UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`ARISTA NETWORKS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`Case IPR2015-01710
`Patent 7,224,668 B1
`
`
`PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`ARISTA NETWORKS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`Case IPR2015-01710
`Patent 7,224,668 B1
`
`
`PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71
`
`
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`Arista Networks, Inc. (“Petitioner” or “Arista”) respectfully requests
`
`reconsideration based on the Board’s misapprehension and/or oversight of key
`
`facts and misapplication of law in deciding to deny institution under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 325(d). This Request is timely as filed within 30 days of the Decision Denying
`
`Institution. See IPR2015-01710, Paper 7 (Feb. 16, 2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)(2).
`
`I.
`
`STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
`
`Patent Owner accuses Petitioner of infringing the U.S. Patent No. 7,224,668
`
`B1 (the “’668 patent”) in two co-pending litigations, namely Cisco Systems, Inc. v.
`
`Arista Networks, Inc., No. 4:14-cv-05343-JSW (N.D. Cal.), filed December 5,
`
`2014, and ITC Inv. No. 337-TA-945 (Network Devices, Related Software and
`
`Components Thereof (II)), filed December 19, 2014.
`
`On April 1, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition requesting inter partes review of
`
`the claims 1–10, 12, 13, 15–28, 30, 31, 33–43, 45–49, 51–64, 66, 67, and 69–72 of
`
`the ’668 patent, namely IPR2015-00974 (“’974 IPR”). See ’974 IPR, Paper 2.
`
`Subsequent to this filing, and prior to the issuance of a decision on institution in
`
`the ’974 IPR, Petitioner became aware of another prior art reference material to the
`
`validity of the ’668 patent, namely U.S. Patent No. 6,246,680 B1 (Ex. 1104,
`
`“Frazier”). See IPR2015-01710, paper 2 at 60 (“’710 Petition”). On August 11,
`
`2015, Petitioner filed another petition requesting inter partes review of the ’668
`
`patent including the Frazier reference (Case IPR2015-01710 (“’710 IPR”)). See
`
`1
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`‘710 IPR, Paper 2.
`
`Several months later, on October 6, 2015 the Board denied institution on the
`
`’974 Petition. See ’974 IPR, paper 7 (“’974 Decision”). More recently, on
`
`February 16, 2016, the Board also denied institution on the ’710 Petition. See ’710
`
`IPR, paper 7 (“’710 Decision”). With respect to the ’710 Petition, the Board
`
`denied institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), reasoning that: (1) the ’710 Petition
`
`“advances the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments that previously
`
`were presented to the Office in the ’974 IPR”; and (2) “Petitioner does not contend
`
`that the newly-cited references were not known or available to it at the time it filed
`
`the ’974 IPR.” Id. at 11.
`
`II. LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) allows a party to request a rehearing on a decision by
`
`the Board on whether to institute a trial. When considering a motion for rehearing
`
`a decision on institution, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion.
`
`Id. An abuse of discretion may be found if a decision is based on an erroneous
`
`interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence,
`
`or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant
`
`factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
`
`Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203
`
`F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`As is noted above, at issue in the present request for rehearing is the Board’s
`
`reliance on 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) in denying institution. Section 325(d) provides:
`
`In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding . . . the
`Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or
`request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or
`arguments previously were presented to the Office.
`
`Notably, this provision does not itself prohibit filing subsequent petitions to
`
`challenge a given patent. Indeed, the PTAB routinely has instituted more than a
`
`single IPR proceeding for a patent based on serial petitions. For example, U.S.
`
`Patent Number 7,237,634 is the subject of thirteen instituted inter partes reviews
`
`based, at least in part, on a number of serial petitions filed by the Ford Motor
`
`Company (“Ford”). See IPR2014-00904, IPR2014-01416, IPR2015-00606,
`
`IPR2015-00722, IPR2015-00758, IPR2015-00784, IPR2015-00785, IPR2015-
`
`00787, IPR2015-00790, IPR2015-00791, IPR2015-00799, IPR2015-00800,
`
`IPR2015-00801. Similarly, U.S. Patent Number 7,104,347 is the subject of five
`
`instituted inter partes reviews based, at least in part, on serial petitions filed by
`
`Ford. See IPR2014-00571, IPR2014-00579, IPR2014-00884, IPR2015-00794,
`
`IPR2015-00795.
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`
`The ’710 Decision demonstrates an abuse of discretion in denying institution
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`on the ’710 Petition. In finding that the ’710 Petition contains art and arguments
`
`that are “substantially the same” as those presented in the ’974 Petition, it ignores
`
`that the two petitions feature different base references, and that markedly different
`
`arguments are presented regarding obviousness. Further, in finding that Petitioner
`
`failed to contend that the newly-cited Frazier reference was “not known or
`
`available to it” at the time it filed the ’974 Petition, the ’710 Petition applies a test
`
`found nowhere in statute or rule while ignoring an express representation to the
`
`contrary by Petitioner. Finally, the present case cannot credibly be cast as
`
`harassment warranting no consideration on the merits under Section 325(d).
`
`A. Only Through Oversight or Misapprehension Could the ’710
`Decision Find that the ’710 Petition Contains Art and Arguments
`That Are Substantially the Same as Those in the ’974 Petition
`
`Substantial evidence does not support the ’710 Decision’s finding that the art
`
`and arguments presented in the ’710 Petition are substantially the same as those in
`
`the ’974 Petition. To the contrary, they are materially different with respect to the
`
`primary references and the arguments made for the obviousness combinations.
`
`The ’710 Petition is based on a different primary reference
`
`1.
`As an initial matter, the primary reference upon which the ’974 Petition
`
`relies for the majority of the claim limitations, namely U.S. Patent No. 6,674,743
`
`(“Amara”), is wholly absent from the ’710 Petition. Compare ’974 Petition at 3
`
`with ’710 Petition at 2-3. Amara is included, alone or in combination with other
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`secondary references, in all invalidity grounds set forth in the ’974 Petition. See id.
`
`The ’710 Petition, on the other hand, introduces a new primary reference—the
`
`Frazier reference. See id. The Petitions overlap only in that the ’710 Petition uses
`
`a subset of the secondary references (namely Habraken and Moberg) included in
`
`the ’974 Petition. Compare ’974 Petition at 58-60 (applying combination of
`
`Amara with Habraken to the challenged claims) with ’710 Petition at 31-56
`
`(applying a combination of Frazier with Habraken to the challenged claims).
`
`The ’710 Decision selectively cites to portions of the discussion of reasons
`
`to combine Habraken with the base references, and notes that similar arguments
`
`are given in each Petition. ’710 Decision at 8-9. Because both base references
`
`generally discuss packet forwarding devices, the fact that the rationale for
`
`combination of secondary references would be similar is unremarkable. Moreover,
`
`this cursory analysis ignores the fact that the actual application of these references
`
`to base references for obviousness—which takes up the majority of the Petitions—
`
`is distinct in each Petition. Indeed, the portions that the ’710 Decision excerpts
`
`account for less than one page out of sixty in each of the two Petitions.
`
`Such limited overlap is not a legitimate basis for finding the entirety of the
`
`art and arguments presented in each Petition are “substantially the same.” Yet, the
`
`’710 Decision fails otherwise to justify its conclusion that the ’710 Petition
`
`advances the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments that previously
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`were presented to the Office in the ’974 Petition. The ’710 Decision’s finding,
`
`therefore, effectively bars the use of secondary references cited in prior filed
`
`petitions in subsequent petitions, despite the PTAB’s established track record
`
`allowing use of such references. See IPR2015-00778, paper 17 at 26-27 (“The fact
`
`that there is overlap in some respect does not mean the prior art as a whole or the
`
`arguments as a whole are the same or substantially the same.”); see also IPR2015-
`
`00799, paper 11 at 6-8 (instituting despite overlapping art with earlier petition);
`
`IPR2015-00792, paper 13 at 17 (same); IPR2015-00615, paper 9 at 24-25 (same);
`
`IPR2015-00057, paper 10 at 20-22 (same); IPR2014-01208, paper 13 at 12-15
`
`(same). By imposing such a bar here, the ’710 Decision is arbitrary and capricious
`
`and therefore an abuse of discretion.
`
`2.
`
`The ’710 Petition presents significantly different arguments
`in making obviousness combinations
`
`In the ’974 Decision, the Board denied institution in part on the finding that
`
`the ’974 Petition “does not identify with specific particularity the ground on which
`
`the challenge to the independent claims is based.” ’974 Decision at 15-16. The
`
`Board took issue with the ’974 Petition’s identifying three limitations of claim 1
`
`that could be met by either or both of the Amara or Habraken prior art references:
`
`As described above with respect to Ground 1A, Amara describes (1)
`the internal applications configuring the interface ports 202-06, (2) the
`internal applications configuring policies applied by the policy
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`engines 224-28, and (3) the addresses of the device being specified in
`the configuration of the device 200. Supra, [1.1], [1.2], [3.0].
`However, even if one were to conclude that this is not the case, it
`would have been obvious in view of Habraken to modify Amara’s
`device to include any or all of (1), (2), and (3).
`
`’974 Decision at 16 (citing ’974 Petition at 58) (emphasis in ’974 Decision). The
`
`Board similarly criticized the ’974 Petition’s treatment of claims 37 and 55, where
`
`another limitation was identified as being met by either or both of Amara or
`
`Habraken. See ’974 Decision at 16. Ultimately, the Board found that the ’974
`
`Petition lacked sufficient specificity because it did not state “which of the different
`
`combinations is relied upon” to support a finding of obviousness. Id. at 17.
`
`In contradistinction, the ’710 Petition contains no such arguments premised
`
`on multiple, alternative combinations of Amara and Habraken. Instead, in
`
`addressing the same limitations, the ’710 Petition argues that it would have been
`
`obvious to modify the Frazier reference in view of Habraken.
`
`A POSITA would have further modified Frazier’s device 101 in view
`of Habraken to have the CPS 160, and in particular the software
`processes running on CPU 161, configure the ports coupled to
`network interface 205 and to have the addresses of the device be
`specified in the configuration of the device 101.
`
`’710 Petition at 28. See also id. at 29-31 (providing reasons for combining Frazier
`
`7
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`and Habraken). As such, the arguments that the ’710 Petition advances as to the
`
`obviousness of these limitations differ from those that the ’974 Petition made—
`
`both in the identity of art relied upon in the combination and in the number of
`
`combinations presented.
`
`Indeed, the ’710 Decision recognizes the distinction, noting that the “current
`
`[’710] Petition apparently attempts to provide [the] specificity” the Board found
`
`lacking in the ’974 Petition. ’710 Decision at 10. Clearly, Petitioner presented
`
`significantly different arguments in the ’710 Petition than in the ’974 Petition.
`
`Therefore, substantial evidence does not support the Decision’s contrary finding.
`
`3.
`The ’710 Decision relies on inapposite precedent
`Biodelivery Sciences International, Inc. v. RB Pharmaceuticals Limited,
`
`Case IPR2014-00998, Paper 12 (“Biodelivery Sciences”), does not support the ’710
`
`Decision’s denying institution under Section 325(d). The facts of that case are
`
`readily distinguishable. In Biodelivery Sciences, the Board denied institution on a
`
`second-filed petition, which the petitioner alleged contained two references that the
`
`first-filed petition did not cite. See id. at 7. Importantly, the first petition actually
`
`discussed one of the allegedly new references (a “EMEA Study Report”), and the
`
`Board’s decision to institute the first petition also cited this reference. Id. The
`
`second allegedly new reference (the “’883 Application”) was also implicated in the
`
`first petition because it was related to a patent that the first petition cited “for the
`
`8
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`same relevant disclosure.” Id. at 8. No such considerations exist here—the Frazier
`
`reference of the ’710 Petition is completely absent from the ’974 Petition.
`
`B. Only Through Oversight or Misapprehension Could the ’710
`Decision Impose an Improper Legal Test and Make Unsupported
`Findings Relating to Petitioner’s Knowledge of the Frazier
`Reference
`
`In declining to institute proceedings, the ’710 Decision also relies on the
`
`Petitioner’s alleged failure to “contend specifically that the newly-cited references
`
`were not known or available to it at the time it filed the ’974 IPR.” ’710 Decision
`
`at 11. In doing so, the Board abused its discretion by applying an improper,
`
`arbitrary (and practically unworkable) legal standard and making findings of fact
`
`that are not supported by substantial evidence.
`
`As an initial matter, nothing in Section 325(d) or any other applicable rule or
`
`statute, requires Petitioner to show that the newly-cited Frazier reference was
`
`unknown or unavailable to it at the time of filing the ’710 Petition. Such a
`
`requirement invokes estoppel principles that do not apply here. Specifically,
`
`Section 315(e)(1) governs the estoppel effect of a ground of invalidity, and bars a
`
`petitioner from requesting a proceeding before the Office on any ground that was
`
`raised or “reasonably could have been raised” in a previous proceeding. 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 315(e)(1). Importantly, this bar arises only after a final written decision in the
`
`inter partes review. Id. Absent a final written decision, neither Section 315(e)(1)
`
`9
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`nor Section 325(d) permits the Board to effectively estop a Petitioner from using
`
`newly-cited references because they “could have been raised” before.
`
`Yet, the ’710 Decision effectively broadens and extends estoppel to any
`
`reference that was “known or available” to a petitioner at the time of a first-filed
`
`petition—a result that is not only inconsistent with the narrower application of
`
`estoppel in Section 315(e)(1), but also arbitrary in its application because there is
`
`no guidance in applicable statutes or rules as to what is meant by this “known or
`
`available” standard and how a petitioner can make a showing that a newly-cited
`
`reference was not “known or available” to it at the time of filing an initial petition.
`
`Indeed, the Board has, on numerous occasions, instituted subsequently filed
`
`petitions for inter partes review without requiring the petitioner to make such a
`
`showing. See IPR2015-00615, paper 9 at 24 (instituting despite “references that
`
`were available to Petitioner at the time of filing” an earlier filed petition);
`
`IPR2015-00778, paper 17 at 27 (noting “Petitioner has not indicated that the prior
`
`art references applied in this proceeding were unavailable to the Petitioner at the
`
`time Petitioner filed its first Petition” but instituting anyway).
`
`Further, in addition to misapplying the law, the ’710 Decision ignores record
`
`evidence contrary to its finding. Even if the statute or regulations allowed the
`
`Board to require a reference in a subsequent petition to be unknown and
`
`unavailable to the Petitioner at the time of its first petition, Petitioner made clear in
`
`10
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`the ’710 Petition that “it was after the filing of the first petition that Arista became
`
`aware of Frazier . . . .” ’710 Petition at 60. This statement is an unambiguous
`
`confirmation that the Frazier reference was not known to Arista at the time it filed
`
`the ’974 IPR. This representation also distinguishes the present case from the
`
`Unilever decision the ’710 Decision cites as supporting its reasoning in this regard,
`
`as no such affirmation was included in the petition in that case. See, generally,
`
`Unilever, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., Case IPR2014-00506, Paper 2 (petition
`
`discussed in Unilever decision).
`
`The ’710 Decision fails to demonstrate that Petitioner was aware of the
`
`teachings of Frazier before Petitioner filed the ’974 Petition. Compare Biodelivery
`
`Sciences at 7-8 (detailing where references alleged not to have been cited in an
`
`earlier filed IPR were mentioned in, or were cited by prior art included in, an
`
`earlier filed petition). Rather, the record contains only Petitioner’s overt
`
`representation to the contrary. As a result, substantial evidence does not support
`
`the ’710 Decision’s finding that Petitioner somehow failed to confirm that the
`
`Frazier reference was not known to it when it filed the ’974 Petition.
`
`To the extent the ’710 Decision is applying its stated standard as requiring
`
`Petitioner not only to represent that it did not know of the newly-cited prior art but
`
`also to demonstrate that the newly-cited reference was somehow “unavailable” to it
`
`at the time the prior petition was filed, the Decision adopts an arbitrary standard
`
`11
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`that cannot be met in practice. The only art that a petition may apply in inter
`
`partes review are patents and printed publications. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). As
`
`these materials are publicly disseminated, arguably any and all prior art a petitioner
`
`could apply in an inter partes review is technically “available” to it at the time it
`
`files a petition (namely via prior art searches through patents and publications). As
`
`such, any subsequently filed petition could be arbitrarily rejected on this ground.
`
`Such a rule would be particularly unjust here where the ’668 patent is
`
`asserted against Petitioner in a Section 337 Investigation before the International
`
`Trade Commission. Requiring a petitioner involved in co-pending litigation to cite
`
`any and all art possibly “available” to it at the time of its initial petition would
`
`counsel towards waiting until the last permissible date to file the petition so as to
`
`ensure that all prior art discovered in the litigation could be included. Such an
`
`approach would be inconsistent with the intent of the inter partes review
`
`proceeding (namely, providing an inexpensive and faster alternative to litigation),1
`
`
`1 See H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011) (“The legislation is designed to
`
`establish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent
`
`quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”); see also
`
`Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review
`
`12
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`because it would encourage delay in seeking IPR.
`
`C. Arista’s Petitions for IPR for the ’668 Patent Cannot Be Credibly
`Cast as Harassment
`
`The ’710 Decision further attempts to support the denial under Section
`
`325(d) on policy grounds, stating “[a]llowing similar, serial challenges to the same
`
`patent, by the same petitioner, risks harassment of patent owners and frustration of
`
`Congress’s intent in enacting the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.” ’710
`
`Decision at 10. Although Congress raised concerns about potential harassment of
`
`patent owners when it passed the AIA, the ’710 Decision notably does not find that
`
`harassment is present here, nor would a finding of harassment be supported by the
`
`facts of this case. As such, reliance by the Board on harassment could arise only
`
`through oversight or misapprehension, and thus, an abuse of discretion.
`
`As an initial matter, the ’710 Petition was Petitioner’s second petition as to
`
`the ’668 patent. To the extent that the ’710 Decision suggests that the
`
`circumstances here qualify as an improper “serial challenge,” it essentially imposes
`
`a limit of only one petition per patent contrary to Congressional intent and Board
`
`practice. Congress could have adopted such a rigid, one petition per patent rule
`
`
`Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77
`
`Fed. Reg. 48680-01 (same).
`
`13
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`when enacting the AIA to protect against abuse, but did not. Instead, Congress
`
`adopted other protections “sought by inventors and patent owners” to prevent inter
`
`partes review from being used for harassment, including imposing “estoppel
`
`against relitigating in court those issues that an inter partes challenger reasonably
`
`could have raised in his administrative challenge,” imposing “time limits on
`
`starting an inter partes [] review when litigation is pending,” and imposing a one-
`
`year time limit on the duration” of the proceeding. 157 Cong. Rec. S1326 (daily
`
`ed. Mar. 7, 2011) (statement of Sen. Sessions).
`
`Although Congress imposed a further safeguard against abuse through
`
`Section 325(d), this provision does not empower the Board to arbitrarily dismiss all
`
`subsequently filed petitions. Relying on Section 325(d) to deny a subsequent
`
`petition in a case such as this one, when the subsequent petition contains a newly-
`
`cited base reference, and no IPR has been instituted, suggests that no subsequent
`
`petition could ever institute.
`
`Further, it is hard to imagine how Cisco can be deemed harassed, or even
`
`inconvenienced, by the ’710 Petition given that the ’974 Petition was not instituted.
`
`Compare Biodelivery Sciences at 6, 9 (denying institution on a second filed
`
`petition where the first filed petition was instituted). This situation is not one
`
`where the Patent Owner may have to defend a second inter partes review on a
`
`patent already undergoing inter partes review. The sum total of Patent Owner’s
`
`14
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`efforts with respect to ’974 and ’710 Petitions were the filing of two Preliminary
`
`Patent Owner’s Responses, undertakings that are not even required. See 37 CFR §
`
`42.107(a) (“The patent owner may file a preliminary response to the petition.”
`
`(emphasis added)). If giving a Patent Owner the opportunity to file a second
`
`Patent Owner’s Response on a patent is grounds for exercising discretion not to
`
`institute under Section 325(d), then the Board may arbitrarily dismiss all
`
`subsequently-filed petitions on this ground. Yet, it has not historically denied all
`
`such subsequently-filed petitions, as noted above.
`
`Moreover, to the extent that the ’710 Decision faults Petitioner for
`
`addressing perceived deficiencies in the first-filed petition, see ’710 Petition at 10,
`
`such activity should not be punished, especially where no IPR has been instituted.
`
`To the contrary, allowing a petitioner to address any deficiencies in an earlier
`
`petition furthers Congress’s purpose of making inter partes review a speedy and
`
`inexpensive way to address invalidity challenges.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Board
`
`withdraw the denial of the ’710 Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), consider the
`
`prior art and arguments set forth in the ’710 Petition on the merits under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 314(a), and authorize inter partes review of claims 1–10, 12, 13, 15–28, 30, 31,
`
`33–43, 45–49, 51–64, 66, 67, and 69–72 of the ’668 patent.
`
`15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: March 17, 2016
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
` /Kevin E. Greene/
`
`W. Karl Renner, Reg. No. 41,265
`Kevin E. Greene, Reg. No. 46,031
`Fish & Richardson P.C.
`P.O. Box 1022
`Minneapolis, MN 55440-1022
`T: 202-783-5070
`F: 202-783-2331
`Attorneys for Petitioner
`
`16
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-01710
`Attorney Docket: 40963-0006IP2
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 CFR § 42.6(e)(1), the undersigned certifies that on March 17,
`
`2016, a complete and entire copy of this Request for Rehearing was provided via
`
`email to the Patent Owner by serving the correspondence addresses of record as
`
`follows:
`
`Lori A. Gordon
`Robert Greene Sterne
`Daniel S. Block
`Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C.
`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20005
`
`Email: lgordon-PTAB@skgf.com
`Email: rsterne-PTAB@skgf.com
`Email: dblock-PTAB@skgf.com
`Email: ptab@skgf.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/Edward G. Faeth/
`Edward G. Faeth
`Fish & Richardson P.C.
`3200 RBC Plaza
`60 South Sixth Street
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`(202) 626-6420
Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.
After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.
Accept $ Charge
Still Working On It
This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.
Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.
A few More Minutes ... Still Working
It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.
Thank you for your continued patience.
This document could not be displayed.
We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
Set your membership
status to view this document.
With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll
get a whole lot more, including:
- Up-to-date information for this case.
- Email alerts whenever there is an update.
- Full text search for other cases.
- Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.
One Moment Please
The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.
Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.
Your document is on its way!
If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.
Sealed Document
We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.
If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.
Access Government Site
