throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571.272.7822
`
`Paper No. 42
`Filed: March 15, 2017
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`CORE WIRELESS LICENSING S.A.R.L.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2015-01898
`Patent 8,434,020 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before JAMESON LEE, DAVID C. MCKONE, and
`KEVIN W. CHERRY, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`CHERRY, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`Apple Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition requesting inter partes
`review of claims 1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, and 16 of U.S. Patent No. 8,434,020
`B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’020 patent”). Paper 2 (“Petition” or “Pet.”). Pursuant to
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we determined the Petition showed a reasonable
`likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of
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`IPR2015-01898
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`claims 1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, and 16, and we instituted an inter partes review
`of these claims on certain asserted grounds of unpatentability. Paper 7
`(“Inst. Dec.”). Patent Owner Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. (“Patent
`Owner”) filed a Patent Owner Response. Paper 18 (“PO Resp.”). Petitioner
`filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Response. Paper 27 (“Reply”). An oral
`hearing was held on December 14, 2016, pursuant to requests by both
`parties. Paper 38 (“Tr.”); see Papers 31, 34, 35.
`We issue this Final Written Decision pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons that follow, we determine Petitioner
`has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 11,
`13, and 16 of the ’020 patent are unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
`I. BACKGROUND
`A. RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`According to Petitioner and Patent Owner, the ’020 patent is involved
`in, at least, the following lawsuits: Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v.
`Apple, Inc., No. 6:14-cv-00751 (E.D. Tex.), and Core Wireless Licensing
`S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00911 (E.D. Tex.). Pet. 5;
`Paper 5, 2. The ’020 patent is also the subject of IPR2015-01984. Paper 13,
`2. A related patent, U.S. Patent No. 8,713,476, is at issue in IPR2015-01899
`and IPR2015-01985.
`
`
`B. THE ’020 PATENT
`The ’020 patent relates to a computing device with an improved user
`interface for applications. Ex. 1001, 1:14–15. The ’020 patent describes a
`“snap-shot” view of an application that brings together, in one summary
`window, a limited list of common functions and commonly accessed stored
`
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`data. Id. at 2:26–30. Preferably, where the summary window for a given
`application shows data or a function of interest, the user can select that data
`or function directly, which causes the application to open and the user to be
`presented with a screen in which the data or function of interest is
`prominent. Id. at 2:31–35. The ’020 patent explains that this summary
`window functionality saves the user from navigating to the required
`application, opening it up, and then navigating within that application to
`enable the data of interest to be seen or a function of interest to be activated.
`Id. at 2:35–39. Figure 2 of the ’020 patent is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 2, reproduced above, illustrates an implementation of the summary
`window (at 3) of the ’020 patent. Ex. 1001, 3:31–32.
`
`
`C. ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
`Claim 1, a device claim, and claim 16, a computer program product
`claim, are the only independent claims of the ’020 patent. The remaining
`challenged claims, claims 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, and 13, all depend, directly or
`
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`indirectly, from claim 1. Claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter in this
`proceeding, and is reproduced below (formatting added).
`1. A computing device comprising a display
`screen,
`the computing device being configured to display
`on the screen a main menu listing at least a
`first application, and
`additionally being configured to display on the
`screen an application summary window that
`can be reached directly from the main menu,
`wherein the application summary window displays
`a limited list of at least one function offered
`within the first application,
`each function in the list being selectable to launch
`the first application and initiate the selected
`function, and
`is
`wherein
`the application summary window
`displayed while
`the application
`is
`in an
`unlaunched state.
`
`Id. at 5:33–43.
`
`
`
`D. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON
`Petitioner relies upon the following prior art references.
`Schnarel US 7,225,409 B1
`
`May 29, 20071
`
`Aberg
`US 6,993,362 B1
`
`Jan. 31, 20062
`
`Nason
`US 6,593,945 B1
`
`July 15, 20033
`
`Wagner
`US 6,256,516 B1
`
`July 3, 20014
`
`
`Ex. 1004
`Ex. 1005
`Ex. 1007
`Ex. 1010
`
`
`1 Schnarel was filed August 25, 1999.
`2 Aberg was filed March 13, 2000.
`3 Nason was filed May 19, 2000.
`
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`Dec. 23, 20035
`
`Yurkovic US 6,668,353 B1
`Ex. 1018
`
`
`Petitioner also relies upon the Declaration of Dr. Brad A. Myers,
`dated September 11, 2015. Ex. 1003. Petitioner also relies on the Rebuttal
`Declaration of Dr. Brad A. Myers, dated October 17, 2016. Ex. 1038.
`
`Patent Owner relies on the Declaration of Scott A. Denning, dated
`July 15, 2016. Ex. 2011.
`Patent Owner also submitted observations on cross examination of
`Dr. Myers. See Paper 32. Petitioner submitted responsive observations. See
`Paper 36. We have considered both.
`E. INSTITUTED GROUNDS OF UNPATENTABILITY
`We instituted an inter partes review on the following grounds of
`unpatentability:
`Challenged Claim(s)
`Basis
`Reference(s)
`§ 103(a) 1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, and 16
`Schnarel6
`§ 103(a) 1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, and 16
`Schnarel and Aberg
`§ 103(a) 6
`Schnarel and Yurkovic
`Schnarel, Aberg, and Yurkovic § 103(a) 6
`Nason7
`§ 103(a) 1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, and 16
`Nason and Yurkovic
`§ 103(a) 6
`Wagner and Nason
`§ 103(a) 11
`
`
`4 Wagner was filed September 24, 1999.
`5 Yurkovic was filed March 25, 1999.
`6 Petitioner includes “the knowledge of a POSITA [(person of skill in the
`art)]” in all of the Schnarel grounds. Pet. 13. Because an obviousness
`inquiry always includes the knowledge of person of ordinary skill, it is
`unnecessary to list explicitly such knowledge in the grounds.
`7 As with Schnarel, Petitioner lists alternative grounds based on Nason that
`explicitly recite “the knowledge of a POSITA.” Pet. 37. For the reasons
`discussed in footnote 6, we do not list those alternative grounds separately.
`
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`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`We interpret claims in an unexpired patent using the “broadest
`reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which
`[they] appear[].” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, we presume a
`claim term carries its “ordinary and customary meaning,” which “is the
`meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
`question” at the time of the invention. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d
`1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The presumption may be overcome by
`providing a definition of the term in the specification with reasonable clarity,
`deliberateness, and precision. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed.
`Cir. 1994). In the absence of such a definition, limitations are not to be read
`from the specification into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181,
`1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Only those terms which are in controversy need be
`construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See
`Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803
`(Fed. Cir. 1999).
`
`1. “application”
`The term “application” is found in independent claims 1 and 16.
`Patent Owner construes this term as requiring that “an ‘application’ exists in
`a particular software architecture having an operating system that can
`manage multiple executables (e.g., applications) and an application can be
`launched to access its associated functions and data.” PO Resp. 14 (citing
`Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 15–20, 29). Patent Owner’s construction, that there must be
`multiple threads of execution, relies on Mr. Denning’s interpretation of a
`discussion in the Specification where the ’020 patent describes that the App
`
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`Snapshot for the “Contacts” application can be opened while there is “an
`active Calendar application” and that the App Snapshot can include contact
`information relating to parties in the “previously or currently open Calendar
`application.” Id. at 15–16 (quoting Ex. 1001, 4:55–59). Patent Owner
`contends that these operations require multiple threads of execution so that
`the device can view the App Snapshot while another application is
`“currently open.” Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 23). Patent Owner submits
`that a person of ordinary skill in July 2000 would have understood that an
`“‘application’ referred to application-level architecture, with the application
`implemented on top of an operating system layer.” Id. (citing Ex. 2011
`¶¶ 15, 29). Patent Owner further argues that a person of ordinary skill
`“would have understood an ‘application’ to be packaged software for
`performing user functions, arranged in an application layer and able to
`access APIs of an operating system.” Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 2011
`¶¶ 10, 29).
`Patent Owner also asserts that “an ‘application’ should be
`distinguished from the windows of the application.” Id. at 17. Patent Owner
`submits that “it is not correct to view the opening of a new window in a
`launched application as tantamount to launching an application.” Id. at 17–
`18. Patent Owner identifies extrinsic evidence—the testimony of
`Mr. Denning and a reference, Richard (US 6,781,611), relied on for a
`different issue during the prosecution of ’020 patent—that it asserts supports
`this contention. Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 30; Ex. 2008, Abstract);
`Ex. 1018, 171, 180–81 (the prosecution history discussion of Richard).
`Petitioner argues that no construction is necessary, but also that if the
`term is construed, then its broadest reasonable interpretation is “a program
`
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`or group of programs working together to provide access to functions and
`data.” Reply 1. Petitioner submits that this is consistent with the
`Specification of the ’020 patent, id. (citing Ex. 1001, 1:33–40, 2:24–25, 3:5–
`22, Fig. 1), and “relevant dictionaries and contemporaneous use,” id. (citing
`Ex. 1028; Ex. 1029, 1:40–47; Ex. 1030, 1:17–20; Ex. 1031, 4, 5). Petitioner
`submits that Patent Owner’s limitations are unsupported by the Specification
`and nothing in the Specification limits the term in this way. Id. at 2.
`We agree with Petitioner that “application” should be construed as “a
`program or group of programs working together to provide access to
`functions and data.” We agree with Petitioner that this construction is
`consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning of the term, as
`evidenced by the dictionaries and extrinsic evidence submitted by Petitioner.
`See Ex. 1028, 5 (“application A program or group of programs designed for
`end users”) (PHILIP E. MARGOLIS, RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COMPUTER &
`INTERNET DICTIONARY 24 (3d ed. 1999)); Ex. 1029, 1:40–47 (“A web
`application is little more than a set of web pages that support different
`functionalities.”) (Kieffer, US 7,996,626 B2, filed Jan. 30, 2001); Ex. 1030,
`1:17–20 (U.S. Provisional App. 60/180,378, filed Feb. 4, 2000 (provisional
`application for Kieffer); Ex. 1031, 4 (“application program: Software that
`enables a computer to perform a set of related tasks for a specific purpose,
`such as . . . Web browsing.”), 5 (“program A set of coded instructions that
`direct a computer in performing a specific task”) (LON POOLE & TODD
`STAUFFER, MACWORLD MAC OS 9 BIBLE 842, 855 (1999)). We further agree
`with Petitioner that this construction is consistent with the Specification’s
`use of this term. See Ex. 1001, 1:33–40, 2:24–25, 3:5–22, Fig. 1.
`
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`
`As for Patent Owner’s proposed construction, we do not agree with
`Patent Owner that the disclosure in the Specification amounts to a definition
`or disclaimer necessary to limit this term. See GE Lighting Sols., LLC v.
`AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309–10 (Fed. Cir. 2014). To begin with, we
`note that a number of the limitations that Patent Owner wishes to read into
`this claim—such as, “application level architecture,” “packaged software,”
`“application layers,” or “APIs”—are not discussed or mentioned in the
`Specification. As for Patent Owner’s reliance on the description of an
`embodiment where two applications are open at once, see PO Resp. 15–16
`(citing Ex. 1001, 4:55–59), that embodiment is described only as a “possible
`feature.” We do not find this optional feature sufficient to limit this term.
`See Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 744 F.3d 732, 735 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
`(noting that non-limiting examples are not sufficient to redefine a term).
`Indeed, this example repeatedly uses the word “may” to describe the features
`that Patent Owner relies upon to argue that the term must be limited, but this
`is precisely the type of tentative language that indicates that the inventors
`did not intend to require that the “applications” of the invention have these
`features. See Prolitec, Inc. v. Scentair Techs., Inc., 807 F.3d 1353, 1358
`(Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that “the use of ‘may’ signifies that the inventors
`did not intend to limit [the claims to a particular feature]”).
`As for Patent Owner’s contentions that “launching an application”
`does not include opening a new window of a launched application, we are
`not persuaded that this limitation should be read into the definition of
`“application.” Patent Owner identifies no support in the Specification or
`claims for this limitation. Instead, Patent Owner relies on the testimony of
`Mr. Denning and a reference relied on for other issues during the
`
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`prosecution, Richard (Ex. 2008, U.S. Patent No. 6,781,611). We find that
`this extrinsic evidence is too vague to support reading this limitation into the
`term application given the lack of support in the Specification and claims.
`Accordingly, we construe “application” to mean “a program or group
`of programs working together to provide access to functions and data.”
`2. “function”
`Patent Owner contends that term “function” should be construed as
`“an action to be activated in an application and performed by a user, and
`should not be interpreted as simply opening an application or a window of
`an application.” PO Resp. 20. Patent Owner identifies several examples of
`functions given in the Specification. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:43 (“create
`a new contact entry”), 2:7 (“open an address book function”), 2:8 (“enter a
`PIN security number”), 2:8–9 (“alter the ring melody”), Figs. 2, 3, 3:33–35
`(“Create Message” and “Enter chat room”)). Patent Owner argues that these
`examples demonstrate that “the ’020 patent consistently describes a
`‘function’ as something more than simply opening a window or opening an
`application.” Id. at 19. Patent Owner asserts that the “the ’020 patent uses
`the term ‘function’ to refer to an action that a user is to perform within the
`corresponding application (e.g. create a new contact entry, perform an
`address book function, enter a PIN number, change a ring tone, create a
`message, or participate in a chat).” Id. Patent Owner further argues that
`“[t]he ’020 patent also describes functions as options that can be
`‘activated.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 1:28, 2:37–39, 5:46, 6:40). Patent Owner
`contends that “[t]he operation of activating a function is distinguished in
`claims 2 and 18 from the operation of opening an application.” Id. (citing
`Ex. 1001, 5:44–46 (“selecting a function listed in the summary window
`
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`causes the first application to open and that selected function to be
`activated.”)).
`Petitioner responds that no construction is necessary and that, if we
`decide to construe the term, “function” should be given its ordinary meaning
`of “operation or command.” Reply 2–3. Petitioner asserts that the
`Specification confirms that “upon selection of a function . . . the device may
`‘display[] the relevant screen offering the relevant functionality’ where the
`‘function of interest is prominent.’” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:35, 3:47–
`51). Petitioner submits that none of Patent Owner’s examples “defines or
`limits ‘function’ to exclude opening a window/displaying on a screen” and
`the ’020 patent does not “require a second user action after initiating the
`function.” Id.
`We agree with Petitioner that the Patent Owner is seeking to limit the
`term “function” improperly. To begin with, Patent Owner does not identify
`and we have not found a definition or disclaimer for the term “function” in
`the Specification. Furthermore, according to the Random House Webster’s
`Computer & Internet Dictionary, which was published in 1999, a “function”
`is “operation” or “command.” Ex. 1028, 6 (PHILIP E. MARGOLIS, RANDOM
`HOUSE WEBSTER’S COMPUTER & INTERNET DICTIONARY (1999)) (“The term
`function is also used synonymously with operation and command. For
`example, you execute the delete function to erase a word.” (emphasis
`added)). This meaning is consistent with the examples from the
`Specification that Patent Owner has identified. Ex. 1001, 1:43 (“create a
`new contact entry”), 2:7–8 (“open an address book function”), 2:8 (“enter a
`PIN security number”), 2:8–9 (“alter the ring melody”), Figs. 2, 3, 3:33–35
`(“Create Message” and “Enter chat room”).
`
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`
`
`Patent Owner’s construction, on the other hand, would exclude the
`Specification’s disclosure that selecting a function offered in the application
`summary can cause a window to open displaying the relevant functionality.
`See Ex. 1001, 2:35, 3:47–51 (noting the device may “display[] the relevant
`screen offering the relevant functionality” where the “function of interest is
`prominent”). Thus, we agree with Petitioner that the broadest reasonable
`interpretation of “function” is “operation or command.”
`3. “reached directly from the main menu”
`Both independent claim 1 and 16 recite “an application summary
`window that can be reached directly from the main menu.” Ex. 1001, 5:37–
`38, 6:26–27. In its discussion of claim construction, Patent Owner does not
`offer an explicit construction. See PO Resp. 12–20. However, Patent
`Owner does state that although the District Court’s constructions in its
`lawsuit against LG Electronics, Inc., are based on the standard set forth in
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), they are “consistent
`with the ’020 patent.” PO Resp. 13. Patent Owner contends that the District
`Court construed “reached directly” as “reached without an intervening step.”
`Id. (citing Ex. 2004, 23).8
`However, Patent Owner additionally contends that in order to be
`considered “reached directly from the main menu” a person of ordinary skill
`would understand that the window would be “separate from, and not part of,
`the main menu.” Id. at 60 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 88). Patent Owner asserts that
`the Specification of the ’020 patent explains that “a user can get to the
`
`8 Patent Owner filed a copy of the Patent Owner Response as Exhibit 2004
`in this case, but filed a correct copy of Exhibit 2004 in IPR2015-01899.
`Patent Owner is directed to file a correct copy Exhibit 2004 in this case as
`well.
`
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`summary window in just two steps—first, launch a main view which shows
`various applications; then, launch the appropriate summary window for the
`application of interest.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1001, 2:61–64, Figs. 1, 2). Patent
`Owner argues that Figure 1 of the ’020 patent illustrates the main view,
`which Patent Owner asserts corresponds to the “main menu,” and that Figure
`2 of the ’020 patent “shows a separate summary window that is displayed on
`top of the main menu when a particular application listed in the main menu
`is selected.” Id. at 61 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:5–35, Figs. 1, 2).
`Petitioner simply contends that no construction is necessary. Reply 5.
`We do not agree that “reached directly from the main menu” requires
`that the summary window be “separate from, and not part of, the main
`menu.” To begin with, nothing in the claims requires such a demarcation.
`Although the claims indicate that the menu and the summary window are
`distinct entities, there is nothing that requires that the summary window be
`“separate” and “not a part” of the main menu. Moreover, there is no express
`requirement in the Specification that the “summary window” be “separate”
`from the menu.
`Patent Owner relies on Figures 1 and 2 of the ’020 patent to support
`its contention, but these figures illustrate why Patent Owner’s construction is
`not supported. For example, Figure 2 shows the “summary window”
`displayed together and as a single view with the options of the main menu.
`The Specification indicates that a user can scroll seamlessly from options in
`the App Snapshot to the next item on the list. See Ex. 1001, 4:6–9
`(“Scrolling down through the App Snapshot and off the end moves the
`highlight to the next application in the list. . . .”). Indeed, the Specification
`states that:
`
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`
`Another caveat regarding the main list is that when the App
`Snapshot opens, there will typically be one item in the main list
`above and below it to preserve context—(i.e., to reduce any
`feeling in the user of having been transported somewhere else
`in the [User Interface (“UI”)]. They have not gone anywhere
`yet; the App Snapshot is just showing where they could easily
`go to.
`Ex. 1001, 4:24–29. The ’020 patent indicates that although these may be
`different views of main menu, Figures 1 and 2 are both part of the main
`menu component of the user interface. Thus, we do not agree the term is
`limited in the manner Patent Owner suggests. With this qualification, we
`adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction of this phrase “reached directly
`from the main menu,” namely, “reached without an intervening step.”
`4. “environment of the device”
`The phrase “environment of the device” appears in claim 6. Claim 6
`depends from claim 1 and additionally recites that “the functionality and/or
`stored data types for a summary window for a given application varies with
`the environment of the device.” Petitioner submits that the phrase includes
`at least device hardware, software, or location. Reply 5. Patent Owner
`argues that this phrase excludes the presence and type of accessory attached
`to the device or SIM card inserted in the mobile phone. PO Resp. 43–44.
`We agree with Petitioner that the “environment of the device”
`includes the device hardware, software, and location, and does not exclude,
`as Patent Owner contends, the presence and type of accessory attached to the
`device or SIM card inserted in the mobile phone. This construction is
`supported by the plain and ordinary meaning of “environment” in the
`computer arts, as evidenced by the McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and
`Technical Terms. See Ex. 1033, 6 (MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF
`
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`SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL TERMS 686 (5th ed. 1994) (“environment
`[COMPUT SCI] The computer system . . . including the hardware and
`system software . . . .”).
`This construction is also consistent with the Specification of the ’020
`patent. For example, the ’020 patent states that the App Snapshot contents
`may change depending on the hardware present and system software (e.g., if
`the device is “Bluetooth-enabled” with Bluetooth hardware and software) or
`location. See Ex. 1001, 4:47–52 (content varies based on other open
`software), 5:25–32 (explaining that the invention “may also be used in
`environments outside of mobile telephony . . . [e.g.,] desktop and laptop PCs
`may also benefit from the present invention”); Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 31, 74–86, 122–
`125.
`
`Thus, we agree with Petitioner that the broadest reasonable
`interpretation of the phrase the “environment of the device” includes device
`hardware, software, and location, and does not exclude the presence and
`type of accessory attached to the device or SIM card inserted in the mobile
`phone.
`
`5. “data stored in that application”
`The phrase “data stored in that application” appears in claim 10.
`Claim 10 depends from claim 1 and recites additionally that “the summary
`window further display[s] a list of data stored in that application.” Ex. 1001,
`6:4–5. Patent Owner argues that “[t]he type of ‘data’ being claimed in
`claim 10 and displayed in the application summary window must be data
`that is ‘stored in’ an associated application.” PO Resp. 20. Patent Owner
`further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would understand
`that data ‘stored in’ an application refers to ‘data’ that is caused to be stored
`
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`by an application in a memory location that is allocated specifically to the
`application.” Id. (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 35). Petitioner responds that no
`construction is necessary, but if we determine a construction is necessary,
`the phrase means—“data associated with that application.” Reply 4.
`We agree with Petitioner that the broadest reasonable interpretation of
`“data stored in that application” is data associated with the application. This
`construction is consistent with the Specification, which refers to the data that
`is displayed in the application summary window as “data associated with
`that application.” Ex. 1001, 3:27–30. Moreover, we see no persuasive
`support for Patent Owner’s efforts to limit the claims to data stored “by” the
`application and to further limit the data to data stored in particular memory
`locations. There is no discussion in the Specification or claims of a
`particular memory location, and we decline to impose such a requirement
`absent some definition or disclaimer limiting the “stor[ing]” of the data to a
`particular location. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669
`F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting claims should be limited only
`when “(1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own
`lexicographer; or (2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim
`term either in the specification or during prosecution”). Thus, we agree with
`Petitioner that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “data stored in that
`application” is “data associated with the application.”
`B. SCHNAREL-BASED OBVIOUSNESS GROUNDS
`One set of instituted grounds relies primarily on the Schnarel
`reference and alleges that claims 1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, and 16 of the ’020
`patent are unpatentable as obvious over Schnarel alone and Schnarel and
`Aberg. Pet. 13–38; Inst. Dec. 7–23. Petitioner also asserts that claim 6 is
`
`
`
`16
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`

`IPR2015-01898
`Patent 8,434,020 B2
`
`additionally obvious over the combinations of Schnarel and Yurkovic and
`Schnarel, Aberg, and Yurkovic. Pet. 18–22, 30–34; Inst. Dec. 19–23.
`1. Schnarel (Ex. 1004)
`Schnarel, titled “Graphical User Interface for a Screen Telephone,”
`describes a graphical user interface for a web telephone and other telephony
`devices that provides information and enables the user to access
`functionality of the device. Ex. 1004, Abstract. In particular, Schnarel
`describes a “start” or “home” screen of a telephony device, which is shown
`in Figure 1 reproduced below. Id. at 4:17–19.
`
`
`Figure 1, reproduced above, illustrates an example of start screen 100.
`Id. at 4:34. The start screen includes the following display elements: pane
`area 102, application selection area or application button bar 104, and call
`slip area 106. Id. at 4:34–37. Schnarel describes that the application button
`bar’s primary functions are to inform the user about all of the applications
`that are available to them and to provide a vehicle for launching those
`applications. Id. at 9:4–6. The default panes within pane area 102 are
`labeled in Figure 2 of Schnarel, reproduced below.
`
`
`
`17
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`IPR2015-01898
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`
`
`Figure 2 illustrates an example of the default panes of the home screen.
`The default panes of the home screen include branding pane 202, date
`and time pane 204, message pane or message summary pane 206, and task
`pane 208. Id. at 5:20–22. Schnarel also describes a message pane that
`allows users to “quickly discover whether or not they have new messages
`and quickly access these new messages.” Id. at 6:26–34. The message pane
`works with a “parent application program” that “notifies the message pane
`program when state changes occur, such as the arrival of a fax, e-mail or
`answering machine message.” Id. at 2:64–3:7. “The message pane displays
`an indicator of the type of message that has arrived in the pane.” Id.
`In the message pane, when the user selects “user-specific messages
`button (308) [shown in Figure 3], the button’s procedure launches a message
`viewer application.” Id. at 6:62–7:3, Fig. 3. The viewer application that is
`chosen depends on the type of new messages available. Id. at 7:1–12.
`Similarly, the controls in the “general messages area enable the user to
`launch a task associated with the control”: e.g., upon “selecting an active fax
`button, the messages application is launched and a fax viewer is displayed,”
`
`
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`18
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`IPR2015-01898
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`
`and “pressing an active call logger button causes the messages application to
`launch, and a call log viewer to be displayed.” Id. at 8:46–67.
`2. Aberg (Ex. 1005)
`Aberg, titled “Portable Communication Apparatus Having a
`Hierarchical Menu System and a Dynamic Menu,” describes a menu system
`for a portable communication apparatus, such as a mobile telephone.
`Ex. 1005, 2:55–57. In particular, Aberg discloses a dynamic menu, which
`may be customized by the user and is easily accessible from the normal
`menu system. Id. at 2:57–60. The menu system is hierarchical and includes
`a plurality of top-level and sub-level menus. Id. at 4:22–31. The dynamic
`menu may be located anywhere further down the menu hierarchy, i.e., a sub-
`menu of any top-level or sub-level menu in the menu system. Id. at 7:25–29.
`The top-level menus include, for example, a mail menu (for reading and
`sending short messages), a clock menu (for setting date and time), a
`calculator menu (for using the mobile telephone to perform calculations), an
`access menu (for barring certain call types, locking the telephone, etc.), and
`a networks menu (for selecting mobile telecommunications network to be
`used). Id. at 4:36–48.
`
`
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`19
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`IPR2015-01898
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`
`Figure 3, reproduced below, illustrates the menu structure of Aberg.
`
`
`Figure 3, reproduced above, is a schematic diagram of a menu system
`according to Aberg’s invention, and includes a dynamic menu that can be
`modified by a user of the communications apparatus. Id. at 3:23–25. Three
`“top-level” menus are shown in Figure 3: SETTINGS menu 100,
`PHONEBOOK menu 200, and SPECIAL menu 300. Id. at 4:32–34.
`SPECIAL menu 300 is a dynamic menu, the contents of which may be
`modified by the user. Id. at 4:34–36. The menu system includes other top-
`level menus not shown in Figure 3. Id. at 4:36–48.
`3. Yurkovic (Ex. 1018)
`Yurkovic, titled “Space/Time Portals for Computer Systems,”
`describes retrieving customized information and displaying tickers and other
`information (e.g., date, time, news, weather information) in a window on a
`computer. Ex. 1018, 3:46–53, 5:29–47, 8:45–59, Fig. 1. The information
`displayed in Yurkovic’s summary window changes based on the user’s
`
`
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`geographic location, providing the user with information relevant to the
`user’s location. Id. at 5:10–47.
`
`4. Analysis
`a. Claims 1, 8, 11, 13, and 16
`i. Claims 1 and

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