Trials@uspto.gov
`571.272.7822
`
`Paper No. 42
`Filed: March 15, 2017
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`CORE WIRELESS LICENSING S.A.R.L.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2015-01899
`Patent 8,713,476 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before JAMESON LEE, DAVID C. MCKONE, and
`KEVIN W. CHERRY, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`CHERRY, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`Apple Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition requesting inter partes
`review of claims 1, 4, 7–9, 20, 28, and 29 of U.S. Patent No. 8,713,476 B2
`(Ex. 1001, “the ’476 patent”). Paper 2 (“Petition” or “Pet.”). Pursuant to
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we determined the Petition showed a reasonable
`likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of
`
`
`571.272.7822
`
`Paper No. 42
`Filed: March 15, 2017
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`CORE WIRELESS LICENSING S.A.R.L.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2015-01899
`Patent 8,713,476 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before JAMESON LEE, DAVID C. MCKONE, and
`KEVIN W. CHERRY, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`CHERRY, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`Apple Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition requesting inter partes
`review of claims 1, 4, 7–9, 20, 28, and 29 of U.S. Patent No. 8,713,476 B2
`(Ex. 1001, “the ’476 patent”). Paper 2 (“Petition” or “Pet.”). Pursuant to
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we determined the Petition showed a reasonable
`likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of
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`claims 1, 4, 7–9, 10, 20, 28, and 29, and we instituted an inter partes review
`of these claims on certain asserted grounds of unpatentability. Paper 7
`(“Inst. Dec.”). Patent Owner Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. (“Patent
`Owner”) filed a Patent Owner Response. Paper 18 (“PO Resp.”). Petitioner
`filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Response. Paper 27 (“Reply”). An oral
`hearing was held on December 14, 2016, pursuant to requests by both
`parties. Paper 38 (“Tr.”); see Papers 31, 34, 35.
`We issue this Final Written Decision pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons that follow, we determine Petitioner
`has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 4, 7–9, 20, 28,
`and 29 of the ’476 patent are unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
`I. BACKGROUND
`A. RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`According to Petitioner and Patent Owner, the ’476 patent is involved
`in, at least, the following lawsuits: Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v.
`Apple, Inc., No. 6:14-cv-00751 (E.D. Tex.), and Core Wireless Licensing
`S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00911 (E.D. Tex.). Pet. 5–6;
`Paper 5, 2. The ’476 patent is also the subject of IPR2015-01985.
`Paper 5, 2. A related patent, U.S. Patent No. 8,434,020, is at issue in
`IPR2015-01898 and IPR2015-01984.
`
`
`B. THE ’476 PATENT
`The ’476 patent relates to a computing device with an improved user
`interface for applications. Ex. 1001, 1:23–24. The ’476 patent describes a
`“snap-shot” view of an application that brings together, in one summary
`window, a limited list of common functions and commonly accessed stored
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`data. Id. at 2:37–41. Preferably, where the summary window for a given
`application shows data or a function of interest, the user can select that data
`or function directly, which causes the application to open and the user to be
`presented with a screen in which the data or function of interest is
`prominent. Id. at 2:42–46. The ’476 patent explains that this summary
`window functionality saves the user from navigating to the required
`application, opening it up, and then navigating within that application to
`enable the data of interest to be seen or a function of interest to be activated.
`Id. at 2:46–50. Figure 2 of the ’476 patent is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 2, reproduced above, illustrates an implementation of the summary
`window (at 3) of the ’476 patent. Ex. 1001, 3:42–43.
`
`
`C. ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
`Claim 1, a device claim, and claim 20, a method claim, are the only
`independent claims of the ’476 patent that are challenged here. Claims 4
`and 7–9 depend directly from claim 1 and claims 28 and 29 depend directly
`
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`from claim 20. Claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter in this
`proceeding, and is reproduced below (formatting added).
`1. A computing device comprising a display
`screen,
`the computing device being configured to display
`on the screen a menu listing one or more
`applications, and
`additionally being configured to display on the
`screen an application summary that can be
`reached directly from the menu,
`wherein
`the application summary displays a
`limited list of data offered within the one or
`more applications,
`each of the data in the list being selectable to
`launch the respective application and enable
`the selected data
`to be seen within
`the
`respective application, and
`wherein the application summary is displayed
`while the one or more applications are in an
`unlaunched state.
`
`Id. at 5:59–6:3.
`
`D. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON
`Petitioner relies upon the following prior art references.
`Schnarel US 7,225,409 B1
`
`May 29, 20071
`
`Aberg
`US 6,993,362 B1
`
`Jan. 31, 20062
`
`Smith
`US 6,333,973 B1
`
`Dec. 25, 20013
`
`Nason
`US 6,593,945 B1
`
`July 15, 20034
`
`
`Ex. 1004
`Ex. 1005
`Ex. 1006
`Ex. 1007
`
`
`1 Schnarel was filed August 25, 1999.
`2 Aberg was filed March 13, 2000.
`3 Smith was filed April 23, 1997.
`4 Nason was filed May 19, 2000.
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`July 3, 20015
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`US 6,256,516 B1
`Wagner
`Ex. 1010
`
`
`Petitioner also relies upon the Declaration of Dr. Brad A. Myers,
`dated September 11, 2015. Ex. 1003. Petitioner also relies on the Rebuttal
`Declaration of Dr. Brad A. Myers, dated October 17, 2016. Ex. 1038.
`
`Patent Owner relies on the Declaration of Scott A. Denning, dated
`July 15, 2016. Ex. 2011.
`
`Patent Owner also submitted observations on cross examination of
`Dr. Myers. See Paper 32. Petitioner submitted responsive observations. See
`Paper 36. We have considered both.
`E. INSTITUTED GROUNDS OF UNPATENTABILITY
`We instituted an inter partes review on the following grounds of
`unpatentability:
`Reference(s)
`Schnarel6
`Schnarel and Aberg
`Schnarel and Smith
`Schnarel, Aberg, and Smith
`Nason7
`Wagner and Nason
`
`Challenged Claim(s)
`Basis
`§ 103(a) 1, 4, 7–9, 20, 28, and 29
`§ 103(a) 1, 4, 7–9, 20, 28, and 29
`§ 103(a) 4
`§ 103(a) 4
`§ 103(a) 1, 4, 7–9, 20, 28, and 29
`§ 103(a) 9
`
`
`
`
`5 Wagner was filed September 24, 1999.
`6 Petitioner includes “the knowledge of a POSITA [(person of skill in the
`art)]” in all of the Schnarel grounds. Pet. 13. Because an obviousness
`inquiry always includes the knowledge of person of ordinary skill, it is
`unnecessary to list explicitly such knowledge in the grounds.
`7 As with Schnarel, Petitioner lists alternative grounds based on Nason that
`explicitly recite “the knowledge of a POSITA.” Pet. 37. For the reasons
`discussed in footnote 6, we do not list those alternative grounds separately.
`
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`II. ANALYSIS
`A. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`We interpret claims in an unexpired patent using the “broadest
`reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which
`[they] appear[].” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, we presume a
`claim term carries its “ordinary and customary meaning,” which “is the
`meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
`question” at the time of the invention. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d
`1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The presumption may be overcome by
`providing a definition of the term in the specification with reasonable clarity,
`deliberateness, and precision. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed.
`Cir. 1994). In the absence of such a definition, limitations are not to be read
`from the specification into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181,
`1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Only those terms which are in controversy need be
`construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See
`Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed.
`Cir. 1999).
`
`1. “application”
`The term “application” is found in independent claims 1 and 20.
`Patent Owner construes this term as requiring that “an ‘application’ exists in
`a particular software architecture having an operating system that can
`manage multiple executables (e.g., applications) and an application can be
`launched to access its associated functions and data.” PO Resp. 13–14
`(citing Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 23, 29). Patent Owner’s construction, that there must be
`multiple threads of execution, relies on Mr. Denning’s interpretation of a
`discussion in the Specification where the ’476 patent describes that the App
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`Snapshot (the summary window) can be opened for the “Contacts”
`application while there is “an active Calendar application” and that the App
`Snapshot can include contact information relating to parties in the
`“previously or currently open Calendar application.” Id. at 15–16 (quoting
`Ex. 1001, 4:64–5:3). Patent Owner contends that these operations require
`multiple threads of execution so that the device can view the App Snapshot
`while another application is “currently open.” Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 2011
`¶ 13). Patent Owner submits that a person of ordinary skill in July 2000
`would have understood that an “‘application’ referred to application-level
`architecture, with the application implemented on top of an operating system
`layer.” Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 23, 29). Patent Owner further argues
`that a person of ordinary skill “would have understood an ‘application’ to be
`packaged software for performing user functions, arranged in an application
`layer and able to access APIs of an operating system.” Id. (citing Ex. 2011
`¶¶ 10, 29).
`Patent Owner also asserts that “an ‘application’ should be
`distinguished from the windows of the application.” Id. at 16–17. Patent
`Owner submits that “it is not correct to view the opening of a new window
`in a launched application as tantamount to launching an application.”
`Id. at 17. Patent Owner identifies extrinsic evidence—the testimony of
`Mr. Denning and a reference, Richards (US 6,781,611), relied on for a
`different issue during the prosecution of the ’476 patent’s parent—that it
`asserts supports this contention. Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 30;
`Ex. 2008, Abstract); Ex. 1018, 171, 180–81 (the prosecution history
`discussion of Richard).
`
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`Petitioner argues that no construction is necessary, but also that if the
`term is construed then its broadest reasonable interpretation is “a program or
`group of programs working together to provide access to functions and
`data.” Reply 1. Petitioner submits that this is consistent with the
`Specification of the ’476 patent, id. (citing Ex. 1001, 1:43–50, 2:34–36,
`3:17–33, Fig. 1), and “relevant dictionaries and contemporaneous use,”
`id. (citing Ex. 1028; Ex. 1029, 1:40–47; Ex. 1030, 1:17–20; Ex. 1031, 4, 5).
`Petitioner submits that Patent Owner’s limitations are unsupported by the
`Specification and nothing in the Specification limits the term in this way.
`Id. at 2.
`We agree with Petitioner that “application” should be construed as “a
`program or group of programs working together to provide access to
`functions and data.” We agree with Petitioner that this construction is
`consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning of the term, as
`evidenced by the dictionaries and extrinsic evidence submitted by Petitioner.
`See Ex. 1028, 5 (“application A program or group of programs designed for
`end users”) (PHILIP E. MARGOLIS, RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COMPUTER &
`INTERNET DICTIONARY 24 (3d ed. 1999)); Ex. 1029, 1:40–47 (“A web
`application is little more than a set of web pages that support different
`functionalities.”) (Kieffer, US 7,996,626 B2, filed Jan. 30, 2001); Ex. 1030,
`1:17–20 (U.S. Provisional App. 60/180,378, filed Feb. 4, 2000 (provisional
`application for Kieffer)); Ex. 1031, 4 (“application program: Software that
`enables a computer to perform a set of related tasks for a specific purpose,
`such as . . . Web browsing.”), 5 (“program A set of coded instructions that
`direct a computer in performing a specific task”) (LON POOLE & TODD
`STAUFFER, MACWORLD MAC OS 9 BIBLE 842, 855 (1999)). We further agree
`
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`with Petitioner that this construction is consistent with the Specification’s
`use of this term. See Ex. 1001, 1:43–50, 2:34–36, 3:17–33, Fig. 1.
`As for Patent Owner’s proposed construction, we do not agree with
`Patent Owner that the disclosure in the Specification amounts to a definition
`or disclaimer necessary to limit this term. See GE Lighting Sols., LLC v.
`AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309–10 (Fed. Cir. 2014). To begin with, we
`note that a number of the limitations that Patent Owner wishes to read into
`this claim—such as, “application level architecture,” “packaged software,”
`“application layers,” or “APIs”—are not discussed or mentioned in the
`Specification. As for Patent Owner’s reliance on the description of an
`embodiment where two applications are open at once, see PO Resp. 15
`(citing Ex. 1001, 4:64–5:3), that embodiment is described only as a
`“possible feature.” We do not find this optional feature sufficient to limit
`this disputed term. See Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 744 F.3d 732, 735
`(Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting that non-limiting examples are not sufficient to
`redefine a term). Indeed, this example repeatedly uses the word “may” to
`describe the features that Patent Owner relies upon to argue that the term
`must be limited, but this is precisely the type of tentative language that
`indicates that the inventors did not intend to require that the “applications”
`of the invention have these features. See Prolitec, Inc. v. Scentair Techs.,
`Inc., 807 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that “the use of ‘may’
`signifies that the inventors did not intend to limit [the claims to a particular
`feature]”).
`As for Patent Owner’s contentions that “launching an application”
`does not include opening a new window of a launched application, we are
`not persuaded that this limitation should be read into the definition of
`
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`“application.” Patent Owner identifies no support in the Specification or
`claims for this limitation. Instead, Patent Owner relies on the testimony of
`Mr. Denning and a reference relied on for other issues during the
`prosecution, Richard (Ex. 2008, U.S. Patent No. 6,781,611). We find that
`this extrinsic evidence is too vague to support reading this limitation into the
`term application given the lack of support in the Specification and claims.
`Accordingly, we construe “application” to mean “a program or group
`of programs working together to provide access to functions and data.”
`2. “function”
`Patent Owner contends that term “function” should be construed as
`“an action to be activated in an application and performed by a user, and
`should not be interpreted as simply opening an application or a window of
`an application.” PO Resp. 19. Patent Owner identifies several examples of
`functions given in the Specification. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:53 (“create
`a new contact entry”), 2:17–18 (“open an address book function”), 2:18
`(“enter a PIN security number”), 2:18–19 (“alter the ring melody”), Figs. 2,
`3, 3:44–46 (“Create Message” and “Enter chat room”)). Patent Owner
`argues that these examples demonstrate that “the ’476 patent consistently
`describes a ‘function’ as something more than simply opening a window or
`opening an application.” Id. at 18. Patent Owner asserts that the “the ’476
`patent uses the term ‘function’ to refer to an action that a user is to perform
`within the corresponding application (e.g. create a new contact entry,
`perform an address book function, enter a PIN number, change a ring tone,
`create a message, or participate in a chat).” Id. at 19. Patent Owner further
`argues that “[t]he ’476 patent also describes functions as options that can be
`‘activated.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 2:47–50).
`
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`Petitioner responds that no construction is necessary and that, if we
`decide to construe the term, “function” should be given its ordinary meaning
`of “operation or command.” Reply 2–3. Petitioner asserts that the
`Specification confirms that “upon selection of a function the application
`summary window may ‘display[] the relevant screen offering the relevant
`functionality’ where the ‘function of interest is prominent.’” Id. at 3 (citing
`Ex. 1001, 2:46, 3:58–62). Petitioner submits that none of Patent Owner’s
`examples “defines or limits ‘function’ to exclude opening a
`window/displaying on a screen” and the ’476 patent does not “require
`second user action after initiating the function.” Id.
`We agree with Petitioner that the Patent Owner is seeking to limit the
`term “function” improperly. To begin with, Patent Owner does not identify
`and we have not found a definition or disclaimer for the term “function” in
`the Specification. Furthermore, according to the Random House Webster’s
`Computer & Internet Dictionary, which was published in 1999, a “function”
`is “operation” or “command.” Ex. 1028, 6 (PHILIP E. MARGOLIS, RANDOM
`HOUSE WEBSTER’S COMPUTER & INTERNET DICTIONARY (1999)) (“The term
`function is also used synonymously with operation and command. For
`example, you execute the delete function to erase a word.” (emphasis
`added)). This meaning is consistent with the examples from the
`Specification that Patent Owner has identified. Ex. 1001, 1:53 (“create new
`a contact entry”), 2:17–18 (“open an address book function”), 2:18 (“enter a
`PIN security number”), 2:18–19 (“alter the ring melody”), Figs. 2, 3, 3:44–
`46 (“Create Message” and “Enter chat room”).
`Patent Owner’s construction, on the other hand, would exclude the
`Specification’s disclosure that selecting a function offered in the application
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`summary can cause a window to open displaying the relevant functionality.
`See Ex. 1001, 2:46, 3:58–62 (noting the device may “display[] the relevant
`screen offering the relevant functionality” where the “function of interest is
`prominent”). Thus, we agree with Petitioner that the broadest reasonable
`interpretation of “function” is “operation or command.”
`3. “reached directly from the menu”
`Both independent claims 1 and 20 recite “an application summary that
`can be reached directly from the menu.” Ex. 1001, 5:62–63, 7:13–14. In its
`discussion of claim construction, Patent Owner does not offer an explicit
`construction. See PO Resp. 12–20. However, Patent Owner does state that
`although the District Court’s constructions in its lawsuit against LG
`Electronics, Inc., are based on the standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH
`Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), they are “consistent with the ’476
`patent.” PO Resp. 12–13. Patent Owner contends that the District Court
`construed “reached directly” as “reached without an intervening step.”
`Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 2004, 23).
`However, Patent Owner additionally contends that in order to be
`considered “reached directly from the menu” a person of ordinary skill
`would understand that the window would be “separate from, and not part of,
`the menu.” Id. at 61 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 116). Patent Owner asserts that the
`Specification of the ’476 patent explains that “a user can get to the summary
`window in just two steps—first, launch a main view which shows various
`applications; then, launch the appropriate summary window for the
`application of interest.” Id. at 61– 62 (quoting Ex. 1001, 3:5–8). Patent
`Owner argues Figure 1 of the ’476 patent illustrates the main view, which
`Patent Owner asserts corresponds to the “main menu,” and Figure 2 of the
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`’476 patent “shows a separate summary that is displayed on top of the main
`menu when a particular application listed in the main menu is selected.”
`Id. at 62 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:17–46, Figs. 1, 2).
`Petitioner simply contends that no construction is necessary. Reply 5.
`We do not agree that “reached directly from the menu” requires that
`the summary window be “separate from, and not a part of the menu.” To
`begin with, nothing in the claims requires such a demarcation. Although the
`claims indicate that the menu and the summary window are distinct entities,
`there is nothing that requires that the application summary be “separate” and
`“not a part” of the menu. Moreover, there is no express requirement in the
`Specification that the “summary window” be “separate” from the menu.
`Patent Owner relies on Figures 1 and 2 of the ’476 patent to support
`its contention, but these figures illustrate why Patent Owner’s construction is
`not supported. For example, Figure 2 shows the “summary window”
`displayed together and as a single view with the options of the menu. The
`Specification indicates that a user can scroll seamlessly from options in the
`App Snapshot to the next item on the list. See Ex. 1001, 4:17–20 (“Scrolling
`down through the App Snapshot and off the end moves the highlight to the
`next application in the list. . . .”). Indeed, the Specification states that:
`Another caveat regarding the main list is that when the App
`Snapshot opens, there will typically be one item in the main list
`above and below it to preserve context—(i.e., to reduce any
`feeling in the user of having been transported somewhere else
`in the [User Interface (“UI”)]. They have not gone anywhere
`yet; the App Snapshot is just showing where they could easily
`go to).
`Ex. 1001, 4:35–40. The ’476 patent indicates that although these may be
`different views of menu, Figures 1 and 2 are both part of the main menu
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`component of the user interface. Thus, we do not agree the term is limited in
`the manner Patent Owner suggests. With this qualification, we adopt Patent
`Owner’s proposed construction of this phrase “reached directly from the
`menu,” namely —“reached without an intervening step.”
`4. “data offered within the one or more applications”
`The phrase “data offered within the one or more applications” appears
`in claims 1 and 20. Patent Owner does not propose a construction for this
`phrase, but states that “the type of ‘data’ being claimed in claims 1 and 20
`(and their dependent claims) must be ‘data’ that is both displayed in a list in
`the ‘application summary’ and is ‘seen within the respective application.’”
`PO Resp. 19–20. Patent Owner submits that examples of this “type” of data
`are “‘preview data’ that previews the first line or subject of a message, or
`data/time that the message arrived may meet these requirements.” Id. at 20
`(citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 36). Petitioner responds that no construction is necessary.
`Reply 4. Petitioner further argues that Patent Owner’s suggestions that
`“‘data’ is limited to information that ‘is both displayed in a list in the
`‘application summary’ and is ‘seen within the respective application,’” are
`not supported by the record. Id. (quoting PO Resp. 19–20, 35). In
`particular, Petitioner notes that the only support for these requirements is
`Mr. Denning’s testimony, and he, in turn, relies on a portion of Specification
`that has nothing to do with “application summary.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001,
`5:8–15). Instead, Petitioner submits that Patent Owner’s limitations on the
`“types” of “data” are inconsistent with the examples of data in application
`summaries shown in the ’476 patent. Id. at 4–5.
`We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner is seeking to improperly
`limit “data offered within the one or more applications.” First, we decline to
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`limit the recited data to “types” of data. See PO Resp. 19. When the
`inventors wished to claim “data types,” the inventors did so expressly. See
`Ex. 1001, claims 3, 4. As for the specific examples of data that Patent
`Owner identifies, we agree with Petitioner that those examples—“‘preview
`data’ that previews the first line or subject of a message, or data/time that the
`message arrived”—are discussed in the context of things that are displayed
`in the launched application, not the summary window. See Ex. 1001, 5:8–15
`(discussing display options in the “Messages view” and stating “[r]ather than
`an App Snapshot opening here” indicating this is not the App Snapshot).
`Thus, we decline to read these examples into the claim. Other than that, we
`determine that no further construction of this phrase is necessary.
`5. “user”
`Claim 4 depends from claim 1 and adds “a user can define what data
`types are of interest to that user for the summary for an application.”
`Neither party proposes a construction for the term “user.” Nevertheless, the
`parties dispute whether a manufacturer, designer, or implementer of a device
`necessarily is a “user” of the device. Pet. 30–31; Reply 13–14; PO Resp.
`36–37. We agree with Patent Owner that a “designer” or “implementer” of a
`device is distinct from a user of that device. PO Resp. 36–37. This
`understanding is consistent with the Specification, which describes them as
`distinct entities. See Ex. 1001, 3:44–45 (“as defined by the system designer,
`or selected by the user . . . .”); 4:50–55 (“Alternatively, the user or system
`designer may define the kinds of functionality and/or stored data to be
`included in the App Snapshot for a given application. The constituency of
`the App Snapshot can therefore vary as determined by the user and/or
`system designer and/or usage patterns of the user.”), 5:33–35 (“[T]he
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`snapshot views are then views of commonly used functions and/or data,
`selected by the system designer, user or through a machine learning
`process.”). Thus, a “user” is an individual operating the device, as distinct
`from the individual(s) who designed and implemented the device.
`6. “mobile telephone”
`In our Decision on Institution, we construed the term “mobile
`telephone” based on what we found to be a lexicographic definition in the
`’476 patent. Neither party challenges that construction, so we maintain it.
`Thus, we construe the term mobile telephone to mean:
`The term ‘mobile telephone’ refers to any kind of mobile device
`with communications capabilities and includes radio (mobile)
`telephones, smart phones, communicators, PDAs and Wireless
`information devices. It includes devices able to communicate
`using not only mobile radio such as GSM or UMTS, but also
`any other kind of wireless communications system, such as
`Bluetooth.
`Inst. Dec. 6 (quoting Ex. 1001, 1:28–34).
`B. SCHNAREL-BASED OBVIOUSNESS GROUNDS
`One set of instituted grounds relies primarily on the Schnarel
`reference and alleges that claims 1, 4, 7–9, 20, 28, and 29 of the ’476 patent
`are unpatentable as obvious over Schnarel alone and Schnarel and Aberg.
`Pet. 13–37; Inst. Dec. 7–22. Petitioner also asserts that claim 4 is
`additionally obvious over the combinations of Schnarel and Smith and
`Schnarel, Aberg, and Smith. Pet. 19–20, 30–33; Inst. Dec. 19–22.
`1. Schnarel (Ex. 1004)
`Schnarel, titled “Graphical User Interface for a Screen Telephone,”
`describes a graphical user interface for a web telephone and other telephony
`devices that provides information and enables the user to access
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`functionality of the device. Ex. 1004, Abstract. In particular, Schnarel
`describes a “start” or “home” screen of a telephony device, which is shown
`in Figure 1 reproduced below. Id. at 4:17–19.
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`Figure 1, reproduced above, illustrates an example of start screen 100.
`Id. at 4:34. The start screen includes the following display elements: pane
`area 102, application selection area or application button bar 104, and call
`slip area 106. Id. at 4:34–37. Schnarel describes that the application button
`bar’s primary functions are to inform the user about all of the applications
`that are available to them and to provide a vehicle for launching those
`applications. Id. at 9:4–6. The default panes within pane area 102 are
`labeled in Figure 2 of Schnarel, reproduced below.
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`Figure 2 illustrates an example of the default panes of the home screen.
`The default panes of the home screen include branding pane 202, date
`and time pane 204, message pane or message summary pane 206, and task
`pane 208. Id. at 5:20–22. Schnarel also describes a message pane that
`allows users to “quickly discover whether or not they have new messages
`and quickly access these new messages.” Id. at 6:26–34. The message pane
`works with a “parent application program” that “notifies the message pane
`program when state changes occur, such as the arrival of a fax, e-mail or
`answering machine message.” Id. at 2:64–3:7. “The message pane displays
`an indicator of the type of message that has arrived in the pane.” Id.
`In the message pane, when the user selects “[u]ser-specific messages
`button (308) [shown in Figure 3], the button’s procedure launches a message
`viewer application.” Id. at 6:62–7:3, Fig. 3. The viewer application that is
`chosen depends on the type of new messages available. Id. at 7:1–12.
`Similarly, the controls in the “general messages area enable the user to
`launch a task associated with the control”: e.g., upon “selecting an active fax
`button, the messages application is launched and a fax viewer is displayed,”
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`and “pressing an active call logger button causes the messages application to
`launch, and a call log viewer to be displayed.” Id. at 8:46–67.
`2. Aberg (Ex. 1005)
`Aberg, titled “Portable Communication Apparatus Having a
`Hierarchical Menu System and a Dynamic Menu,” describes a menu system
`for a portable communication apparatus, such as a mobile telephone.
`Ex. 1005, 2:55–57. In particular, Aberg discloses a dynamic menu, which
`may be customized by the user and is easily accessible from the normal
`menu system. Id. at 2:57–60. The menu system is hierarchical and includes
`a plurality of top-level and sub-level menus. Id. at 4:22–31. The dynamic
`menu may be located anywhere further down the menu hierarchy, i.e., a sub-
`menu of any top-level or sub-level menu in the menu system. Id. at 7:25–29.
`The top-level menus include, for example, a mail menu (for reading and
`sending short messages), a clock menu (for setting date and time), a
`calculator menu (for using the mobile telephone to perform calculations), an
`access menu (for barring certain call types, locking the telephone, etc.), and
`a networks menu (for selecting mobile telecommunications network to be
`used). Id. at 4:36–48.
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`Figure 3, reproduced below, illustrates the menu structure of Aberg.
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`Figure 3, reproduced above, is a schematic diagram of a menu system
`according to Aberg’s invention, and includes a dynamic menu that can be
`modified by a user of the communications apparatus. Id. at 3:23–25. Three
`“top-level” menus are shown in Figure 3: SETTINGS menu 100,
`PHONEBOOK menu 200, and SPECIAL menu 300. Id. at 4:32–34.
`SPECIAL menu 300 is a dynamic menu, the contents of which may be
`modified by the user. Id. at 4:34–36. The menu system includes other top-
`level menus not shown in Figure 3. Id. at 4:36–48.
`3. Smith (Ex. 1006)
`Smith, titled “Integrated Message Center,” describes an integrated
`message center for telecommunications equipment such as a mobile
`telephone. Ex. 1006, 3:50–54, Fig. 7A. In particular, the “integrated
`message center” of Smith graphically displays different types of received
`messages together to facilitate user viewing and manipulation of the
`messages without having to follow a series of menus or launch separate
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`applications. Id. at 2:26–31. The integrated message center represents a
`unified mailbox through which the user is presented with SMS notification
`messages for all types of received messages, including voice, text, ink, fax,
`and email. Id. at 8:26–30. The messages are displayed as a scrollable list of
`notification headers for all of the received messages. Id. at 8:30–40. Each
`entry in the list of notification headers identifies the received message and
`includes the sender’s name, an icon identifying the type of message, and the
`user may specify if the list should include a date/time stamp for when the
`message was received. Id. at 8:40–51.
`
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