throbber
Inter Partes Review of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,141,154
`
`Filed on behalf of Symantec Corporation
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL
`AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`SYMANTEC CORPORATION
`
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`FINJAN, INC
`
`Patent Owner
`
`Case To Be Assigned
`U.S. Patent No. 8,141,154
`
`DECLARATION OF JACK W. DAVIDSON IN SUPPORT OF
`PETITIONER PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.120
`
`Symantec 1010
`IPR of Pat. No. 8,141,154
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`

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`Inter Partes Review of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,141,154
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`Declaration of Jack W. Davidson
`In Support of Petitioner Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.120
`
`I, Jack W. Davidson, declare as follows
`
`I. Overview
`
`1.
`
`I am over 21 years of age and otherwise competent to make this
`
`Declaration. I make this Declaration based upon facts and matters within my own
`
`knowledge and on information provided to me by others.
`
`2.
`
`I have been retained as an expert witness to provide testimony on
`
`behalf of Symantec Corporation (“Symantec” or “Petitioner”) as part of the above-
`
`captioned inter partes review proceeding (“IPR”), including issues relating to the
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`validity of U.S. patent number 8,141,154 (“the ‘154 patent”), entitled “System and
`
`method for inspecting dynamically generated executable code.” I also understand
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`that the ‘154 patent was filed on December 12, 2005 and issued on March 20, 2012
`
`and that the ‘154 patent is currently assigned to Finjan, Inc.
`
`3.
`
`I have reviewed and am familiar with the specification and
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`prosecution history of the ‘154 patent. A copy of the ‘154 patent is provided as
`
`Symantec 1001. As I explain in more detail below, I am familiar with the
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`technology at issue as of the December 12, 2005 filing date of the ‘154 patent.
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`4.
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`I have also reviewed and am familiar with the following prior art,
`
`which I understand is being used by Symantec in the Petition for Inter Partes
`
`Review of the ‘154 patent:
`
`a. U.S. Patent Application Publication 2007/0113282 by Robert F. Ross
`
`(“Ross,” provided as Symantec 1002);
`
`b. U.S. Patent Application Publication 2002/0066022 by Brad Calder et
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`al. (“Calder,” provided as Symantec 1003);
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`c. Design and implementation of a distributed virtual machine for
`
`networked computers, by Emin Gun Sirer et al., Association for
`
`Computing Machinery, December 1999. (“Sirer,” provided as
`
`Symantec 1004).
`
`d. U.S. Patent No. 8,220,055 to Mark K. Kennedy ( “Kennedy,”
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`provided as Symantec 1009)
`
`5. With its Petition and this supporting Declaration, I understand
`
`Symantec is requesting that the Patent Office institute a review of claims 1-12 of
`
`the ‘154 patent, and that the requested review is based on the following grounds:
`
`a. Ground 1: Claims 1-5 are anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 by Ross.
`
`b. Ground 2: Claims 2, 4-8, 10, and 11 are rendered obvious under 35
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`U.S.C. § 103 by Ross.
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`Inter Partes Review of
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`c. Ground 3: Claims 9 and 12 are rendered obvious under 35 U.S.C. §
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`103 by Ross in view of Calder.
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`d. Ground 4: Claims 1-12 are rendered obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103
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`by Calder in view of Sirer.
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`6.
`
`I have been asked to provide a technical review, analysis, and insight
`
`regarding the above-noted references, which I understand form the basis for the
`
`grounds of rejection set forth in the Petition.
`
`7.
`
`I am being compensated for my time in connection with this IPR at a
`
`rate of $400 per hour. I am also being compensated for any out-of-pocket expenses
`
`for my work in this review. My compensation as an expert is in no way dependent
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`upon the results of any investigations I undertake, the substance of any opinion I
`
`express, or the ultimate outcome of the review proceedings. I have been advised
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`that Bryan Cave LLP represents the Petitioner Symantec, Inc. in this matter. I have
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`no direct financial interest in Symantec, Finjan, or the ‘154 patent.
`
`II. My Background and Qualifications
`
`8.
`
`I am a Professor of Computer Science at the University of Virginia.
`
`In addition, I am the Founder and President of Zephyr Software LLC. Zephyr
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`Software, in business since 2001, provides a variety of services including
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`innovative computer security solutions targeted mainly for U.S. Department of
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`Defense applications. For more than 35 years, I have been involved in the design
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`of computer systems and software as well as leading and managing large software
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`development projects.
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`9.
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`I earned a Bachelor’s of Applied Science in Computer Science from
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`Southern Methodist University in 1975, a Master’s of Science in Computer
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`Science from Southern Methodist University in 1977, and a Doctorate in Computer
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`Science from the University of Arizona in 1981. After receiving my Doctorate, I
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`joined the faculty at the University of Virginia. In addition, I have held visiting
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`positions at Princeton University and Microsoft Research in Redmond,
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`Washington.
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`10.
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`For over 35 years, I have conducted research in a variety of areas in
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`computer science including compilers, interpreters, programming languages,
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`computer architecture, embedded systems, program analysis, and most recently
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`computer security. My current research in computer security involves developing
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`methodologies for preventing attacks against critical, enterprise-level computer
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`systems and preventing malware from infecting personal and mobile computers. In
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`these areas and others I have led and managed several large-scale projects
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`involving the collaboration of top U.S. researchers. I am currently leading a large
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`project ($5.8M) called the Cyber Fault-tolerant Attack Recovery project at the
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`University of Virginia, which has been funded by the Defense Advanced Research
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`Project Agency (DARPA). The goal of the Cyber Fault-tolerant Attack Recovery
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`project is to develop defensive cyber techniques that can be deployed to protect
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`existing and planned software systems without requiring changes to the concept of
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`operations of these systems.
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`11.
`
`I am also the principal investigator of a project funded by the Air
`
`Force Research Laboratories (“AFRL”) in Rome, NY. The goal of this project is
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`to transition the results of our previously funded research in cyber security from
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`our research laboratory to the field. That is, we are working with the AFRL to
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`automatically secure mission-critical system against attack by well-funded,
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`determined malicious adversaries and to develop and carry out compelling
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`demonstrations, tests, and exercises that demonstrate the power and effectiveness
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`of the techniques developed in the Dependability Group at the University of
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`Virginia.
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`12. As my current research focus is in cyber security, I have published
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`extensively in the field of computer security. In addition to other publications, the
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`paper “Safe Virtual Execution Using Software Dynamic Execution” written by
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`Kevin Scott and myself and presented at the 18th Annual Computer Security
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`Applications Conference held in Las Vegas, Nevada in December 2002 is
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`particularly relevant to the matter being considered.
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`13. My curriculum vitae, which is provided as Symantec 1011, lists my
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`publications in the computer security area.
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`14.
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`In addition to my scholarly activities in the field of cyber security, I
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`am the President and sole owner of Zephyr Software LLC. I founded Zephyr
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`Software as another vehicle for commercializing my research. Currently, Zephyr
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`Software is focused on commercializing cyber security solutions. Including
`
`myself, Zephyr Software has four employees. Zephyr Software currently has Phase
`
`II SBIR contracts from DARPA and the Office of Naval Research (“ONR”).
`
`15.
`
`The DARPA contract is targeted at securing embedded systems.
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`Network routers, communications equipment, supervisory control and data
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`acquisition (“SCADA”) systems, and industrial control systems (“ICS”) are some
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`examples of embedded systems. Because these systems are part of a critical
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`infrastructure, such as plant operations, the power grid, communication systems,
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`transportation systems, and similar operations, it is vital that these systems be
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`protected from malicious attacks.
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`16.
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`The work being performed under the ONR contract includes
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`developing techniques to prevent malicious adversaries from taking over the
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`control of a program via a technique known as “program hijacking.” Using
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`program hijacking, a malicious entity can take control of a program to carry out a
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`variety of attacks such as denial of service, secret information leakage, shutdown
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`of critical services, and similar attacks.
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`17.
`
`In addition to my research and commercialization activities, I am also
`
`an accomplished and award-winning instructor. In 1989, I received the NCR
`
`Faculty Innovation Award for my development of innovative curriculum materials
`
`and outstanding teaching. I am the co-author of two widely used introductory
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`programming textbooks, C++ Program Design: An Introduction to Programming
`
`and Object-Oriented Design and Java 1.5 Program Design both published by
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`McGraw-Hill.
`
`18.
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`In 2008, I was co-recipient (with my co-author James P. Cohoon) of
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`the IEEE Computer Society Taylor L. Booth Education Award for “sustained
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`effort to transform introductory computer science education through lab-based
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`multimedia pedagogy coupled with examples that attract a diverse student body.”
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`In addition, I have given invited lectures at the Third International Summer School
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`on Advanced Computer Architecture and Compilation for Embedded Systems held
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`in L’Aquila Italy in 2007. Approximately 200 students attended this summer
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`school from the member nations of the European Union.
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`19. As part of my ongoing activities in computer security, I created and
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`teach a course about cyber security at the University of Virginia. The course title is
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`“Defense against the Dark Arts.” The course focuses teaching students techniques
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`for defending computers from computer viruses, computer worms, and other types
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`of malicious attacks. The course was first taught in the Fall of 2005 and I have
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`taught it multiple times since that time. I last taught the course in Spring of 2014.
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`20.
`
`I also was a lecturer in the inaugural Indo-US Engineering Faculty
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`Leadership Institute held in Mysore, India. The goal of the Leadership Institute is
`
`to improve University education in India. The Institute was attended by 120
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`faculty members from Indian Universities.
`
`21.
`
`In the summers of 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014, I helped organize and
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`lectured at the International Summer School on Information Security and
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`Protection (ISSISP) held in Beijing, China (2010), Ghent, Belgium (2011), Tucson,
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`Arizona (2012), and Verona, Italy (2014). Each summer school was attended by
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`50 students from various international universities. ISSISP 2015 will be held in Rio
`
`de Janerio, Brazil.
`
`22. Because of my expertise and stature within in the computing
`
`community, I am often asked to serve on important Boards and Councils. I served
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`as an elected member-at-large of the Association of Computing Machinery (ACM)
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`Special Interest Group on Programming Languages (SIGPLAN) for four years.
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`ACM is the largest professional computing society in the world. I was elected
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`chair of SIGPLAN in 2005. I am a member of the ACM Council, which oversees
`
`the operation of ACM, and I am co-chair of ACM’s Publications Board, which
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`oversees the publication of the organization’s 44 professional journals and 8
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`magazines, and a professional book series.
`
`23. As a leading expert in the field, I help organize many technical
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`conferences in the area including the International Conference on Parallel
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`Architectures and Compilation Techniques (“PACT”), International Symposium
`
`on Code Generation and Optimization (“CGO”), Conference on Programming
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`Language Design and Implementation (“PLDI”), Conference on Languages,
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`Compilers and Tools for Embedded Systems (“LCTES”), International Conference
`
`on Compilers, Architectures and Synthesis for Embedded Systems (“CASES”),
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`Conference on the Principles of Programming Languages (“POPL”), International
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`Conference on Autonomic Computing (“ICAC”), and International Conference on
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`High-Performance and Embedded Architectures (“HiPEAC”).
`
`24.
`
`In the past, I was an Associate Editor of the ACM Transactions of
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`Programming Languages and Systems (“TOPLAS”) and ACM Transactions on
`
`Architecture and Code Optimization (“TACO”) journals. TOPLAS is the archival
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`journal in the area of programming languages and compilers. TACO is an archival
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`journal in the area of computer architecture and program optimization. In 2009, I
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`received SIGPLAN’s Distinguished Service Award for “substantial and sustained
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`contributions to the programming languages research community and to SIGPLAN
`
`in particular.”
`
`25.
`
`I am a Senior Member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
`
`Engineers (“IEEE”), the IEEE Computer Society. I am a Fellow of the Association
`
`for Computer Machinery (“ACM”). The ACM Council established the ACM
`
`Fellows Program in 1993 to recognize and honor outstanding ACM members for
`
`their achievements in computer science and information technology and for their
`
`significant contributions to the mission of the ACM. The ACM Fellows serve as
`
`distinguished colleagues to whom the ACM and its members look to for guidance
`
`and leadership as the world of information technology evolves.
`
`26. A more detailed listing of my professional background and
`
`accomplishments is found in my curriculum vitae provided as Symantec 1011.
`
`III. My Expertise and the Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`
`27. As a result of my more than thirty-years’ experience in the field of
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`computer science and my deep involvement over the last 15 years with computer
`
`security through teaching and research, I am very familiar with techniques to
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`secure and protect computer systems, including techniques to prevent computer
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`viruses, worms and other types of attacks from corrupting both personal computers
`
`and enterprise-level systems.
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`28. Accordingly, I am qualified to provide expert opinions on the
`
`technology described in the ‘154 patent as well as the teachings of the prior art
`
`references at the time of the ‘154 patent.
`
`29. A person of ordinary skill at the time of the alleged invention of the
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`‘154 patent would generally have a master’s degree in computer science, computer
`
`engineering, or a similar field, or a bachelor’s degree in computer science,
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`computer engineering, or a similar field, with approximately two years of
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`experience in the fields of networking and anti-malware development, computer
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`security or equivalent work experience. Additional graduate education might
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`substitute for experience, while significant experience in the field of computer
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`programming, networking, and/or malicious code might substitute for formal
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`education.
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`IV. Applicable Legal Standards
`
`30.
`
`I am not an attorney and do not expect to offer any opinions regarding
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`the law. However, I have been informed of certain legal principles relating to
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`patent claim construction and invalidity that I relied upon in reaching opinions set
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`forth in this report.
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`Obviousness
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`31.
`
`It is my understanding that obviousness is determined from the
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`vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was
`
`made. In order for a claim to be considered invalid under this ground, I understand
`
`that the proposed combination of asserted references must teach or suggest each
`
`and every claim feature and that the claimed invention as a whole must have been
`
`obvious at that time to one of ordinary skill in the art.1
`
`32. My understanding is that one should avoid the use of “hindsight” in
`
`assessing whether a claimed invention would have been obvious. For example, an
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`invention should not be considered in view of what persons of ordinary skill would
`
`know today, nor should it be reconstructed after the fact by starting with the claims
`
`themselves and/or by reading into the prior art the teachings of the invention at
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`issue.
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`1 Accordingly, I understand that that the term “obvious” has both a legal and a
`
`technical meaning. When the term is used throughout this declaration, my
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`opinions and conclusions will be directed to the technical meaning of obvious (i.e.,
`
`whether subject matter was within the technical grasp of a person of ordinary skill
`
`at the time of the invention).
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`33.
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`It is my understanding that obviousness cannot be proven by mere
`
`conclusory statements or by merely showing that an invention is a combination of
`
`elements that were already previously known in the prior art. Rather, it is my
`
`understanding that a party challenging a patent in an Inter Partes Review
`
`proceeding must further establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there
`
`was an apparent reason with some rational underpinnings that would have caused a
`
`person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention to have combined and/or
`
`altered these known elements to arrive at the claimed invention. Such reasons
`
`might include, for example, teachings, suggestions, or motivations to combine that
`
`would have been apparent to a person of ordinary skill in the art.
`
`Claim Language
`
`34.
`
`I understand that, in Inter Partes Review proceedings, claim terms are
`
`to be given the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification as
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`would be read by a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art.
`
`35. As the result of my education and experience, I believe that I
`
`understand how the asserted claims of the ‘154 patent would be understood by a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art applying the above standard.
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`V. Overview of Malware Detection Technology at the Time of the ‘154 Patent
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`36. At the time of the ‘154 patent, networks of computer systems were
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`greatly increasing society’s productivity, as well as the quality of life for many
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`citizens. Society was increasingly relying on computer systems to control vital
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`infrastructure, such as transportation systems, power generation and transmission
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`systems, communication systems, financial systems, and similar infrastructure
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`components. At the time of the ‘154 patent, malware had become a major
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`problem for the computer industry.
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`37. Malware includes viruses, worms, and other types of malicious
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`software, such as spyware, and malicious downloads. For example, the MyDoom
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`virus, which appeared in early 2004, caused billions of dollars in damages, with
`
`estimates ranging from $14B to $38.5B. The virus caused various types of
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`economic damages. For example, business incurred costs associated with
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`providing help desk support, overtime payments, loss of business, degraded
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`internet service, productivity loss, management time reallocation, and
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`implementing a recovery. Because of the high cost of these damages, there was,
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`and continues to be, much interest in developing techniques to defend against
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`various types of malware.
`
`38. Because malware comes in many types, it is useful to categorize or
`
`classify malware by answering the following questions:
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`a) How was the attack created?
`
`b) How was the malicious code transported?
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`c) What vulnerabilities were exploited?
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`d) What damage did the attack cause?
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`39.
`
`For example, the MyDoom virus was created using a popular
`
`programming language called C++. The malicious code was most often spread by
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`e-mail, as typically inserted into the e-mail as an attachment. When an
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`unsuspecting user clicked on the attachment, the user’s computer would be
`
`infected. This virus worked by exploiting a vulnerability of the Windows
`
`operating system; specifically, the Windows operating system used to allow e-mail
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`attachments to be executed by the computer. If an e-mail attachment contained a
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`virus, and the e-mail attachment was executed, the virus would execute and could
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`install additional malware on the infected machine including a backdoor. This
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`backdoor would then allow a remote adversary to access the infected machine. The
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`virus could also install software to initiate a denial-of-service attack against certain
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`Internet sites.
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`40.
`
`In the early 2000’s, the main defense against various types of
`
`malware, including viruses, was anti-virus software. Such software was generally
`
`referred to as anti-virus software even though it would detect other types of
`
`malware such as spyware, backdoors, spammers, and keyloggers.
`
`41.
`
`The dominant technique used by anti-virus software to detect malware
`
`was signature-based scanning. Signature-based scanning is analogous to a
`
`common, standard medical approach for determining if a person is infected with
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`certain biological pathogen. A blood test is performed to see if particular
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`antibodies are present that indicate that the subject is infected. Similarly, with
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`signature-based virus detection, the anti-virus software scans relevant files for a
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`“fingerprint” or “signature” that, if present, indicates malware is present.
`
`42.
`
`There are many aspects to creating powerful, effective, signature-
`
`based anti-virus software. One key aspect for effective scanning is the
`
`completeness of the corpus of signatures used by the scanner. If the signature
`
`database does not contain a signature for specific malware, the malware most
`
`likely will not be detected. Anti-virus vendors expend considerable effort to ensure
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`their signature databases contain up-to-date signatures of newly discovered viruses
`
`and that these updated databases are provided to the licensees of their software on
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`a timely basis.
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`43. Another aspect for effective scanning is the sophistication of the
`
`scanning algorithms and techniques. Anti-virus software vendors continually
`
`investigated new scanning techniques to both speed the scanning process and to
`
`improve the accuracy. Much like the medical tests I mention above, signature-
`
`based scanning may sometimes result in false positives or false negatives. In the
`
`medical context a false positive is when a test has incorrectly indicated the
`
`presence of a pathogen when there is, in actuality, none present. A false negative
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`is when the test has incorrectly indicated that no pathogen is present when there is,
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`in actuality, a pathogen present.
`
`44. At the time of the ‘154 patent, anti-virus researchers continually
`
`worked to improve the accuracy of the signature-based scanning by lowering the
`
`rates of false positives and false negatives. Unfortunately, virus writers also
`
`continually worked to create new techniques for creating malware that would
`
`evade detection by signature-based scanning. This back-and-forth struggle between
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`virus writers and anti-virus defenders is much like an arms race. Each time a virus
`
`writer devised a new mechanism for avoiding detection, anti-virus researchers
`
`responded by developing new techniques. With each successive generation of
`
`malware, maintaining the effectiveness of signature-based scanning (i.e., low rates
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`of false positives and false negatives) grew more difficult.
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`45. One of the advantages of signature-based malware detection is that
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`anti-virus vendors could extensively test their signatures to avoid false positives.
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`They did this by maintaining an extensive corpus of benign programs that would
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`be typically found on target machines. Before a new set of signatures is released,
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`the signatures are extensively tested against the corpus.
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`46. A disadvantage of signature-based scanning is that it is only effective
`
`against known families of malware. That is, appropriate signatures can be tested
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`and evaluated only if a sample of the malware has been captured and analyzed. As
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`it became easier to create new malware and the speed of infection increased
`
`because of the growth of the Internet, anti-virus researchers began to search for
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`other approaches that could complement signature-based scanning.
`
`47. Another approach to detecting malware is to analyze a program to
`
`identify intrinsic malware behavior. This approach is sometimes called “behavior
`
`blocking.” The approach had been known since at least 1997 where it had been
`
`proposed and used for intrusion detection and detection of violations of security
`
`policies. The approach is also sometimes referred to as “execution monitoring.”
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`The primary advantage of behavior blocking over signature-based malware
`
`detection is that it can thwart unknown or previously unseen malware, and it can
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`thwart malware that may have been seen, but for which the signature has not yet
`
`been distributed to end users.
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`48. One form of behavior blocking is to monitor a program as it runs and
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`observe its actions. If the program behaves in some suspicious way, perhaps by
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`carrying out a set of operations that is characteristic of malware, a predetermined
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`security policy can be applied.
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`49.
`
`To avoid damage that might be done before the malicious behavior is
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`recognized, the monitored program is often executed in a “sandbox” that prevents
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`the application from compromising the host computer. The sandbox could be
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`created through some form of virtualization that is either process-level or system-
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`level on the host machine or a separate machine.
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`50.
`
`Typically, the monitoring necessary for behavior blocking is done by
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`some type of reference monitor. A reference monitor works by monitoring a
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`program’s execution steps. The execution may be monitored at different levels. It
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`may be low-level and fine-grained by monitoring every instruction or every
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`memory-reference. It may be high-level such as by monitoring system calls, API
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`calls, or application function or method calls.
`
`51. A common approach to monitoring a program’s execution is to
`
`rewrite function calls so that a substitute function is called. The substitute function
`
`can perform the necessary actions so an execution policy (including a security
`
`policy) can be enforced. Such actions include recording context information (e.g.,
`
`the contents of the run-time stack, the values of arguments, etc.), checking,
`
`modifying, or recording the values of arguments to functions, preventing the
`
`execution of the function, and redirecting control to a substitute function. Because
`
`the substitute function can be written in a high-level language, the writer of the
`
`substitute function has great flexibility in choosing what actions to take when the
`
`substitute function is invoked.
`
`19
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`Inter Partes Review of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,141,154
`
`52. Many of these concepts are concretely illustrated in the paper “Safe
`
`Virtual Execution Using Software Dynamic Translation” which I coauthored with
`
`Kevin Scott. Published in 2002 (provided as Symantec 1018), the paper discusses
`
`one approach to execution monitoring or behavior blocking. The paper describes
`
`how an application’s execution can be monitored so that system calls are
`
`intercepted or “hooked” and a specific security policy is enforced. While the paper
`
`focuses on interception or hooking of system calls, the paper notes that the process
`
`need not be limited to system calls. The paper shows high-level language
`
`examples where particular function calls are hooked.
`
`53. One example in the paper shows the open system call being hooked.
`
`The open system call makes a file available for access by the application. In the
`
`example, the monitor enforces a security policy that prevents a password file from
`
`being opened by the application. The password file is stored in the
`/etc/passwd location. By hooking the open system function, the monitor
`
`invokes a substitute function that modifies the original argument passed to the
`
`function to make it an absolute pathname and checks to make sure that the file
`attempting to be opened is not the password file stored in the /etc/passwd
`
`location. If the file being opened is this password file, the substitute function issues
`
`an error message and terminates the function. If the file being opened is not the
`
`20
`
`

`
`password file, the substitute function opens the file and returns the necessary file
`
`Inter Partes Review of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,141,154
`
`descriptor to the original calling function.
`
`VI. OVERVIEW OF THE ‘154 PATENT
`
`A. The Specification
`
`54.
`
`The ‘154 patent generally relates to “protecting a client computer
`
`from dynamically generated malicious content.” ‘154 patent, Abstract, 1:5-22;
`
`4:30-34, 13:37-40. The ‘154 patent explains that early prior art techniques for
`
`virus detection protection were “reactive,” in that they relied upon a database of
`
`known virus signatures. Id., 1:23-32, 1:54-55, FIG. 1. Following the proliferation
`
`of the Internet, later prior art techniques recognized that certain virus types could
`
`not be recognized by signature-based scans. Instead of relying these techniques,
`
`the prior art systems turned to “proactive” techniques such as “behavioral
`
`analysis.” Id., col. 1:34-64.
`
`55.
`
`Several prior art systems that perform this type of behavioral analysis
`
`are described in the ‘154 patent. These prior art systems included a “gateway
`
`computer,” which received content and transmitted it to a “client computer.” ‘154
`
`patent, 2:46-53, FIG. 1 (labeled “PRIOR ART”). The gateway and/or client
`
`included a “content inspector,” which was used to “automatically scan and parse
`
`executable content, in order to detect which computer operations the content may
`
`21
`
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`
`Inter Partes Review of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,141,154
`
`perform.” It also developed a “security profile” that was then compared against a
`
`set of allowable actions, which is a “security policy”. Id., 1:57-2:17, FIG. 1. The
`
`client also included a “content processor” for processing the content received from
`
`the gateway, such as “a conventional web browser, which processes Internet
`
`content.” Id., 2:54-3:2, FIG. 1.
`
`56. However, according to the ‘154 patent, these prior art proactive virus
`
`protection systems were not able to detect dynamically generated viruses because
`
`inputs that were generated at runtime were not available to the content inspector.
`
`‘154 patent, 3:31-4:26, 4:65-5:3. FIG. 2 of the ‘154 patent attempts to address this
`
`problem through simple and straight-forward modifications to the prior art in order
`
`to analyze inputs generated by the content processor at run time. ‘154 patent, 4:43-
`
`51, 11:63-12:14.
`
`57. As can be seen from the figures below, there are only a few
`
`differences between the system depicted in FIG. 2 and the prior art. In FIG. 2, the
`
`content inspector is replaced with a content modifier. While a content inspector of
`
`FIG. 1 might have modified the content,2 the content modifier of FIG. 2 inserts a
`
`substitute function that is “operational to send the input to a security computer for
`
`inspection.” ‘154 patent, col. 5:10-12. Because this substitute function sends the
`
`2 ‘154 patent, col. 3:9-12 (“gateway computer 105 may modify the content so as to render it harmless, and
`
`subsequently transmit the modified content to client computer 110”).
`
`22
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`
`Inter Partes Review of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,141,154
`
`input to a security computer, a security computer is also added which
`
`communicates with the client. This security computer has an input inspector and
`
`an input modifier for inspecting and modifying the inputs passed to it by the client,
`
`respectively.
`
`58. As FIG. 2 shows, the gateway computer includes a content modifier
`
`instead of a content inspector. The content modifier “modifies original content
`
`received by gateway computer 205 … by scan[ning] the original content and
`
`identif[ying] function calls… [and then] modif[ying] selected ones of the function
`
`calls to corresponding [substitute] function calls.” ‘154 patent, col. 9:13-28,
`
`13:52-62, FIGS. 3, 5. The modified content is sent to the content processor at the
`
`23
`
`

`
`Inter Partes Review of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,141,154
`
`client computer. Id., 13:63-14:1, FIGS. 3, 5. The output of the content modifier
`
`may be a simple wrapper around the original functions, which causes the original
`
`functions to be checked at runtime before it is executed.
`
`Id., Table I.
`
`59.
`
`Scanning content and creating

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