Case 2:14-cv-00690-RSP Document 120 Filed 04/07/15 Page 1 of 35 PageID #: 2274
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`
`
`UNIFIED MEMORY
`PARTHENON
`ARCHITECTURE LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
`HTC CORPORATION and
`HTC AMERICA, INC.,
`
`LG ELECTRONICS, INC. and
`LG ELECTRONICS USA, INC.,
`
` Defendants.
`
`Case No. 2:14-cv-690-JRG-RSP
`(Lead)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`No.
`Case
`(Consolidated)
`
`
`2:14-cv-691-JRG-RSP
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PLAINTIFF PARTHENON UNIFIED MEMORY ARCHITECTURE LLC’S
`OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`
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`Page 1 of 35
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`HTC-LG-SAMSUNG EXHIBIT 1011
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`

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`Case 2:14-cv-00690-RSP Document 120 Filed 04/07/15 Page 2 of 35 PageID #: 2275
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`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
`
`Overview of Patented Technology ...................................................................................... 3
`
`Relevant Legal Standards ................................................................................................... 4
`
`Agreed Constructions.......................................................................................................... 7
`
`Terms for Construction ....................................................................................................... 7
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`G.
`
`H.
`
`I.
`
`J.
`
`“bus” ....................................................................................................................... 7
`
`“real time” and related terms ................................................................................ 10
`
`“fast bus” ............................................................................................................... 14
`
`“coupled,” “coupleable” and “coupling” .............................................................. 15
`
`“directly supplied” and “directly supplies” ........................................................... 18
`
`“display device” and “display adapter .................................................................. 22
`
`“without requiring a second bus” and “without also requiring a second bus” ...... 24
`
`“control circuit” .................................................................................................... 26
`
`“algorithmically translate the noncontiguous addresses to the contiguous
`addresses” ............................................................................................................. 27
`
`“video stream input device circuit” ....................................................................... 28
`
`VI.
`
`Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 29
`
`
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`i
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp.,
`122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................. 6
`
`Avago Techs. U.S., Inc. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.,
`2011 WL 3439929 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2011) ............................................................................. 5
`
`Brown v. 3M,
`265 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ............................................................................................ 4, 25
`
`Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
`810 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Tex. 2011) ........................................................................................ 5
`
`GSK Tech. Inc. v. Eaton Elec. Inc.,
`2008 WL 906713 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 2008) ...............................................................................15
`
`
`Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp.,
`493 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................. 6
`
`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.,
`381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ........................................................................................ 4, 6, 20
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .................................................................................................... 6
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`517 U.S. 370 (1996) .................................................................................................................... 4
`
`Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) .....................................................................................................12
`
`Negotiated Data Solutions, LLC v. Dell, Inc.,
`596 F. Supp. 2d 949 (E.D. Tex. 2009) .......................................................................................15
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................... 5, 15, 25
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ...................................................................................... 4, 5, 6, 7
`
`Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc.,
`711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................. 6
`
`Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp.,
`724 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1983) .................................................................................................... 6
`
`
`
`ii
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`Case 2:14-cv-00690-RSP Document 120 Filed 04/07/15 Page 4 of 35 PageID #: 2277
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`STMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Motorola Inc.,
` 327 F. Supp. 2d 687, 711 (E.D. Tex. 2004) .......................................................................2, 5, 11
`
`SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .................................................................................................... 6
`
`Thomas Swan & Co. v. Finisar Corp.,
` 2014 WL 2885296 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 25, 2014) .......................................................................... 12
`
`Tivo, Inc. v. AT&T Inc.,
`2011 WL 6961021 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2011) ............................................................................ 9
`
`U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
`103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................. 4
`
`UltimatePointer, L.L.C. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd.,
`2013 WL 2325118 (E.D. Tex. May 28, 2013) ...................................................................... 5, 26
`
`Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Inmagine Corp., LLC,
`2013 WL 3871360 (E.D. Tex. July 24, 2013) ...................................................................... 5, 26
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) .............................................................................................. 6, 14
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Plaintiff Parthenon Unified Memory Architecture LLC
`
`(“PUMA”) proposes
`
`constructions for the terms-in-dispute that are based on both the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence
`
`and that are consistent with a previous claim construction order signed by Judge Leonard Davis
`
`relating to the asserted patents. In contrast, Defendants HTC and LG propose constructions that
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`improperly import limitations from the specification, add extraneous language not contemplated
`
`by the claims, and ignore the inventive features of the patents. PUMA’s proposed constructions
`
`more accurately convey the meaning of the terms in dispute.
`
`PUMA has asserted nine patents against the Defendants relating to the implementation of
`
`shared memory in a computer system. All nine patents were originally assigned to
`
`STMicroelectronics, Inc. (“STMicro”), a semiconductor company based in Texas. STMicro
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`filed the patent applications for U.S. Patent No. 5,812,789 and U.S. Patent No. 6,058,459 on the
`
`same day, and the two patents substantially overlap in their specifications, figures, and named
`
`inventors. Additionally, each of the ’789 Patent and the ’459 Patent explicitly incorporate by
`
`reference the specification of the other. Six additional asserted patents—U.S. Patent Nos.
`
`6,427,194; 7,321,368; 7,542,045; 7,777,753; 8,054,315; and 8,681,164—are continuation
`
`applications of the ’459 Patent. Together, those eight patents describe inventive systems and
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`methods for selectively allowing multiple devices, such as a CPU and an audio/video decoder, to
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`access a shared memory. The ninth asserted patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,960,464, describes an
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`inventive memory management system that allows a device that typically requires a large
`
`contiguous block of memory, such as a video decoder, to share noncontiguous memory with
`
`other devices.
`
`STMicro previously asserted the ’789 Patent in a patent infringement suit against
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`Motorola Inc. in the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division. As part of that case, on July
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`16, 2004, Judge Davis entered a claim construction order construing the terms “shared bus” and
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`“real time operation,” both of which are implicated in the current claim construction dispute. See
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`STMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Motorola Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Tex. 2004). PUMA’s
`
`constructions for the terms “real time” and “bus” adopt the constructions previously applied by
`
`Judge Davis. Judge Davis’s constructions of these terms are consistent with how the terms are
`
`used in the patent specifications and consistent with how a person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`would interpret these common terms.
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`In contrast, Defendants’ constructions deviate from Judge Davis’s claim construction
`
`order by incorporating extraneous concepts that are inconsistent with the intrinsic and extrinsic
`
`evidence. For example, as discussed further below, Defendants’ construction for “bus” would
`
`restrict the term to a set of “parallel” signal lines over which information is “broadcast.” Neither
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`the term “parallel” nor “broadcast” appears anywhere in the patents, and Defendants’
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`construction for “bus” would compel the jury to guess as to the meaning of those two new terms.
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`Moreover, Defendants’ overly-narrow construction is contradicted by how their own expert uses
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`the term “bus” in his own patents. Defendants similarly contend that the term “real time” is
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`indefinite despite the fact that another court in this Judicial District has already construed the
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`term and despite the fact that their own expert uses the exact same term—without even defining
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`it—in his own textbooks and academic papers. Given the intrinsic evidence, Judge Davis’s
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`previous claim constructions, and the use of these common terms by the Defendants’ own expert,
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`the Court should reject Defendants’ arguments and constructions for the terms “bus” and “real
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`time.”
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`For other terms, Defendants’ constructions either read out embodiments of the inventions
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`disclosed in the patent specification and figures or improperly import limitations from the
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`specification, whichever serves their needs at the moment. Instead of proposing constructions
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`that adhere to the intrinsic evidence, Defendants’ claim construction efforts are an attempt to
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`manufacture non-infringement arguments by restricting the full scope of the asserted claims.
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`Additionally, because many of Defendants’ proposed constructions insert extraneous language
`
`not found in the patents, Defendants’ constructions would only increase the risk of confusion.
`
`PUMA’s constructions, on the other hand, seek to provide the Jury and the Court with
`
`guidance for understanding the elements of the claimed inventions without either restricting or
`
`broadening their true scope. Because PUMA’s proposed constructions are firmly rooted in the
`
`intrinsic and extrinsic evidence and are consistent with Judge Davis’s previous claim
`
`construction order, PUMA respectfully requests that the Court adopt its proposed constructions.
`
`II.
`
`OVERVIEW OF PATENTED TECHNOLOGY
`All of the asserted patents in this case relate to the implementation of shared memory in a
`
`computer system. The ’789 Patent, ’459 Patent, ’194 Patent, ’368 Patent, ’045 Patent, ’753
`
`Patent, ’315 Patent, and ’164 Patent are generally directed toward novel systems and
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`architectures that allow for multiple devices, such as a microprocessor and an audio/video
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`decoder, to share a computer memory. By sharing a memory, the cost of a computer system can
`
`be decreased and its efficiency increased because the individual devices no longer need their own
`
`dedicated memory and support circuitry. This, in turn, can lead to smaller consumer devices that
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`use less batter power during operation.
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`The last of the nine asserted patents, the ’464 Patent, describes an inventive memory
`
`management system that allows a device that would typically require a large contiguous block of
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`memory, such as a video decoder, to share noncontiguous memory with other devices. When a
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`video decoder shares memory with other devices, the computer system needs to make sure that
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`the video decoder has access to a large enough chunk of contiguous memory to handle video
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`decompression. The ’464 Patent addresses this issue by effectively stitching together
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`noncontiguous memory blocks for use by the decoder. This is accomplished by translating the
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`noncontiguous memory addresses into a set of contiguous addresses. To the video decoder, this
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`makes it appear as if it has access to a contiguous block of memory large enough for it to handle
`
`the video decompression process. The above inventions are discussed in detail in PUMA’s
`
`technical tutorial.
`
`III. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS
`The purpose of claim construction is to resolve the meanings and technical scope of claim
`
`terms. U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Accordingly,
`
`claim construction begins with and “remain[s] centered on the claim language itself.”
`
`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2004). The construction of terms used in a patent claim is a question of law. Markman v.
`
`Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996).
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`Claims are to be construed from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art of
`
`the field of the patented invention at the time of the effective filing date of the patent application.
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). If commonly
`
`understood words are used in the claims, then the “ordinary meaning of claim language as
`
`understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim
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`construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted
`
`meaning of commonly understood words.” Id. at 1314. “Elaborate interpretation” is not
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`required. Id. (citing Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). To do otherwise
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`would convert claim construction from “a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and
`
`technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the
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`claims,” into “an obligatory exercise in redundancy.” U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568. Thus,
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`“district courts are not (and should not be) required to construe every limitation present in a
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`patent’s asserted claims.” O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351,
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`1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`Consistent with this precedent, this Court has often exercised such restraint, refusing to
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`explicitly construe words and phrases whose plain and ordinary meaning are obvious from the
`
`context of the claims without express definitions. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Inmagine Corp.,
`
`LLC, 2013 WL 3871360, *4 (E.D. Tex. July 24, 2013) (“As the claim language already provides
`
`substantial guidance as to the meaning of the claim terms, the plain and ordinary meaning of the
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`claim language controls. Therefore, the term ‘determine if the [first/second] right is available’
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`does not require construction.”); UltimatePointer, L.L.C. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 2013 WL
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`2325118, *14 (E.D. Tex. May 28, 2013) (“Substituting ‘separation’ for ‘distance’ provides no
`
`meaningful guidance as to the meaning of the term. . . . These terms employ the word ‘distance’
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`with its common and ordinary meaning. Therefore, no construction is necessary for these
`
`terms.”); Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 795, 805 (E.D. Tex. 2011)
`
`(“Regarding the ‘specifies the location [of at least a portion of [an/said] object]’ language, the
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`parties’ proposed constructions are merely attempts to restate the claim language or an effort to
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`include the plain and ordinary meaning. Accordingly, this term needs no construction.”); Avago
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`Techs. U.S., Inc. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 2011 WL 3439929, *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2011)
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`(“As with ‘host device,’ the Court will not specifically construe the ‘an electronic chip for use in
`
`an apparatus’ since its plain and ordinary meaning would be readily understood by the jury.”).
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`When an ordinary meaning is not apparent, the courts look to the language of the claims,
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`the specification, prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence such as dictionaries and treatises.
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314-18. Construction begins with the language of the claim, and the court
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`“presume[s] that the terms in the claim mean what they say.” Power Integrations, Inc. v.
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`Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Phillips, 415
`
`F.3d at 1312). Also, “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly
`
`instructive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; see also Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019,
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`1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he language of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of
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`claim interpretation.”).
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`In addition to the claims, the specification’s written description is an important
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`consideration during the claim construction process. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90
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`F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The specification, including the claim language, “is always
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`highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best
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`guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. The patentee may in some
`
`cases act as his or her own lexicographer. “When a patentee defines a claim term, the patentee’s
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`definition governs, even if it is contrary to the conventional meaning of the term.” Honeywell
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`Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 493 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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`Features of a preferred embodiment must not be read into the claims as new limitations.
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`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906-08 (Fed. Cir. 2004); SuperGuide Corp.
`
`v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In fact, the Federal Circuit
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`cautioned that “although the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the
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`invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323; see also Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 957 (Fed. Cir.
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`1983) (“That claims are interpreted in light of the specification does not mean that everything
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`expressed in the specification must be read into all the claims.”); Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at
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`1117 (“[P]articular embodiments appearing in the written description will not be used to limit
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`claim language that has broader effect.”).
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`The prosecution history may also be helpful. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. However, “it
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`often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction
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`purposes.” Id. Extrinsic evidence may provide guidance in some circumstances, but should not
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`be used to “change the meaning of the claims in derogation of the indisputable public records
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`consisting of the claims, the specification and the prosecution history.” Id. at 1319 (quotation
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`marks omitted).
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`IV. AGREED CONSTRUCTIONS
`PUMA has reached agreement with Defendants HTC and LG regarding the construction
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`of the term “simultaneously accesses the bus” as “accesses the bus at the same time.” See
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`Supplemental Joint Claim Construction Statement, Dkt. 116 at 1.
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`V.
`
`TERMS FOR CONSTRUCTION
`“bus”
`A.
`
`PUMA’s Proposal
`No construction necessary.
`
`Alternatively: “a signal line or
`a set of signal lines to which a
`number of devices are coupled
`and over which information
`may be transferred”
`
`Defendants’ Proposal
`“a signal line or set of
`parallel signal lines to
`which a number of devices
`are attached and over
`which information may be
`broadcast among them”
`
`Term and Patent/Claims
`“bus”
`
`‘789: 1, 13
`‘459: 1, 2, 7, 11, 13
`‘194: 1, 2, 9, 11, 16-18, 23
`‘368: 1, 5, 7, 13, 19, 20, 23
`‘045: 1, 4, 5, 12, 15
`‘753: 1, 7
`‘315: 1
`‘164: 1, 6, 7
`
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`The term “bus” is widely used and understood by those of ordinary skill in the art, and
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`the Court need not construe it. To the extent that the term needs construction, however, the
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`Court should adopt PUMA’s proposed construction, which accurately reflects how a person of
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`ordinary skill in the art would view the term.
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`PUMA’s construction comes from a previous case involving the ’789 patent. In that
`
`case, both the plaintiff, STMicro, and the defendant, Motorola, agreed that the term “shared bus”
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`is “[a] signal or set of signal lines to which a number of devices are coupled and over which
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`information may be transferred between them.” STMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Motorola Inc., 327
`
`F. Supp. 2d 687, 711 (E.D. Tex. 2004). Judge Davis subsequently adopted this agreed
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`construction. Id. As explained above, the eight asserted patents that use the term “bus”—
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`including the ’789 Patent—contain substantial overlap in their specifications, figures, and named
`
`inventors. The term “bus” is used across all eight of those patents in a manner consistent with
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`this construction.
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`Additionally, this construction is consistent with how the term is defined in extrinsic
`
`sources. For example, the Sixth Edition of the IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and
`
`Electronics Terms, which was published contemporaneously with the filing date of the ’789
`
`Patent and the ’459 Patent, defines the term “bus” as a “signal line or set of lines used by an
`
`interface system to connect a number of devices and to transfer data.” See Ex. K, IEEE
`
`STANDARD DICTIONARY OF ELEC. & ELECS. TERMS 117 (6th ed. 1996) (definition of “bus”). To
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`the extent a construction is necessary, PUMA requests that the Court adopt its construction for
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`this term.
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`Despite the fact that STMicro and Motorola originally agreed to a construction for the
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`term “bus” in the earlier case involving the ’789 Patent, HTC and LG now propose a materially
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`different construction that uses words that do not appear in the patent specifications or the
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`prosecution histories. The Defendants would require a “bus” to have a set of “parallel” signal
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`lines over which information may be “broadcast.” Neither of those terms appear anywhere in the
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`intrinsic evidence, and adding those limitations would only serve to confuse the Jury.
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`Indeed, the term “broadcast” alone is subject to a variety of constructions and
`
`interpretations. For example, in Tivo, Inc. v. AT&T Inc., one of the parties’ central disputes was
`
`over what the term “broadcast” meant. See Tivo, Inc. v. AT&T Inc., Case No. 2011 WL
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`6961021, at *3–4 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2011) (analyzing whether “broadcast” meant “sending data
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`indiscriminately” or whether it also covered “data that is sent to only a particular user”).
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`Because the term “broadcast” is not used in any of the asserted patents, neither the Parties nor the
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`Court will have any guidance as to how to apply this added term. To the extent it simply means
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`“transmitted”—as held by the court in the Tivo case—PUMA’s use of “transferred” is less
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`ambiguous and less confusing than Defendants’ construction. See id. (construing the term
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`“accepts broadcast data” to mean “accepts data that was transmitted”). However, to the extent
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`Defendants intend for the term “broadcast” to have a more specific meaning, such a narrow
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`construction is not supported by either the intrinsic or extrinsic evidence.
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`Similarly, Defendants’ addition of the term “parallel” is ambiguous in that it could refer
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`either to a geometrical arrangement of the signal lines (i.e., parallel lines versus perpendicular
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`lines) or to the method of data transmission (i.e., parallel data versus serial data). Regardless of
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`which meaning the Defendants intended by adding the term “parallel,” however, the asserted
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`patents do not make either of those distinctions and do not use the term “parallel.” Like the term
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`“broadcast,” the Defendants’ addition of the term “parallel” is not supported by either the
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`intrinsic or extrinsic evidence.
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`In fact, the Defendants’ own expert, Dr. Harold Stone, has defined “bus” in a manner that
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`contradicts Defendants’ construction. In U.S. Patent No. 5,093,890, on which Dr. Stone is a
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`named inventor, the term “bus” is defined as “a series of electrical lines interconnecting the
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`modules in the computer.” Ex. L, U.S. Patent No. 5,093,890, at 1:19–21. Notably, Dr. Stone’s
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`definition does not require “broadcast” capabilities or “parallel” signal lines. As a result, the
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`Court should reject Defendants’ overly narrow construction and adopt PUMA’s construction
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`instead.
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`B.
`
`“real time” and related terms
`
`Term and Patent/Claims
`“real time”
`
`‘789: 1, 13
`‘315: 1
`‘164: 1, 6
`
`a. “the bus having a
`sufficient bandwidth to
`enable the decoder to access
`the memory and operate in
`real time when the first
`device simultaneously
`accesses the bus”
`
`‘789: 1
`
`b. “the bus having sufficient
`bandwidth to transfer data
`in real time between the
`shared memory and the
`decoder”
`
`‘315: 1
`
`
`
`PUMA’s Proposal
`“fast enough to keep up with
`an input data stream”
`
`a. “the bus having a sufficient
`bandwidth to enable the
`decoder to access the memory
`and operate fast enough to keep
`up with an input data stream
`when the first device
`simultaneously accesses the
`bus”
`
`b. “the bus having sufficient
`bandwidth to transfer data fast
`enough to keep up with an
`input data stream between the
`shared memory and the
`decoder”
`
`Defendants’ Proposal
`Indefinite.
`
`Alternatively: “fast enough to
`enable the decoder to decode
`an image in the time between
`screen refreshes”
`Indefinite.
`
`Alternatively:
`
`a. “the bus having enough
`bandwidth to enable the
`decoder to decode an image
`in the time between screen
`refreshes when the first
`device simultaneously
`accesses the bus”
`
`b. “the bus having enough
`bandwidth to transfer data
`between the shared memory
`and the decoder to enable the
`decoder to decode an image
`in the time between screen
`refreshes”
`
`Like the term “bus,” the term “real time” was previously construed in the earlier litigation
`
`between STMicro and Motorola involving the ’789 Patent. In that case, Judge Davis construed
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`the term “real time operation” to mean “processing fast enough to keep up with an input data
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`stream.” STMicroelectronics, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 711. This construction, which PUMA proposes
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`above, comports with both the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.
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`The term “real time” is commonly used in the context of multimedia applications and
`
`audio/video decoding. In this regard, the patent specifications describe a number of indicia of
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`real time operation. For example, the patent specifications state that “[i]f the decoder does not
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`operate in real time the decoded movie would stop periodically between images until the
`
`decoder can get access to the memory.” Ex. A at 3:21–24 (emphasis added). The patents further
`
`state:
`
`A goal is to have the decoder/encoder 45 operate in real time without
`dropping so many frames that it becomes noticeable to the human viewer
`of the movie. To operate in real time the decoder/encoder 45 should
`decode and/or encode images fast enough so that any delay in decoding
`and/or encoding cannot be detected by a human viewer. This means that
`the decoder/encoder 45 has a required bandwidth that allows the
`decoder/encoder 45 to operate fast enough to decode the entire image in
`the time between screen refreshes, which is typically 1/30 of a second,
`with the human viewer not being able to detect any delay in the decoding
`and/or encoding.
`
`Id. at 6:41–52 (emphasis added).
`
`PUMA’s construction also comports with how the term “real time” is understood by
`
`persons of ordinary skill in the art. For example, the Sixth Edition of the IEEE Standard
`
`Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms defines the term “real time” as “a system or mode
`
`of operation in which computation is performed during the actual time that an external process
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`occurs.” See Ex. K, IEEE STANDARD DICTIONARY OF ELEC. & ELECS. TERMS 879 (6th ed. 1996)
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`(definition of “real time”); see also STMicroelectronics, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 693. As observed by
`
`Judge Davis in the earlier litigation, “[t]he relevant dictionary definition indicates that real time
`
`concerns the processor’s ability to ‘keep up with’ the data input.” STMicroelectronics, 327 F.
`
`Supp. 2d at 693. For those reasons, the Court should adopt PUMA’s construction.
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`Despite the fact that “real time” is a common term with a meaning that is well-known to a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art, and despite the fact that another court in this Judicial District
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`has already construed it without issue for the ’789 Patent, Defendants argue that this term renders
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`certain claims indefinite. However, a claim is indefinite only if the specification and prosecution
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`history fail to inform, with “reasonable certainty,” those skilled in the art about the scope of the
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`invention. Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). As observed
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`by this Court, the “definiteness inquiry does not require ‘absolute precision’ because, for
`
`example, the statute ‘must take into account the inherent limitations of language’ and ‘some
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`modicum of uncertainty is the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation.’”
`
`Thomas Swan & Co. v. Finisar Corp., Case No. 2:13-cv-178, 2014 WL 2885296, at *10 (E.D.
`
`Tex. Jun. 25, 2014) (quoting Nautilus).
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`Here, the patent specifications, together with the prosecution history, inform a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art with “reasonable certainty” of the scope of the invention. The fact that
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`Defendants’ propose a different construction that is more limiting does not make the term “real
`
`time” or its earlier construction indefinite. Referring to Nautilus, this Court has noted that the
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`Supreme Court “declined to adopt a test that would render a claim invalid when ‘readers could