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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`ROBERT BOSCH LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`
`Case IPR2016-00038
`Patent 6,292,974
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`____________
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`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.64
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
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`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`
`I.
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`DAVID PECK IS QUALIFIED TO GIVE TECHNICAL
`EXPERT OPINIONS REGARDING THE STATE OF THE
`ART AND THE SKILL LEVEL IN THE ART AT THE TIME
`OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION ...................................................... 1
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`II.
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`DAVID PECK IS QUALIFIED TO PROVIDE OPINIONS
`BASED ON HIS PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS............................ 11
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`III. CONCLUSION................................................................................... 13
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`i
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases
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`Page(s)
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`Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., No. 03 C 7713,
`2006 WL 3718074 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2006) ................................................ 6
`
`In re GPAC Inc.,
`57 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995) .................................................................... 10
`
`Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd.,
`122 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ................................................................ 6, 7
`
`Mytee Prods., Inc. v. Harris Research, Inc.,
`439 F. App’x 882 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ............................................................... 5
`
`In re Oelrich,
`579 F.2d 86 (CCPA 1978) .......................................................................... 10
`
`Okajima v. Bourdeau,
`261 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .................................................................. 10
`
`S.E.B. S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
`594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................... 7
`
`Teva Neuroscience, Inc. v. Watson Pharma, Inc., No. CIV.A. 10-
`5078 CCC,
`2013 WL 1966048 (D.N.J. May 10, 2013) ........................................... 6, 7, 8
`
`Traxys N. Am., LLC v. Concept Mining, Inc.,
`808 F. Supp. 2d 851 (W.D. Va. 2011) .................................................... 4, 12
`
`United States v. Farmer,
`543 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................... 12
`
`Zoltek Corp. v. United States,
`95 Fed. Cl. 681 (2010) .............................................................................. 4, 5
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`Cont’d
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`Statutes and Rules
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`Page(s)
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`Fed. R. Evid. 701 ............................................................................................. 12
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`Fed. R. Evid. 702 ..................................................................................... 3, 7, 10
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`Fed. R. Evid. 703 ....................................................................................... 11, 12
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`Legislative and Administrative Proceedings
`
`CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00540, Paper No. 78 (PTAB Mar. 3, 2015) .................................. 7
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`Primera Technology, Inc. v. Automatic Manufacturing Systems,
`Inc.,
`IPR2013-00196, Paper No. 52 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) ................................ 9
`
`U.S. Endoscopy Grp., Inc. v. CDX Diagnostics, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00639, Paper No. 27 (PTAB Sept. 14, 2015) ................................ 6
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`
`
`
`
`iii
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`Costco Wholesale Corporation (“Petitioner”) hereby opposes the motion
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`(Paper No. 49; the “Motion”) of Robert Bosch LLC (“Patent Owner”) to exclude
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`the following evidence submitted by Petitioner in support of the unpatentability of
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`U.S. Patent No. 6,292,974 (the “’974 Patent”; Ex. 1001): Paragraphs 7, 9–11, 15,
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`18, 19, 21, and 23–26 of the Declaration of David Peck (Ex. 1100). Patent Owner’s
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`assertions regarding David Peck’s qualifications are factually insupportable and
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`legally erroneous.
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`I.
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`DAVID PECK IS QUALIFIED TO GIVE TECHNICAL EXPERT
`OPINIONS REGARDING THE STATE OF THE ART AND THE
`SKILL LEVEL IN THE ART AT THE TIME OF THE CLAIMED
`INVENTION
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`Patent Owner wrongly asserts that “[Mr. Peck] has never been a wiper-blade
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`designer.” Motion at 3. To the contrary, the evidence of record establishes Mr.
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`Peck’s extensive experience in this field. Mr. Peck received a Bachelor of Science
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`in mechanical engineering and has held various automotive engineering roles
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`throughout his career, including Chief Engineer of Applied Research at Rockwell
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`International, Automotive Operations. See Ex. 1100, App’x A (curriculum vitae of
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`David E. Peck) at pp. 15–16.
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`In 1997, Mr. Peck began his employment at Trico Products, Inc. (“Trico”)
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`where he held the title of Manager of Advanced Products and Processes Research
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`and Development. Ex. 1100 ¶ 3. In this role, he “became familiar with the
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`1
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`windshield wiper product design and development process” and “personally
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`participated in the design and development of Trico’s Innovision aftermarket wiper
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`blade,” a commercial flat-spring wiper sold by Trico. Ex. 1100 ¶¶ 5, 14. In
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`developing this flat-spring wiper for commercial production, Mr. Peck became
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`well-versed in the numerous factors that contribute to a windshield wiper’s
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`commercial success. See, e.g., Ex. 2029 (Peck Tr.) at 37:18–22, 71:8–21
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`(aerodynamics);
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`id. at 24:22–25:6, 55:19–56:22, 97:15–21, 108:22–110:4
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`(aesthetics); id. at 40:20–42:7, 89:25–94:20 (conforming curvature to windshield);
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`id. at 24:16–21 (consumer safety); id. at 42:18–43:15, 52:7–53:2 (means of
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`connection); id. at 62:11–16; 107:13–108:20 (climate accommodation); id. at
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`20:12–21:18, 80:7–24 (material selection); id. at 35:20–36:23, 85:14–86:16
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`(product simulation and finite element analysis (“FEA”)); see also Ex. 1100 at 4
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`n.1 (listing examples of Trico’s internal wiper requirements).
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`Mr. Peck currently holds the position of Advanced Technology Subject
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`Matter Expert at Mahindra North American Technical Center, where he works
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`with windshield wipers as the “most experienced” employee on staff. Ex. 1100,
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`App’x A at p. 15; Ex. 2029 at 15:9–13. His wiper-related responsibilities in this
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`role include helping to “make sure all the testing [is] done correctly.” Ex. 2029 at
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`16:16–20.
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`All of this experience, as set forth more fully in his curriculum vitae (Ex.
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`2
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`1100, App’x A), plainly qualifies Mr. Peck “as an expert by knowledge, skill,
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`experience, training, or education” on the subjects of wiper design and testing,
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`such that he “may testify in the form of an opinion.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. For
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`example, Mr. Peck’s testimony that “[w]iper noise during general operation is a
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`function of many technical factors” (Ex. 1100 ¶ 19) finds a foundation in his role
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`developing the Trico Innovision wiper and in his current role where he has been
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`instrumental in reaching an agreement with a supplier “on what testing and what
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`requirements would be needed for meeting the wiper requirements for making a
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`successful wiper.” Ex. 2029 at 16:20–24. Likewise, his position at Rockwell,
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`where the FEA group reported to him from 1986 until 1995 (see Ex. 2029 at
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`84:24–85:9), qualifies him to testify that mechanical engineers were capable of
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`performing FEA long prior to 1997 (Ex. 1100 ¶ 10). His qualifications cannot
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`reasonably be disputed.
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`Contrary to Patent Owner’s suggestion, Mr. Peck’s experience designing
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`production equipment to manufacture wiper components renders him more—not
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`less—qualified to provide expert testimony on the design process. This work
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`involved tailoring the production equipment to the precise wiper design
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`specifications and verifying that the manufactured wiper performed as intended.
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`For example, Mr. Peck explained (Ex. 2029 at 46:7–47:24):
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`Q So going back to the beam blade, when you were designing the
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`3
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`manufacturing equipment, how did you know exactly what it was
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`your manufacturing equipment was supposed to be manufacturing?
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`. . .
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`[A] Well, the tapered rolling mill had to meet a specific thickness
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`gradient. And so the goal was VariFlex tells us, this is the gradient
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`you must have. This thickness at this width. We had to make sure that
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`the thickness would meet a very tight specification and it was
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`repeatable. . . . So we had to make sure that we could match not only
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`the thickness gradient -- and then the same thing, we had to match the
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`width that was required. And we had to make sure that the width
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`variation and the thickness variation were at the same place where
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`they were supposed to be. So that was part of it. And then, of course,
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`as I mentioned earlier, we had to verify that, in fact, the force intensity
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`was what VariFlex predicted. And we had to verify that when put on a
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`glass per the conformance that he determined, that it would wipe
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`effectively, so that was more verification of the VariFlex.
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`By
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`iteratively
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`improving wiper production machinery and verifying
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`the
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`performance of the manufactured wipers, it would be nearly impossible not to gain
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`an intimate understanding of wiper design.
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`Regardless, Patent Owner’s argument still misses the point. “An expert need
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`not have worked in precisely the same field as the subject matter in question to
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`give credible evidence as to the knowledge and level of skill in the relevant art.”
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`Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Millenium Biologix, LLC, IPR2013-00582, Paper No.
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`8, at 29 n.13 (PTAB Mar. 21, 2014); see also Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 95
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`4
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`Fed. Cl. 681, 685 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (“[I]f an
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`expert is qualified to testify about a subject generally and has had training in the
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`subject matter at issue, then the expert may offer an opinion.”).
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`In Zoltek, for example, plaintiff argued that the government’s proffered
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`expert was unqualified. The government demonstrated that the expert had
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`“extensive education and professional experience in the areas of carbon fiber and
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`carbon composite materials,” but plaintiff nonetheless objected to this testimony
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`because of “the absence of any work involving the electrical properties of carbon
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`fibers.” Zoltek, 95 Fed. Cl. at 685. The court rejected this argument and held that
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`“[r]egardless of Dr. Sullivan’s experience with electrical properties of carbon
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`fibers, his substantial experience with carbon fibers establishes his qualification to
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`serve as an expert in this case.” Id.; see also Mytee Prods., Inc. v. Harris Research,
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`Inc., 439 F. App’x 882, 886–87 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming district court decision
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`to admit expert testimony “notwithstanding his lack of experience in carpet
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`cleaning” because “his experience with mechanical devices would ‘provide
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`relevant technical expertise in the pertinent art’”). Here too, Mr. Peck’s
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`“substantial experience” with wipers in general “establishes his qualification to
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`serve as an expert in this case.” Zoltek, 95 Fed. Cl. at 685.
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`Patent Owner also argues that Mr. Peck is unqualified because he had “no
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`experience designing beam-style wiper blades with spoilers at the time of the
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`5
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`invention.” Motion at 3. But this is irrelevant. An “expert must be qualified to
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`testify about what a person with ordinary skill in the art must have understood at
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`the time of the invention, but the expert’s knowledge of that may have come later.”
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`Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., No. 03 C 7713, 2006 WL 3718074, at
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`*1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2006) (emphasis added); see also U.S. Endoscopy Grp., Inc.
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`v. CDX Diagnostics, Inc., IPR2014-00639, Paper No. 27, at 18 (PTAB Sept. 14,
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`2015) (“A witness must provide testimony about the level of skill in the art as of
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`the critical date; however, the witness need not have acquired that knowledge as of
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`the critical date.”). Following the lead of “many district courts,” the Board should
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`“reject[] the ‘remarkable proposition that only those who were skilled in the art at
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`the time of the invention may be qualified to offer opinions on the issue of
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`obviousness.’” Teva Neuroscience, Inc. v. Watson Pharma, Inc., No. CIV.A. 10-
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`5078 CCC, 2013 WL 1966048, at *4 (D.N.J. May 10, 2013) (citation omitted)
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`(compiling cases).
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` By taking the position that to qualify as an expert, Mr. Peck must have had
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`experience designing flat-spring wipers with spoilers at the time of the claimed
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`invention (Motion at 3), Patent Owner essentially argues that being a person of
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`ordinary skill as of the critical date is a prerequisite to expert testimony. “Of course
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`that objection is meritless.” Endress + Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys.
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`Pty. Ltd., 122 F.3d 1040, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (rejecting attack on proffered
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`6
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`expert as unqualified because he was not a person of ordinary skill in the art); see
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`also CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc., IPR2013-00540, Paper No. 78 at 13
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`(PTAB Mar. 3, 2015) (citation omitted) (“Patent Owner’s arguments are
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`unpersuasive at the outset because, to testify as an expert under FRE 702, a person
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`need not be a person of ordinary skill in the art, but rather ‘qualified in the
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`pertinent art.’”). “[T]he relevant inquiry regarding whether an expert should be
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`allowed to provide testimony at trial is not whether she is a [person of ordinary
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`skill in the art], but instead is grounded in whether the expert’s ‘knowledge, skill,
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`experience, training [and] education . . . [i]s likely to assist the trier of fact to
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`understand the evidence.’” Teva Neuroscience, 2013 WL 1966048, at *4 (quoting
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`S.E.B. S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
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`Patent Owner has not addressed this inquiry.
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`In Endress + Hauser, the Federal Circuit explained the reasoning behind this
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`well-settled rule:
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`The “person of ordinary skill in the art” is a theoretical construct used
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`in determining obviousness under § 103, and is not descriptive of
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`some particular individual. To suggest that the construct applies to
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`particular individuals could mean that a person of exceptional skill in
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`the art would be disqualified from testifying as an expert because not
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`ordinary enough.
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`Endress + Hauser, 122 F.3d at 1042 (citations omitted). Even assuming, for
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`7
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`purposes of argument, that Mr. Peck had “no experience in designing beam-style
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`wiper blades at the time of the invention” as Patent Owner asserts (Motion at 3),
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`his education and extensive wiper-related experience, both before and after the
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`date of the claimed invention, qualify him to testify regarding the state of the art
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`and the skill level in the art as of the time the claimed invention was made. His
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`mechanical engineering-related experience with FEA and beam equations can
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`“assist the trier of fact [in] understand[ing] the evidence.” Teva Neuroscience,
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`2013 WL 1966048, at *4.
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`Insofar as Patent Owner faults Mr. Peck for not setting forth an express
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`“understanding of who a person of ordinary skill is in the context of this patent”
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`(Motion at 2), this is irrelevant. Although the law does not require it, under Patent
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`Owner’s own definition of skill level, Mr. Peck was qualified as such a person at
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`the relevant time. According to Patent Owner and its expert, “[a] person of
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`ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’974 patent (‘POSITA’)
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`would have had either an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or
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`similar discipline, or several years of experience in the field of wiper blade
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`manufacture and design.” Patent Owner Response (Paper No. 28) (the “Response”)
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`at 1 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 16–19). Mr. Peck had an undergraduate degree in
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`mechanical engineering prior to the date of the claimed invention and he had
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`several years of experience “in the field of wiper blade manufacture and design.”
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`8
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`See Ex. 1100, App’x A at p. 15.
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`
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`Not only did Mr. Peck have the requisite skill set at the relevant time, he
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`makes very clear in his declaration that his testimony reflects the state of the art
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`“[b]y no later than 1997.” See Ex. 1100 ¶ 7; see also, e.g., id. ¶¶ 8–11 (describing
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`the wiper design process that took place at Trico “[b]y no later than 1997”). In fact,
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`after discussing various sources of wiper noise, Mr. Peck concludes that “prior to
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`1997, a person with my experience would have understood how to design a wiper
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`that is quiet in operation based on the factors that were known to influence wiper
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`noise.” Id. ¶ 26. The combination of Mr. Peck’s qualifications and the express
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`timeframe limitation he imposes renders inescapable the conclusion that his
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`testimony is “directed to what [a person of ordinary skill] would have known and
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`understood” (Motion at 2). Patent Owner’s suggestion to the contrary cannot
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`withstand scrutiny without undermining its own expert’s evaluation of skill level in
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`the art of the ’974 Patent (Ex. 2003 ¶ 19).
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`Unsurprisingly, Patent Owner cites to no authority in support of its
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`contention that an expert must provide a particular skill level definition. See
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`Motion at 2. Where the prior art references of record establish the skill level, as
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`they do here, it is unnecessary for a witness—or even a party—to expressly
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`identify a skill level. In Primera Technology, Inc. v. Automatic Manufacturing
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`Systems, Inc., IPR2013-00196, Paper No. 52 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014), for example,
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`9
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`the Board was “not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that because Petitioner
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`did not state affirmatively the level of ordinary skill in the art,” the evidence was
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`insufficient to establish obviousness. Id. at 8. The Board explained: “We relied on
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`the evidence presented in the record, which includes the testimony of Patent
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`Owner’s declarant and the references themselves. As stated in our Decision, the
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`level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves.”
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`Id. at 8–9 (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In
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`re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91
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`(CCPA 1978)).
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`In this proceeding, Petitioner has set forth in detail why the prior art of
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`record reflects the skill level in the art of the ’974 Patent. See Petition (Paper No.
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`1) at 17–18; Ex. 1008 (Davis Decl.) ¶¶ 15–16; Reply in Support of Petition (Paper
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`No. 33) (the “Reply”) at 1–5. In these circumstances, the Board would be fully
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`capable of assigning Mr. Peck’s testimony the appropriate weight in light of the
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`level of skill in the art that Petitioner has set forth.
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`Accordingly, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Mr. Peck is qualified to
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`provide the technical expert opinions in his declaration regarding the state of the
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`art.
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`10
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`II. DAVID PECK IS QUALIFIED TO PROVIDE OPINIONS BASED ON
`HIS PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS
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`Patent Owner’s argument that Mr. Peck is unqualified to provide expert
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`testimony regarding “financial, marketing, or consumer demand issues” (Motion at
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`5) ignores the foundation for this testimony in Mr. Peck’s own personal knowledge
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`and observations. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 unambiguously states: “[a]n expert
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`may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made
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`aware of or personally observed.” Id. (emphasis added).
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`In the first instance, it is not entirely clear what “financial” or “marketing”
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`testimony Patent Owner is referring to.1 The one specific substantive example that
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`Patent Owner did provide—Mr. Peck’s opinion that “Trico’s Innovision wiper
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`blade was a commercial success” (Motion at 5)—is plainly grounded in Mr. Peck’s
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`personal observations during his tenure at Trico. Mr. Peck does not purport to, for
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`instance, analyze sales or market share data in order to support his opinion that the
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`Trico Innovision enjoyed success;2 instead, his opinion is based on Trico’s inability
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`1 Patent Owner has indicated that this objection applies only to paragraphs 15, 18,
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`and 21 of Exhibit 1100 (Motion at 6), but none of these paragraphs purport to
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`characterize or otherwise provide an opinion about “financ[es]” or “marketing.”
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`2 Indeed, no expert that Petitioner could proffer would be able to do this because
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`Patent Owner provided no such information to analyze; Patent Owner’s assertions
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`11
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`to meet supply demands and its resulting increase in manufacturing capacity. See
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`Ex. 1100 ¶ 15. Having worked at Trico at this time in a senior role, Mr. Peck’s
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`opinion that “[i]n my experience, demand this high constitutes a success” (id.) is
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`well-founded and falls squarely within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence
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`703. Not one of the cases cited by Patent Owner involves an expert who testified
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`based on his or her own personal observations. See Motion at 5–6.
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`Moreover, Mr. Peck is also permitted to provide an opinion as a fact witness
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`if the opinion is “rationally based on the witness’s perception.” Fed. R. Evid. 701.
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`It is well-established that “[t]estimony in the dual roles of both a fact witness and
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`an expert witness . . . is permissible provided that the district court takes
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`precautions to minimize potential prejudice.” United States v. Farmer, 543 F.3d
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`363, 370 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, where there are no concerns of confusing the jury,
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`“[t]he gatekeeping function of the court is relaxed . . . because the court is better
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`equipped than a jury to weigh the probative value of expert evidence.” Traxys N.
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`Am., LLC v. Concept Mining, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 851, 853 (W.D. Va. 2011).
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`Whether the Board believes this testimony is within the scope of Mr. Peck’s
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`regarding purported secondary considerations of nonobviousness were largely
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`unsupported, even though Patent Owner bears the burden of proof on this point.
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`See Reply at 11–20.
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`12
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`expertise or not, it is indisputably based on his own personal observation and
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`rational perception; the Board will have no trouble determining the foundation for
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`Mr. Peck’s testimony and weighing it accordingly.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Board
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`deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude and admit the Declaration of David Peck
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`(Ex. 1100) into evidence in its entirety.
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`
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`Dated: December 23, 2016
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`
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`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`/Stefanie M. Lopatkin/
`Stefanie M. Lopatkin
`Registration No. 74,312
`Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP
`One Battery Park Plaza
`New York, New York 10004
`Stefanie.lopatkin@hugheshubbard.com
`(212) 837-6393
`Attorney for Petitioner
`Costco Wholesale Corporation
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`13
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`IPR2016-00038
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of December, 2016, the foregoing
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence Pursuant to
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.64 was served in its entirety by email on the attorneys of record for
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`Patent Owner:
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`Patrick R. Colsher (patrick.colsher@shearman.com)
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`Mark Hannemann (mark.hannemann@shearman.com)
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`Joseph Purcell (joseph.purcell@shearman.com)
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`/James R. Klaiber/
`James R. Klaiber
`Registration No. 41,902
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`74767066
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