Mail Stop "PATENT BOARD"
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`____________
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________
`
`
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`
`
`
`
`MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`Patent Owner
`
`____________
`
`
`
`Case IPR2015-01725
`Patent 5,915,210
`
`____________
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
`TECHNOLOGIES, LLC’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`
`

`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 1
`I.
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`II.
`III. PROPER CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ............................................................ 3
`A.
`Construction of Independent Claim Terms ........................................... 7
`1.
`“representing substantially the same information as” of
`claims 1, 10, and 19 .................................................................... 7
`“transmit[] [the] second plurality of carrier signals in
`simulcast with the first plurality of carrier signals” of
`claims 1, 10, and 19 .................................................................... 8
`“each of the first plurality of carrier signals representing
`a portion of the information signal substantially not
`represented by others of the first plurality of carrier
`signals” of claims 1, 10, and 19 .................................................. 9
`IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .................................................................. 10
`V.
`REFERENCES RELIED UPON BY PETITIONER .................................... 11
`A. Witsaman ............................................................................................. 11
`B.
`Bingham ............................................................................................... 12
`VI. GROUND 1 – CLAIMS 1, 10, AND 19 ARE NOT OBVIOUS OVER
`WITSAMAN IN VIEW OF BINGHAM. ......................................................... 13
`A. Witsaman in view of Bingham do not disclose “not represented”
`limitation of elements 1(a), 10(a), and 19(a). ...................................... 13
`1. Witsaman does not disclose the “not represented”
`limitation of elements 1(a), 10(a), and 19(a). ........................... 13
`Bingham does not disclose the “not represented”
`limitation of elements 1(a), 10(a), and 19(a). ........................... 14
`VII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 17
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`2.
`
`i
`
`

`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page
`
`CASES
`Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ 2d 1072 (BPAI 2010) ...................................................... 15
`Ex parte Papst-Motoren, 1 USPQ2d 1655 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1986) ................ 4
`Ex Parte Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing L.P., Appeal 2008-005127 (BPAI
`Mar. 15, 2010)....................................................................................................... 4
`In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 70 USPQ2d 1827 (Fed.
`Cir. 2004) .............................................................................................................. 5
`In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .............................................................. 15
`In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 44 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ............................. 5
`In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981 (CCPA 1974) ......................................................... 13, 15
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) ................................................ 16
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .............................. 4, 5, 6, 8
`Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ........... 6
`Vitrionics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ............................. 4
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`35 United States Code § 102 ...................................................................................... 1
`35 United States Code § 103 ...................................................................................... 1
`35 United States Code § 312(c) ................................................................................. 3
`37 Code of Federal Regulations § 42.104(b)(3) ........................................................ 3
`Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2111.01 ................................................... 5
`Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2558 ........................................................ 4
`
`ii
`
`

`
`
`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`On August 13, 2015, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. filed a Petition for Inter
`
`Partes Review under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100, requesting inter partes review of claims
`
`1, 7-8, 10, 15-17, and 19 of the ’210 Patent. Petitioner asserts that claims 1, 7-8,
`
`10, 15-17, and 19 of the ’210 Patent are unpatentable over the following references
`
`under 35 U.S.C. § 103:
`
`Ground 1 - Claims 1, 7-8, 10, 15-17, and 19 as obvious over Witsaman in
`
`view of Bingham.
`
`The ‘210 Patent, entitled “Method and System for Providing Multicarrier
`
`Simulcast Transmission,” was filed on July 24, 1997 and issued on June 22, 1999.
`
`The ‘210 Patent claims priority to U.S. Application No. 07/973,918, filed
`
`November 12, 1992, U.S. Patent No. 5,590,403 (“the ‘403 patent”).
`
`The ‘210 Patent describes and claims a method and system for providing
`
`multicarrier simulcast transmission.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Patent Owner, Mobile Telecommunications Technologies, LLC, submits this
`
`Preliminary Response to the Petition for Inter Partes Review of claims 1, 7-8, 10,
`
`15-17, and 19 of U.S. Patent No. 5,915,210 (“the ‘210 Patent”). 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.107.
`
`1
`
`

`
`
`
`Patent Owner respectfully requests that the Board deny the Petition on every
`
`ground alleged by Petitioner for, at least, the following reasons.
`
`With regard to Ground 1, U.S. Patent No. 5,365,569 (Ex. 1012, “Witsaman”)
`
`does not disclose “each of the first plurality of carrier signals representing a portion
`
`of the information signal substantially not represented by others of the first
`
`plurality of carrier signals,” as recited in claims 1, 10, and 19 of the ‘210 Patent.
`
`John A. C. Bingham, Multicarrier Modulation for Data Transmission: An Idea
`
`Whose Time Has Come, 28 IEEE (Ex. 1015, “Bingham”) does not cure
`
`Witsaman’s defect and does not disclose or suggest these features. Thus,
`
`independent claims 1, 10, and 19 of the ‘210 Patent are not obvious over Witsaman
`
`in view of Bingham.
`
`Dependent claims 7-8 and 15-17 are not obvious over Witsaman in view of
`
`Bingham because independent claims 1 and 10, from which they depend,
`
`respectively, are not obvious over Witsaman in view of Bingham and because of
`
`the additional features these claims recite.
`
`It should be noted that a ground similar to the ground of this IPR was
`
`presented in both IPR2014-01036 (“the Apple IPR”) and IPR2015-00015 (“the T-
`
`Mobile IPR”), and review was not instituted. For example, the Board found in the
`
`Apple IPR that “[f]or this additional ground, we exercise our discretion, and do not
`
`institute review regarding this alleged ground of unpatentability that claims 1, 10,
`
`2
`
`

`
`
`and 19 would have been obvious over Witsaman and Bingham. See 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.108(a).” IPR2014-01036, Paper 9 at 17.
`
`Therefore, there is no reasonable likelihood that Petitioner can prevail with
`
`regard to claims 1, 7-8, 10, 15-17, and 19 of the ‘210 Patent.
`
`III. PROPER CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`By statute, Petitioner must identify “in writing, and with particularity, each
`
`claim challenged, the grounds on which [each] challenge … is based, and the
`
`evidence that supports the grounds . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 312(c). This requires a
`
`precise statement on “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed.” 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.104(b)(3).
`
`The Petition fails to set forth how the independent claims are to be
`
`construed. Petitioner construes only three terms, among which one is directed to
`
`means plus function terms of claim 19. Paper 1 at 5-11.
`
`By leaving the entire breadth of the independent claims without an
`
`articulated construction, Petitioner’s asserted grounds for unpatentability are
`
`deficient because the basis of Petitioner’s conclusion that a particular claim
`
`element or limitation is taught in the asserted references is unclear.
`
`Petitioner’s approach unfairly forces Patent Owner (as well as the Board) to
`
`guess at how Petitioner is construing any given term. Consequently, on its face,
`
`the Petition is deficient and fails to meet the standard for institution of review. If
`
`3
`
`

`
`
`the Board does not summarily deny the Petition for this reason, Patent Owner
`
`respectfully submits the following proposed constructions for purposes of this
`
`proceeding.
`
`MPEP 2258 provides that “[i]n a reexamination proceeding involving claims
`
`of an expired patent, claim construction pursuant to the principle set forth by the
`
`court in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1329
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (words of a claim “are generally given their plain and ordinary
`
`meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the
`
`time of the invention) should be applied since the expired claim are not subject to
`
`amendment. See Ex parte Papst-Motoren, 1 USPQ2d 1655 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter.
`
`1986).”
`
`The ‘210 Patent has expired, and therefore, the claim terms should be
`
`construed according to the principles of Phillips, not under the broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation (BRI) standard. See Ex Parte Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing L.P.,
`
`Appeal 2008-005127 (BPAI Mar. 15, 2010).
`
`The first step in construing claims under Phillips is to “look to the words of
`
`the claims themselves.” Vitrionics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1996). Second, the specification must be considered when construing
`
`claim terms. Id. “[T]he specification is always highly relevant to the claim
`
`4
`
`

`
`
`construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the
`
`meaning of a disputed term.” Id.
`
`Claim construction under Phillips varies from the BRI standard in at least
`
`two important ways. First, the BRI standard includes a prohibition on reading
`
`limitations in the specification into the claims. In contrast, claim construction
`
`under Phillips does not include this prohibition. For example, “[t]he presumption
`
`that a term is given its plain and ordinary meaning may be rebutted by the
`
`applicant by clearly setting forth a different definition of the term in the
`
`specification. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1028 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1997) (the USPTO looks to the ordinary use of the claim terms taking into
`
`account definitions or other “enlightenment” contained in the written description);
`
`But c.f. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369, 70 USPQ2d 1827,
`
`1834 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We have cautioned against reading limitations into a claim
`
`from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only
`
`embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.”). MPEP
`
`2111.01.
`
`Second, the BRI standard does not rely heavily on extrinsic evidence. In
`
`contrast, when performing claim construction under Phillips, “it is entirely
`
`appropriate, perhaps even preferable, for a court to consult trustworthy extrinsic
`
`evidence to ensure that the claim construction it is tending to from the patent file is
`
`5
`
`

`
`
`not inconsistent with clearly expressed, plainly apposite, and widely held
`
`understandings from the pertinent technical field.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-
`
`Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
`
`As described above, under Phillips the specification must be considered
`
`when construing claim terms. Instead, Petitioner mostly cites to other IPR
`
`proceedings, e.g., IPR2014-01035, Apple Inc. v. Mobile Telecommunications
`
`Technologies, LLC (the “Apple IPR”) and IPR2015-00018, T-Mobile USA Inc. v.
`
`Mobile Telecommunications Technologies, LLC (the “T-Mobile IPR”) (which were
`
`previously terminated), and claim construction orders from district court cases,
`
`e.g., m Mobile Telecommunications Technologies, LLC v. Clearwire Corp., Civil
`
`Action No. 2:13-cv-308-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex.) (“Clearwire Order,” Ex. 1004),
`
`Mobile Telecommunications Technologies, LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., Civil
`
`Action No. 2:13-cv-832-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex.) (“Sprint Order,” Ex. 1005), Mobile
`
`Telecommunications Technologies, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., et al., Civil Action
`
`No. 2:13-cv-886-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex.) (“T-Mobile Order,” Ex. 1006), and Mobile
`
`Telecommunications Technologies, LLC v. Leap Wireless International Inc. et al.,
`
`Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-885-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex.) (“Leap Order,” Ex. 1007).
`
`Paper 1, at 5-11.
`
`6
`
`

`
`
`
`A. Construction of Independent Claim Terms
`
`1.
`
`“representing substantially the same information as” of
`claims 1, 10, and 19
`
`Challenged claims 1, 10, and 19 recite “each of the second plurality of
`
`carrier signals [] representing substantially the same information as a respective
`
`carrier signal of the first plurality of carrier signals.” Here, “representing
`
`substantially the same information as” means “the first plurality of carrier signals
`
`and the second plurality of carrier signals substantially represent the same
`
`information.” This construction reflects the plain and ordinary meaning of the
`
`words and is supported by the specification. Ex. 1001 at 1:54, 5:26-40 (reproduced
`
`below). Since the “information” conveyed by the second plurality of carrier
`
`signals refer to the same “information” conveyed by the first plurality of carrier
`
`signals, they substantially represent the same information.
`
`7
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`As a result, under the Phillips standard, the term “representing substantially
`
`the same information as” means “the first plurality of carrier signals and the second
`
`plurality of carrier signals substantially represent the same information.”
`
`2.
`
`“transmit[] [the] second plurality of carrier signals in
`simulcast with the first plurality of carrier signals” of
`claims 1, 10, and 19
`
`Challenged claim 1 recites that the second transmitter is configured “to
`
`transmit a second plurality of carrier signals in simulcast with the first plurality of
`
`carrier signals.”
`
`8
`
`

`
`
`
`Challenged claim 10 similarly recites “transmitting the second plurality of
`
`carrier signals from a second transmitter in simulcast with transmission of the first
`
`plurality of carrier signals from the first transmitter.”
`
`Similar to claims 1 and 10, challenged claim 19 recites “means for
`
`transmitting a second plurality of carrier signals in simulcast with the first plurality
`
`of carrier signals.”
`
`Here, this transmission is “transmitting at the same time the first plurality of
`
`carrier signals from the first transmitter and the second plurality of carrier signals
`
`from the second transmitter.”
`
`The plain and ordinary meaning of simulcast is “to broadcast (a program) by
`
`radio and television at the same time.” http://www.merriam-
`
`webster.com/dictionary/simulcast. Therefore, simulcast means that the first and
`
`second transmitters transmit the first and second plurality of carrier signals,
`
`respectively, at the same time.
`
`3.
`
`“each of the first plurality of carrier signals representing a
`portion of the information signal substantially not
`represented by others of the first plurality of carrier
`signals” of claims 1, 10, and 19
`
`Challenged claims 1, 10, and 19 recite “each of the first plurality of carrier
`
`signals representing a portion of the information signal substantially not
`
`9
`
`

`
`
`represented by others of the first plurality of carrier signals.” Here, this limitation
`
`means “each of the first plurality of carrier signals represent a different portion of
`
`the information signal,” without excluding the possibility of some slight overlap
`
`between the different portions. This construction reflects the plain and ordinary
`
`meaning of the words and is supported by the specification. Ex. 1001 at 13:34-38
`
`(reproduced below).
`
`This passage of the ‘210 Patent describes modulating unique or different
`
`
`
`data streams of an information signal onto each carrier signal.
`
`IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
`
`By this response, Patent Owner respectfully submits the following
`
`arguments and supporting evidence.
`
`Claims 1, 10, and 19 of the ‘210 Patent each recite that “each of the first
`
`plurality of carrier signals representing a portion of the information signal
`
`substantially not represented by others of the first plurality of carrier signals.”
`
`Patent Owner construes this limitation to mean that “each of the first plurality of
`
`carrier signals represent a different portion of the information signal.”
`
`10
`
`

`
`
`
`In contrast, Witsaman does not teach that each of the first plurality of carrier
`
`signals represent a different portion of the information signal carrier frequencies
`
`that are offset from one another, as recited in claims 1, 10, and 19 of the ‘210
`
`Patent. This is not disputed by Petitioner.
`
`Bingham only states that M bits are used . . . to modulate Nc carriers.
`
`Bingham does not disclose modulating each Nc carrier with a different part of M
`
`bits. Nothing in Bingham precludes modulating two carriers with the same M bits.
`
`This is excluded by the ‘210 Patent.
`
`Therefore, Bingham does not cure Witsaman’s defect, and claims 1, 10, and
`
`19 of the ‘210 Patent are not obvious in view of Witsaman in view of Bingham.
`
`Supporting evidence for these arguments includes, but is not limited to, the
`
`’210 Patent specification, Witsaman, Ex. 1012, and Bingham, Ex. 1015.
`
`V. REFERENCES RELIED UPON BY PETITIONER
`
`A. Witsaman
`
`Witsaman is directed to a digital simulcast transmission system for
`
`broadcasting the same paging signal for a number of spaced-apart broadcast sites.
`
`Ex. 1012 at Abstract. FIG. 2, which is shown below, is illustrative of a wide area
`
`group (WAG) of the paging system of Witsaman. The spaced-apart broadcast sites
`
`are called stations in FIG. 2.
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`Witsaman provides that “the individual stations 30 will all broadcast the
`
`same paging signal at the same time.” Ex. 1012 at 7:33-35. Further Witsaman
`
`describes that “[e]ach station broadcasts pages over a distinct carrier frequency that
`
`is associated with a specific WAG 37.” Id. at 35:47-49. So, at least within a wide
`
`area group (WAG), adjacent stations of Witsaman transmit with the same paging
`
`signal and same carrier frequency.
`
`B.
`
`Bingham
`
`Bingham is directed to a method for multicarrier modulation for data
`
`transmission. Ex. 1015 at Title.
`
`Since Petitioner acknowledges, in Paper 1 at 39-40 and 42, that Witsaman
`
`only discloses a method of single carrier modulation, as opposed to multicarrier
`
`12
`
`

`
`
`modulation, Petitioner relies, in Paper 1 at 17-18, on Bingham for multicarrier
`
`modulation.
`
`VI. GROUND 1 – CLAIMS 1, 10, AND 19 ARE NOT OBVIOUS OVER
`WITSAMAN IN VIEW OF BINGHAM.
`
`As noted above, pursuant to the requirements for establishing a prima facie
`
`case of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. §103, all the claim limitations must be taught
`
`or suggested by the applied references. In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981 (CCPA 1974).
`
`A. Witsaman in view of Bingham do not disclose “not represented”
`limitation of elements 1(a), 10(a), and 19(a).
`
`1. Witsaman does not disclose the “not represented” limitation
`of elements 1(a), 10(a), and 19(a).
`
`Patent Owner submits that Witsaman does not also teach, at least, element
`
`1(a) of claim 1, element 10(a) of claim 10, and element 19(a) of claim 19.
`
`Elements 1(a) 10(a), and 19(a) recite, among other things, “each of the first
`
`plurality of carrier signals representing a portion of the information signal
`
`substantially not represented by others of the first plurality of carrier signals.”
`
`Petitioner does not dispute that Witsaman does not teach this limitation.
`
`13
`
`

`
`
`
`2.
`
`Bingham does not disclose the “not represented” limitation
`of elements 1(a), 10(a), and 19(a).
`
`Patent Owner submits that Bingham also does not also teach, at least,
`
`element 1(a) of claim 1, element 10(a) of claim 10, and element 19(a) of claim 19.
`
`Elements 1(a) 10(a), and 19(a) recite, among other things, “each of the first
`
`plurality of carrier signals representing a portion of the information signal
`
`substantially not represented by others of the first plurality of carrier signals.”
`
`Above, Patent Owner construes this limitation to mean “each of the first plurality
`
`of carrier signals represent a different portion of the information signal.”
`
`Petitioner asserts that “Bingham describes that ‘[i]nput data at Mfs b/s are
`
`grouped into blocks of M bits’ and ‘M bits are used . . . to modulate Nc carriers.’
`
`Ex. SAM1015, p. 5. One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood this
`
`disclosure to mean that each of Bingham’s Nc carrier signals represent a portion of
`
`the information signal substantially not represented by others of the carrier signals,
`
`as required by the ’210 patent.” Paper 1 at 18. As a result, Petitioner is equating
`
`the statement in Bingham that Nc carriers are modulated with M bits with the ‘210
`
`Patent claim limitation that each of the first plurality of carrier signals represent a
`
`different portion of the information signal.
`
`The Patent Owner submits that Bingham does not teach the limitation of the
`
`‘210 Patent, because Bingham does not disclose modulating each Nc carrier with a
`
`14
`
`

`
`
`different part of M bits. Nothing in Bingham precludes modulating two carriers
`
`with the same M bits.
`
`Therefore, Bingham does not cure Witsaman’s defect, and claim elements
`
`1(a), 10(a), and 19(a) of the ‘210 Patent are not obvious in view of Witsaman in
`
`view of Bingham.
`
`Also, as described above, to establish a prima facie case of obviousness
`
`under 35 U.S.C. §103, all the claim limitations must be taught or suggested by the
`
`applied references. In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981 (CCPA 1974). Since Witsaman in
`
`view of Bingham does not disclose that the second plurality of carrier signals,
`
`which represent the same information signal as the first plurality of carrier signals,
`
`are slightly offset from the first plurality of carrier signals to prevent destructive
`
`interference, Witsaman in view of Bingham cannot render claims 1, 10, and 19 of
`
`the ‘210 Patent obvious.
`
`In addition, Bingham cannot be combined with Witsaman, because Petitioner
`
`has provided no articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support
`
`the legal conclusion of obviousness. “[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot
`
`be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some
`
`articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
`
`conclusion of obviousness.” Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ 2d 1072, 1076 (BPAI 2010)
`
`(citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with approval in KSR
`
`15
`
`

`
`
`Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
`
`In combining Bingham with Witsaman, Petitioner has simply stated that
`
`“because Witsaman describes broadcasting signals in any format, or modulation
`
`scheme, in which they can be processed (see Ex. SAM1012, 7:55-60), it would
`
`have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ‘210 patent
`
`to employ a multicarrier modulation (MCM) method of transmission, such as the
`
`one described by Bingham.” Paper 1 at 15. Simply stating that “it would be
`
`obvious” is not articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support
`
`the legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, Bingham cannot be combined with
`
`Witsaman.
`
`Further, Witsaman describes prior-art analog-simulcast-systems and teaches
`
`the application of simulcast to digital communications. Bingham teaches
`
`multicarrier modulation, but does not address simulcasting (or paging) at all.
`
`Performing multicarrier modulation in a simulcast environment is not a trivial task.
`
`Witsaman acknowledges that making sure each signal is synchronized is important,
`
`and teaches that precise synchronization can be achieved using its digital
`
`transmission system. However, the precise synchronization required by Witsaman
`
`would be exponentially more difficult to achieve when every single subcarriers has
`
`to be precisely synchronized with the corresponding other subcarriers. Each
`
`additional subcarrier would have to be synchronized by each transmitter. This
`
`16
`
`

`
`
`problem is not addressed in either Witsaman or Bingham, and would be contrary to
`
`motivation to combine.
`
`Dependent claims 7-8 and 15-17 are not obvious over Witsaman in view of
`
`Bingham because independent claims 1 and 10, from which they depend,
`
`respectively, are not obvious over Witsaman in view of Bingham and because of
`
`the additional features these claims recite.
`
`VII. CONCLUSION
`
`
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Patent Owner respectfully requests that the Board
`
`find that Ground 1 in the Petition do not present a reasonable likelihood of
`
`unpatentability, and decline to institute Inter Partes Review of the ’210 Patent.
`
`Date: November 23, 2015
`
`
`Customer No. 67050
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/John R. Kasha/___________________
`John R. Kasha, Lead Counsel
`Registration No. 53,100
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`Kasha Law LLC
`14532 Dufief Mill Rd.
`North Potomac, MD 20878
`(703) 867-1886, telephone
`(301) 340-3022, facsimile
`Email: john.kasha@kashalaw.com
`
`17
`
`

`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(f), a copy of Patent Owner’s
`
`Preliminary Response to Petition for Inter Partes Review filed by the Mobile
`
`Telecommunications Technologies, LLC on November 23, 2015 was duly served
`
`via electronic mail upon MtelGTIPR@gtlaw.com - counsel of record for Samsung
`
`Electronics Co., Ltd. (“Petitioner”).
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`/John R. Kasha/
`Registration No. 53,100
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`Kasha Law LLC
`14532 Dufief Mill Rd.
`North Potomac, MD 20878
`(703) 867-1886, telephone
`(301) 340-3022, facsimile
`Email: john.kasha@kashalaw.com
`
`
`
`18