Case 6:11-cv-00096-LED Document 352 Filed 01/23/13 Page 1 of 39 PageID #: 10198
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TYLER DIVISION
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`TRACBEAM, L.L.C.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`AT&T, INC., et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`CASE NO. 6:11-CV-96
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`This Memorandum Opinion construes the disputed claim terms in U.S. Patent Nos.
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`7,525,484 (“the ‘484 Patent”) and 7,764,231 (“the ‘231 Patent”). Additionally, Defendants’
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`Motion for Summary Judgment of Indefiniteness (Docket No. 316) is DENIED.
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`BACKGROUND
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`The Plaintiff TracBeam, L.L.C. (“TracBeam”) sued the following defendants for
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`infringement of the ‘231 and ‘484 Patents: AT&T, Inc. and AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. (“AT&T”);
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`MetroPCS Communications, Inc. and MetroPCS Wireless, Inc. (“MetroPCS”); Cellco
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`Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless (“Cellco”); TeleCommunication Systems, Inc. (“TCS”);
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`Google, Inc. (“Google”); Skyhook Wireless, Inc. (“Skyhook”); and WaveMarket, Inc., d/b/a
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`Location Labs (“Location Labs”).1 The Patents relate to methods and systems for determining
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`the location of mobile devices using multiple location techniques. Even though it issued first, the
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`‘484 Patent is a continuation of the ‘231 Patent.
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`1 This order refers to all defendants collectively as “Defendants,” and it refers to AT&T, MetroPCS, Cellco, and
`TCS as the “Carrier Defendants.”
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`1
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`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson EXHIBIT 1017
`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson v. TracBeam
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`Case 6:11-cv-00096-LED Document 352 Filed 01/23/13 Page 2 of 39 PageID #: 10199
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`APPLICABLE LAW
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`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention
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`to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
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`1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
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`Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). In claim construction, courts examine the patent’s
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`intrinsic evidence to define the patented invention’s scope. See id.; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S.
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`Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad
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`Commc’ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This intrinsic evidence includes
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`the claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1314; C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 861. Courts give claim terms their ordinary and accustomed
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`meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the
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`context of the entire patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
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`342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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`The claims themselves provide substantial guidance in determining the meaning of
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`particular claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. First, a term’s context in the asserted claim
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`can be very instructive. Id. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the
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`claim’s meaning because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id.
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`Differences among the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Id. For
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`example, when a dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that
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`the independent claim does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314–15.
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`“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id.
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`(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
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`“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
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`dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics
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`2
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`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson EXHIBIT 1017
`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson v. TracBeam
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`Case 6:11-cv-00096-LED Document 352 Filed 01/23/13 Page 3 of 39 PageID #: 10200
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`Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see also Teleflex, Inc. v.
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`Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This is true because a patentee may
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`define his own terms, give a claim term a different meaning than the term would otherwise
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`possess, or disclaim or disavow the claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. In these situations,
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`the inventor’s lexicography governs. Id. Also, the specification may resolve ambiguous claim
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`terms “where the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack
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`sufficient clarity to permit the scope of the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.”
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`Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325. But, “‘[a]lthough the specification may aid the court in
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`interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular embodiments and examples
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`appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.’” Comark Commc’ns,
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`Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v. Advanced
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`Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
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`The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim construction
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`because a patent applicant may also define a term in prosecuting the patent. Home Diagnostics,
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`Inc., v. Lifescan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“As in the case of the specification,
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`a patent applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent.”).
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`Although extrinsic evidence can be useful, it is “‘less significant than the intrinsic record
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`in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317
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`(quoting C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a court
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`understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might use
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`claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too broad or
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`may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert
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`testimony may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining the
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`3
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`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson EXHIBIT 1017
`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson v. TracBeam
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`Case 6:11-cv-00096-LED Document 352 Filed 01/23/13 Page 4 of 39 PageID #: 10201
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`particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert’s conclusory, unsupported
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`assertions as to a term’s definition is entirely unhelpful to a court. Id. Generally, extrinsic
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`evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read
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`claim terms.” Id.
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`Defendants also contend that some claims at issue are invalid for indefiniteness. A claim
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`is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 if it fails to particularly point out and distinctly claim the
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`subject matter that the applicant regards as the invention. The party seeking to invalidate a claim
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 as indefinite must show by clear and convincing evidence that one
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`skilled in the art would not understand the scope of the claim when read in light of the
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`specification. Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. UA-Columbia Cablevision of Westchester, Inc., 336
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`F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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`“mobile station”
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`CLAIM TERMS
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`“Mobile station” is “a mobile wireless device that is at least a transmitting device and
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`may include a receiving device.” The parties agreed to this construction at oral argument. Tr.
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`Markman Hr’g 80–81, Nov. 8, 2012.
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`“communication station”
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`TracBeam argues no construction is necessary. Defendant Google proposes “networked
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`cellular telephony base stations.”
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`The parties dispute whether a communication station is a networked cellular telephony
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`base station, or whether a networked cellular telephony base station is merely one embodiment of
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`a communication station. Google contends that communication stations are called base stations
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`in the specification, so the term “communication station” should be construed using a reference
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`4
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`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson EXHIBIT 1017
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`Case 6:11-cv-00096-LED Document 352 Filed 01/23/13 Page 5 of 39 PageID #: 10202
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`to “base stations” in the Definition section of the ‘231 Patent.2 See Docket No. 317 (“Response”)
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`at 3 (noting the phrase “base station” appears over 400 times in the specification, while the
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`phrase “communication station” does not appear in the specification). The ‘231 Patent defines
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`“infrastructure” as:
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`…the network of telephony communication services, and more particularly, that
`portion of such a network that receives and possesses wireless communications
`with wireless mobile stations. In particular, this infrastructure includes telephony
`wireless base stations (BS) such as those for radio mobile communication
`systems based on CDMA, AMPS, NAMPS, TDMA, and GSM wherein the base
`stations provide a network or cooperative communication channels with an air
`interface with the MS….
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`‘231 Patent, at 9:56–64 (emphasis added). Google contends its construction is proper because it
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`is taken directly from the ‘231 Patent’s Definition section. Response at 4. Google also contends
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`that TracBeam’s proposed construction in non-enabling because the specification does not
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`disclose a communication system. See id. (quoting Magsil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage
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`Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The scope of the claims must be less than or
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`equal to the scope of enablement to ensure that the public knowledge is enriched by the patent
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`specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the claims.”)).
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`TracBeam argues that “communication station” and “networked cellular telephony base
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`station” are not interchangeable; rather, a networked cellular telephony base station is one
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`embodiment of a communication station. See Docket No. 315 (“Brief”) at 4. (“‘Communication’
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`is not limited to ‘cellular telephony’ communication and ‘station’ is not limited to a ‘base
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`station.’”). In support, TracBeam notes that the ‘231 Patent discloses a mobile base station that
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`can be “incorporated into a vehicle.” ‘231 Patent, at 18:6–7. TracBeam contends it would be
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`improper to limit the Claims to a particular embodiment absent an express disavowal of claim
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`2 During prosecution, the phrase “base station” was changed to “communication station.” Response at 3 n.11.
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`5
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`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson EXHIBIT 1017
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`Case 6:11-cv-00096-LED Document 352 Filed 01/23/13 Page 6 of 39 PageID #: 10203
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`scope. Docket No. 326 (“Reply”) at 2. It cites several cases asserting that a specification can be
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`enabling even if it does not disclose every possible variant of an invention. Id.
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`TracBeam also argues Google’s construction is too narrow. The infrastructure definition
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`cited by Google references base stations, not communication stations. See ‘231 Patent, at 9:56–
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`64. TracBeam argues that because a communication station is merely one embodiment of a base
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`station, Google’s construction improperly narrows the claim language. Reply at 2–3.
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`Google did not identify any language of disavowal in the specification, nor did it identify
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`any other language indicating a communication station must be limited to a networked cellular
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`telephony base station. On the contrary, there are multiple disclosed embodiments where a
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`communication station is something other than a telephony base station. For example, there are
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`references to “base stations of a commercial radio service provider,”3 indoor location techniques
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`using a “distributed antenna system,”4 and “low power, low functionality base stations.”5 These
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`are all non-telephony embodiments of a communication station. There are also embodiments of a
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`non-networked base station. The specification discloses a mobile base station that “may not be in
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`constant communication with the fixed location BS network (and indeed may be off-line for
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`substantial periods of time).” ‘231 Patent, at 100:65–68. These mobile base stations are not part
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`of a fixed network. For these reasons, a communication station is not limited to a networked
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`cellular telephony base station.
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`Google’s enablement arguments are unpersuasive. A specification is enabling when one
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`skilled in the art could practice the invention without undue experimentation. ALZA Corp. v.
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`Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Google did not present any evidence
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`3 ‘231 Patent, at 11:20–24.
`4 ‘231 Patent, at 11:48–49.
`5 ‘231 Patent, at 11:56–58.
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`6
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`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson EXHIBIT 1017
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`Case 6:11-cv-00096-LED Document 352 Filed 01/23/13 Page 7 of 39 PageID #: 10204
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`that one skilled in the art could not practice the patented invention.6 Further, even if Google was
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`correct that the Patents disclosed only one embodiment, it would not necessarily follow that the
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`claims must be limited to that embodiment. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. A specification may
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`be enabling even if it does not describe how to make every possible variant of the claimed
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`invention. See AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Thus, Google’s
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`enablement argument fails.
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`“Communication station” requires no construction.
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`“communication stations at terrestrial locations,” “terrestrial communication stations,”
`and “terrestrial stations”
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`TracBeam proposed “communication stations located on or supported (directly or
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`indirectly) by the surface of the Earth.” Google proposed “networked cellular telephony base
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`stations,” its same proposed construction as for “communication stations.”
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`Under Google’s proposed constructions, there is no difference between “communication
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`stations” and “communication stations at terrestrial locations.” This renders the modifying clause
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`“at terrestrial locations” superfluous. The Federal Circuit has cautioned against constructions that
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`turn claim language into “excess verbiage”—exactly what Google’s construction would do here.
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`See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The
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`Patents separately refer to communication stations and communication stations at terrestrial
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`locations; the terms are not used interchangeably. See, e.g., ‘231 Patent, Claim 36, at 186:51–52;
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`187:2, 11–12. Thus, Google’s construction is improper. See Merck & Co., 395 F.3d at 1372 (“A
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`claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does
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`not do so.”); Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1119
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`(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“While not an absolute rule, all claim terms are presumed to have a meaning in
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`6 Google’s only evidence of non-enablement was a single sentence of attorney argument. See Response at 4 (“If
`Plaintiff’s non-construction is adopted, the claims are not enabled and are thus invalid.”).
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`7
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`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson EXHIBIT 1017
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`Case 6:11-cv-00096-LED Document 352 Filed 01/23/13 Page 8 of 39 PageID #: 10205
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`a claim.”). Further, TracBeam’s proposed construction follows the ordinary meaning of the word
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`“terrestrial.” See AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1400 (3d ed. 1997) (defining
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`terrestrial as “of or relating to Earth or its inhabitants”); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
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`288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (acknowledging the heavy presumption that claim terms
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`carry their ordinary and customary meaning).
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`Among the other parties, there is no dispute over the construction of these terms. The
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`remaining Defendants concede that if even Google’s construction is adopted, Google’s
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`construction would encompass TracBeam’s construction. See Response at 3 n.10 (“Defendants
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`agree with Plaintiff
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`that ‘communication stations at
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`terrestrial
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`locations,’ ‘terrestrial
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`communication stations,’ and ‘terrestrial stations’ must be ‘located on or supported (directly or
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`indirectly) by the surface of the earth.’”). Thus, it is agreed by all parties except Google that
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`“communication stations at terrestrial locations,” “terrestrial communication stations,” and
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`“terrestrial stations” must be located on or supported (directly or indirectly) by the surface of the
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`earth. These terms require no further construction.
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`“computational machinery,” “computational machinery performing first and second
`mobile station
`location estimation determiners,” “computational machine
`location
`providing sources,” “mobile station location estimation determiners,” “mobile station
`location determining sources,” “mobile station location estimation sources,” and “mobile
`station location techniques”
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`While this is a diverse collection of claims terms, the parties agree that resolution of a
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`single dispute governs them all. See Reply at 5 n.12. For ease of analysis, the Court will use
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`“computational machinery” and “mobile station location techniques” to explain its constructions.
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`For “computational machinery,” TracBeam proposes “one or more machines (such as a computer
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`or hardware device) that performs computations.” Skyhook proposes “one or more computers
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`not located in a mobile station.” For “mobile station location techniques,” TracBeam proposes
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`“technique for determining mobile station locations.” The Carrier Defendants propose “a
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`Case 6:11-cv-00096-LED Document 352 Filed 01/23/13 Page 9 of 39 PageID #: 10206
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`technique performed by centralized computer equipment for determining mobile station
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`locations.”
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`The parties have two disputes regarding these terms: (1) whether “computational
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`machinery” and “mobile station location techniques” should be limited to “computers;” and (2)
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`whether computational machinery and mobile station location techniques must be “centralized,”
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`or whether they may be “located in a mobile station.” At oral argument, Defendants consented to
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`TracBeam’s hardware device construction that the terms are not limited to computers.7 Tr.
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`Markman Hr’g 53, Nov. 8, 2012. Thus, the sole remaining issue is whether computational
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`machinery and mobile station location techniques must be “centralized” and must not be located
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`in a mobile station.
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`TracBeam argues that computational machinery does not have to be centralized and can
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`exist in a mobile station. Brief at 7. TracBeam argues that the ‘231 Patent describes multiple
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`location centers that are “geographically dispersed” and notes that system components may be
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`“distributed” on a network. Brief at 8; ‘231 Patent, at 20:45–46. TracBeam contends that because
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`system components are distributed throughout the network, their location need not be
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`centralized. Brief at 8. Defendants counter that computational machinery must be located at a
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`“location center.” Reply at 6; ‘231 Patent, at 24:46. Defendants note that Figure 4 of the ‘231
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`Patent discloses a centralized network node that is separate and distinct from the mobile stations.
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`Reply at 6. Further, Defendants assert that the specification does not disclose an embodiment
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`where computational machinery located on one mobile station performs steps for another mobile
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`station. Id. at 7. Thus, Defendants argue the computational machinery cannot be located at a
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`mobile station. Id.
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`7 Defendants made similar statements in their briefing. See Reply at 8 n.19 (“[Defendants] do not dispute that
`switches, routers, and the like are computer equipment.”).
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`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson EXHIBIT 1017
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`Case 6:11-cv-00096-LED Document 352 Filed 01/23/13 Page 10 of 39 PageID #: 10207
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`Defendants’ arguments rest on one particular passage in the specification:
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`Added to this wireless network, the present invention provides the following
`additional components: (10.1) a location center 142 which is required for
`determining a location of a target MS 140 using signal characteristic values for
`this target MS.
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`‘231 Patent, at 24:43–48 (emphasis added). Defendants argue this “location center” limitation
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`must be applied to the entire patent because the sentence describes “the present invention.”
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`Reply at 6; See Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
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`2007) (“When a patent thus describes the features of the ‘present invention’ as a whole, this
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`description limits the scope of the invention.”). However, use of the phrase “the present
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`invention” does not automatically limit the entire patent. Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth
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`Signal, Inc., 659 F.3d 1211, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The phrase is not limiting when other
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`intrinsic evidence does not support applying the limitation to the entire patent. Id.; see DSW, Inc.
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`v. Shoe Pavilion, Inc., 537 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (cautioning against importing
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`limitations from the specification).
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`Here, there are multiple references in the specification disclosing de-centralized
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`computational machinery and location centers. For example, the specification teaches that a
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`mobile location unit may be located onboard a mobile base station. ‘231 Patent, at 99:55–60. It
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`also teaches that a mobile location unit can use a GPS receiver to determine the location of a
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`target mobile station. ‘231 Patent, at 99:63–67. It further teaches that there may be multiple
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`location centers that are “geographically dispersed.” ‘231 Patent, at 20:44–46. Lastly, the
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`Background of the Invention implies that GPS computations may be performed “at or near the
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`object to be located.” ‘231 Patent, at 1:64–66. These references indicate that computational
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`machinery need not be “centralized” or “not located in a mobile station.” It would be improper to
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`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson EXHIBIT 1017
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`Case 6:11-cv-00096-LED Document 352 Filed 01/23/13 Page 11 of 39 PageID #: 10208
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`import this limitation to the entire patent when there are multiple embodiments teaching de-
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`centralized computational machinery and mobile station location techniques.8
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`“Computational machinery” is “one or more machines (such as a computer or hardware
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`device) that performs computations.” “Computational machinery performing first and second
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`mobile station location estimation determiners” requires no construction. “Computational
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`machine location providing sources” is “computational machinery for providing location
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`information.” “Mobile station location estimation determiners” is “machine executed process for
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`providing mobile station location estimates.” “Mobile station location determining sources” is
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`“source (such as a computer system, device, or component) for determining mobile station
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`locations.” “Mobile station location estimating sources” is “source (such as a computer system,
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`device, or component) for estimating mobile station locations.” “Mobile station location
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`techniques” is “technique for determining mobile station locations.”
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`“location information,” “location related information,” and “location related response
`information”
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`The parties agree a single dispute governs these three terms—whether location
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`information must identify a location or merely be related to a location. Tr. Markman Hr’g 14, 18,
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`Nov. 8, 2012. For simplicity, the Court uses the first term, “location information,” to explain its
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`construction.
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`TracBeam argues no construction is necessary. In the alternative, TracBeam proposes
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`“information related to a location.” The Carrier Defendants and Google propose “information
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`identifying a location.” Skyhook proposes “information indicating a determined location of a
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`mobile station.”
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`8 The parties’ remaining claim disputes are non-substantive—the only issue addressed at oral argument was whether
`computational machinery must be centralized. See Tr. Markman Hr’g 53, Nov. 8, 2012.
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`11
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`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson EXHIBIT 1017
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`Case 6:11-cv-00096-LED Document 352 Filed 01/23/13 Page 12 of 39 PageID #: 10209
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`TracBeam argues that Defendants’ proposed constructions unnecessarily limit the claim
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`term. Brief at 13. Its first argument is grammatical. TracBeam argues that when two nouns are
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`used consecutively, the second noun does not identify an instance of the first. Id. at 14. For
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`example, TracBeam notes that a “mountain bike” is not a “bike that identifies a mountain.” Id.
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`Similarly, TracBeam argues that “location information” cannot logically be interpreted as
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`“information that identifies a location.” Id. Second, TracBeam argues that location information is
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`not limited to a “determined location.” Id. at 15. Instead, location information can include data,
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`measurements, and estimates. Id. TracBeam contends that when location information relates to a
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`determined location in the claims, it is emphasized by further limiting language. Id. (citing ‘231
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`Patent Claim 10, at 174:61–67).
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`Defendants argue that “location information” must include an estimate of the location of
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`a mobile station. Response at 10. In Claim 25 of the ‘231 Patent, location information is obtained
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`using corresponding location techniques that “determine a location for the mobile station.” ‘231
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`Patent, Claim 25, at 180:30–32. A different claim in the ‘231 Patent (Claim 1) states that location
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`related information is obtained from location estimation determiners that “provide different
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`geographical indications of an unknown location.” ‘231 Patent, Claim 1, at 171: 6–11.
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`Defendants contend that, while the particular claim language varies, location information “is
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`obtained from wireless location technologies…that provide an estimate of a mobile station’s
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`location.” Response at 11. Additionally, Defendants argue that TracBeam’s grammatical
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`arguments are unpersuasive. Id. at 13. Defendants contend that unlike “mountain bike,” the
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`phrase “location information” does not have a commonly understood meaning. Id. Since location
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`information does not have a commonly understood meaning, it cannot be defined in isolation. Id.
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`12
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`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson EXHIBIT 1017
`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson v. TracBeam
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`Case 6:11-cv-00096-LED Document 352 Filed 01/23/13 Page 13 of 39 PageID #: 10210
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`The specification discloses multiple instances where location information is only used to
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`identify a location instead of actually identifying a location. For example, location information
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`may be “measurement results related to signals” that are “used to locate” the target mobile
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`station. ‘231 Patent, at 27:46–53. Location information may also be “used in deriving” a location
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`estimate. ‘231 Patent, at 110:35–41. Because the specification teaches using location information
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`to identify a location, “location information” itself cannot be construed to require an identified
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`location.
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`None of the four specification passages cited by Defendants compel a different
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`construction.9 Defendants assert that the specification refers to location information as a
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`“location hypotheses.” Reply at 11. Defendants contend that a location hypothesis includes at
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`least a location estimate. Id. Since a location hypothesis includes a location estimate, Defendants
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`contend location information must also include a location estimate. Id.
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` The flaw in Defendants’ argument is that a location estimate is not equivalent to a
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`location hypothesis. A patentee may impliedly redefine a claim term by using a second term as
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`an alternative. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
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`2012). However, the “implied redefinition must be so clear that it equates to an explicit one.” Id.
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`(internal citations omitted).
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`Both the express and implied redefinition arguments fail here. Defendants did not cite
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`any language in the specification or claims expressly stating that hypothesis is synonymous with
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`information. None of the passages cited by Defendant even contain the phrase “location
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`information.” See id. (using two terms in similar fashion is not sufficient to redefine a claim
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`term). Further, there is no clear implied redefinition. The words hypothesis and information have
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`very different ordinary meanings. “Hypothesis” implies some sort of prediction; “information”
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`9 Defendants cite ‘231 Patent, at 13:7–33; id. at 37:31–36; id. at 13:37–41; id. at 68:2–8. Reply at 11–12.
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`13
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`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson EXHIBIT 1017
`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson v. TracBeam
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`Case 6:11-cv-00096-LED Document 352 Filed 01/23/13 Page 14 of 39 PageID #: 10211
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`does not. Thus, the patents do not redefine location hypothesis to mean location information.
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`Accordingly, it would be improper to limit “location information” based on specification
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`references to “location hypotheses.” See Computer Docket Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d
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`1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“This court will not countenance the importation of claim
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`limitations from a few specification statements or figures in the claims.”).
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`Defendants’ construction is improper for a second reason—it seeks to import the final
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`result of the claims into an intermediate step. Defendants argue that location information must
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`identify a location because identifying a location is the fundamental purpose of the patent.
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`Response at 10–11. However, the concept of identifying a location is found in other clauses in
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`the claims.10 This implies that “location information” is broader than merely identifying a
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`location. Instead, obtaining location information is just part of the process of obtaining an actual
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`location identification or estimate. Obtaining location information occurs before analyzing the
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`information obtained from multiple sources. See ‘231 Patent, Claim 1, at 171:29–35. The output
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`of that analysis is the actual identification of a location. Location information itself is something
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`that can be used to identify a location. ‘231 Patent, at 27:46–53; id. at 110:35–41. The actual
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`identification of a location occurs in later steps. Thus, location information does not have to
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`identify a location.
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`“Location information,” “location related information,” and “location related response
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`information” do not require construction.
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`10 For example: “the first location related information includes a geographical indication for a location of the mobile
`station,” ‘231 Patent, Claim 1, at 171:17–19; “location techniques uses the first collection to determine a location for
`the mobile station,” ‘231 Patent, Claim 25, at 180:31–32; “first location technique estimates a location of the mobile
`station,” ‘231 Patent, Claim 162, at 205:43–44; “data indicative of a likelihood of the mobile station being at a
`location represented by said resulting location information,” ‘231 Patent, Claim 162, at 206:5–7; “providing one or
`more location requests for location information, related to a location of one of said mobile stations,” ‘484 Patent,
`Claim 27, at 175:9–11; “first location related information representing one or more of: a first range of locations for
`the first mobile station,” ‘484 Patent, Claim 44, at 177:59–61.
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`14
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`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson EXHIBIT 1017
`T-Mobile / TCS / Ericsson v. TracBeam
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`Case 6:11-cv-00096-LED Document 352 Filed 01/23/13 Page 15 of 39 PageID #: 10212
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`“an unknown location of said mobile station M”
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`The parties agreed not to seek construction of the phrase “geographical indications” and
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`request that the Court only construe “of an unknown location of said mobile station M.”
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`TracBeam proposes “a location of the mobile station for which a resulting location estimate is to
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`be determined.” Defendants propose “a location that has not been determined.”
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`The dispute is whether an “unknown location” is a location that has “not been
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`determined” or a location for which “a resulting location estimate is to be determined.”
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`TracBeam argues that Defendants’ proposed construction improperly requires an unknown
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`location to be categorically unknown. Brief at 16. TracBeam argues this is improperly