Case: 17-2059
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`Document: 52-1
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`Page:1_
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`Filed: 09/19/2018
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`(1 of 16)
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`NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
`
`Anited States Court of Appeals
`for the federal Circuit
`
`PALO ALTO NETWORKS, INC.,
`Appellant
`
`Vv.
`
`FINJAN,INC.,
`Appellee
`
`2017-2059
`
`Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
`Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2015-
`02001, IPR2016-00157, IPR2016-00955, IPR2016-00956.
`
`Decided: September 19, 2018
`
`ORION ARMON, Cooley LLP, Broomfield, CO, argued
`for appellant.
`
`PAUL J. ANDRE, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel
`LLP, Menlo Park, CA, argued for appellee. Also repre-
`sented by JAMES R. HANNAH.
`
`

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`PALO ALTO NETWORKS, INC. v. FINJAN,INC.
`
`Before REYNA, SCHALL, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
`
`STOLL, Circuit Judge.
`
`Appellant Palo Alto Networks, Inc. petitioned for two
`inter partes reviews of Appellee Finjan, Inc.’s U.S. Patent
`No. 8,225,408, alleging that certain claims were un-
`patentable as obvious. The Patent Trial and Appeal
`Board of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“Board”)
`found that there was insufficient evidence that Palo Alto
`Networks’s proposed prior art combinations would have
`taught the “dynamically building” claim limitation. Palo
`Alto Networks,
`Inc., No. IPR2015-02001,
`2017 WL
`1052502, at*4-10 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 17,
`2017)
`(‘Board
`Decision”). Therefore,
`the Board found that Palo Alto
`Networksfailed to carry its burden of demonstrating, by a
`preponderanceof the evidence, that any of the challenged
`claims would have been obvious. Jd. Palo Alto Networks
`appeals. Weaffirm.
`
`I
`
`Finjan’s ’408 patent relates to methods and systems
`for detecting malware in data streamed from a network
`onto a computer. The patent relates to network security,
`including scanning code to determine whether there are
`potential viruses in the code. The patent describes a
`scanner system that preferably uses generic architecture,
`is language-independent, and is customized for a specific
`language by using a set of language-specific rules. The
`’408 patent explains that this adaptive rule-based scanner
`has three components (illustrated in Figure 2, below).
`Tokenizer 210 recognizes and identifies constructs (.e.,
`“tokens”) within a byte source code. For example, code
`between {} or
`[] would become a token.
`Parser 220
`controls the process of scanning incoming content, prefer-
`ably by building a parse tree data structure that repre-
`sents the incoming content. Finally, analyzer 230 checks
`for malware by searching for specific patterns of content
`that indicate malware.
`
`

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`PALO ALTO NETWORKS,INC. v. FINJAN,INC.
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`3 4
`
`08 patent, Fig. 2.
`
`Claims 1, 3-7, 9, 12-16, 18-23, 29, and 35 are at issue
`in this appeal, and independentclaim 1 is illustrative:
`
`1. A computer processor-based multi-lingual
`method for scanning incoming program code,
`comprising:
`
`receiving, by a computer, an incoming stream of
`program code;.
`
`determining, by the computer, any specific one of
`a plurality of programming languages in which
`the incoming stream is written;
`
`instantiating, by the computer, a scanner for the
`specific programming language,
`in response to
`said determining, the scanner comprising parser
`rules and analyzerrules for the specific program-
`ming lauyuayge, wherein the parser rules define
`certain patterns in terms of tokens, tokens being
`lexical constructs for the specific programming
`language, and wherein the analyzer rules identify
`
`

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`PALO ALTO NETWORKS, INC. v. FINJAN, INC.
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`certain combinations of tokens and patterns as be-
`ing indicators of potential exploits, exploits being
`portions of program code that are malicious; ,
`
`identifying, by the computer,
`within the incoming stream;
`
`individual
`
`tokens
`
`dynamically building, by the computer while said
`receiving receives the incoming stream, a parse
`tree whose nodes represent tokens and patterns in
`accordance with the parserrules;
`
`dynamically detecting, by the computer while said
`dynamically building builds the parse tree, com-
`binations of nodes in the parse tree which are in-
`dicators of potential
`exploits, based on the
`analyzer rules; and
`
` ~
`
`indicating, by the computer, the presence of po-
`tential exploits within the incoming stream, based
`on said dynamically detecting.
`
`(emphasis added to highlight the disputed
`Id. claim 1
`claim limitation). We focus on the claim limitation requir-
`ing “dynamically building” a parse tree, which is common
`to all the challenged claims. The Board construed “dy-
`namically building” to mean: “requires that a time period
`for dynamically building overlap with a time period
`during which the incoming stream is being received.”
`Board Decision, 2017 WL 1052502, at *8. This unopposed
`claim construction was proposed by Palo Alto Networks
`based on the plain claim language, which requires “dy-
`namically building, by the computer while said receiving
`receives the incoming stream.” 408 patent, claim 1.
`
`‘II
`
`Palo Alto Networksasserted that claims 1, 3-5, 9, 1Z—
`16, 18, 19, 22, 23, 29, and 35 of the ’408 patent would .
`have been obvious over U.S. Patent No. 7,636,945
`(“Chandnani”) and U.S. Patent No. 5,860,011 (“Kolawa”)
`
`©
`
`

`

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`PALO ALTO NETWORKS,INC. v. FINJAN,INC.
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`5
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Palo Alto Networks also asserted
`that
`the same claims would have been obvious over
`Chandnani, Kolawa,
`and U.S. Patent No. 7,284,274
`(“Walls”).
`
`Chandnani teaches a method of detecting malware in
`a data stream, including determining the programming
`language of the data stream and detecting viral code.
`Figure 2 from Chandnani (duplicated below) illustrates
`Chandnani’s script language virus detection apparatus,
`including detection engine 53, one of the focal points of
`Chandnani’s method:
`
`dats
`
`
` Script
`Language
`54
`
`Rule Base
`stream
`
` Language
`
`Description
`55
`
`Database
`
` Detection
`
`Engine
`
`53
`
`Code
`Detection
`57
`
`Database
`
`Detection
`Data
`Processor
`52
`
`
`
`
`
`
`detection
`
`Chandnani, Fig. 2, col.8 H.5-7. Detection engine 53
`tokenizes the incoming data stream by breaking it into
`smaller pieces known as tokens. As part of that process,
`it receives the languaye check data from the language
`description module 55, as indicated in step 31 of Figure6:
`
`

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`
`Lexically analyze data
`stream to determine appropriate
`
`script language
`
` Retrieve language check data
`
`
`
`Reineve
`language definition data
`
`
`
`Lexically analyze
`data stream to generate
`stream of tokens
`
`Id. at Fig. 6, col. 7 1l. 61-63. The language check data is
`used to lexically analyze the data stream at step 33 to
`determine the appropriate script language.
`Jd. at col. 7
`ll. 68-65. At step 35, the language definition data for the
`script language determined in step 33 is retrieved from
`language description module 55.
`Id. atcol.7 ll. 65-67.
`Using the language definition data retrieved at step 35,
`the data stream is lexically analyzed for a second time to
`generate the stream of tokens at step 37.
`Id. atcol.7
`1. 67-col. 8 1. 3 (“the data stream is againlexically ana-
`lyzed to generate a stream of tokens” (emphasis added)).
`
`

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`7
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`Chandnani provides the following summary ofthe to-
`kenizing procedure, explaining the function of its “lexical
`analyzer”:
`
`To tokenize the data stream, a script language
`used in the data stream is determined using the
`language check data. The data stream is analyzed
`using the language check data to select the lan-
`guage definition data to use for the detection pro-
`cess. Next, the selected language definition data
`and the data stream are supplied to the lexical
`analyzer. The data stream is lexically analyzed
`again, this time using the language definition da-
`ta, to generate a stream of tokens. As mentioned
`above, each generated token correspondsto a spe-
`cific language construct, and may be a correspond-
`ing unique numberor character.
`
`Id. at col. 8 ll. 7-17 (emphases added).
`
`The Board determined that the dispositive issue was
`whether Palo Alto Networks demonstrated, by a prepon-
`derance of the evidence,
`that the prior art teaches or
`suggests “dynamically building” a parse tree “while”
`receiving an incoming stream of program code. Specifical-
`ly, the parties disputed whether Chandnanidiscloses that
`the time period for generating the token stream overlaps
`with the time period for receiving the incoming stream, as
`required by the Board’s construction of “dynamically
`building.”
`
`The Board found that Chandnani does not teach the
`“dynamically building”
`limitation of
`the °408 patent
`because it does not demand or even imply that the data
`stream is being received while being tokenized.
`In sup-
`port of its conclusion, the Board cited testimony of Fin-
`jan’s expert, Dr. Nenad Medvidovic. Ultimately,
`the
`Board concluded that Palo Alto Networks had not demon-
`strated, by a preponderance of the evidence,
`that the
`combination of Chandnani and Kolawa would have taught
`
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`PALO ALTO NETWORKS, INC. v. FINJAN, INC.
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`or suggested “dynamically building” a parse tree “whilc”
`receiving an incoming stream of program code. The Board
`likewise concluded that Palo Alto Networks had not
`demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
`the combination of Chandnani, Kolawa, and Walls teach-
`es or suggests “dynamically building” a parse tree “while”
`receiving an incoming stream of program code. The Board
`found that Finjan had failed to carry its burden of show-
`ing that the instituted prior art disclosed the “dynamical-
`ly building” limitation. Accordingly, it did not consider
`evidence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness,
`including
`expert
`testimony
`from Finjan’s_
`expert,
`Dr. Harry Bims, on that issue.
`
`Palo Alto Networks appeals. We have jurisdiction
`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
`
`III
`
`Obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is a mixed ques-
`tion of law and fact.! We review the Board’s ultimate
`obviousness determination de novo and its underlying
`fact-findings for substantial evidence. Harmonic Inc. v.
`Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`“Substantial evidence is something less than the weightof
`the evidence but more than a merescintilla of evidence,”
`meaning that “[iJt is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasona-
`ble mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
`
`Congress amended § 103 when it enacted the
`1
`Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
`(“AIA”).
`Pub. L.
`No. 112-29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011). Because the
`application that led to the ’408 patent has never contained
`(1)a claim having an effective filing date on or after
`March 16, 2013, or (2) a reference under 35 U.S.C. §§ 120,
`121, or 365(c)
`to any patent or application that ever
`contained such a claim, the pre-AIA § 103 applies. Seeid.
`§ 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293.
`
`

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`PALO ALTO NETWORKS,INC.v. FINJAN, INC.
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`9
`
`Inc., 842F.3d 1376, 1379-80
`In re NuVasive,
`sion.”
`(Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Applied Materials, Inc.,
`692 F.3d 1289, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`As a preliminary matter, the parties do not dispute
`the Board’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the
`art as having a bachelor’s degree or equivalent experience
`in computer science or related academic fields, and three
`to four years of additional experience in the field of com-
`puter security, or equivalent work experience.
`
`A
`
`On appeal, Palo Alto Networks challenges the Board’s
`reading of Chandnani.
`In particular, Palo Alto Networks
`asserts that the Board erred in finding that Chandnani
`does not teach “dynamically building” a parse tree while
`recelving an incoming stream of program code.
`
`Wehold that the Board’s finding is supported by sub-
`stantial evidence becausethe reference itself, by using the
`word “again,” indicates that the data stream is lexically
`analyzed more
`than once
`and not
`simultaneously.
`Chandnaniteaches using “language check datato lexical-
`ly analyze the data stream to determine the appropriate
`script language” and that “[uJsing the language definition
`data ... the data stream is again lexically analyzed to
`generate a stream of tokens.” Chandnani, col. 7 1. 60—
`col. 8 1. 3 (emphasis added). The Board wasalso entitled
`to credit the testimony of Dr. Medvidovic, who opined that
`“simply because Chandnani’s tokenizer operates on a data
`stream does not demand or even imply that the data
`stream is being received while being tokenized.” Board
`Decision, 2017 WL 1052502, at *8 (quoting J.A. 3091-92,
`74 (citing Chandnani, col. 9 ll. 12-16, col. 7 1. 60-col. 8
`1.17, Fig. 6)).
`Dr. Medvidovic further
`testified that
`“Chaudnani would still temporarily store the entire data
`stream in memory at least between the first and second
`lexical analyses.” J.A. 3092 J 74. His testimony supports
`the Board’s conclusion that a person of ordinary skill,
`
`

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`PALO ALTO NETWORKS,INC. v. FINJAN,INC.
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`reviewing Chandnani, would not have understood it to
`teach “dynamically building”a parse tree.
`
`Weappreciate Palo Alto Networks’s argumentand its
`expert’s testimony that speed is critical to malware detec-
`tion and that “delaying analysis of a file obtained from a
`network until the entire file is received would have been
`viewed as creating unnecessary delay for the user and
`subjecting the receiving computerto risk of damage due to
`execution of stored malwarefiles.” Appellant’s Br. at 40;
`see also id. at 8-11. The issue before us, however,
`is
`whether the Board’s reading of Chandnani is supported
`by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
`accept as adequate to support” the Board’s conclusion.
`NuVasive, 842 F.3d at 1379-80. Based on plain language
`quoted above from Chandnani’s specification, we conclude
`that it is supported by such substantial evidence. Seeid.
`
`the Board’s
`Palo Alto Networks next challenges
`treatment of Walls, a prior art reference Palo Alto relied
`on in the alternative for disclosure of the “dynamically
`building” limitation. Palo Alto argues that the Board
`erred by analogizing Walls to Chandnani and by not
`meaningfully reviewing Walls as a separate reference
`that discloses the dynamically building limitation.
`In its
`Final Written Decision, the Board noted that Palo Alto
`Networks’s “challenges based on the combination of Walls
`with Chandnani and Kolawa suffer from the same defi-
`ciencies as its challenges based on Chandnani and Kola-
`wa alone, in that [it] does not sufficiently establish that
`the prior art it relies on discloses the temporal interleav-
`ing required by our construction of ‘dynamically build-
`ing.” Board Decision, 2017 WL 1052502, at *8.
`In so
`holding, the Board considered the disclosure of Walls and
`the expert testimony regarding Walls from both parties.
`It also performed ils own review of Walls and ultimately
`concluded that Palo Alto Networks had not demonstrated,
`by a preponderance of the evidence, that the combination
`of Chandnani, Kolawa, and Walls teaches or suggests
`
`

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`PALO ALTO NETWORKS,INC. v. FINJAN, INC.
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`11
`
`“dynamically building” a parse tree “while” receiving an
`incoming stream of program code. Accordingly, we con-
`clude that, contrary to Palo Alto Network’s assertion, the
`Board did not fail to meaningfully consider the teachings
`of Walls.
`
`B
`
`Finally, Palo Alto Networks asserts that the Board
`erred by not considering particular cross-examination
`testimony from Finjan’s expert witnesses when analyzing
`whether the prior art
`taught “dynamically building.”
`Before trial, Finjan had moved to exclude this particular
`cross-examination testimonyof its experts, Dr. Medvidov-
`ic and Dr. Bims. The Board denied Finjan’s motion.
`Instead,
`the Board explained that
`it would consider
`Finjan’s arguments “as going to the weight that should be
`given to the cross-examination testimony,” not its admis-
`sibility. Board Decision, 2017 WL 1052502, at *10. In its
`Final Written Decision,
`the Board stated that it had
`“considered and weighed the testimony provided by
`Dr. Medvidovic,” but that it had “not relied on the testi-
`mony of Dr. Bims in reaching [its] decision.”
`Jd. Palo
`Alto Networks argues that the Board failed to meaning-
`fully consider the testimony from both witnesses.
`
`that
`protests
`Networks’
`Alto
`Palo
`First,
`Dr. Medvidovic’s cross-examination testimony was not
`substantively discussed in the Board’s decision. Palo Alto
`Networkscites Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC,
`701 F. App’x 946 (Fed. Cir. 2017), where this court held in
`a nonprecedential opinion that it could not review the
`Board’s findings because it could not discern, from the
`Board’s opinion, the scopeof “all evidence and arguments”
`considered by the Board. Google, 701 F. App’x at 954.
`Here, however, it was clear why Dr. Medvidovic's testi-
`mony would not have been convincing. More elaboration
`was
`not
`required.
`The
`Board
`acknowledged
`Dr. Medvidovic’s cross-examination testimony and ex-
`
`

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`plained its reasoning for why Chandnani does notdisclose
`the required claim limitation, even having considered
`Palo Alto Networks’s counterarguments:
`
`[T]o the extent that Chandnanidiscloses different
`embodiments directed to the underlying identifi-
`cation of the file to be seanned—whetherstored on
`a hard or floppy disk, or received via a network—
`Chandnanistill requires multiple passes through
`the file, first to determine the appropriate script
`language and then to lexically analyze the data
`stream to generate the stream of tokens.
`
`Board Decision, 2017 WL 1052502, at *8 (Mar. 17, 2017)
`(citing Chandnani Fig. 6; J.A. 3090-92).
`Indeed, as we
`held in PGS Geophysical AS v. Jancu, even while “we may
`not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that
`the agency itself has not given, we will uphold a decision
`of less than idealclarity if the agency’s path may reason-
`ably be discerned.” 891 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
`(citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas—Best Freight
`Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974); NuVasive, 842 F.3d
`at 1383). As in PGS, we think that the Board did not fail
`to address the question at hand. Wetherefore affirm.
`
`Second, Palo Alto Networks argues that the Board
`gave no rationale for not relying on Dr. Bims’s cross-
`examination testimony. The Board, having found that
`Finjan had failed to carry its burden of showing that the
`instituted prior art disclosed the “dynamically building”
`limitation, did not reach the issue of secondary considera-
`tions of nonobviousness. Therefore, it was not necessary
`for the Board to consider Dr. Bims’s testimony, which was
`limited to the issue of secondary considerations of nonob-
`viousness. Accordingly, we find no error in the Board’s
`decision not
`to consider Dr. Bims’s testimony, and we
`conclude that
`the Board sufficiently explained its ra-
`tionale for declining to doso.
`
`

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`13
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`IV
`
`remaining argu-
`We have considered the parties’
`ments, including Palo Alto Networks’s arguments regard-
`ing “temporal interleaving,” and.find them unpersuasive.
`Weaffirm the Board’s decision.
`
`AFFIRMED
`
`COSTS
`
`Costs to Appellee.
`
`

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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
`JUDGMENT ACCOMPANIED BY OPINION
`
`OPINION FILED AND JUDGMENT ENTERED: 09/19/2018
`
`The attached opinion announcing the judgment of the court in your case wasfiled and judgment was entered on
`the date indicated above. The mandate will be issued in due course.
`
`Information is also provided about petitions for rehearing and suggestions for rehearing en banc. The questions
`and answers are those frequently asked and answered by the Clerk's Office.
`
`Costs are taxed against the appellantin favor of the appellee under Rule 39. The party entitled to costs is
`provideda bill of costs form and an instruction sheet with this notice.
`
`The parties are encouragedto stipulate to the costs. A bill of costs will be presumed correct in the absence of a
`timely filed objection.
`
`Costs are payable to the party awarded costs. If costs are awarded to the government, they should be paid to
`the Treasurer of the United States. Where costs are awarded against the government, payment should be made to
`the person(s) designated under the governing statutes, the court's orders, and the parties’ written settlement
`agreements. In cases betweenprivate parties, payment should be madeto counsel for the party awardedcostsor,if
`the party is not represented by counsel, to the party pro se. Payment of costs should not be sent to the court. Costs
`should be paid promptly.
`.
`
`If the court also imposed monetary sanctions, they are payable to the opposing party unless the court's opinion
`provides otherwise. Sanctions should be paid in the same wayas costs.
`
`Regarding exhibits and. visual aids: Your attention is directed Fed. R. App. P. 34(g) which states that the clerk
`may destroy or dispose of the exhibits if counsel does not reclaim them within a reasonable time after the clerk gives
`notice to remove them. (The clerk deems a reasonable time to be 15 days from the date the final mandate is issued.)
`
`FOR THE COURT
`
`-
`
`/s/ Peter R. Marksteiner
`
`Peter R. Marksteiner
`Clerk of Court
`
`17-2059 - Palo Alto Networke, Inc.v. Finjan, Inc.
`United States Patent and Trademark Office, Case Nos. IPR2015-02001, IPR2016-00157, IPR2016-00955, IPR2016-
`00956
`
`

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`SR UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`
`Sage:
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`eee
`717 MADISON PLACE, N.W.
`WASHINGTON, D.C. 20439
`
`PETER R. MARKSTEINER
`CLERK OF COURT
`
`CLERK’S OFFICE
`202-275-8000
`
`Information Sheet
`
`Petitions for Rehearing and Petitions for Hearing and Rehearing En Banc
`
`1. When is a petition for rehearing appropriate?
`
`The Federal Circuit grants few petitions for rehearing each year. Thesepetitions for
`rehearing are rarely successful because theytypically fail to articulate sufficient
`grounds upon whichto grant them. Ofnote, petitions for rehearing should not be used
`to reargue issues previously presented that were not accepted by the merits panel
`during initial consideration of the appeal. This is especially so when the court has
`entered a judgmentof affirmance without opinion under Fed. Cir. R. 36. Such
`dispositions are entered if the court determines the judgmentofthetrial court is based
`on findings that are not clearly erroneous, the evidence supporting the jury verdictis
`sufficient, the record supports the trial court’s ruling, the decision of the administrative
`agency warrants affirmance under the appropriate standardof review, or the judgment
`or decision is without an error of law.
`
`2. Whenis a petition for hearing/rehearing en banc appropriate?
`
`En banc consideration is rare. Each three-judge merits panel is charged with deciding
`individual appeals underexisting Federal Circuit law as established in precedential
`opinions. Because each merits panel mayenter precedential opinions, a party seeking
`en banc consideration must typically show that either the merits panel has(1)failed to
`follow existing decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court or Federal Circuit precedentor (2)
`followed Federal Circuit precedent that the petitioning party now seeks to have
`overruled by the court en banc. Federal Circuit Internal Operating Procedure #13
`identifies several reasons when the Federal Circuit may opt to hear a matter en banc.
`
`3. Is it necessaryto file either of these petitions before filing a petition for
`a writ certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court?
`
`No. A petition for a writ of certiorari may be filed once the court has issueda final
`judgmentin a case.
`
`
`
`
`
`For additional information andfiling requirements, please refer to Fed.
`Cir. R. 40 (Petitions for Rehearing) and Fed. Cir. R. 35 (Petitions for
`Hearing or Rehearing En Banc).
`
`Revised August 21, 2018
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2059
`
`Document: 52-4
`
`Page:1_
`
`Filed: 09/19/2018
`
`(16 of 16)
`
`
`
`PETER R. MARKSTEINER
`CLERK OF COURT
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`717 MADISON PLACE, N.W.
`WASHINGTON,D.C. 20439
`
`Information Sheet
`
`Filing a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
`
`CLERK’S OFFICE
`202-275-8000
`
`There is no automatic right of appeal to the Supreme Courtof the United States from
`judgments of the Federal Circuit. Instead, a party mustfile a petition for a writ of
`certiorari which the Supreme Court will grant only when there are compelling reasons. See
`Supreme Court Rule 10.
`
`Time. The petition must be filed in the Supreme Courtof the United States within 90 days
`of the entry of judgmentin this Court or within 90 days of the denialof a timely petition for
`rehearing. The judgmentis entered on the day the Federal Circuit issues a final decision in
`your case. The time does not run from the issuance of the mandate. See Supreme Court
`Rule 13.
`
`Fees. Either the $300 docketing fee or a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis with
`an affidavit in support thereof must accompanythepetition. See Supreme Court Rules 38
`and 39.
`
`Authorized Filer. The petition must be filed by a memberof the bar of the Supreme Court
`of the United States or by the petitioner as a self-represented individual.
`
`Format of a Petition. The Supreme Court Rules are very specific about the content and
`formatting of petitions. See Supreme Court Rules 14, 33, 34. Additional information is
`available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/rules guidance.aspx.
`
`Number of Copies.Forty copies of a petition mustbe filed unless the petitioneris
`proceeding in forma pauperis, in which case anoriginal and ten copies of both the petition
`for writ of certiorari and the motionfor leave to proceed in forma pauperis mustbefiled.
`See Supreme Court Rule 12.
`
`Filing. Petitions are filed in paper at Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States, 1 First
`Street, NE, Washington, DC 205438.
`
`Effective November13, 2017, electronic filing is also required for filings submitted by
`parties represented by counsel. See Supreme Court Rule 29.7. Additional information
`about electronicfiling at the Supreme Courtis available at
`https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/electronicfiling.aspx.
`
`No documentsare filed at the Federal Circuit and the Federal Circuit provides no
`information to the Supreme Court unless the Supreme Court asksfor the information.
`Revised August 21, 2018
`
`