UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`________________
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`VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.
`Petitioner,
`v.
`JOAO CONTROL & MONITORING SYSTEMS, LLC
`Patent Owner
`________________
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`Case IPR2015-01612
`Patent 7,397,363
`________________
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`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITION
`FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.107
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`________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`________________
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`VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.
`Petitioner,
`v.
`JOAO CONTROL & MONITORING SYSTEMS, LLC
`Patent Owner
`________________
`
`Case IPR2015-01612
`Patent 7,397,363
`________________
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`
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`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITION
`FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.107
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`Patent Owner’s Response to Petition
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1
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`II. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................. 1
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` A. Overview of the ‘363 Patent .......................................................................... 2
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` B. Prosecution History of the ‘363 Patent .......................................................... 2
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` C. Exemplary Claim ............................................................................................ 3
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`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ............................................................................... 4
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` A. Legal Standards .............................................................................................. 4
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` B. “processing device” ........................................................................................ 8
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`IV. RESPONSE TO PROPOSED GROUNDS OF INVALIDITY ......................... 9
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` C. “first signal” and “second signal” .................................................................. 8
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` A. Ground 3 is Deficient ..................................................................................... 9
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` 1. Spaur fails to disclose the “A to B to C” system of claim 68 ................. 10
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` B. Ground 4 is Deficient ................................................................................... 19
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`VII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 21
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`LIST OF EXHIBITS
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`Description
`Exhibit
`EX2001 Notice of Intent to Issue Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate
`EX2002 Declaration of Steven W. Ritcheson
`August 26, 2015 Opinion and Order Construing Disputed Claim Terms
`in the matter of JCMS v. Chrysler Group LLC, Case No. 13-cv-13957
`(E.D. Mich.)
`EX2004 Transcript of April 20, 2016 Deposition of Scott Andrews
`“AT&T Plans to Offer Internet Over a $500 Wireless Phone,”
`EX2005
`NYTimes.com, July 12, 1996.
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`EX2003
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`Patent Owner’s Response to Petition
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`I.
`INTRODUCTION
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`In response to the Petition for Inter Partes Review (“Petition”) filed by
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`Petitioner, the Board declined to institute inter partes review (Paper 7, the
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`“Decision”) of claims 21, 24, 27, 29-31 and 33. However, the Board has
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`instituted inter partes review of claims 68, 69, 72, 74, 77 and 80 (“Challenged
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`Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,397,363 (“the ‘363 Patent”) based on the following
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`grounds:
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`Ground
`3
`4
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`Claims
`68, 69, 74, 77
`and 80
`72
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`Proposed Rejections
`anticipated by Spaur
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`obvious in view of Spaur
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`The two instituted grounds of rejection are substantively flawed, in that
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`Spaur teach important properly construed claim limitations. For example, none of
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`the cited references teach an “A to B to C” monitoring system/method, as
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`required by the challenged claims and as will be explained in more detail below.
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`Accordingly, Joao Control & Monitoring Systems, LLC (“JCMS” or
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`“Patent Owner”) submits this Response to Petitioner’s Petition and the Board’s
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`Decision.
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`II. BACKGROUND
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`Patent Owner’s Response to Petition
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`A. Overview of the ‘363 Patent
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`The ‘363 Patent is directed to a novel and unconventional system for, inter
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`alia, remotely-controlling and/or monitoring systems located at vehicles and
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`premises. EX1001 at 26. The Challenged Claims are directed to a specially
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`assembled and programmed distributed control and monitoring system for
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`vehicles, wherein control and/or monitoring functions for a vehicle or for a
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`vehicle system, vehicle equipment system, vehicle component, vehicle device,
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`vehicle equipment, or vehicle appliance, of a vehicle, can be distributed among
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`three separate and distinct processing devices, each of which can generate or
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`transmit a separate and distinct signal in order to control and/or detect a state of
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`disrepair of a separate fourth device of or at the vehicle, which is the respective
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`vehicle system, vehicle equipment system, vehicle component, vehicle device,
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`vehicle equipment, or vehicle appliance.
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`B.
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`Prosecution History of the ‘363 Patent
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`The patent application that issued as the ‘363 patent was filed on
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`September 16, 2002. EX1001. The ‘363 patent issued on July 8, 2008. Id.
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`During prosecution, the Applicant chose to be his own lexicographer and
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`provided explicit definitions for various terms, including “processing device,” in
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`“Supplement to the Remarks for the Amendment filed on October 24, 2007” filed
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`on November 23, 2007 during prosecution of the patent application that issued as
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`the ‘363 patent (see EX1007, hereinafter “First Remarks”).
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`C.
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`Exemplary Claim
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`Claim 68 is the only independent claim for which inter partes review was
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`instituted. It is reproduced below:
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`68. An apparatus, comprising:
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`a first processing device, wherein the first processing device at least
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`one of monitors and detects an event regarding at least one of a vehicle system, a
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`vehicle equipment system, a vehicle component, a vehicle device, a vehicle
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`equipment, and a vehicle appliance, of a vehicle, wherein the first processing
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`device is located at the vehicle, and further wherein the event is a detection of a
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`state of disrepair of the at least one of a vehicle system, a vehicle equipment
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`system, a vehicle component, a vehicle device, a vehicle equipment, and a
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`vehicle appliance, wherein the first processing device at least one of generates a
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`first signal and transmits a first signal to a second processing device, wherein the
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`first signal contains information regarding the event, and further wherein the
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`second processing device is located at a location which is remote from the
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`vehicle, wherein the second processing device automatically receives the first
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`signal, and further wherein the second processing device at least one of generates
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`a second signal and transmits a second signal to a communication device,
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`wherein the second signal is transmitted to the communication device via, on, or
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`over, at least on of the Internet and the World Wide Web, wherein the
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`communication device is located remote from the second processing device, and
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`wherein the communication device automatically receives the second signal, and
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`further wherein the communication device provides information regarding the
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`event.
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`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`Legal Standards
`A.
`The Board concluded that the term of the ‘363 Patent will expire prior to
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`the end of the one-year period allotted for an inter partes review, and thus the
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`Board is treating the ‘363 Patent as expired for purposes of claim interpretation.
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`Decision at 8. Claim terms in an expired patent are generally given their
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`“ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in
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`the art in question at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
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`1303,1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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`However, it is important to note that the Manual of Patent Examining
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`Procedure (MPEP) and controlling case law make it clear that the determination
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`of the ordinary and customary meaning of a term or phrase does not occur in a
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`vacuum, but instead it must be made in light of the patent’s specification and the
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`intrinsic evidence. MPEP §2111.01 is clear and unequivocal on this point. The
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`pertinent portion of the MPEP §2111.01 recites:
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`The ordinary and customary meaning of a term may be
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`evidenced by a variety of sources, including “the words
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`of
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`the claims
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`themselves,
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`the remainder of
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`the
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`specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic
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`evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the
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`meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.”
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1314, 75 USPQ2d
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`at 1327. If extrinsic reference sources, such as
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`dictionaries, evidence more than one definition for the
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`term, the intrinsic record must be consulted to identify
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`which of the different possible definitions is most
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`consistent with Applicant’s use of the terms. Brookhill-
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`Wilk 1, 334 F.3d at 1300, 67 USPQ2d at 1137; see also
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`Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158
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`F.3d 1243, 1250, 48 USPQ2d 1117, 1122 (Fed. Cir.
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`1998) (“Where there are several common meanings for
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`a claim term, the patent disclosure serves to point away
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`from the improper meanings and toward the proper
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`meanings.”) and Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc.,
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`90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
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`1996) (construing the term “solder reflow temperature”
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`to mean “peak reflow temperature” of solder rather than
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`the “liquidus temperature” of solder in order to remain
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`consistent with the specification.). (Emphasis added).
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`“[A] patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer” and assign special
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`definitions to the words in the claim, as long as those definitions are clearly
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`stated in the patent specification or file history. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
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`Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP
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`Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Therefore, “it is always
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`necessary to review the specification to determine whether the inventor has used
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`any terms in a manner inconsistent with their ordinary meaning. The
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`specification acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the
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`claims or when it defines terms by implication.” Id. Because the specification
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`must contain a description sufficient to those of ordinary skill in the art to make
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`and use the invention, the specification “is the single best guide to the meaning of
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`a disputed claim term.” Id.
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`The prosecution history of the patent is also important to a proper claim
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`construction. As a complete record of proceedings before the U.S. Patent and
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`Trademark Office, it may contain representations made by the applicant
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`regarding the scope of the claims. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. “The patentee is
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`bound by representations made and actions that were taken in order to obtain the
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`patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d
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`1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). The prosecution history limits the meaning of
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`claim terms “so as to exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during
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`prosecution.” Southwall, 54 F.3d at 1576. Prior art, some of which may be
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`contained in the file history, is also important because a valid claim cannot read
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`on, or cover within its scope, what is disclosed in the prior art. See General
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`American Transportation Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766, 771 (Fed. Cir.
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`1996).
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`B.
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`“processing device”
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`The term “processing device” appears in independent claim 68 and its
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`construction is necessary to interpret the meaning of the claim. Petitioner has
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`offered no construction for this key term.
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`As discussed supra, Applicant chose to be his own lexicographer and
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`provided an explicit definition for the term “processing device” in the First
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`Remarks. EX1007 at 9-10. Accordingly, the term “processing device” should be
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`construed as “a device or a computer, or that part of a device or a computer,
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`which performs an operation, an action, or a function, or which performs a
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`number of operations, actions, or functions.” This proposed construction is
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`consistent with Applicant’s definition of the term “processing device” in the First
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`Remarks, and is also supported by and is consistent with the Specification of the
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`‘363 Patent, including the written description, the drawings and the claims.
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`C.
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`“first signal” and “second signal”
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`JCMS respectfully submits that construction of these terms is necessary at
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`this time, as will become apparent below.
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`In litigation involving the ‘363 Patent, the U.S. District Court for the
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`Eastern District of Michigan issued an Opinion and Order Construing Disputed
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`Claim Terms in which they construed the terms “first signal,” “second signal”
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`and “third signal” as follows:
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`“The Court does, however, find that Defendant’s
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`proposed alternative constructions are consistent with
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`the normal understanding of the claim terms. In fact,
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`the parties agree that the “first signal” is a signal sent
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`by the first device, the “second signal” is sent by the
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`second device, and the “third signal” is sent by the
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`third device.” EX2003 at 23. (emphasis added).
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`JCMS respectfully submits that, for purposes of this proceeding, these
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`constructions should be adopted, as they are required to evaluate the merits of
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`Petitioner’s arguments, namely:
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`• “first signal” is “a signal sent by a first device”
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` •
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` “second signal” is “a signal sent by a second
` device”
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`IV. RESPONSE TO PROPOSED GROUNDS OF INVALIDITY
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`A. Ground 3 is Deficient
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`Ground 3 alleges that claims 68, 69, 74, 77 and 80 are anticipated by
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`Spaur. However, Patent Owner respectfully submits that Spaur fails to disclose
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`every claimed element, as required under § 102, when the claim elements are
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`properly construed.
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`At the outset, Patent Owner disagrees with the Petitioner’s interpretation of
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`“processing device” that would allow the CDPD network modem 76 of Spaur to
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`serve as the “second processing device” of claim 68. Patent Owner maintains
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`that the CDPD network modem 76 of Spaur is merely a component of a
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`communication system or communication network, as taught by the specification
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`of the ‘363 Patent, and not a “processing device.” Petitioner’s arguments and the
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`constructions and interpretations that have been adopted by the Board,
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`notwithstanding, Petitioner’s arguments with respect to Spaur still fail with
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`regards to claim 68.
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`1.
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`Spaur fails to disclose the “A to B to C” system of claim 68
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`Independent claim 68 recites, inter alia, a “second processing device” that
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`receives a “first signal” from a “first processing device” and that “at least one of
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`generates a second signal and transmits a second signal to a communication
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`device.” Spaur fails to disclose, teach or suggest, these features.
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`As discussed supra in Section III.C, the “first signal” and “second signal”
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`recited in claim 68 are properly construed as:
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`• “first signal” is “a signal sent by a first device”
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`• “second signal” is “a signal sent by a second device”
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`Petitioner alleges that the claimed “second processing device” of claim 68
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`is satisfied by the CDPD network modem 76 of Spaur, that the claimed “first
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`processing device” is satisfied by the “controller 30” of Spaur, and that the
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`claimed “communication device” is satisfied by “computer terminal 60” of
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`Spaur. See Paper 2 at 49 and 52-53. (“The data is transmitted from controller 30
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`(the first processing device) via cellular phone 80 to the CDPD network modem
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`(the second processing device), and it is then transmitted over the Internet 68 to
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`computer terminal 60 (the communication device)”).
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`Claim 68 requires that the “second processing device” receive a first signal
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`sent from the claimed “first processing device.” The device in Spaur that receives
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`a signal from the “controller 30” (which Petitioner asserts is the claimed first
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`processing device) is the “vehicle CDPD network modem 82” of Spaur (via
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`“phone interface 84”). Thus, based on Petitioner’s anticipation arguments (which
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`are based on an interpretation of “processing device” that would allow a
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`component of a communication system or communication network, as well as an
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`interface device, to function as the claimed processing devices), the phone
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`interface 84 of Spaur must be the component that corresponds to the claimed
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`second processing device because it receives a signal from the claimed first
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`processing device (a “first signal” based on the construction of “first signal”
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`and “second signal,” discussed above).
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`Claim 68 requires that the “communication device” receives a “second
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`signal” from the second processing device which, as discussed above, must
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`necessarily be a signal from phone interface 84 (the second device) based on the
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`proper construction of “first signal” and “second signal.” However, the “second
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`signal” from the phone interface 84 is received by an intermediate device
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`between the phone interface 84 of Spaur and computer terminal 60 of Spaur.
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`That intermediate device is the vehicle CDPD network modem 82 of Spaur. See
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`EX1004 at Fig. 2.
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`Vehicle CDPD network modem 82 of Spaur, in response to the second
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`signal from the phone interface 84, actually generates a third signal (as the
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`vehicle CDPD network modem 82 is a third device) that is received by cellular
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`phone 80 of Spaur. Id. Cellular phone 80, in turn, generates a fourth signal that is
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`received by remote CDPD network modem 76. Id. Remote CDPD network
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`modem 76, in turn, generates a fifth signal that is received by modem 64 of
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`Spaur. Id. Modem 64, in turn, generates a sixth signal that is received by
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`computer terminal 60. Id. Thus, the computer terminal 60 of Spaur (which
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`Petitioner asserts corresponds to the claimed “communication device”) does not
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`receive a “second signal” from the intermediate second processing device (which
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`Petitioner asserts is satisfied by remote CDPD network modem 76 of Spaur), but
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`rather, the computer terminal 60 receives a “sixth signal” from the modem 64 of
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`Spaur.
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`Thus, Spaur teaches a first processing device at the vehicle (controller 30),
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`that sends a first signal to a second processing device at the vehicle (phone
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`interface 84), which, in turn, sends a second signal to a third processing device at
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`the vehicle (vehicle CDPD network modem 82), which, in turn, sends a third
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`signal to a fourth processing device at the vehicle (cellular phone 80), which, in
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`turn, sends a fourth signal to a fifth processing device remote from the vehicle
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`(remote CDPD network modem 76), which, in turn, sends a fifth signal to a
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`vehicle sixth processing device remote from the vehicle (modem 64), which, in
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`turn, sends a sixth signal to a communication device (computer terminal 60). This
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`is an “A to B to C to D to E to F to G” system in which devices A, B, C and D are
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`all located at the vehicle, and devices D, E, F and G which are remote from the
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`vehicle.
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`Indeed, Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Andrews, confirmed during his cross-
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`examination testimony that the signals pass through numerous processing
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`devices, based on Petitioner’s broad interpretation of “processing device” that
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`would allow a component of a communication system or communication network,
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`or even an interface device, to function as the claimed processing devices:
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`EX2004 at p. 30, line 24 to p. 33, line 4
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`Q: What do you identify in Spaur as being the second
`processing device?
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`A: The second processing device in Spaur would be the
`CDPD network modem 76.
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` . . .
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`Q: Controller 30 is the first processing device; correct?
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`A: That’s correct.
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`Q: Okay. It generates a first signal?
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`A: Yes.
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`Q: Now, what is the path of the signal?
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`A: That signal goes from the controller through the phone
`interface into a vehicle CDPD modem over a call phone
`to the other end of the CDPD link where it is then made
`available to or is connected to the Internet.
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`Q: So that’s element 76, the remote CDPD network
`modem you identified as the second processing device?
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`A: That’s what I would consider to be the second
`processing device, yes.
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`Q: . . . you indicated that a processing device is what?
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`A: A device that performs a process.
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`Q: . . . does the phone interface perform a process?
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`A: Well, the phone interface 84 is not remote from the
`vehicle, is it? It does perform a process. All of these
`things perform processes –
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`Q: . . . would you consider the network computer, the
`network modem 82 to also be a processing device?
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`A: . . . I would say that the phone and the – the phone is
`a communications device, but, you know, even your
`other claims in this and other patents talk about a cellular
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`phone as being a processing device. So there are
`numerous processing devices that these signals pass
`through. (emphasis added).
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`Q: Okay. So would it be fair to say that phone interface
`84, vehicle CDPD network modem 82, and cellular
`phone 80 are all processing devices?
`
`A: I would characterize them as processing devices that
`are part of a communications system, yes. (emphasis
`added).
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`In contrast to the “A to B to C to D to E to F to G” system disclosed in
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`Spaur, claim 68 requires a first processing device at the vehicle, which sends a
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`first signal to a second processing device remote from the vehicle which, in turn,
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`sends a second signal to a communication device remote the vehicle. This is an
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`“A to B to C” system in which devices C and D are both remote from the vehicle.
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`In view of the foregoing, the Patent Owner respectfully submits that Spaur
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`fails to disclose the claimed “second processing device” of Claim 68 which 1) is
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`located at a location which is remote from the vehicle; and 2) wherein the second
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`processing device automatically receives the first signal, and further wherein the
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`second processing device at least one of generates a second signal and transmits a
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`second signal to a communication device, wherein the second signal is
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`transmitted to the communication device via, on, or over, at least one of the
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`Internet and the World Wide Web. As noted herein, the phone interface 84 of
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`Spaur is not located remote from the vehicle. To the contrary, it is located at the
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`vehicle. Further, the phone interface 84 does generate or transmit a second signal
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`to a communication device via, on, or over, at least on of the Internet and the
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`World Wide Web.
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`
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`The remote CDPD network modem 76 cannot serve as the “second
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`processing device” of Claim 68 as it does not receive the first signal sent from the
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`controller 30. Rather, it actually receives a fourth signal sent from a fourth
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`device, which is the cellular phone 80.
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`
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`In view of the foregoing, Spaur does not disclose the claimed “second
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`processing device of claim 68. For at least these reasons, JCMS respectfully
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`submits that Spaur fails to disclose every element and feature of claim 68.
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`Accordingly, Spaur fails to anticipate the subject matter of claims 26, 42 and 48.
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`Claims 69, 74, 77 and 80 depend from claim 68. Thus, claims 69, 74, 77 and 80
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`are also patentable over Spaur for at least the reasons discussed above.
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`With regards to claim 69, Spaur does not disclose an intelligent agent, a
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`software agent, or a mobile agent. During his deposition, Mr. Andrews provided
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`testimony regarding intelligent agents, software agents, and mobile agents.
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`EX2004 at p. 38, line 14 to p. 40, line 19. In spite of his ideas as to what an
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`“agent” is, Mr. Andrews simply could not provide a definitive explanation as to
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`when software rises to the level of being an “agent.”
`
`The fact is that Spaur does not disclose an “intelligent agent”, a “software
`
`agent”, or a “mobile agent.” Mr. Andrew’s opinions, that Spaur discloses an
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`“intelligent agent”, a “software agent”, or a “mobile agent” are, at best,
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`conclusory and without any support, as evidenced by Mr. Andrew’s inability to
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`clearly explain the concepts of an “intelligent agent”, a “software agent”, and a
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`“mobile agent.” Thus, Spaur does not disclose all of the elements and features of
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`claim 69 so as to anticipate claim 69.
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`
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`With regards to claim 74, Spaur does not disclose the system of claim 68
`
`which further provides that “the first processing device transmits a first
`
`diagnostic signal to the second processing device, and further wherein the second
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`processing device transmits a second diagnostic signal to the communication
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`device in response to the first diagnostic signal, and further wherein the
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`communication device provides diagnostic data or information regarding the at
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`least one of a vehicle system, a vehicle equipment system, a vehicle component, a
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`vehicle device, a vehicle equipment, and a vehicle appliance.”
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`
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`In fact, Spaur does not even contain the word “diagnostic.” In its Petition,
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`Petitioner provides four separate citations to Spaur, at Col. 3, lines 30-39; Col 4,
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`lines 14-16; Col. 4, lines 26-29; and Col. 9, lines 3-12. See Petition at 55-56.
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`None of these citations, however, disclose the claimed “first diagnostic signal”
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`and “second diagnostic signal” of claim 74.
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`
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`In view of the foregoing, Patent Owner respectfully submits that Spaur
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`does not disclose all of the elements and features of claim 74 so as to anticipate
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`claim 74.
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`B. Ground 4 is Deficient
`
`Ground 4 alleges that claim 72 is obvious over Spaur. Claim 72 depends
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`from claim 68, and thus, claim 72 is also patentable for at least the reasons
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`discussed in Section IV.A.
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`
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`Further, claim 72 provides that the “communication device is at least one
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`of a wireless device, a cellular telephone, and a personal digital assistant.”
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`Petitioners maintains that, since Spaur uses a wireless device (wireless device 18
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`(FIG. 1) and cell phone 80 (FIG. 2)) at the vehicle, to receive and transmit
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`information, then it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to use a
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`wireless device, a cellular telephone, or a personal digital assistant, remote from
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`the vehicle and in connection with the Internet or the World Wide Web as and for
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`the claimed “communication device.” However, Mr. Andrews, could not support
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`this position during cross-examination. See EX2004 at p. 44, line 14 to p. 46, line
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`4.
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`In view of the foregoing, it would not have been obvious to use a wireless
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`device, a cellular telephone, or a personal digital assistant, in connection with the
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`Internet or the World Wide Web at the time of the invention of claim 72 of the
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`‘363 Patent. In fact, Mr. Andrews acknowledged that cellular telephones were
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`not typically used with the Internet in 1996. Id. at p. 45, lines 8-12 and p. 45, line
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`20 to p. 46, line 4. Indeed, at the time of the effective filing date of the
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`Challenged Claims of the ‘363 Patent, a cellular phone and associated digital
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`cellular service for wirelessly connecting to the Internet was “too expensive to be
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`a mass market product.” See EX2005 at 1. (quoting Alan Reiter, editor of
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`Wireless Internet & Mobile Computing).
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`Lastly, Mr. Andrews also acknowledged that the cell phone 80 at the
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`vehicle of Spaur was merely used to receive and transmit information, and
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`provided no interface with a person. Id. at p. 45, line 7.
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`Accordingly, Patent Owner respectfully submits that Spaur does not render
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`obvious claim 72.
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`VII. CONCLUSION
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`
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`For the foregoing reasons, JCMS respectfully submits that Petitioner has
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`failed to establish that claims 68, 69, 72, 74, 77 and 80 are unpatentable. Patent
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`Owner respectfully requests that the Board confirm the patentability of claims 68,
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`69, 72, 74, 77 and 80.
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`Date: May 9, 2016
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`
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
` Sinergia Technology Law Group, PLLC
`By:
`/René A. Vazquez/
`
`Raymond A. Joao (Lead Counsel)
`
`Reg. No. 35,907
`
`René A. Vazquez (Backup Counsel)
`
`Reg. No. 38,647
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`Counsel for Patent Owner
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`CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
`I hereby certify service of the foregoing PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE
`
`TO PETITION FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.107 to
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`the following counsel for Petitioner on May 9, 2016 via electronic service at:
`
`Michael J. Lennon (Lead Counsel), Reg. No. 26,562
`Clifford A. Ulrich (Backup Counsel), Reg. No. 42, 194
`Kenyon & Kenyon LLP
`One Broadway
`New York, NY 10004
`Phone: 212-425-7200
`Email: mlennon@kenyon.com; culrich@kenyon.com
`
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`Date: May 9, 2016
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`
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`
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` Sinergia Technology Law Group, PLLC
`
`By:
`
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`
`
`
`
`/René A. Vazquez/
`Raymond A. Joao (Lead Counsel)
`Reg. No. 35,907
`René A. Vazquez (Backup Counsel)
`Reg. No. 38,647
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`
`22 22
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