throbber
Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 1 of 17 PageID #: 4876
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`
`C.A. No. 12-030-RGA
`
`C.A. No. 12-032-RGA
`
`C.A. No. 12-033-RGA
`
`))))))))))
`
`)))))))))))
`
`)))))))))))
`
`M2M SOLUTIONS LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`SIERRA WIRELESS AMERICA, INC. and
`SIERRA WIRELESS, INC.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`M2M SOLUTIONS LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`ENFORA, INC., NOV A TEL WIRELESS
`SOLUTIONS, INC., and NOV A TEL
`WIRELESS, INC.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`M2M SOLUTIONS LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, INC., TELIT
`COMMUNICATIONS PLC, and TELIT
`WIRELESS SOLUTIONS INC.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT’S
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS OF “PROCESSING MODULE” AND
`“PROGRAMMABLE INTERFACE” BASED ON THE FEDERAL
`CIRCUIT EN BANC DECISION IN WILLIAMSON V. CITRIX ONLINE
`
`
`Novatel Exhibit 103(cid:23)
`Enfora et al. v. M2M Solutions
`IPR2015-01672
`
`Page 1 of 17
`
`

`
`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 2 of 17 PageID #: 4877
`
`Table of Contents
`
`Page
`
`NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING ............................................................ 1 
`
`
`
`
`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .......................................................................................... 2 
`
`III.  BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 3 
`
`A.  The “Processing Module” and “Programmable
`Interface” are Means-Plus-Function Limitations ....................................................... 3 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`The Court’s Claim Construction Opinion .................................................................. 5 
`
`The Federal Circuit Opinion in Williamson ............................................................... 5 
`
`IV.  STANDARD FOR RECONSIDERATION/REARGUMENT ............................................ 8 
`
`V.  RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT’S
`MARKMAN CONSTRUCTION IS WARRANTED ........................................................... 8 
`
`A.  The Federal Circuit Opinion in
`Williamson Changes the Controlling Law ................................................................. 8 
`
`B. 
`
`“Processing Module” and “Programmable Interface” Should
`Be Construed Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, and the Asserted
`Claims Should Be Held Invalid as Indefinite Because
`There is No Corresponding Structure in the Specification ......................................... 9 
`
`VI.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 10 
`
`
`
`i
`
`Page 2 of 17
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`

`
`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 3 of 17 PageID #: 4878
`
`
`
`Table of Authorities
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases 
`Apeldyn Corp. v. AU Optronics Corp.,
`831 F. Supp. 2d 837 (D. Del. 2011) ......................................................................................... 8
`Ficep Corp. v. Voortman USA Corp.,
`2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37013 (D. Md. Mar. 24, 2015) ............................................................ 8
`Knowles Elecs. LLC v. Analog Devices, Inc.,
`2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22298 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2013) ........................................................... 8
`Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,
`382 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ....................................................................................... passim
`Mass. Inst. of Tech. & Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Abacus Software,
`462 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................ 5
`Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co.,
`2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78002 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2010) ............................................................... 8
`Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC,
`No. 2011-02409, 2012 WL 2523827 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2012) ............................................ 4, 5
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`No. 2013-1130, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 10082 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 16, 2015) ........................ passim
`
`Statutes 
`35 U.S.C. § 112 .................................................................................................................. passim
`
`Rules 
`D. Del. L.R. 7.1.5 ........................................................................................................................8
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) ...................................................................................................................8
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) ....................................................................................................................8
`
`
`ii
`
`Page 3 of 17
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`

`
`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 4 of 17 PageID #: 4879
`
`Defendants Sierra Wireless America, Inc., Sierra Wireless Inc., Enfora, Inc., Novatel
`
`Wireless Solutions, Inc., Novatel Wireless, Inc., Telit Communications PLC and Telit Wireless
`
`Solutions, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”)1 move for reconsideration of this Court’s November
`
`12, 2013 Memorandum Opinion relating to claim construction (“Claim Construction Opinion,”
`
`D.I. 94). Specifically, they move for reconsideration of the constructions of the “processing
`
`module” and “programmable interface” limitations.
`
`Reconsideration is warranted because of the Federal Circuit’s recent en banc decision in
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, No. 2013-1130, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 10082 (Fed. Cir. Jun.
`
`16, 2015) (Exh. A), which overruled its prior holding in Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood
`
`Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Lighting World established a “strong
`
`presumption” that a claim limitation which does not use the word “means” is not a means-plus-
`
`function limitation, and is therefore not subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. This Court relied on
`
`Lighting World in its Claim Construction Opinion. Defendants submit that Williamson, which
`
`specifically over ruled the “strong presumption,” changes the outcome of the Court’s decision.
`
`I.
`
`NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING
`In January 2012, M2M Solutions LLC (“M2M”) sued Defendants for infringement of
`
`two patents. The Court held a Markman hearing and construed certain claim terms including
`
`“processing module” and “programmable interface” in U.S. Patent No. 8,094,010 (“the ‘010
`
`patent”). (D.I. 94). Defendants argued that those claim limitations had no structure, making
`
`them means-plus-function limitations, and that the specification also had no corresponding
`
`structure, making them indefinite. (D.I. 68 at 38-41, 46-47, 70-72 and 74-75). The Court
`
`1
`At the time of the Claim Construction Opinion, five cases were pending, consolidated for
`purposes of claim construction and discovery: C.A. Nos. 12-030-RGA, 12-031-RGA,
`12-032-RGA, 12-033-RGA and 12-034-RGA. C.A. Nos. 12-030-RGA, 12-032-RGA
`and 12-033-RGA remain pending.
`
`
`
`Page 4 of 17
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`

`
`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 5 of 17 PageID #: 4880
`
`
`disagreed and cited Lighting World, holding that because the word “means” had not been
`
`included in the claims, there was a strong presumption “that is not readily overcome” against a
`
`means-plus-function interpretation. (D.I. 94 at 10).
`
`Fact and expert discovery is now closed, and the parties are in the dispositive and
`
`Daubert motion stages. The Federal Circuit issued its decision in Williamson on June 16, 2015,
`
`shortly after the last of the expert depositions was taken.
`
`II.
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Williamson overruled a long line of cases that imposed a
`
`“strong presumption” that the absence of the world “means” meant a claim term was not written
`
`in means-plus-function format, stating:
`
`Our consideration of this case has led us to conclude that such a heightened
`burden is unjustified and that we should abandon characterizing as “strong” the
`presumption that a limitation lacking the word “means” is not subject to § 112,
`para. 6. That characterization is unwarranted, is uncertain in meaning and
`application, and has the inappropriate practical effect of placing a thumb on what
`should otherwise be a balanced analytical scale.
`
`Williamson at *18. The court also:
`
`Overrule[d] the strict requirement of “a showing that the limitation essentially is
`devoid of anything that can be construed as structure.” Id. at *18.
`
`Therefore, now:
`
`when a claim term lacks the word “means,” the presumption can be overcome and § 112,
`para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to “recite
`sufficiently definite structure” or else recites “function without reciting sufficient
`structure for performing that function.” Id. at *19.
`
`Thus, Williamson changed the controlling law relating to the Court’s construction of
`
`“processing module” and “programmable interface,” and also held that:
`
`“Module” is a well-known nonce word that can operate as a substitute for
`“means” in the context of § 112, para. 6. Id. at *21.
`
`
`
`2
`
`Page 5 of 17
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`

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`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 6 of 17 PageID #: 4881
`
`
`For the reasons explained in detail in the Joint Claim Construction Brief (D.I. 68 at 38-
`
`41, 46, 70-72 and 74-75) (“Markman Brief”), there is no structure in the “processing module” or
`
`“programmable interface” claim limitations, and also no corresponding structure disclosed in the
`
`specification for carrying out those functions. The asserted claims, therefore, are indefinite and
`
`invalid as a matter of law.
`
`III. BACKGROUND
`their Markman Brief, Defendants explained
`In
`
`the “processing module” and
`
`“programmable interface” limitations should be construed as means-plus-function limitations
`
`under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (D. I. 68 at 68, 70-72, 74-75). M2M relied on the “strong”
`
`presumption against that interpretation (D.I. 68 at 37, 41 and 69).
`
`A.
`
`The “Processing Module” and “Programmable
`Interface” are Means-Plus-Function Limitations
`All of the asserted claims of the ‘010 patent include a “processing module for
`
`authenticating an at least one transmission sent from a programming transmitter and received by
`
`the programmable communicator device ….” The term “processing module” is used in
`
`connection with other functions as well (e.g., to process “the received data.” (claim 64)).
`
`As explained in the Markman Brief (D.I. 68 at 70-72), the specification only discloses a
`
`“processing means,” not a “processing module,” for authenticating. The specification only
`
`mentions “processing module” once for a different function – for generating alarms, not for
`
`authenticating. (‘010 patent col. 10, lines 53-55).
`
`M2M agreed that this alarm generating processing module is not the claimed “processing
`
`module for authenticating,” referring to it as:
`
`another unclaimed “processing module” that comprises software for generating
`SMS alarm messages in response to detecting changes in status conditions. (D.I.
`68, at 69, n. 39, citing ‘010 patent 10:23-31; 10:53-65 (emphasis added)).
`
`
`
`3
`
`Page 6 of 17
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`

`
`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 7 of 17 PageID #: 4882
`
`
`The specification
`
`instead describes a “processing means”
`
`(not module)
`
`for
`
`authenticating:
`
`-
`
`-
`
`-
`
`It is a further object of the present invention to provide a programmable
`communications apparatus, which comprises a processing means to
`process coded transmissions and permit only transmissions comprising a
`coded number, which determines the authenticity of the message, to be
`allowed to program the number to which the said apparatus be linked.
`(col. 4, lines 35-40 (emphasis added)).
`
`For the purposes of programming the IP address or telephone number of
`the fixed or mobile telephone to which the communicator is linked is
`provided an SMS processing means 60. This communicates with an
`authentication means 90, which in turn is able to store numbers into a
`permitted callers list 110. (col. 8, lines 42-47 (emphasis added)).
`
`The programmable communicator includes a processing means to
`determine that the PUK code is correct and the means to store the
`transmitted number. (col. 9, lines 41-43 (emphasis added)).
`
`The term “processing module” with the function of “authenticating” was added to the
`
`Abstract of an application that led to U.S. Patent No. 7,583,197 (the “‘197 patent”) in 2006, six
`
`years after its filing date. (See D.I. 68 at 70, n.4 and 72). The ‘010 patent is a continuation of
`
`that application.
`
`M2M agreed that the function of the “processing module” is authenticating a
`
`transmission. (D.I. 68 at 68). As set forth above, the only description in the specification of any
`
`“processing” function to authenticate incoming transmissions is of a “processing means.” Id. at
`
`70-1.
`
`Defendants cited to district court decisions finding the term “processing module” to be a
`
`means-plus function-limitation and indefinite where, as here, there is no structure disclosed in
`
`the specification. Id. at 71, citing, inter alia, Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC, No. 2011-02409,
`
`2012 WL 2523827 at *24 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2012) (“‘[M]odule’ is simply a generic description
`
`for software or hardware that performs a specified function.”), which M2M criticized (D.I. 68 74
`
`
`
`4
`
`Page 7 of 17
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`

`
`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 8 of 17 PageID #: 4883
`
`
`at n. 41). Although the Court recognized the Williamson district court decision supported
`
`Defendants, and the split in the case law, it held the weight of authority supported a conclusion
`
`that § 112, ¶ 6 did not apply. (D.I. 94 at 13). The Williamson district court decision has now
`
`been affirmed by the Federal Circuit en banc.
`
`In their Markman Brief, Defendants urged the Court to consider the “programmable
`
`interface” limitation to be in means-plus-function format for similar reasons (D.I. 68 at 38-41
`
`and 46-47). The claim does not provide guidance as to whether it is a physical, software, or
`
`physical and software interface, but merely a function with no corresponding structure.
`
`B.
`The Court’s Claim Construction Opinion
`The Court rejected Defendants’ proposed construction of “processing module” as a
`
`means-plus-function limitation, and instead construed it as “[c]omponents or units of a computer
`
`program,” and construed “programmable interface” as “an interface that is able to be directly
`
`programmed” (D.I. 94 at 12). The Court held:
`
`Even though a term might not bring a particular structure to mind, that is not
`dispositive and the court can look to the dictionary to see if the term is one that is
`“understood to describe structure, as opposed to a term that is simply a nonce
`word or a verbal construct that is not recognized as the name of structure and is
`simply a substitute for the term ‘means for.’”
`
`D.I. 94 at 10 (quoting Lighting World at 1360, and citing Mass. Inst. of Tech. & Elecs. for
`
`Imaging, Inc. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). The Court also held
`
`that the “strong presumption” could not be overcome because “programmable interface”
`
`connotes sufficient structure to a person of ordinary skill in the art, and both terms have well
`
`understood definitions. Id. at 11.
`
`C.
`The Federal Circuit Opinion in Williamson
`Williamson involved the claim term “distributed learning control module.” The Federal
`
`Circuit held that “module” was a “well-known nonce word that can operate as a substitute for
`
`
`
`5
`
`Page 8 of 17
`
`

`
`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 9 of 17 PageID #: 4884
`
`
`‘means’ in the context of § 112, para. 6.” Williamson , 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 10082, at *17. It
`
`found that “module” did not provide any indication of structure “because it sets forth the same
`
`black box recitation of structure for providing the same specified function as if the term ‘means’
`
`had been used.” Id. at *21-22.
`
`Additionally, the Federal Circuit determined that the specification failed to disclose the
`
`necessary algorithms for performing all of the claimed functions, and thus held that the claim
`
`was invalid as indefinite under § 112, ¶ 2. Id. at *9.
`
`In the en banc portion of its opinion, the court expressly overruled its prior holdings, in
`
`Lighting World and elsewhere, that had established a heightened bar for overcoming the
`
`presumption that a limitation expressed in functional language without the word “means” is not
`
`subject to § 112, ¶ 6. Id. at *17-18. The court stated:
`
`Our consideration of this case has led us to conclude that such a heightened
`burden is unjustified and that we should abandon characterizing as “strong”
`the presumption that a limitation lacking the word “means” is not subject to §
`112, para. 6. That characterization is unwarranted, is uncertain in meaning and
`application, and has the inappropriate practical effect of placing a thumb on what
`should otherwise be a balanced analytical scale. It has shifted the balance struck
`by Congress in passing § 112, para. 6 and has resulted in a proliferation of
`functional claiming untethered to § 112, para. 6 and free of the strictures set forth
`in the statute. Henceforth, we will apply the presumption as we have done prior
`to Lighting World, without requiring any heightened evidentiary showing and
`expressly overrule the characterization of that presumption as “strong.” We
`also overrule the strict requirement of “a showing that the limitation essentially
`is devoid of anything that can be construed as structure.”
`
`The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of
`ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for
`structure. When a claim term lacks the word “means,” the presumption can be
`overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the
`claim term fails to “recite sufficiently definite structure” or else recites
`“function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.”…
`
`Id. at *18-19 (citations and quotations omitted; emphasis added).
`
`
`
`6
`
`Page 9 of 17
`
`

`
`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 10 of 17 PageID #: 4885
`
`
`The court further held that “the claim does not describe how the ‘distributed learning
`
`control module’ interacts with other components in the distributed learning control server in a
`
`way that might inform the structural character of the limitation-in-question or otherwise impart
`
`structure to the ‘distributed learning control module’ as recited in the claim.” Id. at *23.
`
`The court concluded that the “distributed learning control module” limitation “fails to
`
`recite sufficiently definite structure and [ ] the presumption against means-plus-function claiming
`
`is rebutted.” Id. at *24-25.
`
`After determining that the claim was in means-plus-function format, the court looked to
`
`the specification for corresponding structure. It determined that the “module” had three claimed
`
`functions, but found that the specification failed to disclose structure corresponding to the third
`
`of these (“coordinating the operation of the streaming data module”). Id. at *25-26. The court
`
`affirmed the district court’s finding that the specification failed to disclose corresponding
`
`structure.
`
`The court found that the specification required that the distributed learning control
`
`module be implemented in a special purpose computer. Id. at *27. This was so because the
`
`module had specialized functions as outlined in the specification. Id. The court then reiterated
`
`its longstanding requirement that, in such cases, the structure disclosed in the specification be
`
`more than simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor:
`
`We require that the specification disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed
`function. The algorithm may be expressed as a mathematical formula, in prose, or
`as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure.
`
`Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded:
`
`Because the ‘840 patent fails to disclose any structure corresponding to the
`“coordinating” function of the “distributed learning control module,” we affirm
`the judgment that claims 8-16 are invalid for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 112, para. 2. Id. at *29-30.
`
`
`
`7
`
`Page 10 of 17
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`

`
`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 11 of 17 PageID #: 4886
`
`
`The same is true here: there are no algorithms or physical structures in the specification
`
`that a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize as corresponding to either the functions
`
`of the “processing module” or the “programmable interface.”
`
`IV.
`
`STANDARD FOR RECONSIDERATION/REARGUMENT
`Motions for reconsideration or reargument are governed by D. Del. L.R. 7.1.5. A motion
`
`for reconsideration is the “functional equivalent” of a motion to alter or amend judgment under
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). See, e.g., Apeldyn Corp. v. AU Optronics Corp., 831 F. Supp. 2d 837, 839
`
`(D. Del. 2011) (granting reargument of claim construction).
`
`A court may reconsider a ruling if there has been a change in the controlling law.
`
`Apeldyn, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 839-40. Further, an order may be reconsidered at any time until
`
`final judgment is entered. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[A]ny order or other decision,
`
`however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
`
`fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be
`
`revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’
`
`rights and liabilities.” (Emphasis added).
`
`District courts regularly grant motions for (partial) reconsideration or reargument of
`
`claim construction rulings. See, e.g., Apeldyn; Ficep Corp. v. Voortman USA Corp., 2015 U.S.
`
`Dist. LEXIS 37013 at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 24, 2015); Knowles Elecs. LLC v. Analog Devices, Inc.,
`
`2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22298 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2013); Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis
`
`Elevator Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78002 at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2010).
`
`V.
`
`RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT’S
`MARKMAN CONSTRUCTION IS WARRANTED
`A.
`The Federal Circuit Opinion in Williamson Changes the Controlling Law
`As discussed, Williamson expressly overruled prior holdings on the precise issue the
`
`Court addressed in the Claim Construction Opinion.
`
`
`
`8
`
`Page 11 of 17
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`

`
`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 12 of 17 PageID #: 4887
`
`
`Because the Court’s construction of “processing module” and “programmable interface”
`
`relied on the then-existing “strong presumption” standard in Lighting World, which Williamson
`
`overruled, the Court’s construction was based on a legal standard that has now been overruled.
`
`B.
`
`“Processing Module” and “Programmable Interface” Should Be
`Construed Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, and the Asserted
`Claims Should Be Held Invalid as Indefinite Because
`There is No Corresponding Structure in the Specification
`Under the standard set forth in Williamson, the “processing module” and “programmable
`
`interface” should be construed under § 112, ¶ 6, and Defendants have established that the
`
`limitations fail to recite any structure. (D.I. 68 at 38-41, 46, 70-72 and 74-75).
`
`As the holding in Williamson made plain, adding the word “processing” does not provide
`
`structure to the nonce word “module.” Williamson, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 10082, at *18 (“The
`
`prefix ‘distributed learning control’ does not impart structure into the term ‘module.’”). Further,
`
`the “processing module” limitation, as a whole, is “in a format consistent with traditional means-
`
`plus-function claim limitations. It replaces the term ‘means’ with the term ‘module’ and recites
`
`[a] function[ ] performed by the [‘processing module’].” Id. at *21.
`
`The claims do “not describe how the ‘[]module’ interacts with other components…in a
`
`way that might…impart structure to the ‘[]module’ as recited in the claim.” Id. at *23.
`
`Accordingly, “processing module” “fails to recite sufficiently definite structure and [ ] the
`
`presumption against means-plus-function claiming is rebutted.” Id. at *24-25. The limitation
`
`thus is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
`
`The same is true of the “programmable interface” claim term. Even though the term
`
`“programmable” might be well understood (D.I. 94 at 11), it does not give the claim element
`
`sufficient structure. Id. at *19 (“But the fact that one of skill in the art could program a computer
`
`to perform the recited functions cannot create structure where none otherwise is disclosed.”).
`
`
`
`9
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`Page 12 of 17
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`

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`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 13 of 17 PageID #: 4888
`
`
`Although this Court did not reach the issue of whether there is any structure in the
`
`specification corresponding to these functions, there cannot be a serious debate. As explained in
`
`detail in Defendants’ Markman Brief (at 70-72 and 74-75) and above, the ‘010 patent’s
`
`specification fails to disclose any structure, other than the “processing means” (which is not the
`
`“processing module”).
`
`Similarly, there is no disclosed structure in the specification for a “programmable
`
`interface,” and it is unclear if it is a physical, software, or physical and software interface. (See
`
`Markman Brief at 38-41 and 46-47). There is no device mentioned, no software and no
`
`algorithms. As the court held in Williamson:
`
`These disclosures, however, are merely functions of the “distributed learning
`control module.” The specification does not set forth an algorithm for performing
`the claimed functions.
`
` Id. at *22. Because the ‘010 patent fails to disclose any structure corresponding to the
`
`“authenticating” function of the “processing module” limitation, the claims are indefinite under
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 and are invalid.
`
`For similar reasons, “the programmable interface” is a means-plus-function claim
`
`element with no structure for performing the claimed functions and no corresponding structure in
`
`the specification. Thus, the claims embodying that limitation are invalid.
`
`VI. CONCLUSION
`The claim limitations “processing module” and “programmable interface” are means-
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`plus-function limitations. Because there is no corresponding structure in the specification, the
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`asserted claims are invalid as a matter of law.
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`10
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`Page 13 of 17
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`

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`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 14 of 17 PageID #: 4889
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`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
`
`/s/ Jack B. Blumenfeld
`
`
`
`
`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
`Rodger D. Smith II (#3778)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`jblumenfeld@mnat.com
`rsmith@mnat.com
`
`Attorneys for Telit Communications PLC, Telit
`Wireless Solutions Inc. and Motorola
`Solutions, Inc.
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`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
`
`/s/ Thomas C. Grimm
`
`
`
`
`Thomas C. Grimm (#1098)
`Jeremy A. Tigan (#5239)
`Stephen J. Kraftschik (#5623)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`tgrimm@mnat.com
`jtigan@mnat.com
`skraftschik@mnat.com
`
`Attorneys for Sierra Wireless, Inc.
`
`
`
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`David A. Loewenstein
`Clyde A. Shuman
`Keren Livneh
`PEARL COHEN ZEDEK LATZER
`1500 Broadway, 12th Floor
`New York, NY 10036
`(646) 878-0800
`
`
`
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Robert E. Krebs
`Jennifer Hayes
`NIXON PEABODY LLP
`2 Palo Alto Square
`30000 El Camino Real, Suite 500
`Palo Alto, CA 94306-2106
`(650) 320-7700
`
`Ronald F. Lopez
`NIXON PEABODY LLP
`One Embarcadero Center, Suite 1800
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`(415) 984-8200
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`11
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`Page 14 of 17
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`

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`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 15 of 17 PageID #: 4890
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`DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP
`
`/s/ Francis DiGiovanni
`
`
`
`
`Francis DiGiovanni (#3189)
`Thatcher A. Rahmeier (#5222)
`222 Delaware Avenue
`Suite 1410
`Wilmington, DE 19801-1621
`(302) 467-4200
`francis.digiovanni@dbr.com
`thatcher.rahmeier@dbr.com
`
`Counsel for Defendants Novatel Wireless Inc.,
`Novatel Solutions Inc. and Enfora, Inc
`
`
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Christopher W. Kennerly
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`1117 S. California Ave.
`Palo Alto, CA 94304-1106
`(650) 320-1800
`
`Elizabeth L. Brann
`Ericka J. Schulz
`Jeffrey D. Comeau
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`4747 Executive Drive
`12th Floor
`San Diego, CA 92121
`(858) 458-3000
`
`
`July 10, 2015
`
`
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`12
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`Page 15 of 17
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`

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`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 16 of 17 PageID #: 4891
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`RULE 7.1.1 CERTIFICATE
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`I hereby certify that the subject of the foregoing motion has been discussed with
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`counsel for the Plaintiff and that we have not been able to reach agreement.
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`/s/ Jack B. Blumenfeld
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`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
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`Page 16 of 17
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`Case 1:12-cv-00030-RGA Document 180 Filed 07/10/15 Page 17 of 17 PageID #: 4892
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on July 10, 2015, I caused the foregoing to be electronically
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`
`
`
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`filed with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF, which will send notification of such filing to all
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`registered participants.
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`
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`
`
`I further certify that I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served on
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`July 10, 2015, upon the following in the manner indicated:
`
`Richard D. Kirk, Esquire
`Stephen B. Brauerman, Esquire
`BAYARD, P.A.
`222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 900
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
`Marc N. Henschke, Esquire
`FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
`111 Huntington Avenue, Suite 2600
`Boston, MA 02199
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
`Jeffrey N. Costakos, Esquire
`Kimberly K. Dodd, Esquire
`Kadie M. Jelenchick, Esquire
`Matthew J. Shin, Esquire
`FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
`777 E. Wisconsin Avenue
`Milwaukee, WI 53202
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
`Jason J. Keener, Esquire
`Jeffrey J. Mikrut, Esquire
`FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
`321 North Clark Street, Suite 2800
`Chicago, IL 60654
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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` /s/ Jack B. Blumenfeld
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`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
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`Page 17 of 17

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