throbber
Filed: December 23, 2016
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`ROBERT BOSCH LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`
`Case IPR2016-00041
`Patent 8,099,823
`
`____________
`
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.64
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`I.
`
`DAVID PECK IS QUALIFIED TO GIVE TECHNICAL
`EXPERT OPINIONS REGARDING THE STATE OF THE
`ART AND THE SKILL LEVEL IN THE ART AT THE TIME
`OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION ...................................................... 1
`
`II.
`
`DAVID PECK IS QUALIFIED TO PROVIDE OPINIONS
`BASED ON HIS PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS............................ 11
`
`III. CONCLUSION................................................................................... 13
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Page(s)
`
`Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., No. 03 C 7713,
`2006 WL 3718074 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2006) ................................................ 6
`
`In re GPAC Inc.,
`57 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995) .................................................................... 10
`
`Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd.,
`122 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ................................................................ 6, 7
`
`Mytee Prods., Inc. v. Harris Research, Inc.,
`439 F. App’x 882 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ............................................................... 5
`
`In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86 (CCPA 1978) ........................................................ 10
`
`Okajima v. Bourdeau,
`261 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .................................................................. 10
`
`S.E.B. S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
`594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................... 7
`
`Teva Neuroscience, Inc. v. Watson Pharma, Inc., No. CIV.A. 10-
`5078 CCC,
`2013 WL 1966048 (D.N.J. May 10, 2013) ........................................... 6, 7, 8
`
`Traxys N. Am., LLC v. Concept Mining, Inc.,
`808 F. Supp. 2d 851 (W.D. Va. 2011) .................................................... 4, 12
`
`United States v. Farmer,
`543 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................... 12
`
`Zoltek Corp. v. United States,
`95 Fed. Cl. 681 (2010) .............................................................................. 4, 5
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`Cont’d
`
`Statutes and Rules
`
`Page(s)
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 701 ............................................................................................. 12
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 702 ..................................................................................... 3, 7, 10
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 703 ....................................................................................... 11, 12
`
`Legislative and Administrative Proceedings
`
`CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00540, Paper No. 78 (PTAB Mar. 3, 2015) .................................. 7
`
`Primera Technology, Inc. v. Automatic Manufacturing Systems,
`Inc.,
`IPR2013-00196, Paper No. 52 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) ................................ 9
`
`U.S. Endoscopy Grp., Inc. v. CDX Diagnostics, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00639, Paper No. 27 (PTAB Sept. 14, 2015) ................................ 6
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`
`Costco Wholesale Corporation (“Petitioner”) hereby opposes the motion
`
`(Paper No. 53; the “Motion”) of Robert Bosch LLC (“Patent Owner”) to exclude
`
`the following evidence submitted by Petitioner in support of the unpatentability of
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,099,823 (the “’823 Patent”; Ex. 1001): Paragraphs 7, 9–11, 15,
`
`18, 19, 21, and 23–26 of the Declaration of David Peck (Ex. 1100). Patent Owner’s
`
`assertions regarding David Peck’s qualifications are factually insupportable and
`
`legally erroneous.
`
`I.
`
`DAVID PECK IS QUALIFIED TO GIVE TECHNICAL EXPERT
`OPINIONS REGARDING THE STATE OF THE ART AND THE
`SKILL LEVEL IN THE ART AT THE TIME OF THE CLAIMED
`INVENTION
`
`Patent Owner wrongly asserts that “Petitioner has made no showing that
`
`[Mr. Peck] has ever been a wiper-blade designer.” Motion at 3. To the contrary, the
`
`evidence of record establishes Mr. Peck’s extensive experience in this field. Mr.
`
`Peck received a Bachelor of Science in mechanical engineering and has held
`
`various automotive engineering roles throughout his career, including Chief
`
`Engineer of Applied Research at Rockwell International, Automotive Operations.
`
`See Ex. 1100, App’x A (curriculum vitae of David E. Peck) at pp. 15–16.
`
`In 1997, Mr. Peck began his employment at Trico Products, Inc. (“Trico”)
`
`where he held the title of Manager of Advanced Products and Processes Research
`
`and Development. Ex. 1100 ¶ 3. In this role, he “became familiar with the
`
`1
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`windshield wiper product design and development process” and “personally
`
`participated in the design and development of Trico’s Innovision aftermarket wiper
`
`blade,” a commercial flat-spring wiper sold by Trico. Ex. 1100 ¶¶ 5, 14. In
`
`developing this flat-spring wiper for commercial production, Mr. Peck became
`
`well-versed in the numerous factors that contribute to a windshield wiper’s
`
`commercial success. See, e.g., Ex. 2029 (Peck Tr.) at 37:18–22, 71:8–21
`
`(aerodynamics);
`
`id. at 24:22–25:6, 55:19–56:22, 97:15–21, 108:22–110:4
`
`(aesthetics); id. at 40:20–42:7, 89:25–94:20 (conforming curvature to windshield);
`
`id. at 24:16–21 (consumer safety); id. at 42:18–43:15, 52:7–53:2 (means of
`
`connection); id. at 62:11–16; 107:13–108:20 (climate accommodation); id. at
`
`20:12–21:18, 80:7–24 (material selection); id. at 35:20–36:23, 85:14–86:16
`
`(product simulation and finite element analysis (“FEA”)); see also Ex. 1100 at 4
`
`n.1 (listing examples of Trico’s internal wiper requirements).
`
`Mr. Peck currently holds the position of Advanced Technology Subject
`
`Matter Expert at Mahindra North American Technical Center, where he works
`
`with windshield wipers as the “most experienced” employee on staff. Ex. 1100,
`
`App’x A at p. 15; Ex. 2029 at 15:9–13. His wiper-related responsibilities in this
`
`role include helping to “make sure all the testing [is] done correctly.” Ex. 2029 at
`
`16:16–20.
`
`All of this experience, as set forth more fully in his curriculum vitae (Ex.
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`1100, App’x A), plainly qualifies Mr. Peck “as an expert by knowledge, skill,
`
`experience, training, or education” on the subjects of wiper design and testing,
`
`such that he “may testify in the form of an opinion.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. For
`
`example, Mr. Peck’s testimony that “[w]iper noise during general operation is a
`
`function of many technical factors” (Ex. 1100 ¶ 19) finds a foundation in his role
`
`developing the Trico Innovision wiper and in his current role where he has been
`
`instrumental in reaching an agreement with a supplier “on what testing and what
`
`requirements would be needed for meeting the wiper requirements for making a
`
`successful wiper.” Ex. 2029 at 16:20–24. Likewise, his position at Rockwell,
`
`where the FEA group reported to him from 1986 until 1995 (see Ex. 2029 at
`
`84:24–85:9), qualifies him to testify that mechanical engineers were capable of
`
`performing FEA long prior to 1997 (Ex. 1100 ¶ 10). His qualifications cannot
`
`reasonably be disputed.
`
`Contrary to Patent Owner’s suggestion, Mr. Peck’s experience designing
`
`production equipment to manufacture wiper components renders him more—not
`
`less—qualified to provide expert testimony on the design process. This work
`
`involved tailoring the production equipment to the precise wiper design
`
`specifications and verifying that the manufactured wiper performed as intended.
`
`For example, Mr. Peck explained (Ex. 2029 at 46:7–47:24):
`
`Q So going back to the beam blade, when you were designing the
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`
`manufacturing equipment, how did you know exactly what it was
`
`your manufacturing equipment was supposed to be manufacturing?
`
`. . .
`
`[A] Well, the tapered rolling mill had to meet a specific thickness
`
`gradient. And so the goal was VariFlex tells us, this is the gradient
`
`you must have. This thickness at this width. We had to make sure that
`
`the thickness would meet a very tight specification and it was
`
`repeatable. . . . So we had to make sure that we could match not only
`
`the thickness gradient -- and then the same thing, we had to match the
`
`width that was required. And we had to make sure that the width
`
`variation and the thickness variation were at the same place where
`
`they were supposed to be. So that was part of it. And then, of course,
`
`as I mentioned earlier, we had to verify that, in fact, the force intensity
`
`was what VariFlex predicted. And we had to verify that when put on a
`
`glass per the conformance that he determined, that it would wipe
`
`effectively, so that was more verification of the VariFlex.
`
`By
`
`iteratively
`
`improving wiper production machinery and verifying
`
`the
`
`performance of the manufactured wipers, it would be nearly impossible not to gain
`
`an intimate understanding of wiper design.
`
`Regardless, Patent Owner’s argument still misses the point. “An expert need
`
`not have worked in precisely the same field as the subject matter in question to
`
`give credible evidence as to the knowledge and level of skill in the relevant art.”
`
`Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Millenium Biologix, LLC, IPR2013-00582, Paper No.
`
`8, at 29 n.13 (PTAB Mar. 21, 2014); see also Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 95
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`Fed. Cl. 681, 685 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (“[I]f an
`
`expert is qualified to testify about a subject generally and has had training in the
`
`subject matter at issue, then the expert may offer an opinion.”).
`
`In Zoltek, for example, plaintiff argued that the government’s proffered
`
`expert was unqualified. The government demonstrated that the expert had
`
`“extensive education and professional experience in the areas of carbon fiber and
`
`carbon composite materials,” but plaintiff nonetheless objected to this testimony
`
`because of “the absence of any work involving the electrical properties of carbon
`
`fibers.” Zoltek, 95 Fed. Cl. at 685. The court rejected this argument and held that
`
`“[r]egardless of Dr. Sullivan’s experience with electrical properties of carbon
`
`fibers, his substantial experience with carbon fibers establishes his qualification to
`
`serve as an expert in this case.” Id.; see also Mytee Prods., Inc. v. Harris Research,
`
`Inc., 439 F. App’x 882, 886–87 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming district court decision
`
`to admit expert testimony “notwithstanding his lack of experience in carpet
`
`cleaning” because “his experience with mechanical devices would ‘provide
`
`relevant technical expertise in the pertinent art’”). Here too, Mr. Peck’s
`
`“substantial experience” with wipers in general “establishes his qualification to
`
`serve as an expert in this case.” Zoltek, 95 Fed. Cl. at 685.
`
`Patent Owner also argues that Mr. Peck is unqualified because he had “no
`
`experience designing beam-style wiper blades with spoilers at the time of the
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`invention.” Motion at 3. But this is irrelevant. An “expert must be qualified to
`
`testify about what a person with ordinary skill in the art must have understood at
`
`the time of the invention, but the expert’s knowledge of that may have come later.”
`
`Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., No. 03 C 7713, 2006 WL 3718074, at
`
`*1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2006) (emphasis added); see also U.S. Endoscopy Grp., Inc.
`
`v. CDX Diagnostics, Inc., IPR2014-00639, Paper No. 27, at 18 (PTAB Sept. 14,
`
`2015) (“A witness must provide testimony about the level of skill in the art as of
`
`the critical date; however, the witness need not have acquired that knowledge as of
`
`the critical date.”). Following the lead of “many district courts,” the Board should
`
`“reject[] the ‘remarkable proposition that only those who were skilled in the art at
`
`the time of the invention may be qualified to offer opinions on the issue of
`
`obviousness.’” Teva Neuroscience, Inc. v. Watson Pharma, Inc., No. CIV.A. 10-
`
`5078 CCC, 2013 WL 1966048, at *4 (D.N.J. May 10, 2013) (citation omitted)
`
`(compiling cases).
`
` By taking the position that to qualify as an expert, Mr. Peck must have had
`
`experience designing flat-spring wipers with spoilers at the time of the claimed
`
`invention (Motion at 3), Patent Owner essentially argues that being a person of
`
`ordinary skill as of the critical date is a prerequisite to expert testimony. “Of course
`
`that objection is meritless.” Endress + Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys.
`
`Pty. Ltd., 122 F.3d 1040, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (rejecting attack on proffered
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`expert as unqualified because he was not a person of ordinary skill in the art); see
`
`also CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc., IPR2013-00540, Paper No. 78 at 13
`
`(PTAB Mar. 3, 2015) (citation omitted) (“Patent Owner’s arguments are
`
`unpersuasive at the outset because, to testify as an expert under FRE 702, a person
`
`need not be a person of ordinary skill in the art, but rather ‘qualified in the
`
`pertinent art.’”). “[T]he relevant inquiry regarding whether an expert should be
`
`allowed to provide testimony at trial is not whether she is a [person of ordinary
`
`skill in the art], but instead is grounded in whether the expert’s ‘knowledge, skill,
`
`experience, training [and] education . . . [i]s likely to assist the trier of fact to
`
`understand the evidence.’” Teva Neuroscience, 2013 WL 1966048, at *4 (quoting
`
`S.E.B. S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
`
`Patent Owner has not addressed this inquiry.
`
`In Endress + Hauser, the Federal Circuit explained the reasoning behind this
`
`well-settled rule:
`
`The “person of ordinary skill in the art” is a theoretical construct used
`
`in determining obviousness under § 103, and is not descriptive of
`
`some particular individual. To suggest that the construct applies to
`
`particular individuals could mean that a person of exceptional skill in
`
`the art would be disqualified from testifying as an expert because not
`
`ordinary enough.
`
`Endress + Hauser, 122 F.3d at 1042 (citations omitted). Even assuming, for
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`purposes of argument, that Mr. Peck had “little to no experience in designing
`
`beam-style wiper blades at the time of the invention” as Patent Owner asserts
`
`(Motion at 3), his education and extensive wiper-related experience, both before
`
`and after the date of the claimed invention, qualify him to testify regarding the
`
`state of the art and the skill level in the art as of the time the claimed invention was
`
`made. His mechanical engineering-related experience with FEA and beam
`
`equations can “assist the trier of fact [in] understand[ing] the evidence.” Teva
`
`Neuroscience, 2013 WL 1966048, at *4.
`
`
`
`Insofar as Patent Owner faults Mr. Peck for not setting forth an express
`
`“understanding of who a person of ordinary skill is in the context of this patent”
`
`(Motion at 2), this is irrelevant. Although the law does not require it, under Patent
`
`Owner’s own definition of skill level, Mr. Peck was qualified as such a person at
`
`the relevant time. According to Patent Owner and its expert, “[a] person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’823 patent (‘POSITA’)
`
`would have had either an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or
`
`similar discipline, or several years of experience in the field of wiper blade
`
`manufacture and design.” Patent Owner Response (Paper No. 32) (the “Response”)
`
`at 1 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 16–19). Mr. Peck had an undergraduate degree in
`
`mechanical engineering prior to April 2001 and he also had several years of
`
`experience “in the field of wiper blade manufacture and design.” See Ex. 1100,
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`App’x A at p. 15.
`
`
`
`Not only did Mr. Peck have the requisite skill set at the relevant time, he
`
`makes very clear in his declaration that his testimony reflects the state of the art
`
`“[b]y no later than 1997.” See Ex. 1100 ¶ 7; see also, e.g., id. ¶¶ 8–11 (describing
`
`the wiper design process that took place at Trico “[b]y no later than 1997”). In fact,
`
`after discussing various sources of wiper noise, Mr. Peck concludes that “prior to
`
`1997, a person with my experience would have understood how to design a wiper
`
`that is quiet in operation based on the factors that were known to influence wiper
`
`noise.” Id. ¶ 26. The combination of Mr. Peck’s qualifications and the express
`
`timeframe limitation he imposes renders inescapable the conclusion that his
`
`testimony is “directed to what [a person of ordinary skill] would have known and
`
`understood” (Motion at 2). Patent Owner’s suggestion to the contrary cannot
`
`withstand scrutiny without undermining its own expert’s evaluation of skill level in
`
`the art of the ’823 Patent (Ex. 2003 ¶ 19).
`
`
`
`Unsurprisingly, Patent Owner cites to no authority in support of its
`
`contention that an expert must provide a particular skill level definition. See
`
`Motion at 2. Where the prior art references of record establish the skill level, as
`
`they do here, it is unnecessary for a witness—or even a party—to expressly
`
`identify a skill level. In Primera Technology, Inc. v. Automatic Manufacturing
`
`Systems, Inc., IPR2013-00196, Paper No. 52 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014), for example,
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`the Board was “not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that because Petitioner
`
`did not state affirmatively the level of ordinary skill in the art,” the evidence was
`
`insufficient to establish obviousness. Id. at 8. The Board explained: “We relied on
`
`the evidence presented in the record, which includes the testimony of Patent
`
`Owner’s declarant and the references themselves. As stated in our Decision, the
`
`level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves.”
`
`Id. at 8–9 (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In
`
`re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91
`
`(CCPA 1978)).
`
`In this proceeding, Petitioner has set forth in detail why the prior art of
`
`record reflects the skill level in the art of the ’823 Patent. See Petition (Paper No.
`
`9) at 25–26; Ex. 1014 (Davis Decl.) ¶¶ 15–16; Reply in Support of Petition (Paper
`
`No. 38) (the “Reply”) at 2–4. In these circumstances, the Board would be fully
`
`capable of assigning Mr. Peck’s testimony the appropriate weight in light of the
`
`level of skill in the art that Petitioner has set forth.
`
`Accordingly, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Mr. Peck is qualified to
`
`provide the technical expert opinions in his declaration regarding the state of the
`
`art.
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`II. DAVID PECK IS QUALIFIED TO PROVIDE OPINIONS BASED ON
`HIS PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS
`
`Patent Owner’s argument that Mr. Peck is unqualified to provide expert
`
`testimony regarding “financial, marketing, or consumer demand issues” (Motion at
`
`5) ignores the foundation for this testimony in Mr. Peck’s own personal knowledge
`
`and observations. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 unambiguously states: “[a]n expert
`
`may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made
`
`aware of or personally observed.” Id. (emphasis added).
`
`In the first instance, it is not entirely clear what “financial” or “marketing”
`
`testimony Patent Owner is referring to.1 The one specific substantive example that
`
`Patent Owner did provide—Mr. Peck’s opinion that “Trico’s Innovision wiper
`
`blade was a commercial success” (Motion at 5)—is plainly grounded in Mr. Peck’s
`
`personal observations during his tenure at Trico. Mr. Peck does not purport to, for
`
`instance, analyze sales or market share data in order to support his opinion that the
`
`Trico Innovision enjoyed success;2 instead, his opinion is based on Trico’s inability
`
`
`1 Patent Owner has indicated that this objection applies only to paragraphs 15, 18,
`
`and 21 of Exhibit 1100 (Motion at 6), but none of these paragraphs purport to
`
`characterize or otherwise provide an opinion about “financ[es]” or “marketing.”
`
`2 Indeed, no expert that Petitioner could proffer would be able to do this because
`
`Patent Owner provided no such information to analyze; Patent Owner’s assertions
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`to meet supply demands and its resulting increase in manufacturing capacity. See
`
`Ex. 1100 ¶ 15. Having worked at Trico at this time in a senior role, Mr. Peck’s
`
`opinion that “[i]n my experience, demand this high constitutes a success” (id.) is
`
`well-founded and falls squarely within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence
`
`703. Not one of the cases cited by Patent Owner involves an expert who testified
`
`based on his or her own personal observations. See Motion at 5–6.
`
`Moreover, Mr. Peck is also permitted to provide an opinion as a fact witness
`
`if the opinion is “rationally based on the witness’s perception.” Fed. R. Evid. 701.
`
`It is well-established that “[t]estimony in the dual roles of both a fact witness and
`
`an expert witness . . . is permissible provided that the district court takes
`
`precautions to minimize potential prejudice.” United States v. Farmer, 543 F.3d
`
`363, 370 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, where there are no concerns of confusing the jury,
`
`“[t]he gatekeeping function of the court is relaxed . . . because the court is better
`
`equipped than a jury to weigh the probative value of expert evidence.” Traxys N.
`
`Am., LLC v. Concept Mining, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 851, 853 (W.D. Va. 2011).
`
`Whether the Board believes this testimony is within the scope of Mr. Peck’s
`
`
`regarding purported secondary considerations of nonobviousness were entirely
`
`unsupported, even though Patent Owner bears the burden of proof on this point.
`
`See Reply at 18–23.
`
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`expertise or not, it is indisputably based on his own personal observation and
`
`rational perception; the Board will have no trouble determining the foundation for
`
`Mr. Peck’s testimony and weighing it accordingly.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Board
`
`deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude and admit the Declaration of David Peck
`
`(Ex. 1100) into evidence in its entirety.
`
`
`
`Dated: December 23, 2016
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`/Stefanie M. Lopatkin/
`Stefanie M. Lopatkin
`Registration No. 74,312
`Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP
`One Battery Park Plaza
`New York, New York 10004
`Stefanie.lopatkin@hugheshubbard.com
`(212) 837-6393
`Attorney for Petitioner
`Costco Wholesale Corporation
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2016-00041
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of December, 2016, the foregoing
`
`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence Pursuant to
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.64 was served in its entirety by email on the attorneys of record for
`
`Patent Owner:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Patrick R. Colsher (patrick.colsher@shearman.com)
`
`Mark Hannemann (mark.hannemann@shearman.com)
`
`Joseph Purcell (joseph.purcell@shearman.com)
`
`/James R. Klaiber/
`James R. Klaiber
`Registration No. 41,902
`
`74761864
`
`
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket