Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
` Paper 21
`Entered: January 27, 2017
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`
`VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`JOAO CONTROL & MONITORING SYSTEMS, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2015-01610
`Patent 6,542,076 B1
`_______________
`
`
`
`Before DAVID C. MCKONE, STACEY G. WHITE, JASON J. CHUNG,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`Opinion for the Board filed by Administrative Patent Judge, WHITE.
`Opinion Concurring filed by Administrative Patent Judge, CHUNG.
`
`WHITE, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
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`I. INTRODUCTION
`Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition
`requesting inter partes review of claims 3, 18, 65, 67, 68, 70, 73, 91, 94, 96,
`103, 110, 116, 119, 120, and 205 of U.S. patent No. 6,542,076 B1 (Ex. 1001,
`“the ’076 patent”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319. Joao Control &
`Monitoring Systems, LLC, (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response.
`(Paper 6). Based on our review of these submissions, we instituted inter
`partes review of claims 3, 18, 65, 67, 68, 70, 73, 91, 94, 96, 103, 110, 116,
`119, 120 and 205 of the ’076 patent on grounds of unpatentability asserted
`under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. Paper 11 (“Dec.”). Specifically, we
`authorized this inter partes review to proceed as to the following grounds:
`Reference(s)
`Basis Claim(s) Challenged
`§ 102 3, 18, 65, 67, 68, 70, 73, 91,
`Kniffin1
`103, 116, 119, 120, and 205
`Kniffin and one of
`Spaur,2 Behr,3 or Kubler4 § 103 94 and 110
`Kniffin and Neely5
`§ 103 96
`§ 102 3, 18, 65, 67, 70, 73, 91,
`Ryoichi6
`103, 116, 119, and 205
`Ryoichi and one of
`§ 103 94 and 110
`Spaur, Behr, or Kubler
`Ryoichi and Neely
`§ 103 68, 96, and 120
`Id. at 24–25.
`
`
`1 U.S. Patent No. 6,072,402 (Ex. 1010) (“Kniffin”).
`2 U.S. Patent No. 5,732,074, filed Jan. 16, 1996 (Ex. 1020) (“Spaur”).
`3 U.S. Patent No. 5,808,566, filed June 23, 1995 (Ex. 1021) (“Behr”).
`4 U.S. Patent No. 5,726,984, filed Oct. 5, 1995 (Ex. 1022) (“Kubler”).
`5 U.S. Patent No. 4,602,127 (Ex. 1018) (“Neely”).
`6 U.S. Patent No. 5,113,427 (Ex. 1011) (“Ryoichi”).
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`Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner’s Response (Paper 22, “PO
`Resp.”), and Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 26, “Reply”). No oral hearing
`was conducted. Paper 20.
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. §318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73.
`For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has demonstrated by a
`preponderance of the evidence that claims 3, 18, 65, 67, 68, 70, 73, 91, 94,
`96, 103, 110, 116, 119, 120, and 205 of the ’076 patent are unpatentable.
`
`A. Related Proceedings
`
`The parties inform us that the ʼ076 patent is at issue in approximately
`one dozen lawsuits pending in courts around the country. Paper 17, Pet. 1–
`2. In addition, ex parte reexamination No. 90/013,302 was filed with respect
`to the ’076 patent and has been stayed in light of this proceeding. Paper 16.
`The ’076 patent also is the subject of a co-pending petition for inter partes
`review (IPR2015-01508).
`
`B. The ʼ076 patent
`The ’076 patent describes a control, monitoring, and/or security
`apparatus and method for vehicles. Ex. 1001, 1:25–32. The apparatus
`described in the ’076 patent allows an owner, occupant, or other authorized
`individual to control or to perform various monitoring and security tasks in
`regards to a vehicle from a remote location and at any time. Id. at 3:5–11.
`An embodiment of the apparatus of the ’076 patent includes a
`transmitter system which is “a remote system, which may or may not be
`physically connected to the remainder of the apparatus. Further, the
`transmitter system is not located in the [vehicle] . . . , but rather, is located
`external from, and/or separate and apart from, the vehicle.” Id. at 3:50–56.
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`The apparatus also includes a CPU that is connected electrically and/or
`linked to one or more vehicle equipment systems (e.g., vehicle ignition or
`anti-theft systems). Id. at 4:35–37; 4:61–5:14. The vehicle equipment
`systems may be activated, de-activated, reset, or controlled by the apparatus.
`Id. at 5:15–18. This activation or control may be achieved by a user entering
`a code on the transceiver of the transmitter system. Id. at 6:30–36. The
`code is transmitted to the CPU and then the CPU communicates with the
`appropriate vehicle equipment system. Id. at 7:16–21.
`
`C. Illustrative Claim
`As noted above, Petitioner challenges claims 3, 18, 65, 67, 68, 70, 73,
`91, 103, 116, 119, 120, and 205 of the ʼ076 patent, of which claims 3, 73,
`and 205 are independent. Claim 3 is illustrative of the challenged claims
`and is reproduced below:
`3.
`A control apparatus, comprising:
`
`a first control device, wherein the first control device at least
`one of generates a first signal and transmits a first signal for
`at least one of activating, de-activating, disabling, and re-
`enabling, at least one of a vehicle system, a vehicle
`equipment system, a vehicle component, a vehicle device, a
`vehicle equipment, and a vehicle appliance, of a vehicle,
`wherein the first control device is located at the vehicle,
`
`wherein the first control device at least one of generates the first
`signal and transmits the first signal in response to a second
`signal, wherein the second signal is at least one of generated
`by a second control device and transmitted from a second
`control device, wherein the second control device is located
`at a location which is remote from the vehicle, wherein the
`second signal is transmitted from the second control device
`to the first control device, wherein the second signal is
`automatically received by the first control device, and
`further wherein the second control device at least one of
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`generates the second signal and transmits the second signal
`in response to a third signal,
`
`wherein the third signal is at least one of generated by a third
`control device and transmitted from a third control device,
`wherein the third control device is located at a location
`which is remote from the vehicle and remote from the
`second control device, wherein the third signal is transmitted
`from the third control device to the second control device,
`and further wherein the third signal is automatically received
`by the second control device.
`
`II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`As acknowledged by the parties, the ’076 patent has expired. See
`Pet. 9; PO Resp. 8. We construe expired patent claims according to the
`principles set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
`(en banc). See In re Rambus, 694 F.3d 42, 46 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “In
`determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look
`principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language
`itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.”
`DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014
`(Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). A patentee may act
`as a lexicographer by giving a term a particular meaning in the specification
`with “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” In re Paulsen, 30
`F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`
`A. Term Preliminarily Construed in the Decision to Institute
`
`For purposes of the Decision to Institute, we construed the term
`“control device.” Dec. 5–9. Neither party raised any concerns regarding
`this construction during trial. See PO Resp. 10–11; Reply 1. Based on our
`review of the full record, we discern no reason to modify or further discuss
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`in this Final Written Decision our construction for this claim term. For
`convenience, the claim construction is reproduced in the table below.
`Term
`Citations
`Construction
`Control
`Ex. 2002, 6 A device or a computer, or that part of a device or
`Device
`a computer, which performs an operation, an
`action, or a function, or which performs a number
`of operations, actions, or functions.
`B. First, Second, and Third Signal Terms
`
`Patent Owner provides proposed constructions for the first, second,
`and third signal terms. PO Resp. 11–12. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts
`that the “first signal” is “a signal sent by a first device”; the “second signal”
`is “a signal sent by a second device”; and the “third signal” is “a signal sent
`by a third device.” Id. at 12.
`We agree, for example, that a first signal is sent by a first device. For
`example, claim 3 recites, in relevant part, that the “first control device”
`generates and transmits the first signal. The parties’ dispute, however, is
`directed to whether there may be an intermediate device between the
`transmitting device (e.g., second device) and the signal’s destination (e.g.,
`first device). In Patent Owner’s view, there may not be an intermediate
`device, between the first and second devices, that modifies or changes the
`signal. See PO Resp. 32.
`As part of our analysis, we note that the Applicant provided an
`express definition of the term “signal” in the First Remarks filed on
`November 23, 2007, during prosecution of the patent application that issued
`as the U.S. patent No. 7,397,363 (“the ’363 patent”) (Ex. 2002). The ’076
`patent and the ’363 patent each descend from U.S. Patent Application No.
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`08/622,749. See Ex. 1001, at [63].7 Patent Owner relied upon this same
`filing in support of its arguments regarding the construction of “remote,”
`“control device,” and “located at.” See Dec. 6–7. The Applicant provided
`this definition several years after the issuance of the ’076 patent. See Ex.
`1001, at [45] (Apr. 1, 2003 issuance date). As the Federal Circuit has noted,
`however, “[a] statement made during prosecution of related patents may be
`properly considered in construing a term common to those patents,
`regardless of whether the statement pre- or post-dates the issuance of the
`particular patent at issue.” Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d
`1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Multi–Tech Sys., Inc.,
`357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
`In that 2007 filing, the term “signal” was defined as “an indication, or
`an indication having or conveying data, information, or a message, or a
`conveyor of data, information, or a message, or an indication representing
`data or information.” Ex. 2002, 11. We are persuaded that this definition is
`instructive to understanding the proper scope of these claim terms. Thus, a
`first signal, for example, is an “an indication, or an indication having or
`conveying data, information, or a message, or a conveyor of data,
`information, or a message, or an indication representing data or information
`that is sent by a first device.”
`We have not been directed to evidence in the specification sufficient
`to show that the Applicant desired to narrow this very broad definition of
`signal in a manner that would exclude signals that pass through
`intermediaries. As defined by the Applicant, a signal may be an indication,
`
`7 This information was modified by a Certificate of Correction issued July 1,
`2003. See Ex. 1001, 95.
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`information, or a message and we are not persuaded that it is impermissible
`for an intermediary to pass this information on and to add further data to the
`information that it received.
`For the foregoing reasons, we construe the term “first signal” to be “a
`signal sent by a first device”; “second signal” to be “a signal sent by a
`second device”; and “third signal” to be “a signal sent by a third device.”
`The recited signals all are construed to be “an indication, or an indication
`having or conveying data, information, or a message, or a conveyor of data,
`information, or a message, or an indication representing data or
`information.” Finally, we are not persuaded that these terms exclude signals
`that may pass through an intermediary and any such intermediary may
`append additional information to the received signals.
`
`III. ANALYSIS
`A. Analysis of Asserted Ground of Anticipation by Kniffin
`
`Petitioner asserts that claims 3, 18, 65, 67, 68, 70, 73, 91, 103, 116,
`119, 120, and 205 of the ’076 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102
`as anticipated by Kniffin. Pet. 12–32. Petitioner relies on claim charts
`showing how this reference allegedly discloses the claimed subject matter.
`Id. Petitioner further relies on a declaration from Scott Andrews. Ex. 1002.
` Overview of Kniffin
`Kniffin describes a secure entry system that uses radio transmissions
`to communicate with locks, keys, and related components. Ex. 1010,
`Abstract. Figure 1 is reproduced below.
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`Figure 1 depicts the first embodiment of Kniffin. Id. at 2:25–26. In
`this embodiment, a secure entry system includes a lock (or other access
`control device) 12 that has an integrated cellular, paging, or other RF
`receiver 14. Users establish communication with the lock via “a cellular
`telephone, by a conventional telephone, or by some other communications
`link 16” that is in communication with clearinghouse 18. Id. at 2:32–34. In
`order to identify the lock that the user wishes to access, computer 20 of
`clearinghouse 18 synthesizes a series of voice prompts that are relayed to the
`user over communications link 16 that prompt the user to provide the
`appropriate identifying information. Id. at 2:35–43. If the clearinghouse
`determines that the user is authorized to access the lock then the
`clearinghouse will send a signal to lock 12. Id. at 2:44–47.
`Figure 4 is reproduced below.
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`Figure 4 depicts the fourth embodiment of Kniffin. Id. at 8:5–6. This
`embodiment is described in the context of an access control device for a
`delivery truck. Id. at 8:6–8. As described in Kniffin’s specification “the
`access control device 64 is not particularly detailed in FIG. 4, [but] it can
`take the same form as lock 12 of FIG. 1 (but with a lock mechanism adapted
`to secure the doors of a delivery truck).” Id. at 8:46–48. Here, a delivery
`company calls clearinghouse 66 and identifies the sequence of deliveries to
`be made by a truck. When truck 62 arrives at a delivery location, access
`control device 64 will sense whether this location is the expected location by
`detecting an identification device 70. Id. at 8:25–27. Identification device
`70 may be a proximity card mounted at the loading dock or an electronic key
`carried by an authorized employee. Id. at 8:27–30. “If the detected
`identification device corresponds to the first expected stop that had earlier
`been programmed, the truck access control device unlocks, permitting access
`to the truck’s contents.” Id. at 8:30–33. At any time, the delivery company
`can call clearinghouse 66 and modify the route. Id. at 8:61–67.
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` Discussion
`Each of the challenged independent claims (3, 73, and 205) recites a
`first, second, and third control device. Petitioner asserts that “[c]laims 3, 73,
`and 205 identify these same control devices but in different orders.” Pet. 8.
`Petitioner includes the following chart on page 9 of its Petition.
`
`
`
`The preceding chart illustrates Petitioner’s allegation that the independent
`claims recite the same control devices in different orders. Id. Patent
`Owner’s arguments regarding the challenged claims are in accord with
`Petitioner’s grouping of the control devices. See e.g., PO Resp. 14–15
`(discussing the first control device of claims 3 and 73 and the third control
`device of claim 205 as part of an argument directed to the “first control
`device” of claim 3). Petitioner and Patent Owner rely upon substantially
`similar evidence and arguments for these three devices. Thus, our analysis
`of Kniffin’s disclosures applies to each of the independent claims. For
`convenience, unless otherwise indicated, we shall use the terms first, second,
`and third control device to refer to the control devices as described in claim
`3.
`
`Petitioner argues that Kniffin discloses these control devices through
`its discussion and depiction of access control device 64 (first control device)
`(Pet. 12), clearinghouse 18 or 66 (second control device) (id.), and
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`communications link 16 (third control device) (id.). Petitioner asserts that
`“access control device 64 is adapted to secure the doors of the truck and
`guard against unauthorized opening.” Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 1010, 8:11–14,
`8:46–48). Petitioner argues that “[c]learinghouse 66 receives signals from a
`telephone 22 and communications link 16, and includes an RF transmission
`system for transmitting the schedule of stops. Moreover, truck access
`control device 64 is responsive to signals from clearinghouse 66, as Kniffin
`discloses that truck access control device 64 may be reprogrammed by
`clearinghouse 66.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1010, 8:61–67; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 11–
`13). In the first embodiment, users communicate with the clearinghouse via
`“a cellular telephone, by a conventional telephone, or by some other
`communications link 16,” and Petitioner argues that the communications
`link of the fourth embodiment is depicted as having similar communications.
`Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1010, 2:31–43, 8:61–67; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 11–13).
`Patent Owner asserts that Kniffin does not disclose all of the elements
`of the independent claims. PO Resp. 13–25. Specifically, Patent Owner
`contends that “Kniffin does not generate a signal (the claimed ‘first signal’
`. . . ) for instructing the lock mechanism 32 to unlock the doors in response
`to a signal from the clearinghouse 66 (which Petitioner asserts corresponds
`to the claims ‘second control device’).” Id. at 17. Patent Owner asserts that
`information received from clearinghouse 66 is merely stored in memory. Id.
`at 18. “In fact, the signal that triggers the access control device 64 of
`Kniffin to generate a signal for instructing the lock mechanism 32 to unlock
`the doors is a signal from an ‘identification device 70’ that is present at one
`of the authorized locations stored in memory 68.” Id.
`
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`Claim 3 recites “wherein the first control device at least one of
`generates the first signal and transmits the first signal in response to a second
`signal.” Ex. 1001, 106:51–54; see also id. 122:10–12 (similar language in
`claim 73), 141:38–40 (claim 205). Thus, in each of the independent claims,
`the first control device must respond to a signal from the second control
`device. Petitioner asserts that access control device 64 is the first control
`device and that clearinghouse 18 or 66 is the second control device. Pet. 12.
`Therefore, Petitioner must establish that Kniffin discloses that access control
`device 64 responds to a signal from the clearinghouse. We are not
`persuaded that Petitioner has a made a sufficient showing on this point.
`Petitioner alleges that “clearinghouse 66 transmits the schedule to the
`truck access control device 64 . . . where the schedule is stored in memory
`68.” Id. at 14. Petitioner then makes the bare assertion that “Kniffin’s truck
`access control device 64 (the in-vehicle control device), located in the
`vehicle, is responsive to signals from clearinghouse 66 (the middle device),
`located remote from the vehicle.” Id. at 15. Petitioner also contends that
`“truck access control device 64 is responsive to signals from clearinghouse
`66, as Kniffin discloses that truck access control device 64 may be
`reprogrammed by clearinghouse 66.” Id. at 15–16 (citing Ex. 1010, 8:61–
`67, Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 11–13). Petitioner, however, does not explain why storing a
`schedule in memory or reprogramming a device discloses the recited device
`responsive to a second signal. Nor does Petitioner explain the import or
`impact of the signal sent from identification device 70. This is key because
`Kniffin states that “[i]n response to identification of the authorized user at
`the lock within the prescribed time period, a lock microprocessor CPU 30
`instructs a lock mechanism 32 to unlock.” Ex. 1010, 3:64–66. In the fourth
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`embodiment, access is based on the identity of a location and not that of an
`individual. See id. at 8:17–18 (“Each possible destination is assigned an
`identification number.”). Access is granted “[i]f the detected identification
`device corresponds to the first expected stop.” Id. at 8:30–31. Access is
`blocked if “the access control device . . . sense[s] either the absence of an
`identification device, or will sense an identification device that does not
`correspond to an authorized stop.” Id. at 8:39–45.
`Petitioner responds to Patent Owner’s arguments by stating that
`“[w]hile Kniffin describes controlling the in-vehicle lock mechanism,
`Kniffin also describes storing data in an in-vehicle memory, in response to
`data received by the access control device from a clearinghouse.” Reply 6
`(citing Pet. 12–13). Petitioner asserts that Patent Owner’s arguments
`regarding Kniffin’s disclosures as related to the lock do not address
`Kniffin’s disclosures as related to activating memory. Id. at 7. We,
`however, are not persuaded that Petitioner has put forth sufficient evidence
`to establish that the mere act of storing information in memory discloses the
`disputed limitation.
`The specification of the ’076 patent describes the “operational steps
`and/or sequence of operation of the apparatus and method of the present
`invention.” Ex. 1001, 38:62–64. In order “to prevent an unauthorized
`access” the system compares the received program command with “data
`which may be stored in apparatus program memory.” Id. at 39:23–34.
`Kniffin’s stored schedule of stops appears to be similar to the stored data
`described in the ’076 patent. The control device, however, is not responsive
`to the stored data, but rather it responds to the program code. See id. at
`39:35–49. Thus, we are not persuaded that Kniffin’s disclosure of storing
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`the schedule is sufficient to disclose the disputed limitation. Therefore, we
`are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated that Kniffin discloses a
`first control device that is responsive to a second control signal.
`For the foregoing reasons we determine that Petitioner has not carried
`its burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
`independent claims 3, 73, and 205 are anticipated by Kniffin. By that same
`regard, we also are not persuaded that Petitioner has established the
`unpatentability of dependent claims 18, 65, 67, 68, 70, 91, 94, 96, 103, 110,
`116, 119, and 120 as relates to the asserted grounds that include Kniffin.
`The various anticipation and obviousness grounds asserted for each of those
`claims relies upon the assertions and arguments discussed above in relation
`to Petitioner’s assertions regarding Kniffin’s disclosures as applied to the
`independent claims. Petitioner has not argued that the above discussed
`deficiency is remedied by arguments or evidence put forth in any of the
`other Kniffin-based grounds. Therefore, Petitioner has not satisfied its
`burden in relation to its assertions of unpatentability based on Kniffin as
`directed to claims 3, 18, 65, 67, 68, 70, 73, 91, 94, 96, 103, 110, 116, 119,
`120, and 205 of the ’076.
`
`B. Analysis of Asserted Grounds Based on Ryoichi
`
` Analysis of Asserted Ground of Anticipation by Ryoichi
`Petitioner asserts that claims 3, 18, 65, 67, 70, 73, 91, 103, 116, 119,
`and 205 of the ’076 Patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as
`anticipated by Ryoichi. Pet. 42–56. Petitioner relies on claim charts
`showing how this reference allegedly discloses the claimed subject matter.
`Id. at 50–55. Petitioner further relies on a declaration from Scott Andrews.
`Ex. 1002.
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` Overview of Ryoichi
`Ryoichi describes “a radio-signal-responsive control system for
`controlling various devices on a motor vehicle.” Ex. 1011, 1:9–11. Figure 1
`of Ryoichi is reproduced below.
`
`
`
`Figure 1 is a block diagram of the first embodiment of Ryoichi’s radio-
`signal-responsive vehicle device control system. Id. at 3:24–26. Personal
`radio paging unit 9 is inserted into the door of the vehicle. Id. at Fig. 3,
`7:52–55. A calling number is dialed on telephone unit TEL and that number
`represents a code number corresponding to a desired message signal. Id. at
`7:60–64. A radio wave indicating the message is radiated automatically
`from fixed radio station ST and that wave is received by personal radio
`paging unit 9. Id. at 7:64–67. In response, personal radio paging unit 9
`generates a sound that is detected by sensors 10 and these sensors turn on
`code converter 11 and control unit S. Id. at 8:1–5. Code converter 11
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`converts the received electric signal into the format for the control unit S.
`Id. at 8:5–15. Then the converted code signal is sent to control unit S, which
`selects and executes a program corresponding to the received code signal.
`Id. at 8:15–17. For example, control program PO is a program for operating
`the handbrake remotely. Id. at 8:17–22.
`a. Independent Claims 3, 73, and 205
`Petitioner’s arguments as to the independent claims may be
`summarized as follows: Petitioner argues that Ryoichi discloses the three
`recited control devices8 through its discussion and depiction of personal
`radio paging unit 9 (first control device) (Pet. 42–43), fixed radio station ST
`(second control device) (id. at 43), and telephone unit TEL (third control
`device) (id.). Petitioner asserts that “[p]ersonal radio paging unit 9 (the in-
`vehicle device), located in the vehicle, generates sounds representing
`message signals, and the sounds are converted into code read by control unit
`S to run a program, e.g., unlocking the doors.” Id. at 44 (citing Ex. 1011,
`4:57–5:15; 8:1–22; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 35–36). According to Petitioner, personal
`radio paging unit 9 is responsive to signals sent by radio station ST and
`paging unit 9 generates calling sounds in response to the signals from radio
`station ST. Id. (citing Ex. 1011, 7:64–8:3; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 35–37). In addition,
`radio station ST is contended to be responsive to signals from telephone
`
`8 As with Kniffin, Petitioner espouses similar analysis of the first control
`device of claims 3 and 73 and the third control device of claim 205; as well
`as for the second control device of all three claims; and the third control
`device of claims 3 and 73 and the first control device of claim 205. Thus,
`our analysis of Ryoichi’s disclosures applies to each of the independent
`claims. For convenience, unless otherwise indicated, we shall use the terms
`first, second, and third control device to refer to the control devices as
`described in claim 3.
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`TEL because users enter a message into the touchpad of telephone TEL and
`a signal representing the entered message is sent to radio station ST for
`transmission. Id. at 44–45 (citing Ex. 1011, 7:60–8:1; Ex. 1002, ¶¶ 35–37).
`Patent Owner argues that Ryoichi fails to teach the second control
`device. PO Resp. 30. Petitioner asserts that Ryoichi discloses this element
`through its discussion and depiction of fixed radio station ST. Pet. 44.
`Petitioner asserts that personal radio paging unit 9 (first control device) is
`responsive to signals sent from fixed radio station ST and the fixed radio
`station ST is responsive to signals sent from telephone TEL (third control
`device). Id. at 44–45. According to Patent Owner, fixed radio station ST is
`part of the communications system or network and as such it cannot be the
`second control device. PO Resp. 30. Patent Owner’s Response to the
`Petition, however, contains no discussion as to why a device that is part of
`the communication system may not be a second control device. See PO
`Resp. 30. Presumably, Patent Owner’s contention that it “maintains” this
`argument is based on the fact that it unsuccessfully argued this point in its
`Preliminary Response. Our rules, however, preclude such incorporation by
`reference of arguments. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not
`be incorporated by reference from one document into another document.”).
`Accordingly, we do not consider those arguments in this Decision. We find
`Petitioner’s analysis to be persuasive and we adopt it as the basis for our
`determination that Ryoichi’s fixed radio station ST discloses the second
`control device.
`Patent Owner also argues that in Ryochi,
`the vehicle devices/systems are not controlled in response to a
`“third signal” from the “third control device” (personal paging
`unit 9), but rather are controlled in response to a “fourth
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`signal,” a “fifth signal” and a “sixth signal” from multiple
`intermediate devices (sensor 10, code converter 11 and control
`unit S, respectively) which are positioned between the personal
`paging unit 9 of Ryochi and the vehicle devices/systems of
`Ryochi.
`
`PO Resp. 33. Thus, Patent Owner argues that Ryoichi discloses a system
`with six devices and seven signals and not the claimed three device/three
`signal system. Id. at 35. Petitioner argues, and we agree, that “[t]he claims
`of the ’076 patent do not require the first signal to be transmitted directly,
`excluding all conduits or electrical components between the first control
`device and the vehicle component.” Reply 16. As discussed above, we are
`not persuaded that the claims exclude systems with intermediate devices
`such as Ryoichi’s sensor 10, code converter 11, and control unit S. See
`§ II.B. So the question is whether Petitioner has demonstrated that the
`devices and signals in Ryoichi disclosed the recited devices and signals. We
`are persuaded that Petitioner has made such a showing.
`As noted by Mr. Andrews, “Ryoichi provides for the control of an
`‘automobile-mounted device’ in which the telephone unit sends information
`related to controlling a device to a paging center, which subsequently sends
`paging signals containing the control information over the paging network.
`These are received by the paging unit in the vehicle, and are used to control
`various vehicle components.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 35; see id. ¶ 37. We find Mr.
`Andrews’ analysis of Ryoichi’s disclosures to be reasonable and we adopt it
`as our own. Thus, we are persuaded that Ryoichi discloses a system where
`the information sent from the telephone is received by the fixed radio station
`ST, which responds by sending control information to personal paging unit
`9. After receipt of the control information from fixed radio station ST, the
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`personal paging unit responds by sending a signal to control the specified
`vehicle system. Therefore, we do not find Patent Owner’s argument to be
`persuasive and we are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments regarding the
`disclosures of Ryoichi.
`Based on our review of the full record, we find persuasive Petitioner’s
`arguments and evidence and we adopt them as the basis for our
`determination that Ryoichi discloses the limitations of claims 3, 73, and 205.
`See Pet. 42–56. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated
`by a preponderance of the evidence the unpatentability of independent
`claims 3, 73, and 205 over the disclosures of Ryoichi.
`b. Dependent Claims 18, 65, 67, 70, 91, 103, 116, and 119
`Claim 18 depends from claim 3; claims 91, 103, 116, and 119 depend
`from 73; and claims 65, 67, and 70 depend from claim 205. We have
`reviewed Petitioner’s assertions regarding these claims and we are persuaded
`that these claims also are anticipated by Ryoichi. See Pet. 46–56. For
`example, claim 18 depends from claim 3 and further recites, in relevant part,
`an interface device that provides an interface