exterior of one side (50 or 138), wherein the support
`element has outer edges, wherein the sides of the
`wind deflection strip have respective free ends
`having thereon respective claw-shaped extensions
`that fittingly grip around the outer edges of the
`support element at least in sections and engage at
`least one of the upper belt surface (24) and the lower
`belt surface (22), so that the wind deflection strip
`can be snapped onto the outer edges or slid onto the
`outer edges in a longitudinal direction, wherein the
`wind deflection strip has a height extending from
`the base point to ends of the sides farthest from the
`base point, and wherein a substantial majority of the
`height is above the upper belt surface in a direction
`facing away from the windshield.
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`E. Prior Art and Asserted Grounds
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`Petitioner asserts that claims 1, 6, 9, and 10 of the ’823 patent are
`unpatentable on the following grounds:
`Basis Claim(s) Challenged
`Reference(s)
`§ 102 1, 9, and 10
`Prohaska1
`Prohaska, and Appel2 or Hoyler3 § 103 1, 9, and 10
`Kotlarski ’3834 or Merkel,5 and
`§ 103 1, 9, and 10
`Prohaska
`Prohaska, Appel or Hoyler, and
`Kotlarski ’0906 or Mathues7
`Kotlarski ’383 or Merkel,
`Prohaska, and Kotlarski ’090 or
`Mathues
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`§ 103 6
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`§ 103 6
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`1 U.K. Patent App. GB 2 106 775 A, published April 20, 1983 (Ex. 1005).
`2 U.S. Patent No. 3,192,551, issued July 6, 1965 (Ex. 1006).
`3 German Patent No. 1,028,896, published April 24, 1958 (Ex. 1007). The
`English translation begins at page 5.
`4 PCT WO 99/02383, published January 21, 1999 (Ex. 1003). Petitioner
`instead cites to Exhibit 1004, U.S. Patent 6,279,191, which issued from the
`PCT application in Exhibit 1003, because the PCT “does not include
`reference numbers for line citations, and because it encompasses the same
`subject matter.” Pet. 20, n.2.
`5 PCT WO 99/12784, published March 18, 1999 (Ex. 1008). Petitioner
`instead cites to Exhibit 1009, U.S. Patent 6,295,690, which issued from the
`PCT application in Exhibit 1009, for the same reasons as explained in supra
`note 4. Pet. 21, n.3.
`6 PCT WO00/34090, published June 15, 2000 (Ex. 1020). Petitioner instead
`cites to Exhibit 1021, U.S. Patent 6,295,690, which issued from the PCT
`application in Exhibit 1020, for the same reasons as explained in supra note
`4. Pet. 22 (citing id. at 5, n.1).
`7 U.S. Patent No. 3,121,133, issued February 11, 1964 (Ex. 1019).
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`Petitioner also relies on the declaration of Gregory W. Davis, Ph.D.
`(Ex. 1014).
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`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Claim Construction
`
`We interpret the claims of an unexpired patent using the broadest
`reasonable interpretation in light of the specification of the patent. 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.100(b).
`Petitioner points out that the “support means” of claim 1 was
`construed previously by Patent Owner in a district court proceeding to be a
`means-plus-function limitation, and has identified what Patent Owner
`alleged to be the corresponding structure. Pet. 14–15. Petitioner takes the
`position that, although it “does not agree that Patent Owner’s construction
`represents the broadest reasonable construction of the claim term in the
`abstract,” in this proceeding, the “Patent Owner should not be heard to assert
`a narrower construction.” Id. at 15. In its claim charts, Petitioner identifies
`corresponding structure in the prior art consistent with Patent Owner’s prior
`construction. See, e.g., id. at 28 (“Prohaska discloses a support means, in the
`form of a back 31 of flexible strip 30”).
`Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has not met the requirement of 37
`C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) to construe means-plus-function claims because
`Petitioner has not set forth its own claim construction, and that the Petition
`should be denied on that basis alone. Prelim. Resp. 9–11. Our Rules require
`that, “[w]here the claim to be construed contains a means-plus-function
`[limitation] . . ., the construction of the claim must identify the specific
`portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts
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`Patent 8,099,823
`corresponding to each claimed function.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Patent
`Owner argues that some PTAB panels have interpreted this Rule as requiring
`every element in a challenged claim that contains a means-plus-function
`limitation to be construed explicitly according to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). See
`Prelim. Resp. 9–11. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has not “offer[ed]
`any actual construction,” and that on that basis, “the Petitioner should be
`denied.” Id. at 9, 11.
`We disagree with Patent Owner. First, we do not agree that our rules
`always require an original, explicit, or full construction of every
`means-plus-function limitation in a challenged claim in order for a petition
`to be considered. In particular, Rule 104(b)(3) does not state --where the
`claim contains a means-plus-function limitation-- but rather “[w]here the
`claim to be construed contains a means-plus-function [limitation].” 37
`C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (emphasis added). In addition, the Rule merely
`requires “identi[fication]” of the corresponding structure. Thus, the Rule
`states that, in a claim that is construed by a petitioner that has a means-plus-
`function limitation, the petitioner must point out the corresponding structure.
`Accordingly, we hold that the Rules do not require every means-plus-
`function limitation in a challenged claim to be fully or explicitly construed
`by a petitioner.8
`
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`8 As a practical matter, however, we note that a petitioner who fails to offer a
`claim construction of a potential means-plus-function limitation of a
`challenged claim may very likely run the risk of failing to demonstrate a
`reasonable likelihood of success on the merits for failing to address
`adequately the patentability of the claimed subject matter, but that is a
`separate issue.
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`Second, we do not agree that Petitioner’s identification of the
`corresponding structure here was improper, even under the stricter reading
`of Rule 104(b)(3) that Patent Owner offers. Petitioner has identified the
`corresponding structure in its Petition, and points to where the prior art
`discloses that structure. See Pet. 14–15 (“this function corresponds to ‘a
`wall connected to both sides of the wind deflection strip, or the channel wall
`facing the upper belt surface of the support element, and their equivalents’”);
`id. at 28 (“Prohaska discloses a support means, in the form of a back 31 of
`flexible strip 30”). Although Petitioner does not cite to particular passages
`of the ’823 patent where this structure can be found, given that the
`corresponding structure identified by Petitioner (a wall) is simple and readily
`identifiable, Petitioner has sufficiently identified the corresponding structure
`in the specification. In addition, although Petitioner expresses some
`skepticism of Patent Owner’s prior construction, Petitioner relies on that
`construction for purposes of this proceeding. Petitioner has made clear the
`ground of unpatentability upon which it relies with respect to this limitation,
`and the prohibition on new arguments in Petitioner’s Reply ensures that
`Patent Owner has a full and fair opportunity to respond to the grounds in its
`Response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) (“A reply may only respond to
`arguments raised in the corresponding opposition or patent owner
`response”). Accordingly, on the facts before us, Petitioner has satisfied the
`notice and identification functions of Rule 104(b)(3) with respect to the
`claimed “support means.”
`Lastly, the prior Board cases Patent Owner cites in support of its
`position have facts different from this case. In Pride Solutions, the
`petitioner construed a “retention means” functionally as “a mechanism that
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`retains something” but did not offer corresponding structure. Pride
`Solutions, LLC v. Not Dead Yet Mfg., Inc., Case IPR2014-00627, Paper 14,
`9–11 (PTAB Mar. 17, 2014). Similarly, in PanelClaw, the petitioner argued
`the limitation should be read to be “purely functional” and did not point to
`corresponding structure. PanelClaw, Inc. v. SunPower Corp., Case
`IPR2014-00386, Paper 7, 9 (PTAB June 30, 2014). Here, on the other hand,
`Petitioner does identify a corresponding structure for the construed “support
`means.” Pet. 14–15. We further point out that, in PanelClaw, the Board
`noted that “[w]e are not required to deny the Petition on account of
`Petitioner’s failure to comply with the rule,” but that the particular
`circumstances of the case warranted such a result. PanelClaw, Paper 7, 10
`n.6. In Apple v. ContentGuard, the petitioner attempted to incorporate by
`reference prior statements of corresponding structure. Apple, Inc. v.
`ContentGuard Holdings, Inc., Case IPR2015-00456, Paper 9, 6 (PTAB June
`15, 2015). Here, Petitioner offers identification of the corresponding
`structure in the Petition itself. Pet. 14–15. In SAS v. ComplementSoft, the
`petitioner did not offer a construction for the term “means for allowing,”
`which the Board determined to be “fatal” to the petitioner’s challenge, but
`the reason given was because the “analysis . . . is insufficient to show that
`the prior art teaches the means-plus-function limitation of claim 11”
`(emphases added), rather than simply for not construing the term in its claim
`construction section. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, Case
`IPR2013-00226, Paper 9, 11 (PTAB Aug. 12, 2013).9 Accordingly, our
`holding here is consistent with the prior Board decisions identified by Patent
`
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`9 The holding in SAS v. ComplementSoft is an example of the risk of not
`offering a claim construction we identified in supra n.8.
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`Owner regarding the requirements of a petition challenging claims including
`means-plus-function limitations.
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`B. Petitioner’s Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
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`Petitioner asserts several grounds of unpatentability (Pet. 27–60),
`which we address in turn.
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`1. Anticipation by Prohaska
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`Petitioner asserts that claims 1, 6, 9, and 10 are anticipated by
`Prohaska. Pet. 2, 27–30, 54, 57. We briefly introduce Prohaska before
`turning to our discussion of Petitioner’s analysis.
`a. Prohaska
`Prohaska is directed to an automobile windshield wiper blade. Ex.
`1005, 1:5–7. Prohaska describes the known problem of an air stream
`striking the wiper blade, which diminishes the contact pressure of the wiper,
`causing lifting and deterioration of the wiper blade, especially at high
`vehicle speeds. Id. at 1:8–16. Prohaska explains that spoilers are known,
`but prior spoilers were attached to the yoke or were unduly complicated and
`unattractive. Id. at 1:25–29. Prohaska proposes a spoiler formed on, or
`attached to, a flexible strip, which in turn is attached to a wiper blade. Id. at
`1:48–52, 68–77. One embodiment is shown in Figure 3, reproduced below
`with added coloring:
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`Figure 3 of Prohaska depicts spoiler 20 (in green) integral with flexible strip
`30 (also green) and attached to wiper 10 (in blue). Id. at 2:71–75.
`b. Discussion of the Prohaska Anticipation Ground
`Independent claim 1 requires a flexible resilient support element, an
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`elastic rubber wiper strip, and a wind deflection strip. Petitioner asserts that
`the support element reads on flexible strip 30; that the wiper reads on wiper
`element 10; and that the wind deflection strip reads on spoiler 20. Pet. 27–
`28. Petitioner specifically relies on the embodiment shown in Figure 3 of
`Prohaska in order to show the limitations of claim 1 requiring the wind
`deflection strip to have two sides and a support means. Id. at 28. Claim 1
`additionally requires that “the sides of the wind deflection strip have
`respective free ends . . . that fittingly grip around the outer edges of the
`support element.” Thus, the claimed wind deflection strip grips the support
`element; to do so they must be separate structures. Addressing that
`limitation, Petitioner asserts that “Prohaska expressly discloses clipping a
`spoiler 20 that contacts the top and bottom of a flexible strip 30 by means of
`claw-like extensions (detents 28 and 29).” Id. at 29. Spoiler 20 of Prohaska,
`however, does not use claws to grip flexible strip 30; they are one and the
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`same in Figure 3. Flexible strip 30 in Figure 3 of Prohaska, as shown above,
`has claw-like elements that grip onto the wiper. Accordingly, Petitioner has
`not shown how Prohaska describes each element of claim 1, arranged as
`required by the claim. This deficiency applies to dependent claims 6, 9, and
`10. Petitioner’s assertions with respect to this anticipation ground are
`insufficient to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success.
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`2. Obviousness in View of Prohaska and Appel
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`Petitioner asserts that claims 1, 9, and 10 are unpatentable in view of
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`the windshield wipers of Prohaska and Appel. Pet. 3, 27–30, 54, 57. In
`general, Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious to clip the spoiler
`of Prohaska on the beam-style wiper of Appel. See, e.g., id. at 43. We
`discussed the spoiler of Prohaska above, we next describe Appel before
`turning to our discussion of Petitioner’s ground.
`a. Appel
`Appel discloses a wiper having a spring element as a backbone to
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`distribute the wiper load evenly. Ex. 1006, 1:23–28. Figures 4 and 5 of
`Appel are reproduced below.
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`Figures 4 and 5 of Appel are top and side views, respectively, of a
`beam-style windshield wiper blade.
`b. Discussion of the Prohaska / Appel Obviousness Ground
`Petitioner identifies where Prohaska and Appel disclose each
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`limitation of claims 1, 9, and 10. Pet. 27–30, 54, 57. Petitioner asserts that
`Prohaska discloses a hollow wind deflection strip (spoiler) and that Appel
`discloses a belt-shaped flexible spring support element and wiper. Id. at 27.
`Petitioner points to Prohaska’s disclosure “to retrofit the spoilers it discloses
`onto flexible strips sharing features with embodiments of Appel.” Id. at 43
`(citing Ex. 1005, 1:68–70). Petitioner asserts, therefore, that the proposed
`combination is “a simple arrangement of old elements, each performing the
`same function it had been known to perform.” Id. at 43–44.
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`Patent Owner argues that Petitioner “does not provide any motivation
`. . . or an explanation of how the resulting structure would be able to
`function as a wiper blade.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Regarding the reason to
`combine, Petitioner has pointed out that Prohaska itself suggests retrofitting
`wipers without a spoiler to have a spoiler. Pet. 43 (citing Ex. 1005, 1:68–70
`(“It is easily possible to retrofit a wiper blade by squeezing a spoiler against
`its flexible strip or clipping it on this flexible strip”)). Further, Patent Owner
`does not offer any evidence or explanation for how such a combination
`would fail to result in a functional wiper blade, such that the argument is
`unpersuasive on this record.
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`Patent Owner also argues that Prohaska “disparages the embodiment
`of Figure 3” such that a person of ordinary skill in the art would avoid it.
`Prelim. Resp. 15–16. The cited portion of Prohaska that Patent Owner
`addresses states: “[b]ecause the back 31 of the resilient strip is developed as
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`a hollow member with about triangular cross-section, there is a hollow space
`5 between the surfaces 21 and 22 which possibly migh[t] be
`disadvantageous.” Ex. 1005, 3:2–6. Prohaska then goes on to offer a
`different embodiment (shown in Figure 6) that purportedly avoids the
`disadvantage by the wiper extending up into the hollow space to fill it. Id. at
`3:7–22. A patent that offers multiple solutions to a problem, even if it
`characterizes some solutions as having disadvantages and others not, does
`not teach away from those solutions. See DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic
`Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“A reference
`does not teach away […] if it merely expresses a general preference for an
`alternative invention but does not ‘criticize, discredit, or otherwise
`discourage’ investigation into the invention claimed.”); Medichem, S.A. v.
`Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[w]here the prior art
`contains ‘apparently conflicting’ teachings . . . each reference must be
`considered ‘for its power to suggest solutions to an artisan of ordinary skill .
`. . consider[ing] the degree to which one reference might accurately discredit
`another.’”) (citing In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 591 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). On this
`record, we are persuaded by Petitioner that Prohaska teaches a way to form a
`spoiler that retrofits onto existing wipers and that is hollow. We have no
`evidence before us or reason to believe that the particular problem identified
`by Prohaska regarding the hollow Figure 3 spoiler would prevent a person of
`ordinary skill in the art from considering it obvious to apply it to Appel in
`the manner proposed by Petitioner.
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`Patent Owner lastly criticizes Petitioner’s use of the Kruger and Davis
`declarations and the citation to allegedly non-prior art (Eckhardt). Prelim.
`Resp. 11–13, 16–17. Patent Owner asserts that the citations to the Kruger
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`declaration amount to incorporation by reference. Id. at 11–13. Mr. Daniel
`H. Kruger, Ph.D., attests to his supervision in the creation of certain
`three-dimensional drawings and animations that appear in other exhibits of
`record. Ex. 1016. Petitioner cites, for example, to Exhibits 1028 and 1030
`prior to its claim chart pointing to the disclosures of Prohaska and Appel it
`asserts satisfy the limitations of claim 1; these exhibits are an animation and
`illustrations of the proposed combination, respectively. Pet. 27; see
`generally Ex. 1028; Ex. 1030. Petitioner’s proposed obviousness ground
`here is explained fully in the Petition in the claim chart on pages 27–30 and
`text on pages 42–44. The citations to Exhibits 1028 and 1030 serve merely
`as further evidence offered to assist in envisioning what the proposed
`combination would look like. There is no analysis in these exhibits that
`must be in the Petition in order for Petitioner to make its case.10
`Accordingly, the citations are not improper and are not improper
`incorporation by reference. This same analysis applies to the similar
`allegations Patent Owner makes with respect to the other grounds and
`claims. See Prelim. Resp. 12 (alleging improper incorporation by reference
`on pages 27, 30, 34, 37, 49, 54, and 57 of the Petition).
`Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the Davis declaration are
`likewise unpersuasive. Patent Owner offers as an example Petitioner’s
`citation of paragraph 55 of the Davis declaration on page 38 of the Petition.
`Page 38 of the Petition, however, does not cite to the Davis declaration.
`
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`10 In other words, the citations here are additional evidence; the prohibition
`in our rules is with respect to arguments. 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3)
`(“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into
`another document.”) (emphasis added).
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`Lastly, Patent Owner argues that Eckhardt (Ex. 1017) is not prior art.
`Petitioner cites to Exhibit 1017, among others, as evidence that a hollow
`spoiler was known. See Pet. 42 (“the hollow cross-section would reduce
`stiffness, increase material savings, and weigh less than a spoiler with a solid
`cross-section”); Ex. 1014 ¶ 57. Regardless of whether Eckhardt is prior
`art,11 we agree with Patent Owner that Eckhardt shows a spoiler that is
`hollow for the purposes of providing a channel for fluids rather than for
`reducing stiffness, increasing material savings, or weighing less, as
`Petitioner asserts. See Ex. 1017, 13 (describing “a channel 16 for a washer
`fluid”), 14 (describing Figure 3, which Dr. Davis discussed at Ex. 1014 ¶ 57,
`as having a channel 18, which is simply a larger version of channel 16).
`Accordingly, we do not find Petitioner’s assertions regarding Eckhardt
`persuasive and do not rely on them for purposes of this Decision.
`In view of the above, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown a
`reasonable likelihood that claim 1 of the ’823 patent is obvious in view of
`Prohaska and Appel.
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`3. Remaining Claims and Grounds
`
`Patent Owner does not address specifically the remaining claims or
`grounds at this time and instead focuses its arguments on those issues
`addressed above. Petitioner offers its analysis of claims 9 and 10 under the
`
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`11 Exhibit 1017 was published on August 16, 2001 (Ex. 1017, (43)), whereas
`the application issuing as the ’823 patent was filed on February 9, 2009 but
`claims priority to a series of applications ultimately leading to a foreign
`application filed April 26, 2001 (Ex. 1001, (22), (62)). Patent Owner does
`not explain whether the subject matter of the ’823 patent properly can claim
`benefit to one or more earlier filing date(s), but we need not reach that issue
`at this time for the reasons explained herein.
`
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`Case IPR2016-00041
`Patent 8,099,823
`Prohaska and Appel ground, as well as its analysis of three other references
`(Hoyler, Kotlarski ’383, and Merkel) in combination with Prohaska that also
`address claims 1, 9, and 10. Pet. 30–48, 54–60. Petitioner also sets forth its
`analysis of claim 6, which depends from claim 1, in view of Prohaska,
`Appel, Hoyler, Kotlarski ’383, and Merkel in addition to Kotlarski ’090 and
`Mathues. Pet. 48–54.
`We have set forth our analysis for claim 1 under the Prohaska and
`Appel ground. Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), “inter partes review [must not] be
`instituted unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would
`prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”
`Petitioner has satisfied that requirement and we therefore also institute on
`these remaining obviousness claims and grounds, as set forth in our Order
`below.
`
`III. ORDER
`
`
`
`In view of the foregoing, it is hereby:
`ORDERED that inter partes review of the ’823 patent is instituted on
`the following grounds:
`Whether claims 1, 9, and 10 would have been obvious in view
`of Prohaska, and Appel or Hoyler;
`Whether claims 1, 9, and 10 would have been obvious in view
`of Kotlarski ’383 or Merkel, and Prohaska;
`Whether claim 6 would have been obvious in view of Prohaska,
`Appel or Hoyler, and Kotlarski ’090 or Mathues;
`Whether claim 6 would have been obvious in view of
`Kotlarski ’383 or Merkel, Prohaska, and Kotlarski ’090 or Mathues;
`
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`Case IPR2016-00041
`Patent 8,099,823
`FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37
`C.F.R. § 42.4, inter partes review of the ʼ823 patent shall commence on the
`entry date of this Order, and notice is hereby given of the institution of a
`trial; and
`
`FURTHER ORDERED that no ground other than those specifically
`provided above is authorized.
`
`
`
`PETITIONER:
`
`Richard M. Koehl
`James R. Klaiber
`David Lansky
`HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP
`richard.koehl@hugheshubbard.com
`james.klaiber@hugheshubbard.com
`david.lansky@hugheshubbard.com
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Enrique Iturralde
`SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP
`Enrique.Iturralde@shearman.com
`
`
`
`
`
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