Paper No. 16
`Filed: February 16, 2016
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_________________
`
`
`
`ALLSTEEL INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`DIRTT ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS LTD.
`Patent Owner
`
`__________________
`
`Case IPR2015-01691
`Patent No. 8,024,901
`__________________
`
`
`
`
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, SCOTT A. DANIELS, and
` JACQUELINE T. HARLOW, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
`PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`
`Filed: February 16, 2016
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_________________
`
`
`
`ALLSTEEL INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`DIRTT ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS LTD.
`Patent Owner
`
`__________________
`
`Case IPR2015-01691
`Patent No. 8,024,901
`__________________
`
`
`
`
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, SCOTT A. DANIELS, and
` JACQUELINE T. HARLOW, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
`PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED ........... 1
`
`THE PANEL’S DECISION ON CLAIM 8 ..................................................... 3
`
`III. BASES FOR REHEARING AND REVERSAL AS TO CLAIM 8 ............... 6
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`The Standard for Rehearing .................................................................. 6
`
`Relevant Claim Construction Principles ............................................... 6
`
`The Sole Embodiment of Claim 8 ......................................................... 8
`
`The Panel’s Construction Excludes the “Generally L-Shaped
`Slot” of the Sole Embodiment. .............................................................. 9
`
`The Panel’s Construction Overlooks that the “Generally L-
`Shaped Slot” of the Sole Embodiment Is Configured Such that
`Not All Surfaces “Engage a Substantially L-Shaped Hook.” ............. 13
`
`Petitioner Has Demonstrated a Reasonable Likelihood of
`Success on Claim 8. ............................................................................ 15
`
`IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 15
`
`
`
`
`
`-i-
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`
`
`FEDERAL CASES
`Anchor Wall Systems, Inc. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc.,
`340 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ........................................................................... 12
`
`Page(s)
`
`Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp.,
`732 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ............................................................................. 8
`
`Epos Technologies Ltd. v. Pegasus Technologies Ltd.,
`766 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................. 8
`
`Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC,
`582 F. App’x 864 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................................... 1, 7
`
`In re Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC,
`793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ......................................................................... 1, 6
`
`Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc.,
`152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ............................................................................. 7
`
`Kaneka Corp. v. Xiamen Kingdomway Group Co.,
`790 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ....................................................................passim
`
`Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels,
`No. 2015-1631, 2016 WL 463539 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2016) ................................. 2
`
`FEDERAL STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 .......................................................................................................... 3
`
`RULES
`
`Rule 42.71(c) ........................................................................................................ 6, 15
`
`REGULATIONS
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) ................................................................................................... 6
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) ................................................................................................... 2
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ................................................................................................. 2
`
`-ii-
`
`
`
`
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`AVX Corp. v. Greatbatch Ltd.,
`IPR2015-00710, paper 13, slip op. (PTAB Jan. 13, 2016) ....................... 2, 11, 13
`
`Merial Ltd. v. Virbac, IPR2014-01279, Paper 18, slip op. (PTAB Apr. 15,
`2015) ..................................................................................................................... 6
`
`Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. Black Hills Media, LLC, IPR2014-00766, paper 16,
`slip op. (PTAB Feb. 23, 2015) .............................................................................. 6
`
`
`
`-iii-
`
`
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED
`
`The Panel’s decision not to institute inter partes review (“IPR”) of claim 8
`
`of the ’901 patent represents an abuse of discretion because it depends upon
`
`constructions of two claim terms that ignore the sole embodiment of claim 8
`
`disclosed in the ’901 patent—indeed, the Panel’s constructions exclude this sole
`
`embodiment. This oversight is fatal to the Panel’s analysis under Federal Circuit
`
`law, which has repeatedly emphasized that under the Phillips standard “a claim
`
`construction that excludes a preferred embodiment is ‘rarely, if ever, correct’” and
`
`“a construction that excludes all disclosed embodiments . . . is especially
`
`disfavored.” See, e.g., Kaneka Corp. v. Xiamen Kingdomway Group Co., 790 F.3d
`
`1298, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal citation omitted). Ignoring this intrinsic
`
`evidence results in the Panel’s analysis being inconsistent with the broadest
`
`reasonable interpretation standard that it is required to apply here, In re Cuozzo
`
`Speed Tech., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1275-79 (Fed. Cir. 2015)—a standard that can
`
`never result in a construction that is narrower than what a court would provide
`
`under the Phillips standard. Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 F. App’x
`
`864, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Here, if the Panel’s improperly narrow constructions
`
`are corrected, the Petitioner’s evidence and arguments show that claim 8 is invalid,
`
`or, at the very least, that there is a “reasonable likelihood” that Petitioner will
`
`prevail for claim 8—especially because the “reasonable likelihood of success”
`1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`standard of review is “very different” from the standard of review for a Board’s
`
`Final Written Decision. See Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, No. 2015-1631, 2016
`
`WL 463539, at *9 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2016) (emphasis added). Accordingly, for the
`
`reasons set forth in detail below, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), Petitioner
`
`requests rehearing and reversal of the Panel’s decision denying Institution of Inter
`
`Partes Review (“IPR”) with respect to claim 8 of the ’901 patent (Paper 10 at 16-
`
`18). Petitioner does not request rehearing on any other aspect of the Panel’s
`
`decision.1
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`Petitioner addressed the arguments upon which this Motion is based at
`
`Petition (Paper 1), pp. 9, 34–36, 39, and 43. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). For
`
`example, petitioner stated that “[t]he claims in this inter partes review are given the
`
`“broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification. See 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.100(b).” Paper 1, at 9. Based on a proper claim construction, Petitioners
`
`arguments and evidence submitted on pp. 34-36, 39, and 43 set forth why IPR of
`
`claim 8 should be instituted. See AVX Corp. v. Greatbatch Ltd., IPR2015-00710,
`
`paper 13, slip op. at 5-7 (PTAB Jan. 13, 2016) (granting-in-part a request for
`
`rehearing where the Petitioner submitted a modified figure, further clarifying an
`
`2
`
`invalidity argument).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`II. THE PANEL’S DECISION ON CLAIM 8
`
`
`
`In its petition for IPR, Petitioner argued that claims 1, 4, 5, 8, and 9 are
`
`obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Raith (Ex. 1003) and Yu (Ex. 1005). (Petition
`
`at 33-34.) The Panel instituted IPR on claims 1, 4, 5, and 9, but declined to
`
`institute on claim 8. (Paper 10 at 18.) Claim 8 of the ’901 patent depends from
`
`claim 1 and reads as follows:
`
`The movable reconfigurable wall system of claim 1, wherein said
`
`stringers include a cantilever channel stringer, said cantilever channel
`
`stringer having: a central horizontally extending channel portion with
`
`a generally L-shaped slot, said L-shaped slot adapted to receive and
`
`engage a substantially L-shaped hook formed on a wall accessory; an
`
`upper portion having a tile support; a lower portion having a tile
`
`support; and a pair of extending webs connecting said channel portion
`
`to said upper and a lower portion. (Ex. 1001.)
`
`The Panel reasoned that “Petitioner has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable
`
`likelihood that it would prevail in its challenge to claim 8,” specifically with
`
`respect to the limitation “a central horizontally extending channel portion with a
`
`generally L-shaped slot, said L-shaped slot adapted to receive and engage a
`
`substantially L-shaped hook formed on a wall accessory.” (Paper 10 at 17-18.)
`
`The Panel agreed with Petitioners’ arguments regarding the remaining limitations
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`of claim 8. (Id. at 17.)
`
`
`
`The Panel’s analysis in deciding not to institute IPR on claim 8 centered on
`
`Petitioner’s modified version of Yu Figure 30, which appeared at page 36 of the
`
`Petition and is reproduced below.
`
`Modified Excerpt of Fig. 30 of Yu (Pet. at 36.)
`
`
`
`As the Panel recognized, the green marking shown in modified Figure 30 indicates
`
`where, in Petitioner’s view, the claimed “generally L-shaped slot” is found in Yu.
`
`(Paper 10 at 17.) Nonetheless, the Panel determined that Petitioner has not
`
`demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that this claim element is met in Yu because
`
`“the longer portion of the L [in the modified figure from Yu] is in space, not
`
`defined by any boundary,” which “is not sufficient to show how the channel
`
`portion has a generally L shaped slot as claimed.” (Paper 10 at 18 (emphasis in
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`original).) The Panel provided the additional explanation that “Petitioner has not
`
`directed [the Panel] to where in Yu bracket 189-5 [i.e., the structure in Yu that
`
`forms the top boundary of the longer portion of the L-shaped channel] engages
`
`connector bracket 26” such that the Yu channel is “adapted to receive and engage a
`
`substantially L-shaped hook formed on a wall accessory.” (Id.)
`
`Accordingly, the Panel’s decision on claim 8 depends on implicit
`
`constructions of “generally L-shaped slot” and “L-shaped slot adapted to . . .
`
`engage a substantially L-shaped hook.” The Panel’s construction of L-shaped slot
`
`requires all portions of the “generally L-shaped slot” to be bounded, with no
`
`portions being “in space, not defined by any boundary.” And the Panel’s implicit
`
`construction of “said L-shaped slot adapted to receive and. . . engage a
`
`substantially L-shaped hook” requires that all portions of the “generally L-shaped
`
`slot” be adapted to “engage a substantially L-shaped hook” as opposed to a portion
`
`of the slot. These implicit claim constructions are an abuse of discretion because
`
`they rely on analysis that misapprehends or overlooks critical aspects of the
`
`intrinsic record of the ’901 patent, thereby defining the claim in a way that
`
`excludes even the sole embodiment disclosed in the ’901 patent for claim 8.
`
`Because the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 8 is not limited in the
`
`manner asserted by the Panel, Petitioner meets the reasonable likelihood of success
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`standard necessary for institution on claim 8 for the reasons presented in the
`
`Petition. (Pet. at 33-43.)
`
`III. BASES FOR REHEARING AND REVERSAL AS TO CLAIM 8
`
`A.
`
`The Standard for Rehearing
`
`“When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for
`
`an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “An abuse of discretion may be
`
`determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual
`
`finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an
`
`unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Yamaha Corp. of Am. v.
`
`Black Hills Media, LLC, IPR2014-00766, paper 16, slip op. at 2 (PTAB Feb. 23,
`
`2015) (citations omitted). Likewise, where the Board has “misapprehended or
`
`overlooked a significant fact, the necessary abuse of discretion required by Rule
`
`42.71(c) has been established.” Merial Ltd. v. Virbac, IPR2014-01279, paper 18,
`
`slip op. at 8 (PTAB Apr. 15, 2015).
`
`B. Relevant Claim Construction Principles
`
`
`
`The Panel applies the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard to claim
`
`construction when considering a petition for institution of IPR. In re Cuozzo Speed
`
`Tech., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1275-79 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Importantly, “[t]he broadest
`
`reasonable interpretation of a claim term may be the same as or broader than the
`
`construction of a term under the Phillips standard. But it cannot be narrower.”
`6
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 F. App’x 864, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
`
`(emphasis added).
`
`
`
`A near universal rule of claim construction under Phillips and certainly
`
`under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard is that “[a] patent claim
`
`should be construed to encompass at least one disclosed embodiment in the written
`
`description portion of the patent specification.” Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro,
`
`Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Federal Circuit is unequivocal that
`
`in theory the only time the rule may not apply is where there is “highly persuasive
`
`evidentiary support” indicating it should not. Id. (“A claim construction that does
`
`not encompass a disclosed embodiment is . . . ‘rarely, if ever, correct and would
`
`require highly persuasive evidentiary support.’”) (citation omitted). The Federal
`
`Circuit routinely reverses courts that do not observe this rule of construction.
`
`For example, in Kaneka Corp., the Federal Circuit vacated a district court’s
`
`claim construction of the term “sealed tank,” because it excluded all of the
`
`embodiments disclosed in the patent at issue. 790 F.3d at 1304. There, the district
`
`court construed “sealed tank” to mean “a tank that is closed to prevent the entry or
`
`exit of materials,” which the defendants contended was consistent with the plain
`
`and ordinary meaning of the term. Id. The patentee, however, argued that such a
`
`construction conflicted with the specification, which only disclosed tanks “sealed
`
`to the atmosphere, but not necessarily other materials.” Id. Even though the
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`specification never actually used the term “sealed,” the Federal Circuit agreed with
`
`the patentee because “a construction that excludes all disclosed embodiments . . . is
`
`especially disfavored.” Id.; see also Epos Technologies Ltd. v. Pegasus
`
`Technologies Ltd., 766 F.3d 1338, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (vacating a district
`
`court’s claim construction that excluded a preferred embodiment); Broadcom
`
`Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (explaining that
`
`“an interpretation which ‘excludes a [disclosed] embodiment from the scope of the
`
`claim is rarely, if ever, correct.’” (citation omitted)).
`
`C.
`
`The Sole Embodiment of Claim 8
`
`
`
`A preferred embodiment of the ’901 patent includes “work surfaces, mill
`
`work and wall accessories such as trays or document holders” that are
`
`“connectable to modules 20,” which “can be easily achieved in the [wall system of
`
`the ’901 patent] using cantilever channel stringers 40 with channel brackets
`
`horizontally disposed in the channel between adjacent tiles 18 as shown most
`
`clearly in FIGS. 8 and 9.” (Ex. 1001 at 6:16-21.) The ’901 patent further
`
`describes the channel stringers of the preferred embodiment:
`
`Each channel stringer 40 includes a central horizontally extending
`
`channel portion 41 with a generally L-shaped slot 42 formed along its
`
`length adapted to receive and engage a substantially L-shaped hook 45
`
`8
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`formed on a wall accessory 47 such as the document holder shown in
`
`FIG. 8. (Id. at 6:22-26.)
`
`Beyond Figures 8 and 9, which are referenced in the above language from the
`
`specification and reproduced below, the ’901 patent includes no further description
`
`of the claimed “generally L-shaped slot.” Thus, this is the sole embodiment for
`
`claim 8.
`
`
`
`
`
`D.
`
`The Panel’s Construction Excludes the “Generally L-Shaped
`Slot” of the Sole Embodiment.
`
`
`The Panel declined to institute IPR on Claim 8 on the basis that the L-shaped
`
`slot in Yu includes a “longer portion of the L” that is “in space, not defined by any
`
`boundary.” (Paper No. 10 at 18.) But the only disclosure of a “generally L-shaped
`
`slot” in the ’901 patent has a “longer portion of the L” that is “in space, not defined
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`by any boundary.” This is clearly seen in the magnified L-shaped slot from Figure
`
`9 of the ’901 patent below:
`
`The “Generally L-shaped Slot” disclosed in the ’901 Patent
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Annotated Figure 9 of ’901 patent
`(mirror image). Patent Owner Prelim.
`Response at 45.
`
`The image on the right above is a magnified image of “generally L-shaped slot
`
`42,” but as is clear from the image, the boundaries of “slot 42” define a shape that
`
`is plainly more “J-shaped” than “L-shaped,” and only when the illustrative red
`
`lines are added—lines that are “in space, not defined by any boundary” just like in
`
`Petitioner’s modified Figure 30
`
`from Yu—does an “L-shape” emerge.
`
`Accordingly, and just as the district court improperly did in Kaneka, the Panel’s
`
`requirement that the “generally L-shaped slot” not be formed by portions that are
`
`“in space, not defined by any boundary” excludes “slot 42” from Figure 9 of the
`
`’901 patent—i.e., the sole embodiment of “generally L-shaped slot” disclosed in
`
`10
`
`the patent.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`In addition to overlooking the sole embodiment of the ’901 patent in
`
`reaching its implicit claim constructions, the Panel also overlooked the word
`
`“generally” in claim 8 in reaching its determination that Yu does not disclose a
`
`“generally” L-shaped slot as claimed. Indeed, as the below images illustrating the
`
`“slots” in both Yu and the preferred embodiment of the ’901 patent demonstrate,
`
`the two slots are “generally” L-shaped in much the same way2:
`
`If the slot disclosed in the ’901 patent is “generally L-shaped”…
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Annotated Figure 9 of ’901 patent
`(mirror image). Patent Owner Prelim.
`Response at 45.
`
`2
`Allsteel is simply explaining the arguments made in its petition. See
`
`AVX Corp. v. Greatbatch Ltd., IPR2015-00710, paper 13, slip op. (PTAB Jan. 13,
`
`2016) (granting a motion for rehearing in which the petitioner clarified, in more
`
`detail, its invalidity positions).
`
`11
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Why isn’t the slot in Yu “generally L-shaped”?
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Modified Excerpt of Fig. 30 of Yu
`(Pet. at 36.)
`
`
`
`
`Petitioner submits that, to the extent that the slot shown in Figure 9 is “generally L-
`
`shaped” (as the Panel must concede that it is to avoid excluding the sole
`
`embodiment), the slot identified in Yu in the Petition is also “generally L-shaped”
`
`according to claim 8. To the extent that the Panel is implicitly construing claim 8
`
`to exclude the term “generally” or otherwise require a more precise “L-shaped
`
`slot” than appears in Yu, the Panel has further abused its discretion by
`
`misapprehending or overlooking this claim language. See, e.g., Anchor Wall
`
`Systems, Inc. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 1310–11 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2003) (holding that court erred in construing term “generally parallel” to mean
`
`12
`
`exactly parallel).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`E.
`
`The Panel’s Construction Overlooks that the “Generally L-
`Shaped Slot” of the Sole Embodiment Is Configured Such that
`Not All Surfaces “Engage a Substantially L-Shaped Hook.”
`
`
`The panel also declined to institute IPR on the basis that “Petitioner has not
`
`directed [the Panel] to where in Yu bracket 189-5 [i.e., the structure in Yu that
`
`forms the top boundary of the longer portion of the L-shaped slot] engages
`
`connector bracket 26” such that the Yu slot is “adapted to receive and engage a
`
`substantially L-shaped hook.” (Paper 10 at 18.) But the plain language of claim 8
`
`does not require Petitioner to demonstrate that bracket 189-5 in Yu, which defines
`
`the longer top portion of the L-shaped slot, engages connector bracket 26. Nothing
`
`in claim 8 requires that all surfaces or portions of the “generally L-shaped slot”
`
`directly engage all surfaces or portions of a “substantially L-shaped hook.” Here,
`
`the Panel provides no explanation for why claim 8 should be narrowed in this way
`
`and, in any event, again overlooks Figure 9 from the ’901 patent and the related
`
`disclosure.
`
`Looking again at the annotated version of Figure 9,3 “substantially L-shaped
`
`hook 45” plainly does not contact or “engage” all surfaces or portions of “generally
`
`
`3 Allsteel is simply explaining the arguments made in its petition. See AVX
`
`Corp. v. Greatbatch Ltd., IPR2015-00710, paper 13, slip op. (PTAB Jan. 13, 2016)
`
`13
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`L-shaped slot 42.” Indeed, if it were the case that hook 45 must engage all
`
`surfaces of slot 42, hook 45 would need to be shaped identically to slot 42, which it
`
`is not.
`
`
`In sum, the panel adopted a narrow view of claim 8 requiring that that all
`
`surfaces or portions of the “generally L-shaped slot” directly engage all surfaces or
`
`portions of a “substantially L-shaped hook.” But this construction excludes the
`
`sole embodiment of claim 8 and thus cannot be correct. See, e.g., Kaneka Corp.,
`
`790 F.3d at 1304.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`(granting a motion for rehearing in which the petitioner clarified, in more detail, its
`
`14
`
`invalidity positions).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`F.
`
`Petitioner Has Demonstrated a Reasonable Likelihood of Success
`on Claim 8.
`
`
`The Panel’s decision not to institute on claim 8 was based on implicit,
`
`narrowing claim constructions that exclude not only the “generally L-shaped slot”
`
`disclosed in Yu, but the sole embodiment of claim 8 as well. The Panel’s decision
`
`is based on a plain oversight of the relevant disclosure in the ’901 patent and is
`
`incompatible with the broadest reasonable construction standard, an error that
`
`amounts to an abuse of discretion. E.g., Merial Ltd., IPR2014-1279, Paper 18 at 8
`
`(noting that where the Board has “misapprehended or overlooked a significant fact,
`
`the necessary abuse of discretion required by Rule 42.71(c) has been established.”)
`
`With this error removed from the appropriate analysis, Petitioner has shown a
`
`reasonable likelihood of success that it will prevail on inter partes review of claim
`
`8 for the reasons set forth in the Petition. (Pet. at 33-43.)
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner requests that the Panel rehear
`
`and reverse its decision not to institute IPR on claim 8 of the ’901 patent.
`
`/R. Trevor Carter/
`R. Trevor Carter
`Reg. No. 40,549
`
`
`
`15
`
`Dated: February 16, 2016
`
`By:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), I hereby certify that I caused a true and
`correct copy of the foregoing Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing Pursuant to 37
`C.F.R. § 42.71(d) to be served via e-mail, as a PDF file attachment, on February
`16, 2016, on the following:
`
`
`Chad Nydegger
`cnydegger@wnlaw.com
`
`David Todd
`dtodd@wnlaw.com
`
`Michael J. Frodsham
`mfrodsham@wnlaw.com
`
`
`
`Dated: February 16, 2016
`
`By:
`
`/R. Trevor Carter/
`R. Trevor Carter
`Reg. No. 40,549
`
`
`
`
`Victor P. Jonas
`Reg. No. 58,590
`Nick M. Anderson
`Reg. No. 67,582
`Timothy Sullivan
`(Pro Hac Vice pending)
`FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP
`2200 Wells Fargo Center
`90 South Seventh Street
`Minneapolis, MN 55402-3901
`Telephone: (612) 766-7000
`Facsimile: (612) 766-1600
`Victor.Jonas.PTAB@FaegreBD.com
`Trevor.Carter@FaegreBD.com
`Nick.Anderson@FaegreBD.com
`Timothy.Sullivan@FaegreBD.com
`
`16
Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.
After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.
Accept $ Charge
Still Working On It
This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.
Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.
A few More Minutes ... Still Working
It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.
Thank you for your continued patience.
This document could not be displayed.
We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
Set your membership
status to view this document.
With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll
get a whole lot more, including:
- Up-to-date information for this case.
- Email alerts whenever there is an update.
- Full text search for other cases.
- Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.
One Moment Please
The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.
Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.
Your document is on its way!
If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.
Sealed Document
We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.
If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.
Access Government Site
