`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`No. 14 C 9852
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`Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer
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`JOAO CONTROL & MONITORING
`SYSTEMS, LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`TELULAR CORPORATION,
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`Defendant.
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`Joao Control & Monitoring Systems, LLC (“Plaintiff” or “Joao Control”) owns a number of
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`patents, including the two at issue in this case. Joao Control filed this lawsuit against Defendant
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`Telular Corporation (“Defendant” or “Telular”), alleging infringement of two patents for systems
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`designed to provide security for vehicles and premises through a computer network connected
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`to the Internet. Telular contends that the two patents violate the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101,
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`because they are based on abstract ideas and do not contain any “inventive concept” sufficient
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`to confer patent eligibility. For the reasons set forth below, the court agrees. Defendant’s
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`motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) is granted.
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`BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiff Joao Control is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
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`Yonkers, New York. (Compl. [1] ¶ 2.) Defendant Telular Corporation is a Delaware corporation
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`with its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. (Id. ¶ 3.) The two patents-in-suit—United
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`States Patent No. 6,587,046 (the “`046 patent”) and United States Patent No. 7,397,363 (the
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`“`363 patent”)—were issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to Raymond A. Joao, who
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`subsequently assigned all rights, title, and interest to Plaintiff. The `046 patent was issued in
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`July 2003, and the `363 patent was issued in July 2008. (`046 patent at 1, Compl. Ex. A; `363
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`patent at 1, Compl. Ex. B.) The subject matter of the two patents is similar; they both broadly
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`claim apparatuses and methods for monitoring and controlling property remotely through a
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`VWGoA - Ex. 1010
`Case No. IPR2015-01612
`Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. - Petitioner
`Joao Control & Monitoring Systems, LLC - Patent Owner
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`1
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`computer network and the Internet. Each patent, moreover, aims to “overcom[e] the
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`disadvantages and drawbacks . . . associated with the known prior art control, monitoring,
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`and/or security systems” by “allowing owners, occupants and/or other authorized individuals to
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`exercise and/or provide control, monitoring and/or security functions over [vehicles and]
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`premises, from a remote location and at any time.” (`046 patent, col. 3, ll. 8–11, 15–18; `363
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`patent, col. 3, ll. 5–9, 13–15.)
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`A.
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`The `046 Patent
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`The `046 patent, entitled “Monitoring Apparatus and Method,” generally describes a
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`system for monitoring physical property from a remote location through a network of devices
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`connected to “the Internet or World Wide Web.” (`046 patent, Abstract.) The patent is 82 pages
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`long and contains a total of 112 claims: 6 independent claims and 106 dependent claims. (Id. at
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`col. 109, l. 1 – col. 118, l. 36.) Claims 1 and 30 of the `046 patent are representative and claim
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`the following:
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`A monitoring apparatus, comprising:
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`the processing device receives video
`a processing device, wherein
`information recorded by at least one of a video recording device and a
`camera, wherein the at least one of a video recording device and a camera is
`located at a vehicle, and wherein the processing device is located at a
`location remote from the vehicle,
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`wherein the processing device receives a signal transmitted from a
`communication device, wherein the communication device is located at a
`location remote from the processing device and remote from the vehicle,
`wherein the video information is transmitted from the processing device to the
`communication device in response to the signal, and further wherein the
`video information is transmitted to the communication device on or over at
`least one of the Internet and the World Wide Web.
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`
` A monitoring apparatus, comprising:
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` a
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`the processing device receives video
` processing device, wherein
`information recorded by at least one of a video recording device and a
`camera, wherein the at least one of a video recording device and a camera is
`located at a premises, and wherein the processing device is located at a
`location remote from the premises,
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`
` 1.
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`30.
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`2
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`2
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`wherein the processing device receives a signal transmitted from a
`communication device, wherein the communication device is located at a
`location remote from the processing device and remote from the premises,
`wherein the video information is transmitted from the processing device to the
`communication device in response to the signal, and further wherein the
`video information is transmitted to the communication device on or over at
`least one of the Internet and the World Wide Web.
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`(Id. at col. 109, ll. 1–17; col. 11, ll. 14–31.) As is evident from the claim language, claims 1 and
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`30 describe the same apparatus, except that the apparatus described in claim 1 applies to the
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`monitoring of a vehicle, and the apparatus described in claim 30 applies to the monitoring of a
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`premises.
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`
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`The other claims in the `046 patent contain only slight variations of the monitoring
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`apparatuses described in claims 1 and 30. Dependent claims 6, 17, 35, and 46, for example,
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`describe the same apparatuses as those described in claims 1 and 30, but include a
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`“processing device” with slightly different capabilities. (Id. at col. 110, ll. 19–31; col. 111, ll. 46–
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`52; col. 112, ll. 35–47.) Specifically, the processing device described in claims 17 and 46 can
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`“control [the] operation of” the video or camera located at the vehicle or premises, in addition to
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`transmitting signals to the communication device, while the processing device described in
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`claims 6 and 35 can receive and transmit “audio information” from an audio recording device
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`located at the vehicle or premises. (Id.) Independent claims 58 and 85 describe apparatuses
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`almost identical to those recited in claims 1 and 30, except that the “video recording device”
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`component sends information to a “transmitter,” which transmits the information to the
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`processing device, as opposed to sending the information directly to the processing device. (Id.
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`at col. 113, ll. 33–58.) Independent claims 111 and 112 similarly describe a “method” for
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`receiving and transmitting video information from a vehicle or premises to a remote location
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`through the use of a “video recording device and camera,” “transmitter,” “processing device,”
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`and “communication device.” (Id. at col. 117, l. 34 – col. 118, l. 36.)
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`3
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`3
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`B.
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`The `363 Patent
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`The `363 patent, entitled “Control and/or Monitoring Apparatus and Method,” describes a
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`system for monitoring and controlling property from a remote location through a network of
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`devices connected to “the Internet and/or World Wide Web.” (`363 patent, Abstract.) The
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`patent is 87 pages long and contains a total of 88 claims: 7 independent claims and 81
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`dependent claims. (Id. at col. 104, l. 13 – col. 122, l. 67.) Claims 1 and 21, worded awkwardly,
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`are representative of the patent:
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`1.
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`An apparatus, comprising:
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`a first processing device, wherein the first processing device at least one of
`generates a first signal and transmits a first signal for at least one of
`activating, de-activating, disabling, re-enabling, and controlling an operation
`of, at least one of a premises system, a premises device, a premises
`equipment, a premises equipment system, a premises component, and a
`premises appliance, of or located at a premises, wherein the first processing
`device is associated with a web site, and further wherein the first processing
`device is located at a location remote from the premises,
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`wherein the first processing device at least one of generates the first signal
`and transmits the first signal in response to a second signal, wherein the
`second signal is at least one of generated by a second processing device,
`wherein the second processing device is located at a location which is remote
`from the first processing device and remote from the premises, wherein the
`first processing device determines whether an action or an operation
`associated with information contained in the second signal, to at least one of
`activate, de-activate, disable, re-enable, and control an operation of, at least
`one of a premises system, a premises device, a premises equipment, a
`premises equipment system, a premises component, and a premises
`appliance, is an authorized or allowed action or an authorized or allowed
`operation, and further wherein the first processing device at least one of
`generates the first signal and transmits the first signal to a third processing
`device if the action or the operation is determined to be authorized or an
`allowed operation, wherein the third processing device is located at the
`premises,
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`wherein the second signal is transmitted to the first processing device via, on,
`or over, at least one of the Internet and the World Wide Web, and further
`wherein the second signal is automatically received by the first processing
`device, wherein the first signal is transmitted to and automatically received by
`the third processing device, wherein the third processing device at least one
`of generates a third signal and transmits a third signal for at least one of
`activating, de-activating, disabling, re-enabling, and controlling an operation
`of, the at least one of a premises system, a premises device, a premises
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`4
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`4
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`21.
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`equipment, a premises equipment system, a premises component, and a
`premises appliance, in response to the first signal.
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`An apparatus, comprising:
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`a first processing device, wherein the first processing device at least one of
`generates a first signal and transmits a first signal for at least one of
`activating, de-activating, disabling, re-enabling, and controlling an operation
`of, at least one of a vehicle system, a vehicle equipment system, a vehicle
`component, a vehicle device, a vehicle equipment, and a vehicle appliance,
`of or located at a vehicle, wherein the first processing device is associated
`with a web site, and further wherein the first processing device is located at a
`location remote from the vehicle,
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`wherein the first processing device at least one of generates the first signal
`and transmits the first signal in response to a second signal, wherein the
`second signal is at least one of generated by a second processing device and
`transmitted from a second processing device, wherein the second processing
`device is located at a location which is remote from the first processing
`device and remote from the vehicle, wherein the first processing device
`determines whether an action or an operation associated with information
`contained in the second signal, to at least one of activate, de-activate,
`disable, re-enable, and control an operation of, the at least one of a vehicle
`system, a vehicle equipment system, vehicle component, a vehicle device, a
`vehicle equipment, and a vehicle appliance, is an authorized or allowed
`action or an authorized or an allowed operation, and further wherein the first
`processing device at least one of generates the first signal and transmits the
`first signal to a third processing device if the action or the operation is
`determined to be an authorized or an allowed operation, wherein the third
`processing device is located at the vehicle,
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`wherein the second signal is transmitted to the first processing device via, on,
`or over, at least one of the Internet and the World Wide Web, and further
`wherein the second signal is automatically received by the first processing
`device, wherein the first signal is transmitted to and automatically received by
`the third processing device, wherein the third processing device at least one
`of generates a third signal and transmits a third signal for at least one of
`activating, de-activating, disabling, re-enabling, and controlling an operation
`of, the at least one of a vehicle system, a vehicle equipment system, a
`vehicle component, a vehicle device, a vehicle equipment, and a vehicle
`appliance, in response to the first signal.
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`(`363 patent, col. 104, ll. 13–60; col. 108, ll. 16–62.) Like the `046 patent, claims 1 and 21 of the
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``363 patent describe the same apparatus, except that the apparatus described in claim 1
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`applies to the monitoring of a premises, and the apparatus described in claim 21 applies to the
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`monitoring of a vehicle.
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`5
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`5
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`The other claims of the `363 patent build upon, but do not vary significantly from, the
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`apparatuses described in claims 1 and 21. Dependent claims 9 and 33, for example, describe
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`the same apparatuses recited in claims 1 and 21, except that the apparatus “detects at least
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`one of a [premises/vehicle] use, an unauthorized use of the [premises/vehicle], a theft of the
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`[premises/vehicle], and an occurrence warranting providing notice to [the owner, operator, or
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`user] of the [premises/vehicle].” (Id. at col. 106, ll. 48–57, col. 110, ll. 26–36.) Dependent claim
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`29 describes the apparatus recited in claim 21, but also includes a “positioning device” that
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`“determines a position or a location of the vehicle” and transmits this information to the second
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`processing device. (Id. at col. 109, ll. 49–61.) Independent claims 42, 68, and 84 are very
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`similar to the apparatuses recited in claims 1 and 21, except that a first processing device
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`“monitors and detects an event,” such as “a state of disrepair,” occurring at a vehicle or
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`premises, and then signals containing information about this event are transmitted from the first
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`processing device and second processing device to the communication device. (Id. at col. 114,
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`ll. 33–62, col. 119, ll. 37–65, col. 121, l. 46 – col. 122, l. 9.) Lastly, independent claims 87 and
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`88 similarly describe a “method” for receiving and transmitting information about “an event”
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`occurring at a vehicle or premises through the use of first and second processing devices that
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`transmit signals containing information about the event to a communication device. (Id. at col.
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`117, l. 34 – col. 118, l. 36, col. 122, l. 28 – 124, l. 5.)
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`C.
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`Procedural History
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`In its complaint, filed on December 8, 2014, Plaintiff Joao Control alleges that Defendant
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`Telular has infringed on the `046 and `363 patents by advertising and selling “control and
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`monitoring devices and systems,” which “can be operated and controlled through remote access
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`via interactive cellular and/or broadband connections via one or more online portals.” (Compl.
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`¶ 11.) On August 21, 2015, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting
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`that the `046 and `363 patents claim an ineligible subject matter in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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`(Def. Mot. [45].) Plaintiff moved to strike Defendant’s motion [61], and the court denied that
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`6
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`6
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`motion on January 5, 2016 [67]. Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant’s motion on December
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`15, 2015 [60], and Defendant filed a reply on December 29, 2015 [64].
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`DISCUSSION
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`Standard of Review
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`A motion for judgment on the pleadings under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) challenges “the
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`A.
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`
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`sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” Hallinan v.
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`Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009), and is subject
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`to the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d
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`1950, 1581 (7th Cir. 1991). This means that the court will view the facts and inferences drawn
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`from the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Emerg. Servs. Billing
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`Corp., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor
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`Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998)). Because every patent is
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`presumed to be issued properly, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 91 (2011), a
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`party challenging patent eligibility under Rule 12(c) must point to clear and convincing evidence
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`that the patent covers a patent-ineligible subject matter.1 Id. This clear-and-convincing
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`standard applies only to questions of fact, not questions of law. SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l
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`Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 375 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[W]e find it inappropriate to speak in terms
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`of a particular standard of proof being necessary to reach a legal conclusion [because]
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`1
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`Several courts have questioned the application of the clear-and-convincing
`evidence standard to § 101 cases based on language in a recent concurring opinion by Federal
`Circuit Judge Mayer. Specifically, Judge Mayer wrote: “[b]ecause the [Patent and Trademark
`Office] has for many years applied an insufficiently rigorous subject matter eligibility standard,
`no presumption of eligibility should attach when assessing whether claims meet the demands of
`section 101.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 720–21 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
`(hereinafter, “Ultramercial II”); see Modern Telecom Sys. LLC v. Earthlink, Inc., No. SA CV 14-
`0347-DOC, 2015 WL 1239992, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2015) (declining to apply clear and
`convincing evidence standard in a § 101 case); Wireless Media Innov., LLC v. Maher Terminals,
`LLC, 100 F. Supp. 3d 405 (D.N.J. 2015) (same); DataTern, Inc. v. Microstrategy, Inc., Nos. 11-
`11970-FDS, 11-12220-FDS, 2015 WL 5190715, at *7–8 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2015) (questioning
`the applicability of the clear-and-convincing standard in the context of a § 101 challenge). While
`the court finds Judge Mayer’s rationale compelling, it has adhered to the clear-and-convincing
`evidence standard absent a controlling opinion from the Supreme Court or Federal Circuit.
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`7
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`7
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`[s]tandard of proof relates to specific factual questions.”); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs, Inc., 464
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`F.3d 1286, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he movant retains the burden to show the invalidity of the
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`claims by clear and convincing evidence as to underlying facts.”) In considering a Rule 12(c)
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`motion, a court may look at documents incorporated into the pleadings by reference as well as
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`matters of public record, Wood, 925 F.2d at 1582, such as the patents themselves and the
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`prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (7th Cir. 2005).
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`B.
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`Patent Eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101
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`Defendant contends that the `046 and `363 patents should be declared invalid because
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`they contain no more than an abstract idea. To be patent-eligible, § 101 of the Patent Act
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`requires that a claimed invention be a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
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`composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Although
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`§ 101 is broad in scope, the Supreme Court has recognized three fundamental exceptions to
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`statutory patent eligibility: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Bilski v.
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`Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)).
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`These narrow exceptions “strik[e] the balance between protecting inventors and not granting
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`monopolies over procedures that others would discover by independent, creative application of
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`general principles.” Id. at 606. An invention is not necessarily ineligible for patent because it
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`involves an abstract concept, however. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347,
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`2354 (2014). An invention that applies an abstract concept to “a new and useful end,” so as to
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`“integrate the building blocks [of human ingenuity] into something more,” will be eligible for
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`patent protection. Id.
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`To determine whether an invention is patent-eligible under § 101, courts engage in a
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`two-step process. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (citing Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus
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`Labs, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296–97 (2012)). First, the court must determine “whether the claims at
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`issue are directed to one of the patent-ineligible concepts”—laws of nature, natural phenomena,
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`or abstract ideas. Id. (citation omitted). If they are, the court must then “search for an ‘inventive
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`8
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`8
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`concept’” in the claims to determine whether they contain any “additional elements” that
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`“transform [the ineligible concept] into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quotation and citation
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`omitted).
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`
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`In some circumstances, courts may properly decide the question of patent eligibility
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`without first construing the claim terms. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of
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`Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[C]laim construction is not an inviolable
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`prerequisite to a validity determination under § 101.”) Indeed, where patent eligibility is
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`dispositive, determining that issue at the outset “will have a number of salutary effects,” such as
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`conserving scarce judicial resources and minimizing unnecessary litigation costs. Ultramercial
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`II, 772 F.3d at 718–19. Plaintiff cites as supplemental authority a recent case from New Jersey,
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`Synchronoss Tech., Inc. v. Hyperlync Tech., Inc., which denied a pre-claims-construction
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`motion to dismiss pursuant to § 101, concluding that because the parties disputed construction
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`of certain key terms in the patent, the court could not determine whether “‘every possible
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`plausible construction of each of the . . . claims asserted . . . render[ed] the patent ineligible.’”
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`No. 15-2845 (MLC), 2016 WL 868920, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2016) (quoting A Pty Ltd. v. Google,
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`Inc., No. 15-157, 2015 WL 5883354, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2015)). In this case, in contrast,
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`the court concludes that resolution of the parties’ disputes regarding certain key patent terms
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`would have no bearing on the court’s § 101 analysis. The court has reviewed the parties’ Joint
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`Claim Construction Status Report [77], and even interpreting the claims in the light most
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`favorable to Plaintiff, there is no “reasonable construction that would bring [the claims] within
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`patentable subject matter.” Ultramercial II, 772 F.3d at 719 (quoting Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu,
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`LLC, No. 09-cv-6918, 2010 WL 3360098, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010)). It should also be
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`noted that the patent-at-issue in Synchronoss Tech. involved a data synchronization invention
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`that was “rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in
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`the realm of computer networks.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). The court reasoned
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`that claims construction was necessary in order to determine whether the patent claims stated
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`
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`9
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`9
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`
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`“how [certain] interactions . . . [were] manipulated to yield a desired result.” Id. As will be
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`discussed in more detail below, neither the `046 nor the `363 patent purports to overcome a
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`problem unique to computers; rather, the patents merely use conventional components to
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`implement the allegedly novel concept of remote monitoring and control of property. Further, it
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`is clear without claims construction that the patents do not provide details about how the
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`computers contained therein are “manipulated” or otherwise programmed to yield results. Thus
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`no formal claim construction is required.
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`1.
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`The `046 and `363 Patents are Directed to Abstract Ideas
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`Under the framework set forth in Alice, the court must first look to whether the `046 and
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``363 patents are directed to patent-ineligible concepts. Defendant argues that the patents
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`violate § 101 because they attempt to obtain patent protection for an abstract idea: “asset
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`monitoring and processing of signals thereon.” (Def. Mot. at 3.) The court does not adopt
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`Defendant’s characterization of the patents in all respects, but does agree with Defendant that
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`the patents at issue here generally seek to protect the abstract idea of monitoring and
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`controlling property, thus claiming ineligible subject matter in violation of § 101.
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`
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`Although “[t]he Supreme Court has not ‘delimit[ed] the precise contours of the ‘abstract
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`ideas’ category,’” the Federal Circuit has found that a patent claim is directed to an abstract idea
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`when it involves a concept that is “well-known” and that “humans have always performed.”
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`Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347
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`(Fed. Cir. 2014). The Federal Circuit has also described an abstract idea as one “ha[ving] no
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`particular concrete or tangible form or application.” Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc.,
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`793 F.3d 1306, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015). According to the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit,
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`classic examples of abstract ideas include: mathematic algorithms, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
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`U.S. 63, 64 (1978); fundamental economic and business practices, Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2356–57;
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`and data recognition and storage, Content Extraction, 76 F.3d at 1347. In Alice, for example,
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`the Supreme Court invalidated a patent for mitigating settlement risk through a computer
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`10
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`10
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`system, concluding that the patent was directed to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement.
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`134 S. Ct. at 2351–52, 2355. The Court reasoned that the concept of intermediated settlement
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`was a “fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce,’” and thus
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`exceeded the limitations imposed by § 101. Id. at 2355 (citation omitted).
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`
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`Based upon this guidance from the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit, in a number of
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`recent decisions, courts have invalidated patents directed to the idea of monitoring and
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`communicating information. In Wireless Media Innovations, for example, the court invalidated
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`two patents for a system and method of “monitoring locations, movement, and load status of
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`shipping containers within a container-receiving yard, and storing, reporting and communicating
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`this information in various forms through generic computer functions.” 100 F. Supp. 3d 405, 413
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`(D.N.J. 2015). This was an abstract idea, according to the court, because these general
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`monitoring and recording functions “could be carried out by human memory, by hand, or by
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`conventional equipment and general purpose computer and printer resources.” Id. at 415.
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`Similarly, in MacroPoint, LLC v. FourKites, Inc., the court held that certain patents were directed
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`towards an abstract idea because their claims “disclose[d] nothing more than a process for
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`tracking freight, including monitoring, locating, and communicating regarding the location of the
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`freight.” No. 15-cv-1002, 2015 WL 6870118, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 6, 2015); see also
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`Neochloris, Inc. v. Emerson Process Mgmt. LLLP, No. 14 C 9680, 2015 WL 5951753, at *4
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`(N.D. Ill. 2015) (Chang, J.) (holding that patent was invalid under § 101 because patent claims
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`were directed to abstract idea “of observing, analyzing, monitoring, and altering” data coming
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`from a water treatment plant); Hewlett Packard Co. v. ServiceNow, Inc., No. 14-cv-00570-BLF,
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`2015 WL 1133244, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2015) (concluding that patent was invalid under
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`§ 101 because it was “directed to the abstract idea of monitoring deadlines and providing an
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`alert when the deadline is approaching”).
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`The court agrees with the courts’ reasoning in Wireless Media Innovations and
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`MacroPoint. Here, similarly, the `046 and `363 patents are directed to the abstract idea of
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`monitoring and controlling property and communicating this information through generic
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`computer functions. Plaintiff asserts that the `046 and `363 patents are unique in that they allow
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`for the monitoring and control of property remotely without the need for a centralized security
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`office, but this does not change the fact that, at its core, the purpose of the claimed invention is
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`the abstract idea of monitoring, i.e., surveillance. The surveillance of property in order to
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`provide security is a “well-known” concept that “humans have always performed.” Content
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`Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347. Further, surveillance is not confined to any location, time, or
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`system; it thus “has no particular concrete or tangible form or application.” Versata Dev. Grp.,
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`793 F.3d at 1333. Law enforcement officials have used various forms of electronic video and
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`audio recording devices to monitor potential criminal activity on or around property since the
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`mid-twentieth century. See, e.g., O’Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345, 346 (1967) (involving
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`use of electronic surveillance installed in a commercial establishment to monitor conversation of
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`suspect). And although monitoring may have been done by the human eye before the invention
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`of electricity, the general concept of keeping watch over property is timeless. As early as 31
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`BC, for example, the Romans monitored and secured their empire through numerous
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`watchtowers, which could communicate through a signaling system. See generally P. Southern,
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`Signals versus Illumination on Roman Frontiers, 21 BRITANNIA, 233–42 (1990). In recent times,
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`the monitoring of vehicles and premises has become ubiquitous—one would be hard-pressed to
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`find a store or street corner in all of Chicago that is not under some sort of video surveillance.
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`See Vitale v. City of Bridgeview Police Officer Glynn, No. 89 C 9181, 1990 WL 141440, at *1
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`(N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1990) (demonstrating that idea of an in-store surveillance system was a
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`familiar concept as early as the 1990s); Schwartz v. Coulter, No. 91 C 7954, 1993 WL 398578,
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`at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 1993) (same).
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`The fact that the `046 and `363 patents purport to solve a problem by allowing
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`individuals to monitor their property remotely through the use of a computer network does not
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`make the patents non-abstract. See, e.g., Tuxis Technologies, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No.
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`13-1771-RGA, 2015 WL 1387815, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 25, 2015) (“[T]he fact that [performance of
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`the idea] occurs remotely and/or over the Internet does not make the claimed subject matter
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`non-abstract.”) In fact, a claimed invention’s ability to operate remotely has played little to no
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`role in other courts’ § 101 analyses. See, e.g., Becton, Dickson & Co. v. Baxter Intern., Inc.,
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`No. 1-14-CV-222-LY, 2015 WL 5148850, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2015) (“The fact that [an
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`invention] is ‘remote’ is of no added consequence to the abstract nature of the concept.”); Cloud
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`Satchel, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 553, 562 (D. Del. 2014) (patent claim “at its
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`core, describes the implementation of the abstract idea of cataloguing documents to facilitate
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`their retrieval from storage in the field of remote computing”). Logically, this makes sense;
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`“[s]tating an abstract idea while adding the wor[d] ‘[remotely]’ is not . . . the sort of ‘additional
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`featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the [invention] is more than a drafting effort
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`designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2350–51.
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`In addition to its monitoring, the security system described in the `363 patent is directed
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`to controlling equipment located in or on a vehicle or premises. This, too, is an abstract idea.
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`Turning equipment on and off, or otherwise controlling equipment, is a well-known concept.
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`Indeed, the most basic electronic equipment, such as coffee makers, toasters, and electric
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`lights, would be rendered useless if humans could not control them. In Vehicle Intelligence and
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`Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, the Federal Circuit invalidated a patent for a system
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`designed to screen a vehicle for equipment impairments and then control the vehicle in
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`response to the screening results. No. 2015–1411, ___ Fed. App. ___, 2015 WL 9461707, at *2
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`(Fed. Cir. Dec. 28, 2015). The Federal Circuit held that the claims were directed to an abstract
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`idea because “[n]one of the claims at issue are limited to a particular kind of impairment, explain
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`how to perform either screening or testing for any impairment, specify how to program [the
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`system] to perform any screening or testing, or explain the nature of control to be exercised on
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`the vehicle in response to the test results.” Id. at *2.
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`The `363 patent suffers from the same deficiencies as the patent-at-issue in Vehicle
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`Intelligence and Safety. The representative patent claims describe