Trials@uspto.gov
`571.272.7822
`
`
`Paper No. 10
`Filed: January 6, 2016
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`
`TERREMARK NORTH AMERICA LLC, VERIZON BUSINESS
`NETWORK SERVICES INC., VERIZON SERVICES CORP.,
`TIME WARNER CABLE INC., ICONTROL NETWORKS, INC. and
`COXCOM, LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`JOAO CONTROL & MONITORING SYSTEMS, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2015-01478
`Patent 6,542,076 B1
`_______________
`
`
`
`Before HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, STACEY G. WHITE, and
`JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`WHITE, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denial of Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
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`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`A. Background
`Terremark North America LLC (“Terremark”); Verizon
`Communications, Inc.,1 Verizon Services Corp., Time Warner Cable Inc.
`(“Time Warner”), iControl Networks, Inc., and CoxCom, LLC (collectively
`“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) seeking to institute an inter
`partes review of claims 31, 40, 48, 143, 177, 183, 185, 188, 206, 216, and
`217 of U.S. Patent No. 6,542,076 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’076 patent”) pursuant
`to 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319. Joao Control & Monitoring Systems, LLC,
`(“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. (Paper 9, “Prelim. Resp.”).
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter
`partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable
`
`
`1 The Petition lists Verizon Communications, Inc. as a petitioning party (Pet.
`2) and the caption of the Petition does not list Verizon Communications,
`Inc.; instead it lists Verizon Business Network Services Inc. as a petitioning
`party. Petitioner identifies “Verizon Communications Inc., Verizon
`Corporate Resources Group LLC and Verizon Data Services LLC as a real
`party-in-interest for the IPR requested by this Petition solely to the extent
`that Patent Owner contends that these separate legal entities should be
`named a real party-in-interest in the requested IPR.” Pet. 2. It is, however,
`Petitioner’s obligation to identify all real parties-in-interest. 35 U.S.C. §
`312(a). As such, we take Petitioner’s statement as an admission that these
`entities are real parties-in-interest. Petitioner notes that Verizon
`Communications Inc. has more than 500 affiliated entities and states that
`“each of these entities agrees to be estopped under the provisions of 35
`U.S.C. §§ 315 and/or 325 as a result of any final written decision in the
`requested IPR to the same extent that the Petitioners are estopped.” Id. On
`this record, we construe any mismatch between the named Verizon entities
`to be a typographical error.
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`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the
`claims challenged in the petition.”
`Petitioner contends the challenged claims are unpatentable under
`35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 on the following specific grounds (Pet. 20–53):
`
`
`Reference(s)
`Busak2
`Busak and French4
`
`Basis
`§ 1023
`
`§ 103
`
`Claim(s) Challenged
`31, 48, 143, 177, 183, 185,
`188, 206, 216, and 217
`40
`
`For reasons discussed below, we do not institute inter partes review of
`the ʼ076 patent.
`
`B. Related Proceedings
`Petitioner informs us that the ʼ076 patent is at issue in twenty-six
`lawsuits pending in courts around the country. Pet. 3–4. In addition, ex
`
`
`2 U.S. Patent No. 5,461,372, issued Oct. 24, 1995, filed Jan. 19, 1993
`(“Busak”) (Ex. 1005).
`3 Petitioner argues that the claims at issue are entitled to a priority date of no
`earlier than July 18, 1996. Pet. 16–20. Petitioner then argues Busak would
`be prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and cites a February 4, 1992 issuance
`date. Id. at 20–21. Busak, however, issued October 24, 1995 and thus, on
`this record would be prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) if we were to agree
`with Petitioner’s arguments regarding the priority date of the challenged
`claims. We, however, decline to decide that issue because, on the current
`record, it appears that Busak’s January 19, 1993 filing date makes it
`available as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). The other asserted prior art
`reference, French, qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) under
`either date.
`4 U.S. Patent No. 5,061,916, issued Oct. 29, 1991 (“French”) (Ex. 1006).
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`parte reexamination No. 90/013,302 was filed with respect to the ’076 patent
`and is pending. Id. at 3.
`
`C. Statutory Bar
`
`Patent Owner asserts that the Petition must be denied as untimely.
`Prelim. Resp. 11–19. A statutory time bar regarding the institution of an
`inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), which provides as
`follows:
`
`PATENT OWNER’S ACTION.—An inter partes review
`may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is
`filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner,
`real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a
`complaint alleging infringement of the patent. The time
`limitation set forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a
`request for joinder under subsection (c).
`
`On June 23, 2014, two of the petitioning parties, Verizon
`Communications and Time Warner, were served with complaints alleging
`infringement of the ’076 patent. Prelim. Resp. 12; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 2, 4. By
`stipulation of the parties, Terremark, another of the petitioning parties, was
`substituted in place of Verizon Communications. Ex. 2001 ¶ 3, Ex. 2004.
`Thus, under the statute, Petitioner must have filed its Petition by June 23,
`2015. The filing date accorded to the Petition is June 23, 2015. Notice of
`Filing Date Accorded (Paper 3).
`Patent Owner alleges that this filing date is improper because
`Petitioner did not effect service until June 24, 2015. Prelim. Resp. 13. In
`support of this assertion, Patent Owner provides a printout of tracking
`information that shows acceptance of the package containing the service
`copy of the Petition by Federal Express on June 24, 2015. Ex. 2007. In
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`addition, Patent Owner argues that that Petitioner’s electronic transmission
`of the Petition and supporting documents did not constitute proper service.
`Prelim. Resp. 16–18. According to Patent Owner, Petitioner “[sent an
`email] to Patent Owner’s litigation counsel at 11:55 pm on June 23, 2015”
`and this email contained links to an electronic file share site which had links
`to the Petition and supporting evidence. Id. at 16; Ex. 2009. Patent Owner
`argues that there is no evidence that the Petition and supporting evidence
`actually were available June 23, 2015. Prelim. Resp. 16–17. Patent Owner
`also asserts that its litigation counsel was not representing Patent Owner in
`any matters before the USPTO and that it had not consented to email
`service. Id.
`Patent Owner cites 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) that states “[a] petition filed
`under section 311 may be considered only if— . . . (5) the petitioner
`provides copies of any of the documents required under paragraphs (2), (3),
`and (4) to the patent owner or, if applicable, the designated representative of
`the patent owner.” See Prelim. Resp. 15. The statute, however, does not
`require that the documents be served on the Patent Owner, nor does it
`specify when the Patent Owner must receive these documents. The statute,
`instead, requires that the Petitioner “provide[]” copies to the Patent Owner.
`Patent Owner was provided with, and did receive, copies of the documents
`in question. We, therefore, decline to deny this Petition for failure to meet
`the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 312.
`In addition, the facts of this case are similar to Micron Tech., Inc. v.
`e.Digital Corp., Case IPR2015-00519 (PTAB Mar. 24, 2015) (Paper 14), in
`which the Board addressed a Motion to Deny a Petition a Filing Date based
`on Improper Service. The petitioner in Micron filed timely the petition, and
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`paid timely the filing fee. In addition, in Micron, the petitioner served a
`copy of the petition and supporting documents on the patent owner’s
`litigation counsel via email before expiration of the statutory bar date. The
`petitioner in Micron failed to timely serve the patent owner at the
`correspondence address of record. The Board, however, denied the patent
`owner’s motion because the patent owner, through its litigation counsel,
`received the petition prior to the one year statutory bar date. Micron, slip op.
`at 4–6.
`Patent Owner also relies on 37 C.F.R. § 42.106, which states “[a]
`petition to institute inter partes review will not be accorded a filing date
`until the petition satisfies [the requirement of] . . . (2) [e]ffect[ing] service of
`the petition on the correspondence address of record as provided in
`§ 42.105(a).” We agree that mailing via FedEx the day after filing the
`Petition failed to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.105(a). In addition, the
`purported email service, on this record, also does not appear to have been
`proper. The error appears harmless, however, because Patent Owner
`received the Petition no later than the morning of June 25, 2015 when the
`FedEx package was delivered. In addition, Patent Owner does not assert
`that it was unable to access the documents submitted via email. Patent
`Owner timely responded to the Petition and thus, we see no prejudice to
`Patent Owner from Petitioner’s service miscues. In this instance, we,
`therefore, decline to change the filing date accorded. See 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.5(b). Petitioner, however, must follow the rules on service, such as 37
`C.F.R. § 42.6(e), going forward. Thus, we decline to deny the Petition for
`failure to meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
`
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`D. The ʼ076 Patent
`The ’076 patent discusses a control, monitoring, and/or security
`apparatus and method for vehicles or premises. Ex. 1001, 1:25–32. The
`apparatus described in the ’076 patent allows an owner, occupant, or other
`authorized individual to control or to perform various monitoring and
`security tasks in regards to a premises from a remote location and at any
`time. Id. at 3:5–11.
`An embodiment of the apparatus of the ’076 patent includes a
`transmitter system which is “a remote system, which may or may not be
`physically connected to the remainder of the apparatus. Further, the
`transmitter system is not located in the [vehicle or premises] . . . , but rather,
`is located external from, and/or separate and apart from, the vehicle.” Id. at
`3:50–56. The apparatus also includes a CPU that is connected electrically
`and/or linked to one or more vehicle equipment systems (e.g., vehicle
`ignition or anti-theft systems), which are located externally from the
`apparatus. Id. at 4:35–37; 4:61–5:14. The vehicle equipment systems may
`be activated, de-activated, reset, or controlled by the apparatus. Id. at 5:15–
`18. This activation or control may be achieved by a user entering a code on
`the transceiver of the transmitter system. Id. at 6:30–36. The code is
`transmitted to the CPU and then the CPU communicates with the appropriate
`vehicle equipment system. Id. at 7:16–21.
`
`
`E. Illustrative Claim
`As noted above, Petitioner challenges claims 31, 40, 48, 143, 177,
`183, 185, 188, 206, 216, and 217 of the ʼ076 patent, of which claims 31,
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`143, and 206 are independent. Claim 31 is illustrative of the challenged
`claims and is reproduced below:
`31. A control apparatus, comprising:
`
`a first control device, wherein the first control device at least
`one of generates a first signal and transmits a first signal for
`at least one of activating, de-activating, disabling, and re-
`enabling, at least one of a premises system, a premises
`equipment system, a premises component, a premises
`device, a premises equipment, and a premises appliance, of a
`premises, wherein the first control device is located at the
`premises,
`
`wherein the first control device at least one of generates the first
`signal and transmits the first signal in response to a second
`signal, wherein the second signal is at least one of generated
`by a second control device and transmitted from a second
`control device, wherein the second control device is located
`at a location which is remote from the premises, wherein the
`second signal is transmitted from the second control device
`to the first control device, wherein the second signal is
`automatically received by the first control device, and
`further wherein the second control device at least one of
`generates the second signal and transmits the second signal
`in response to a third signal, wherein the third signal is at
`least one of generated by a third control device and
`transmitted from a third control device,
`
`wherein the third control device is located at a location which is
`remote from the premises and remote from the second
`control device, wherein the third signal is transmitted from
`the third control device to the second control device, and
`further wherein the third signal is automatically received by
`the second control device.
`
`II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`As acknowledged by the parties, the ’076 patent has expired. See Pet.
`12; Prelim. Resp. 6. We construe expired patent claims according to the
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`standard applied by the district courts. See In re Rambus, 694 F.3d 42, 46
`(Fed. Cir. 2012). Specifically, we apply the principles set forth in Phillips v.
`AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “In determining the
`meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic
`evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written
`description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc.
`v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
`(citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). A patentee may act as a
`lexicographer by giving a term a particular meaning in the specification with
`“reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d
`1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`Petitioner asserts that “[t]he terms of the challenged claims have a
`well-understood meaning” and such, Petitioner does not seek an explicit
`construction for any term. Pet. 12. Petitioner does present arguments
`regarding the construction of several terms in an effort to preempt Patent
`Owner’s potential arguments regarding these terms. Id. at 12–16. Patent
`Owner provides argument for several of these terms; however, we are not
`persuaded that express construction of these terms is necessary in order to
`resolve the disputes currently before us. See Prelim. Resp. 26–27. Thus, we
`discern no need to provide express constructions for these terms at this time.
`Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir.
`1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and
`only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).
`Patent Owner, however, also argues that the terms “premises,”
`“remote,” and “located at” are defined expressly in the prosecution history
`of at least two related applications. Prelim. Resp. 23–24. Petitioner does not
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`provide explicit arguments regarding these terms. Patent Owner seeks to
`rely upon statements made in the Preliminary Remarks filed by Applicant on
`November 26, 2006, during prosecution of the patent application that issued
`as U.S. Patent No. 7,277,010 (“the ’010 patent”) (Ex. 2011) and in the First
`Remarks filed on November 23, 2007, during prosecution of the patent
`application that issued as U.S. Patent No. 7,397,363 (“the ’363 patent”) (Ex.
`2012). Prelim. Resp. 23. These statements were made several years after
`the issuance of the ’076 patent. See Ex. 1001 at (45) (April 1, 2003 issuance
`date). The ’076 patent and the ’010 and ’363 patents all descend from U.S.
`Patent Application Nos. 08/587,628, 08/622,749, 08/489,238, and
`08/073,755. See Ex. 1001 at (63)5; Prelim. Resp. 23.
`As the Federal Circuit has noted, “[a] statement made during
`prosecution of related patents may be properly considered in construing a
`term common to those patents, regardless of whether the statement pre- or
`post-dates the issuance of the particular patent at issue.” Teva Pharm. USA,
`Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Microsoft
`Corp. v. Multi–Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
`Explicit definitions for these terms were provided in the related applications.
`See Ex. 2011, 3–5; Ex. 2012, 8, 10. We have reviewed the definitions stated
`in those related applications and we find them to be reasonable and
`instructive to understanding the proper scope of these claims terms. See In
`re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Thus, we adopt the
`following constructions for the purposes of this decision.
`
`
`5 We note that this portion of the ’076 patent has been modified by a
`Certificate of Correction, which may be found on page 95 of the Exhibit.
`
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`
`Term
`Remote
`
`Citations
`Ex. 2011, 3
`Ex. 2012, 10
`
`Premises
`
`Ex. 2011, 4
`Ex. 2012, 8–9
`
`Located at Ex. 2011, 5
`Ex. 2012, 8
`
`
`
`III. ANALYSIS
`
`Construction
`“‘Remote’ means ‘separate and apart from, or
`external from, or at a distance from or distant
`from, or not located in.’”
`“‘Premises’ means ‘a building or a structure
`and the grounds or parcel of land associated
`with the building or the structure, or a
`building or structure or a portion, room, or
`office, of or in the building or structure, or a
`home, mobile home, mobile building, mobile
`structure, residence, residential building,
`office, commercial building, commercial
`office, structure, equipment, facility, machine,
`rig, assembly line, or edifice.’”
`“‘Located at’ means ‘situated at, or situated
`in, or situated on.’”
`
`We turn to Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability to
`determine whether Petitioner has met the threshold of 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`
`A. Asserted Anticipation over Busak (Ex. 1005)
`
`1. Overview of Busak
`Busak is a U.S. Patent titled “System and Method for Modifying
`Security in a Security System.” Ex. 1005 at [54]. Busak describes a security
`system that can be accessed by a user from within the space to be controlled,
`or remotely through the use of a telecommunications interface. Id. at 1:18–
`20. An embodiment of Busak is depicted in Figure 1, which is reproduced
`below.
`
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`Figure 1, reproduced above, depicts an embodiment of Busak’s automation
`system. Id. at 2:54–59. As described in Busak’s specification, “automation
`system 10 would be particularly suitable for automatically controlling a
`building, such as a small commercial building, a home, or a similar
`building.” Id. at 3:19–21. Automation system 10 includes principal control
`system 12, which is security system 16. Id. at 3:21–26. The principal
`control system is “electrically connected to a plurality of control systems 14,
`including lighting system 18.” Id. at 3:26–27. Lighting system 18 is a
`commercially available system that may be used to control lights or other
`electrical devices and it may be connected to the security system. Id. at
`5:29–40. The automation system also includes telecommunications device
`34, which may be a touch tone telephone. Id. at 5:52–53.
`.
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`
`2. Analysis of Asserted Ground of Anticipation by Busak
`Petitioner asserts that claims 31, 48, 143, 177, 183, 185, 188, 206,
`216, and 217 of the ’076 Patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as
`anticipated by Busak. Pet. 20–46. Petitioner relies on claim charts showing
`how this reference allegedly discloses the claimed subject matter. Id.
`Petitioner further relies on a declaration from Richard Bennett. Ex. 1002.
`Each of the challenged independent claims (31, 143, and 206) recites
`a first, second, and third control device. In claims 31 and 143, the “first
`control device is located at the premises.” Id. at 114:1–2; 132:45–46.
`Similarly, in claim 206, the “third control device is located at the premises.”
`Id. at 141:60–61. All three independent claims recite that “the second
`control device is located at a location which is remote from the premises.”
`Id. at 114:7–9; 132:51–53; 141:62–63. In addition, claims 31 and 143 recite
`that “the third control device is located at a location which is remote from
`the premises and remote from the second control device.” Id. at 114:18–20;
`132:61–64. Similarly, claim 206 recites that the “first control device is
`located at a location remote from the second control device and remote from
`a premises.” Id. at 141:48–50. Thus, all of the independent claims require
`three control devices, one of which is located on the premises and two other
`control devices that are located at two other places that are remote from the
`premises.
`Petitioner argues that Busak discloses these control devices6 through
`its discussion and depiction of lighting system 18 with a control system 14
`
`6 Petitioner argues that the first control device of claim 206 correlates to the
`third control device of claim 31; that the second control device of claim 206
`correlates to the second control device of claim 31; and that the third control
`
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`therein and control points 84 (first control devices), principal control system
`16 (second control device), and telecommunications device 34 (third control
`device). Pet. 24. Petitioner asserts that Busak discloses that the “second
`control device is located remote from the premises” (id. at 26) because
`Busak’s specification states that “control system 14 could be remote from
`security system 16. . . ” and that control points 84 are on the premises and
`may be connected to security system 16 via hardwire 88 or RF connections
`86. Id. at 27 (citing Ex. 1005, 3:35–39, Fig. 2, Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 30–31).
`We are not persuaded that these disclosures are sufficient to anticipate
`the challenged claims. “[U]nless a reference discloses within the four
`corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of
`the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim,
`it cannot be said to prove prior invention of the thing claimed and, thus,
`cannot anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102.” Net MoneyIn, Inc. v. VeriSign,
`Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Busak describes a preferred
`embodiment in which a control system 14 could be at a location remote from
`that of security system/principal control system 16. Ex. 1005, 3:35–37.
`
`device of claim 206 correlates to the first control device of claim 31. Pet. 40
`n.7. Petitioner relies on the same disclosures in Busak for each of the
`corresponding devices in claims 31 and 206. Compare Pet. 22–23 and Pet.
`40–42. This is also true for Petitioner’s arguments regarding claim 143,
`which recites a first, second, and third control device in language similar to
`that used in claim 31. See id. at 32–34 (providing citations to Busak nearly
`identical to those cited in support of its arguments regarding claim 31).
`Thus, our analysis of Busak’s disclosures applies to each of the independent
`claims. For convenience, unless otherwise indicated, we shall use the terms
`first, second, and third control device to refer to the control devices as
`described in claim 31.
`
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`Busak, however, also discloses that there may be “[a] plurality of control
`systems 14” and that these systems “as well as any number of other systems
`. . . might be located in or near the building, and including systems which
`could be remote from the building.” Id. at 3:26–35. We are not persuaded
`that Busak’s principal control system is “separate and apart from, or external
`from, or at a distance from or distant from, or not located in” (i.e., remote
`from) (see § II (claim construction)) the premises because the cited portions
`of the reference do not describe the principal control system as being apart
`from the premises. Also, we are not persuaded that the ability to connect
`control systems 14 and principal control system 16 via an RF connection
`discloses that principal control system 16 is remote from the premises
`because an RF connection could be used to connect devices that are located
`in the same premises. Busak, instead, merely describes that “system 14
`could be remote from security system 16. . .” and that control points 84 are
`on the premises and may be connected to security system 16 via hardwire 88
`or RF connections 86. Ex. 1005, 3:35–39, Fig. 2. Thus, we are not
`persuaded that Busak discloses that control system 16 “is located remote
`from the premises.”
`Based on the foregoing, we determine that as to claims 31, 143, and
`206, Petitioner has not met the threshold of 35 U.S.C § 314(a). Petitioner
`has not provided sufficient evidence to show that Busak discloses that the
`claimed “second control device is located remote from the premises.” For
`similar reasons, we also determine that Petitioner has not met the threshold
`of 35 U.S.C § 314(a) for dependent claims 48, 177, 183, 185, 188, 216, and
`217.
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`B. Analysis of Asserted Ground of Obviousness over Busak and French
`
`Petitioner asserts that claim 40 of the ’076 patent is unpatentable
`under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Busak and French. Pet. 46–52.
`Petitioner relies on claim charts showing how this reference allegedly
`discloses the claimed subject matter. Id. Petitioner further relies on a
`declaration from Richard Bennett. Ex. 1002. Claim 40 depends from claim
`31. Petitioner does not assert that French cures the above-noted deficiency
`found in claim 31. Nor does Petitioner provide additional argument that the
`limitations of claim 31 would have been obvious over the disclosures of
`Busak. Thus, for reasons described above we are not persuaded that
`Petitioner has met the threshold of 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and we deny
`institution of review of claim 40 over Busak and French.
`
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, we determine Petitioner has not
`demonstrated there is a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in establishing
`the unpatentability of claims 31, 40, 48, 143, 177, 183, 185, 188, 206, 216,
`and 217 of the ʼ076 patent.
`
`V. ORDER
`For the reasons given, it is
`ORDERED that the Petition is denied as to all challenged claims and
`no trial is instituted.
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`PETITIONER:
`
`Frank C. Cimino, Jr.
`FCCimino@Venable.com
`Megan S. Woodworth
`MSWoodworth@Venable.com
`VENABLE LLP
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`Vaibhav P. Kadaba
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`D. Clay Holloway
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`KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP
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`PATENT OWNER:
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`Raymond A. Joao
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`René A. Vazquez
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`HENINGER GARRISON DAVIS, LLC 1
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`Jackson Ho
`jackson.ho@klgates.com
`David A. Simons
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`K&L GATES LLP