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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`RPX CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`APPLICATIONS IN INTERNET TIME, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
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`Case IPR2015-01750 (Patent 8,484,111 B2)
`Case IPR2015-01751 (Patent 7,356,482 B2)
`Case IPR2015-01752 (Patent 7,356,482 B2)
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`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: April 25, 2019
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`Before LYNNE E. PETTIGREW, MITCHELL G. WEATHERLY, and
`JENNIFER MEYER CHAGNON, Administrative Patent Judges.
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`RPX Exhibit 1101
`RPX v. AIT
`IPR2015-01750
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`IPR2015-01751 (Patent 7,356,482 B2)
`IPR2015-01752 (Patent 7,356,482 B2)
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`APPEARANCES:
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`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
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`RICHARD F. GIUNTA, ESQ.
`ELISABETH H. HUNT, Ph.D., ESQ.
`RANDY PRITZKER, ESQ.
`Wolf, Greenfield & Sacks, P.C.
`600 Atlantic Avenue
`Boston, Massachusetts 02210
`(617) 646-8322 (Giunta)
`rich.giunta@wolfgreenfield.com
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`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
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`STEVEN C. SEREBOFF, ESQ.
`SoCal IP Law Group, LLP
`310 N. Westlake Boulevard
`Suite 120
`Westlake Village, California 91362
`(805) 230-1356
`ssereboff@socalip.com
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`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Thursday, April
`25, 2019, commencing at 1:00 p.m. at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
`600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
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`1:00 p.m.
`Please be seated. Good afternoon,
`JUDGE CHAGNON:
`everybody. I am Judge Chagnon, and I'm joined in the room today by
`Judge Weatherly, and I'll wait until Judge Pettigrew gets on the screen.
`There she is. She's joining us remotely today.
`This is a hearing for three IPR proceedings; IPR2015-01750, -01751,
`and -01752 on remand from the Federal Circuit. The parties involved are
`Petitioner, RPX Corporation, and Patent Owner, Applications in Internet
`Time, LLC.
`So, counsel, in a moment I'll have you step to the podium to
`introduce yourselves, and let us know who'll be presenting today. But I
`just want to remind everybody the hearing is closed to the public, so I also --
`when you're at the podium to introduce yourself, please go ahead and
`introduce everyone else that's here with you today. And just confirm that
`they are authorized to access the confidential information that is in the case.
`So, Petitioner, you can go ahead first.
`MR. GIUNTA: Thank you, Your Honors. Good afternoon. I'm
`Rich Giunta from Wolf, Greenfield for the Petitioner, RPX. I'm joined
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`today by my colleagues, Elisabeth Hunt and Randy Pritzker. And we're
`also joined by Steve Chiang who is the Vice President and Chief IP officer
`at RPX. And all of us have signed a protective order.
`JUDGE CHAGNON: Okay, thank you.
`MR. GIUNTA: And I'll be presenting.
`MR. SEREBOFF: Good afternoon, Your Honors. Steve Sereboff
`for Patent Owner, Applications in Internet Time. I'm alone today.
`JUDGE CHAGNON: Thank you.
`MR. SEREBOFF: So I'll be presenting.
`JUDGE CHAGNON: All right, as per the hearing order, each party
`has 45 minutes to present arguments today. The issue on remand is limited
`to the question of whether Salesforce is a real party in interest and/or privy
`of Petitioner, therefore causing the petition to potentially be time-barred
`under 35 USC 315(b). Petitioner bears the burden on this issue, so will
`present first, followed by Patent Owner. And the Petitioner may reserve up
`to half your time to rebut any issues raised during Patent Owner's
`presentation.
`Just another note that because Judge Pettigrew is remote, she cannot
`see the screen here in the room. So just make sure you identify the slide
`that you are presenting, so she can follow along. And remember also to
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`stay at the podium so she can hear you from the microphone. And lastly, if
`either party believes the other party is presenting an argument that's
`improper for any reason, I would ask that you not interrupt, but just please
`bring that up during your own presentation time. Are there any questions
`before we get started today?
`MR. GIUNTA: No, Your Honor.
`JUDGE CHAGNON: All right. Mr. Giunta, did you want to
`reserve time today?
`MR. GIUNTA: Yes, Your Honor. Fifteen minutes, please.
`JUDGE CHAGNON: All right. You can get started whenever
`you're ready.
`MR. GIUNTA: Thank you, Your Honors. So we plan to begin
`with the law to first establish what would you require to find that Salesforce
`is an RPI or privy, and then discuss the relevant evidence discussing that
`Salesforce is neither.
`Slide two. So AIT alleges that under the Federal Circuit – a test the
`Federal Circuit announcement. Salesforce is an RPI or Salesforce benefits
`from these IPRs and has a relationship with RPX. While AIT purports to
`analyze whether Salesforce is a beneficiary, AIT merely argues that
`Salesforce benefits from these IPRs.
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`Slide three. Our brief explains the broad benefits-plus-relationship
`test would conflict with the Supreme Court's Taylor decision and the Federal
`Circuit's Wi-Fi Remand decision. Unable to reconcile its overly broad
`benefits-plus-relationship tests with Wi-Fi Remand, AIT ignores that case
`entirely.
`Slide four. Our brief also cited a number of Board cases explicitly
`rejecting the assertion that the RPI test of the Federal Circuit analysis is a
`broad benefits-plus-relationship test. We reproduced some of those cases
`here on Slide 4. And like it did with Wi-Fi Remand, AIT ignores those
`cases entirely.
`If the Federal Circuit had established a broad
`Slide five.
`benefits-plus-relationship test, it would have reversed. Because the record
`was clear that Salesforce has a contractual relationship with RPX and is
`accused of infringing the AIT patents. Federal Circuit did not reverse
`because more is required for Salesforce to be an RPI. Federal Circuit
`explicitly required that the Board determine whether RPX can be said to be
`representing Salesforce's interest in these IPRs. That's clear from the
`express language of the decision as the Board recognized in the Unified v.
`Barkan case. AIT completely ignores the requirement that Salesforce is not
`an RPI unless RPX is representing Salesforce's interest in these IPRs.
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`Slide six. AIT alleges Salesforce is an RPI under Taylor's proxy
`category. The Supreme Court in Taylor explained that preclusion based on
`proxy can be triggered when a party bringing a second action as a designated
`representative or an agent of a party to a first action. The Supreme Court
`warned that, quote, courts should be cautious about finding preclusion on
`this basis, end quote. And explained that the principles of agency law are
`suggestive, and that preclusion is appropriate only if the punitive agent's
`conduct of the suit is subject to the control of the party bound by the prior
`adjudication.
`Slide seven. AIT's proxy argument fails for two reasons. First, a
`proxy is one authorized to substitute in for another.
`If Your Honors agree
`with us that RPX pursued its own interest, then RPX was not substituting in
`for Salesforce.
`Slide eight. Pre-institution, the only argument AIT made was that
`RPX must be Salesforce's proxy because RPX had no interest of its own.
`RPX's briefing has cited overwhelming evidence that RPX filed these IPRs
`to pursue its own interests. Given that, AIT pivots and now argues that
`RPX interests are irrelevant as a matter of law. Like much of what AIT
`argues, that's unsupported by any authority. No authority supports that a
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`party pursuing its own interest could somehow be found in a proxy of
`another.
`Slide nine. The second reason AIT's proxy argument fails is that
`Taylor made clear that RPX could only be found to be Salesforce's proxy if
`it is subject to Salesforce's control in these IPRs. AIT does not
`meaningfully dispute that Salesforce did not control these IPRs. The word,
`control, appears in AIT's opposition only three times, and two of them are
`here on Slide 9. AIT suggests that control does not matter for privy, but
`Taylor makes clear that control is a requirement for preclusion under AIT's
`proxy theory.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: How does the concept of privity differ
`from this notion of proxy?
`MR. GIUNTA: Proxy is one of the ways in which privity can be
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`found.
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`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Right. So what other -- I mean privity
`sometimes is based in a -- for example a contractual relationship, which we
`know exists here. Is there any other type of privity at issue in this case
`other than proxy, I suppose is one way for me to ask this question.
`MR. GIUNTA: So that gets us to the waiver point on privity, Your
`Honor. It's our view that AIT waived privity all together, but certainly to
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`the extent it even hinted at privity, the only time-bar argument made was
`proxy. So now in its papers argues a separate Taylor category.
`It argues
`that the contractual relationship between RPX and Salesforce is the very
`definition of privity. That's a separate Taylor category that we'll talk about.
`But there's actually no hint of that in their briefing or arguments before Your
`Honor, before it went up to the Federal Circuit. So that argument, we think
`should unquestionably be waived.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Okay.
`MR. GIUNTA: Does that answer your question?
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Thank you.
`MR. GIUNTA: Okay, so AIT's conclusory assertion that there's no
`evidence of no control is wrong. We will walk through the evidence in a
`moment. It's extensive.
`Slide ten. Proxy arguments were rejected in both WesternGeco and
`Wi-Fi Remand because like here, the evidence showed that the Petitioner
`had its own interest in filing the IPRs and the time-barred litigant did not
`control or direct the IPRs.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Are both of those things necessary to
`prove no proxy, or is just one of them necessary, in your view?
`MR. GIUNTA: I think --
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`JUDGE WEATHERLY: In other words, if you have your own
`interest but there was some level of control, would that be enough to --
`MR. GIUNTA: I don't think that's proxy, Your Honor.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Okay.
`MR. GIUNTA: I don't think that's proxy. There may be a
`different theory under which you could find that a party that controlled the
`action was an RPI, but that's not a proxy theory. We're unaware of any
`case where a party that's pursuing its own interest could somehow be found
`to be a proxy for another.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Okay.
`MR. GIUNTA: But both of those things are absent here. And
`they were both absent in Wi-Fi Remand and WesternGeco. And the
`Federal Circuit noted that it affirmed the Board's finding that the Petitioner
`had its own interests. And they also noted that the assertion that the
`Petitioner was acting on behalf of the time-bar litigant was nothing more
`than speculation and conjecture unsupported by any evidence. If Your
`Honors agree with us that the evidence establishes that RPX pursue these
`IPRs for its own reasons and that Salesforce did not control these IPRs, that's
`fatal to AIT's proxy argument for both RPI and privity.
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`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Well let me ask you something about
`speculation and conjecture, because it seems to me that really in fact the
`Patent Owner is saying that the evidence implies privity. And any sort of
`inference that you draw from evidence to some extent, I suppose, could be
`characterized as speculation or conjecture. It's just, is it high quality
`enough to justify a finding? So I mean there are links between the two
`companies, besides the contractual relationship, the common board member
`is another link. Why should we not infer what the Patent Owner wants us
`to infer? What's unreasonable about the inferences the Patent Owner wants
`us to draw?
`MR. GIUNTA: I think I would have to take them one by one
`because I think there are lots of different inferences that they allege that you
`should draw --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Right.
`MR. GIUNTA: -- and they're all defensible. Right, there is no
`evidence of any. So we have sworn testimony from two witnesses who
`have explained the reasons that RPX filed these IPRs, that Salesforce was
`uninvolved. They didn't communicate with them; they didn't coordinate
`about anything relating to these IPRs.
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`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Well and I recognize also that you have a
`kind of -- the maybe unenviable position of having to prove a negative,
`which isn’t particularly easy to do unless you just get simply get someone to
`say, we didn't do it.
`MR. GIUNTA: So what we tried to do is to have both of our
`witnesses state unequivocally, right?
`I believe their testimony eliminates
`any possible theory that AIT has advanced. So we have sworn testimony
`from two witnesses who eliminate every speculation that it had. We'll walk
`through it. There is extensive documentary evidence in this case that
`corroborates everything they said.
`AIT tried to suggest that our witnesses weren't credible and had to
`resort to, frankly, blatantly misrepresenting the record to do so. There isn't
`a whiff of evidence that undermines the credibility in any of the testimony of
`our witnesses. So on all these points about, maybe Salesforce's payments
`had something to do with it, Your Honors walked through the institution
`decision. Right? The overlapping board member, we don't even know
`what the theory is. Right?
`If the theory is that it establishes as a legal
`matter of control, our corporate expert came forward and explained to Your
`Honors that it's not true, it's not that unusual, this gentleman is a very well
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`, he's been on lots of boards. The
`regarded technology investor
`notion that it gave Salesforce any control is -- again, it's just speculation.
`So we are in the position of having to prove a negative. And if
`Your Honors have concerns about any of these theories, we're certainly
`happy to talk about them and all the evidence we have. But we have also
`had our witnesses state categorically that all those inferences are simply
`wrong. And so then I would respectfully suggest that all they're left with is
`speculation. Counsel's going to get up --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Or unreasonable inferences.
`that really aren't reasonable at all.
`MR. GIUNTA: They're not based on anything.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: They're not reasonable to draw from the
`evidence.
`MR. GIUNTA: That's right. They're based on a hope. Right?
`I mean it starts from the false premise. Their entire case started from the
`false premise that RPX had no interest, so it must have been doing this for
`Salesforce. And then that was a phony -- they either didn't understand
`RPX's business, or they misrepresented it to Your Honors. Once people
`understand RPX's business and why they did it, then all the things that
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`happened make complete sense as the way they were explained by our
`witnesses.
`The notion that RPX had to try to figure out whether Salesforce
`wanted to do this and engaged in coded communication and all the rest of it,
`it's just -- it's complete fabrication that the witnesses have all explained are
`not true. They suggest that it's a problem that there's no evidence from
`Salesforce. They don't explain what fact where we need evidence, that
`there isn't evidence. Right? So I don't know what testimony of Salesforce
`reportedly would be necessary for us to demonstrate that they're not an RPI.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: So the affirmative case from your side
`depends on you establishing in part -- and this isn't exclusive, but helpful for
`your side, is establishing what RPX's interests are. So can we go along
`those lines a little bit?
`MR. GIUNTA: Absolutely, Your Honor. Sure, that was my
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`intent.
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`JUDGE WEATHERLY: I'm the one who's taking you off --
`(Simultaneous speaking.)
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: -- I
`apologize.
`MR. GIUNTA: No, that's okay, Your Honor. That's okay. So
`I'll skip through the -- I mean the other important sort of legal requirement I
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`wanted to talk about is beneficiary and how it relates to other Salesforce --
`sorry -- whether RPX could be considered to be representing Salesforce's
`interest. So in addition to ignoring the requirements of representation and
`agency, AIT again just says Salesforce benefits. But a beneficiary is not
`anyone who incidentally benefits. Federal Circuit explained that the Trial
`Practice Guide correctly states that determining if a non-party is a clear
`beneficiary requires determining whether the petition was filed at the non-
`party's behest. RPX's brief establishes that behest means command, and
`AIT, again, ignores that entirely. So if Your Honors agree with us, the
`evidence shows that Salesforce didn't request or command RPX to files
`these IPRs for Salesforce. And they were no sense filed at Salesforce's
`behest.
`In Wi-Fi Remand, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's findings
`that the Petitioner had an interest of its own. That was an important fact in
`that case as well. As we will discuss, the evidence here is the same.
`I wanted to very briefly talk about privity before we get to the facts.
`So privity is a limited exception to the general rule that a non-party's diverse
`action is not precluded from pursuing an action on its own. We've talked
`about proxy. I wanted to move to their other argument about the
`relationship. So, Slide 16.
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`AIT argues that simply because RPX and Salesforce have a
`contractual relationship, they're in privity. That's just wrong as a matter of
`law. As the Supreme Court explained in Taylor, only substantive legal
`relationships justifying preclusion establish privity. WesternGeco and Wi-
`Fi Remand are the leading Federal Circuit cases on privity. Again, AIT
`ignores them both.
`Slide 17. So in WesternGeco the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding
`that a common desire to invalidate the patent and a contractual relationship
`between the Petitioner and a time-barred litigant, was insufficient to
`establish privity because contractual relationship did not give the Petitioner
`control over the litigation. So precluding the Petitioner from pursuing its
`IPRs was not justified.
`Slide 18. Exact same result in Wi-Fi Remand. So Wi-Fi Remand
`and WesternGeco established that in Taylor's substantive legal relationship
`category, RPX cannot be precluded from pursuing its IPRs unless its
`relationship with Salesforce gave RPX control over the Salesforce litigation
`or CBMs. As we'll discuss, it's undisputed that RPX had no control. AIT
`doesn't even allege that RPX could have somehow controlled Salesforce's
`litigation.
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`Slide 48. So at the pre-hearing conference, Your Honors asked that
`we address whether the Federal Circuit ordered Your Honors to consider
`privity, so I just wanted to quickly hit that.
`It's argued that the majority
`clearly did not. The basis of Judge Reyna's concurrence was that he would
`have remanded on privity. And if the majority had ordered that, there
`would have been no need for Judge Reyna's concurrence.
`RPX believes AIT clearly waived any privity argument. Federal
`Circuit said it was hinted at, at the oral hearing. Privity was mentioned
`twice at the oral hearing. Page 48, Line 7 to 12 when counsel quoted
`315(b). And then at Page 50, Lines 8 to 9 when counsel characterized what
`the statute says. AIT was clear it was not arguing privity because at Page
`48, Line 15, counsel said, quote, I will be discussing basically only RPI, end
`quote. So no privity argument was made at the oral hearing, and certainly
`no privity arguments separate from AIT's proxy argument, which was the
`only basis for the 315(b) challenge in AIT's papers. And proxy was the
`only theory counsel mentioned at oral hearing. He mentioned that at Page
`49, Line 23.
`Initially even if Your Honors find that AIT hinted at privity at
`the oral argument, oral hearing is too late to make new arguments. So
`RPX's view is that the Federal Circuit majority did not order Your Honors to
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`consider privity. And left it to Your Honors to determine in the first
`instance whether it was waived.
`Okay, so unless Your Honors have any questions on the legal test,
`I'll get to the facts. Okay, Slide 19. So in our reply we explained that AIT
`does not meaningfully dispute a host of facts relating to the nature of RPX's
`business, RPX's relationship with Salesforce, and RPX's reasons for filing
`these IPRs. RPX's primary business is defensive patent aggregation.
`RPX uses membership fees to acquire rights under thousands of patent assets
`and licenses those assets to RPX members. By taking these patent assets
`out of the hands of NPEs, RPX reduces risk for its members who need not
`incur the cost and exposure of defending against NPE suits on those patent
`assets. Slide 20.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Before you move to Slide 20, there's one
`fact that you list here in your business model that says that, a typical client's
`membership agreement and annual fee cover only RPX's patent aggregation
`service, which is the primary reason clients join RPX. That statement sort
`of begs a few questions from me. One is what is an atypical client's
`membership agreement do? More specifically, Salesforce's membership
`agreement? And how does RPX pay for you, petition services --
`MR. GIUNTA: So on the first question, I don't --
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`JUDGE WEATHERLY: -- if not from membership fees?
`MR. GIUNTA: Okay. So on the first question, our witnesses are
`super careful people, right? And they're not going to represent that every
`RPX's member's agreement is the same. So what I would suggest is the
`most critical one, the Salesforce one --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Right.
`MR. GIUNTA:
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Okay.
`MR. GIUNTA:
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`JUDGE WEATHERLY: The Salesforce's fees entitle it
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`MR. GIUNTA: That's right.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Okay. And that's spelled out in the
`evidence.
`MR. GIUNTA: That's right.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Okay.
`MR. GIUNTA: That's right. And in terms of how does -- how
`does RPX pay for IPRs? Well RPX has revenue and membership fees are
`one of its sources of revenue. It has other lines of business that don't
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`impact Salesforce, insurance, et cetera. So RPX has revenue, and then it
`decides to file IPRs for its own reasons, which we'll talk about. So filing
`IPRs to pursue its own business reasons is an expense, just like anyone else.
`But it is not taking a particular member's fees and using those fees to file
`IPRs on behalf of that member. It is simply taking some of its revenue and
`deciding that its patent aggregation defense business will benefit for all the
`reasons we'll talk about if it attacks NPE patent, so it chooses to do so for its
`own reasons.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: But you can't -- you can't say though that
`Salesforce's -- the revenue that RPX generates from Salesforce's fees isn't
`used to fund IPRs like this IPR. Can you?
`MR. GIUNTA: If what you're saying --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: In other words, the money doesn't attain a
`sort of tag as it comes in and go into isolated buckets that only get used for
`certain purposes. What I've just understood from you is that just RPX's
`revenues as a whole are used to fund IPRs.
`MR. GIUNTA: That's my understanding, Your Honor.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: And Salesforce is part of what generates -
`- is part of what pays -- I mean some of the revenue is from Salesforce.
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`Right? So how do we know that the money that Salesforce pays doesn't
`fund this IPR?
`MR. GIUNTA: If you're suggesting are the particular dollars that
`come from certain clients earmarked and go to particular places and are only
`used for certain purposes, there's no evidence about that, but I can't imagine
`that that's the way that RPX runs its business.
`I would suggest that any
`connection between fees and IPR filing is a lot more multi-stepped removed
`from IPRs than Unified Patents. At least the way that I understand their
`business --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Okay.
`MR. GIUNTA: -- is they go out and they collect fees.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: So I think the answer that I'm
`understanding to my question is we don't know that Salesforce's dollars
`aren't being used to --
`MR. GIUNTA: I mean I would frame it differently, Your Honor.
`I think it's an unfair -- I don't mean that disrespectfully -- to suggest that you
`can earmark a particular dollar from some client that's unrelated to the
`reason that RPX files an IPR and say, we're going to treat those fees as those
`fees.
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`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Well except that you've already said that
`the way that RPX funds its IPR efforts is generally from its revenue.
`I
`guess this comes back to one of the questions that gets sparked by the
`statement in here about membership agreements covering only aggregation
`services, kind of implies that maybe there are some other membership
`agreements that fund more than aggregation services, that also fund IPRs or
`something like that.
`I believe the inference that these
`MR. GIUNTA: No, there is not.
`agreements fund anything for RPX, I would respectfully submit is an
`inference -- an incorrect inference that's not supported by the record. What
`this suggests is that some people who are RPX members who sign up for its
`patent aggregation service, they may also pay -- they made a contract
`separately and pay RPX separate additional fees for a different service.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Okay.
`MR. GIUNTA: Some, insurance for example. Some people are
`members of RPX, they may also have insurance.
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: So maybe part of the reasonableness or
`unreasonableness of, sort of, attributing some of the revenue that Salesforce
`pays to being part of what funds this particular IPR will be borne out by you
`explaining, in more detail, the interest that RPX has -- you know, the
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`individual interest that RPX has in filing IPRs, including this one. Most
`specifically, this one.
`MR. GIUNTA: Thank you, Your Honor. Okay. Let's go to
`Slide 22. Before I get to the reason RPX files, I just want to quickly cover
`-- so Salesforce's membership agreement corroborates Mr. Chuang's
`testimony that clients in general, and Salesforce in particular, join RPX
`because of its defensive aggregation service, and not IPRs. Salesforce's
`membership grants Salesforce license rights under RPX's portfolio,
`, and IPRs are nowhere mentioned.
`date of Salesforce's first membership further corroborates
`The
`Mr. Chuang's testimony that Salesforce joined because of defensive
`aggregation and not IPRs.
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`corroborates Mr. Chuang's testimony --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: Well I mean
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`membership agreement also
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`MR. GIUNTA: I don't believe it's true. And there's certainly no
`evidence that RPX had ever said to anyone that it was going to file IPRs for
`its own reason. And when Salesforce joined, we respectfully submit that
`the reason -- the actual contract between these parties, public companies, is
`very strong evidence about what they were contracting for. All, you know,
`these inferences aside, the disagreement clearly covers things that aren't
`contracted for. I'm just simply pointing out that we don't just have sworn
`testimony of our witnesses. Every document corroborates --
`JUDGE WEATHERLY: I was more just picking at your assertion
`that -- the fact that
`the contract
`is evidence that, that's not something that the parties had in mind. That's
`all.
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`of the
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`MR. GIUNTA: Okay. Salesforce's
`membership agreement also corroborates. Salesforce
`under which, Salesforce
`patents. AIT has argued in the papers that
`obtained rights to
`there's no evidence of any value that Salesforce gets from its membership.
`We have this evidence. They got a license under
`patents.
`Slide 24. So let's get to the reaso
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