UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________________
`
`MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`BRADIUM TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
`Patent Owner
`____________________
`
`CASE IPR2015-01434
`Patent 7,908,343
`____________________
`
`PATENT OWNER BRADIUM TECHNOLOGIES LLC’S
`PRELIMINARY RESPONSE PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. §42.107
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`D. 
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 
`I.
`THE REQUIREMENTS TO INSTITUTE AN INTER PARTES REVIEW .................... 2 
`II.
`III. GROUNDS 1 AND 2 ARE FATALLY FLAWED BECAUSE THE PETITION
`DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT EITHER LINDSTROM OR POTMESIL IS
`PRIOR ART ....................................................................................................................... 3 
`A. 
`Petitioner Has Not Shown that Lindstrom Qualifies as Prior Art .......................... 4 
`B. 
`Petitioner Has Not Shown that Potmesil Qualifies as Prior Art ............................ 9 
`IV. EVERY GROUND FAILS BECAUSE THE PETITION DOES NOT IDENTIFY
`THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CLAIMS AND THE ASSERTED
`REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 12 
`An Obviousness Analysis That Fails To Identify Any Difference Between
`A. 
`A Claim And Any Asserted Reference Is Fatally Flawed ................................... 12 
`Ground 1 .............................................................................................................. 14 
`1. 
`Claim 1 ..................................................................................................... 14 
`2. 
`Claim 13 ................................................................................................... 16 
`Ground 2 .............................................................................................................. 17 
`Ground 3 .............................................................................................................. 17 
`1. 
`Claim 1 ..................................................................................................... 18 
`2. 
`Claim 13 ................................................................................................... 19 
`Grounds 4 and 5 ................................................................................................... 19 
`E. 
`EVERY GROUND FAILS BECAUSE THE PETITION FAILS TO
`ARTICULATE REASONS WITH RATIONAL UNDERPINNING
`SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONCLUSION OF OBVIOUSNESS ......................... 20 
`An Obviousness Analysis Must Explain Why A POSITA Would Have
`A. 
`Had Reason To Modify An Asserted Reference In Light Of A Particularly
`Identified Teaching Of Another Reference .......................................................... 20 
`Ground 1 .............................................................................................................. 21 
`1. 
`Claim 1 ..................................................................................................... 21 
`2. 
`Claim 13 ................................................................................................... 24 
`Ground 2 .............................................................................................................. 26 
`Ground 3 .............................................................................................................. 26 
`
`V.
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`D. 
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`
`1. 
`Claim 1 ..................................................................................................... 26 
`Claim 13 ................................................................................................... 30 
`2. 
`Grounds 4 and 5 ................................................................................................... 31 
`E. 
`VI. THE BOARD SHOULD DENY THE ENTIRE PETITION BECAUSE IT DOES
`NOT RELATE THE ACTUAL CLAIM LANGUAGE TO THE ASSERTED
`REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 31 
`The Petition Omits The Language Of All The Claims And Fails To Map
`A. 
`Each Claim Element To A Particular Teaching Of Any Asserted
`Reference ............................................................................................................. 32 
`The Petition Incorrectly Summarizes/Mischaracterizes the References .............. 41 
`B. 
`VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 47
`
`
`
`iii
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`

`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`Cases 
`
`2Wire, Inc. v. TQ Delta LLC
`IPR2015-00239 (P.T.A.B. May 29, 2015) ......................................................................... passim
`
`Apple Inc. v. DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc.,
`IPR2015-00369 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2015) ................................................................... 6, 7, 9, 10
`
`Cisco Systems, Inc., v. C-Cation Technologies, LLC,
`IPR2014-00454 (P.T.A.B. August 29, 2014); .................................................................... 21, 23
`
`Dish Network L.L.C. v. Dragon Intellectual Property, LLC,
`IPR2015-00499 (P.T.A.B. July 17, 2015) ........................................................................ 6, 8, 11
`
`Google Inc. v. ART+COM InnovationPool GmbH,
`IPR2015-00788 (P.T.A.B. September 2, 2015), ................................................................ passim
`
`Google, Inc. v. Everymd.com LLC,
`IPR2014-00347(P.T.A.B. May 22, 2014) ........................................................................... 13, 34
`
`Gracenote, Inc. v. Iceberg Industries LLC,
`IPR2013-00552 (P.T.A.B. March 7, 2014) ............................................................................... 42
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) ............................................................................................................... passim
`
`Hopkins ManufacturingCorp. v. Cequent Performance Products, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00616 (P.T.A.B. August 17, 2015) ........................................................... 3, 23, 30, 34
`
`In re Kahn,
`441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ................................................................................ 20, 22, 29, 30
`
`In re Lister,
`583 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ........................................................................................ 4, 7, 11
`
`Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
`688 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .................................................................................... 12, 15, 18
`
`KSR Int’l v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ............................................................................................................ 20, 29
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`
`Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co.,
`CBM-2012-00003 (Order) (P.T.A.B. November 26, 2012) ................................... 13, 15, 16, 18
`
`Plant Science, Inc. v. The Andersons, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00939 (P.T.A.B. December 14, 2014) ..................................................... 21, 24, 29, 30
`
`Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. v. Signal IP, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00968 (P.T.A.B. August 25, 2015) .......................................................................... 22
`
`Whole Space Industries Ltd. v. Zipshade Industrial (B.V.I.) Corp.,
`IPR2015-00488 (P.T.A.B. July 24, 2015) ......................................................................... passim
`
`Statutes 
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) ....................................................................................................................... 12
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ...................................................................................................................... 4, 5
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) .......................................................................................................................... 2
`
`35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 311(b) .......................................................................................................... 4
`
`AIA § 102(a) and (b)....................................................................................................................... 5
`
`Rules 
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) ........................................................................................................ passim
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 .......................................................................................................................... 1
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c)........................................................................................................................ 3
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.22 .......................................................................................................................... 34
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2) .......................................................................................................... passim
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) ................................................................................................................. 1, 6
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.62(a)...................................................................................................................... 10
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65 .......................................................................................................................... 11
`
`37 C.F.R. §42.24(a)(1)(i) .................................................................................................. 23, 29, 33
`
`37 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(5) .................................................................................................................... 4
`
`FRE 602 .................................................................................................................................... 7, 11
`
`FRE 702 ........................................................................................................................................ 11
`
`
`
`v
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`

`
`FRE 802(6).................................................................................................................................... 10
`FRE 802(6) .................................................................................................................................. .. 10
`
`FRE 802(6)(E) .............................................................................................................................. 11
`FRE 802(6)(E) ............................................................................................................................ .. 11
`
`FRE 803(6)(D) .............................................................................................................................. 11
`FRE 803(6)(D) ............................................................................................................................ .. 11
`
`FRE 901(a) .................................................................................................................................... 10
`FRE 901(a) .................................................................................................................................. .. 10
`
`
`
`vi
`Vi
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`

`
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`
`
`Patent Owner Bradium Technologies LLC (“Patent Owner”) hereby
`
`preliminarily responds under 37 C.F.R. § 42.107 to the Petition challenging U.S.
`
`Patent No. 7,908,343 (the “ ‘343 patent”) filed by Petitioner Microsoft Corporation
`
`(“Petitioner”). Petitioner’s request for inter partes review must be denied for at
`
`least the following reasons:
`
`(1) The Petition fails to establish that either Lindstrom or Potmesil is prior
`
`art against the ‘343 patent.
`
`(2) The Petition fails identify the difference(s) between the claims and the
`
`asserted references as required by Graham.
`
` (3) The Petition supports its assertions of obviousness with mere conclusory
`
`statements and impermissible incorporation by reference to arguments from the
`
`Michalson Declaration (Ex. 1009) , in violation of 37 C.F.R. §42.6(a)(3)
`
`(4) The Petition does not “specify where each element of the claim is
`
`found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.” 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.104(b)(4) because each Ground has at least one of the following deficiencies: (i)
`
`failing to map each actual term of the claims to a specific teaching from an asserted
`
`reference, (ii) providing citations to the asserted references that do not in fact teach
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`
`the claim elements against which such citations are applied, and (iii)
`
`mischaracterizing in certain instances the citations to the asserted references.
`
`Due to at least these deficiencies, the Petition does not establish “a
`
`reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of
`
`the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) The particular
`
`deficiencies in the Petition that this Response discusses below are exemplary only,
`
`and do not exhaust all the instances where the Petition fails to meet the
`
`requirements for instituting an inter partes review.
`
`II. THE REQUIREMENTS TO INSTITUTE AN INTER PARTES REVIEW
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) sets forth the threshold requirements for instituting an
`
`inter partes review:
`
`
`
`(a)THRESHOLD.—The Director may not authorize an inter partes
`review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the
`information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any
`response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable
`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1
`of the claims challenged in the petition.
`(Emphasis added). Among various other requirements, the petition “must specify
`
`where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed
`
`publications relied upon” (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)), and it must contain a “full
`
`statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`
`
`the significance of the evidence including material facts, and the governing law,
`
`rules, and precedent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2). Moreover, a petition is subject to
`
`the prohibition that “[a]rguments must not be incorporated by reference from one
`
`document into another document.” 37 C.F.R. §42.6(a)(3).
`
`
`
` A Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to the relief
`
`that it is requesting. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). Thus, no relief will be granted unless
`
`the arguments in the Petition itself support granting such relief. Whole Space
`
`Industries Ltd. v. Zipshade Industrial (B.V.I.) Corp., IPR2015-00488, Paper 14 at 8
`
`(P.T.A.B. July 24, 2015) (“We address only the basis, rationale, and reasoning put
`
`forth by the Petitioner in the Petition, and resolve all vagueness and ambiguity in
`
`Petitioner’s arguments against the Petitioner.”); Hopkins ManufacturingCorp. v.
`
`Cequent Performance Products, Inc., IPR2015-00616, Paper 9 at 7 (P.T.A.B.
`
`August 17, 2015).
`
`III. GROUNDS 1 AND 2 ARE FATALLY FLAWED BECAUSE THE
`PETITION DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT EITHER LINDSTROM OR
`POTMESIL IS PRIOR ART
`Ground 1 is based, in part, on Maps Alive: Viewing Geospatial Information
`
`on the WWW, Michael Potmesil, Computer Networks and ISDN Systems Vol. 29,
`
`issues 8-13, pp. 1327-1342 ("Potmesil") (Ex. 1002). Ground 2 is based, in part, on
`
`both Potmesil and An Integrated Global GIS and Visual Simulation System by P.
`
`Lindstrom et al., Tech. Rep. GIT-GVU-97-07, ("Lindstrom") (Ex, 1004).
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`

`
`Petitioner fails to meet its burden of establishing that the Lindstrom and Potmesil
`
`references are printed publications within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and
`
`311(b), and that such references are prior art to the ’343 Patent. In particular,
`
`Petitioner fails to show in the Petition, or even otherwise, that each reference was
`
`“publicly accessible,” prior to the critical date, i.e. that each reference “has been
`
`disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and
`
`ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can
`
`locate it.” In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding a reference
`
`had not been shown to be a printed publication under this standard).
`
`Petitioner Has Not Shown that Lindstrom Qualifies as Prior Art
`
`A.
`The Petition does not contain a “full statement of the reasons” why
`
`Lindstrom is prior art, and Ground 2 fails on this basis alone. See 37 C.F.R. §§
`
`42.22(a)(2) and 42.104(b)(5). The Petition includes only a conclusory assertion
`
`that Lindstrom is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), Petition at Pages ii and 10.
`
`Lindstrom itself is undated. While Petitioner has attached declarations from Peter
`
`Lindstrom and Charles Carpenter that purport to address the issue, the conclusory
`
`assertion in the Petition makes no reference to those declarations, and fails to
`
`present any “statement of the reasons,” much less a “full” one, regarding the key
`
`issue of whether the Lindstrom reference is qualifying prior art. In Google Inc. v.
`
`ART+COM InnovationPool GmbH, IPR2015-00788, Paper 7 (P.T.A.B. September
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`
`
`2, 2015), the PTAB held in similar circumstances that the declaration should be
`
`ignored, and that the petition itself was insufficient to prove that a reference was
`
`prior art.
`
`In Google, the Petition attempted to establish that the Leclerc reference
`
`qualified as a “printed publication” under § 102(b) merely by asserting, in
`
`conclusory fashion, that “each of the asserted grounds consists of references that
`
`were patented or published prior to December 17, 1995” and that ‘all the
`
`references herein qualify as prior art under at least pre-AIA § 102(a) and (b).” Id.
`
`at 6. The Petition there was accompanied by the Declaration of Dr. Lastra (id. at
`
`10), which included testimony asserting that Leclerc was publicly available prior to
`
`the critical date. The Board held that since “[n]one of this testimony was cited or
`
`discussed in the Petition…we decline to give any weight to it.” Id. See also
`
`2Wire, Inc. v. TQ Delta LLC, IPR2015-00239, Paper 18 at 10 (P.T.A.B. May 29,
`
`2015) (“Consequently, we do not consider information presented in the Declaration
`
`but not discussed sufficiently in the Petition.”).
`
`Similarly here, the Board should decline to give any weight to the Peter
`
`Lindstrom and Charles Carpenter declarations, since neither of them is discussed in
`
`the Microsoft Petition. Indeed, Petitioner’s attempt to address this critical issue
`
`only through declarations represents an attempt to circumvent the page limits by
`
`including extra arguments outside the Petition. The Petition does not meet
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s burden, and the Board should disregard the Lindstrom reference. See
`
`37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(a)(3) & 42.22(a)(2). See also Apple Inc. v. DSS Tech. Mgmt.,
`
`Inc., IPR2015-00369, Paper 14 at 10 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2015) (burden under
`
`314(a) not satisfied by conclusory assertion as to “publication” of asserted
`
`reference).
`
`Even if the Board considered the Peter Lindstrom and Charles Carpenter
`
`Declarations, they do not establish that Lindstrom was publicly accessible prior to
`
`the critical date of the '343 Patent. See Dish Network L.L.C. v. Dragon Intellectual
`
`Property, LLC, IPR2015-00499, Paper 7 at 10-11 (P.T.A.B. July 17, 2015)
`
`(reference not shown to be a printed publication without satisfactorily showing
`
`public accessibility). Here, the declarations do not demonstrate that either
`
`declarant has personal knowledge of the public accessibility of the Lindstrom
`
`reference as of 1997. Both declarants assert that they checked a specific FTP site
`
`that was known to them. Ex. 1014 at ¶ 4; Ex. 1015 at ¶ 7. This does not establish
`
`public accessibility.
`
`The declarations include conclusory statements that Lindstrom was
`
`“available to the public” and “could be located by the general public” “through a
`
`search of the online Georgia Tech catalog” or a web search engine, Ex. 1014 at ¶ 4;
`
`Ex. 1015 at ¶ 7. Tellingly, neither declaration states that the declarant himself used
`
`an internet search engine or used a Georgia Tech catalog to find Lindstrom, or
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`
`
`observed anyone else doing so. Thus, neither declarant has personal knowledge of
`
`public accessibility. The statements therefore lack foundation and should be
`
`disregarded. FRE 602. See also Apple Inc., IPR2015-00369, Paper 14 at 5-7
`
`(P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2015) (Petitioner failed to show that the library stamp date
`
`indicated that the reference was publicly accessible due to no showing of
`
`declarant’s personal knowledge of how or when the reference was made available
`
`to the public or of declarant’s specialized knowledge of MIT library archiving
`
`procedures).
`
`The standard for “public accessibility” is not whether the publication was
`
`available online to one who knew where to look for it. Instead, “public
`
`accessibility” requires a showing that the reference could be located by interested
`
`persons exercising reasonable diligence. In re Lister, 584 F.3d 1307, 1314-16
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2009). The Charles Carpenter and Peter Lindstrom Declarations’
`
`assertion that Lindstrom was available through a search of the online Georgia Tech
`
`catalog not only is not based on any statement of personal knowledge, it also fails
`
`to show the nature and extent of the cataloging and indexing had been done prior to
`
`the critical date. In Lister, the Federal Circuit held that indexing in the Copyright
`
`Office catalog was insufficient to support a finding of public accessibility, though
`
`demonstrated accessibility through Westlaw or Dialog would be sufficient. Id. at
`
`1315. Petitioner, which has the burden, does not provide any evidence to show
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`

`
`that any cataloging done at Georgia Tech qualifies as sufficient under Lister. See
`
`also Dish Network L.L.C., IPR2015-00499, Paper 7 at 10-11 (P.T.A.B. July 17,
`
`2015) (insufficient evidence as to when and how a thesis was made available to the
`
`public and library’s “specific practices as to indexing and cataloging papers in the
`
`relevant time period”). Petitioner’s failure to provide any evidence as to how
`
`Lindstrom was cataloged or in what manner it could have been located through
`
`search tools prior to the critical date of the ’343 Patent is fatal to its assertion that
`
`Lindstrom is prior art.
`
`The exhibits attached to the Peter Lindstrom and Charles Carpenter
`
`declarations also do not show that Lindstrom is qualifying prior art. Exhibits B
`
`and C to both declarations (which are identical), and Exhibit D to the Charles
`
`Carpenter Declaration are inadmissible as hearsay. Exhibits B and C are purported
`
`e-mails by a Ms. Swobe, who has not submitted a declaration. Exhs. 1014 at ¶¶ 9-
`
`10; 1015 at ¶¶ 16-17. Her statements, offered for the truth of their contents, are
`
`hearsay. In addition, the declarations assert that Exhibits B and C show that
`
`Lindstrom was made available on an FTP site and web location, (Ex. 1014 at ¶¶ 9-
`
`10, Ex. 1015 at ¶¶ 16-17), without showing indexing or cataloging of the reference.
`
`As discussed above, the failure of evidence regarding the indexing and cataloging
`
`renders the evidence fatally deficient. Exhibit D to the Charles Carpenter
`
`Declaration is a purported screenshot taken from the “Wayback Machine,” a third-
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`
`
`party archive regarding which no authenticating declaration has been provided. It,
`
`too, is also hearsay. Ex. 1015 at ¶¶ 13-14. Likewise, Exhibit D of the Charles
`
`Carpenter Declaration purportedly shows a 1998 version of the GVU Technical
`
`Reports website, Ex. 1015 at ¶¶ 13-14, but the declaration does not allege that
`
`Lindstrom was cataloged or findable based on this website. A screenshot
`
`purporting to show an FTP directory that contained Lindstrom (Ex. 1015 at ¶ 11)
`
`also does not show indexing or cataloging of either Lindstrom or that directory.
`
`In conclusion, The Petitioner has not shown that Lindstrom was publicly
`
`accessible prior to the critical date.
`
`Petitioner Has Not Shown that Potmesil Qualifies as Prior Art
`
`B.
`The Petition also does not contain a “full statement of the reasons” why
`
`Potmesil is prior art; thus Grounds 1 and 2 fail on this basis alone. See 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.22(a)(2). The Petition's only statement on this key issue is in a single,
`
`conclusory sentence on page 10, which is insufficient for the reasons discussed in
`
`the section immediately above. 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2); Google Inc., IPR2015-
`
`00788, Paper 7 at 10 (P.T.A.B. September 2, 2015); Apple Inc., IPR2015-00369,
`
`Paper 14 at 10 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2015); Whole Space Industries Ltd., IPR2015-
`
`00488, Paper 14 at 8 (P.T.A.B. July 24, 2015); 2Wire, Inc., IPR2015-00239, Paper
`
`18 at 10 (P.T.A.B. May 29, 2015).
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`

`
`Exhibit 1002 (which is not explained in the Petition) also does not show that
`
`Potmesil is a printed publication because the d’Arnaud Declaration relies on
`
`unauthenticated hearsay, and even if this hearsay is considered, the declaration still
`
`contains insufficient facts.
`
`A UCSC library sticker that Ms. d’Arnaud relies upon as purporting to show
`
`a receipt date of November 6, 1997 for Potmesil is unauthenticated hearsay if
`
`relied upon for the truth of this date, and Petitioner has not shown that a hearsay
`
`exception applies. See Apple Inc. v. DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc., IPR2015-00369, Paper
`
`14 at 6-7 (P.T.A.B. Aug 12, 2015) (library stamp was hearsay and Petitioner failed
`
`to establish that hearsay exception applied).
`
`The Petition and Ex. 1002 contain insufficient information to authenticate
`
`Potmesil and its purported library sticker. See FRE 901(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.62(a).
`
`The cover of Potmesil in Ex. 1002 is incomplete because one of the library stickers
`
`on the left-hand side is partially obscured, and because the back cover page is
`
`entirely omitted. The Petition refers to Potmesil as “issues 8-13,” while the
`
`purported cover page lists the issue as issue 7. (Petition at ii; Ex. 1002 at pp. 4-5.)
`
`Petitioner has not shown that any hearsay exception applies to the Potmesil
`
`sticker, including the business record hearsay exception FRE 802(6). For one,
`
`without a complete and unobscured copy of the cover of Potmesil, Petitioner
`
`cannot show that the circumstances surrounding Potmesil meet the trustworthiness
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`
`
`requirement of FRE 802(6)(E). Further, Ms. d’Arnaud is not a qualified witness
`
`under FRE 803(6)(D) because she does not state that she has personal or expert
`
`knowledge of the library’s procedures as they existed in 1997. See FRE 602, 702.
`
`Ms. d’Armaud does not state that she was employed by the library in 1997 and
`
`does not state that she investigated the library’s 1997 procedures. Ex. 1002 at 1, ¶¶
`
`1-3.
`
`Also, the library sticker purports to show only a library receipt date, which is
`
`insufficient to establish public accessibility without competent evidence as to (1)
`
`when and how Potmesil was made available to the public and (2) the library’s
`
`specific practices as to indexing and cataloging papers. Dish Network L.L.C.,
`
`IPR2015-00499, Paper 7 at 10-11 (P.T.A.B. July 17, 2015). Ms. d’Arnaud’s naked
`
`opinion at Paragraph 6 that “[b]ased on the library’s normal procedures” Potmesil
`
`was placed “into circulation” has no foundation in personal knowledge or
`
`expertise, and she further does not explain what the library’s applicable
`
`“circulation” procedures were in 1997, and thus her unsupported opinion is entitled
`
`to no weight. See FRE 602, FRE 702, 37 C.F.R. § 42.65. Therefore, Petitioner has
`
`submitted no competent evidence that Potmesil was disseminated or otherwise
`
`made available to the extent that an ordinarily skilled artesian exercising
`
`reasonable diligence could locate it. See In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2009).
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`

`
`Since the Petition does not establish that either Potmesil or Lindstrom is
`
`prior art against the ‘343 patent, Ground 1, which is based on Potmesil, and
`
`Ground 2, which is based on both of these references, fail completely.
`
`IV. EVERY GROUND FAILS BECAUSE THE PETITION DOES NOT
`IDENTIFY THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CLAIMS AND THE
`ASSERTED REFERENCES
`A. An Obviousness Analysis That Fails To Identify Any Difference
`Between A Claim And Any Asserted Reference Is Fatally Flawed
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`A legal conclusion of obviousness must be based on a factual background
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`developed by consideration of the following factors: (1) the scope and content of
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`the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue; and
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`(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. 35 U.S.C. §
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`103(a); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). Without exception,
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`consideration of every factor in the Graham framework is mandatory. Kinetic
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`Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
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`(“Indeed, courts must consider all of the Graham factors prior to reaching a
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`conclusion with respect to obviousness.”) Therefore, an obviousness analysis that
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`does not identify the difference(s) between the claim and the prior art is legally
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`inadequate to support a conclusion of obviousness. Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at
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`1360 (“Indeed, courts must consider all of the Graham factors prior to reaching a
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`conclusion with respect to obviousness.”) ; Whole Space Industries Ltd., IPR2015-
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`00488, Paper 14 at 9 (“[N]or does the Petition identify the differences between the
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`prior art and the claims at issue, which is one of the fundamental factual inquiries
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`underlying an obviousness analysis.”); Google, Inc. v. Everymd.com LLC,
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`IPR2014-00347, Paper 9 at25(P.T.A.B. May 22, 2014) (“Rather, Petitioners’
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`summaries, quotations, and citations from both references, with Belanger’s figures,
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`place the burden on us to…identify any differences between the claimed subject
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`matter and the teachings of Shah and Belanger.”) (emphasis added); Liberty
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`Mutual Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., CBM-2012-00003, Paper 7 at 2 -
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`3 (Order) (P.T.A.B. November 26, 2012) (“Differences between the claimed
`
`invention and the prior art are a critically important underlying factual inquiry for
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`any obviousness analysis.”). Indeed, if a petitioner “does not state the differences
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`between a challenged claim and the prior art, and relies instead on the Patent
`
`Owner and the Board to determine those differences based on the rest of the
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`submission in the petition,” then such a petitioner “risks having the corresponding
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`ground of obviousness not included for trial for failing to adequately state a claim
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`for relief.” Id. at 3. The abandonment of this critically important Graham factor
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`will invariably taint the purported combination because it will not specify a
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`particular way of modifying the primary reference in view of a teaching from the
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`secondary reference to overcome an identified difference between the claim and
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`the primary reference. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., CBM-2012-00003, Paper 7 at 3
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`13
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`

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`(“The first [deficiency] involves a plurality of prior art references applied not in
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`combination to complement one another but as distinct and separate alternatives.”).
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` As demonstrated below, in each of its Grounds, the Petition fails to identify
`
`any difference between the claims and any asserted reference as required by the
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`Grahamframework, and for this reason no Ground establishes a reasonable
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`likelihood of prevailing.
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`B. Ground 1
`For Ground 1, the Petition alleges claims 1 – 9, 13, and 17 - 19 would have
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`been obvious to a POSITA based on Potmesil, in view of PCT Publication No. WO
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`1999/041675 by Cecil V. Hornbacker, III ("Hornbacker"). As explained below,
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`under the Graham framework, the Petition fails to support a conclusion of
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`obviousness because it fails to identify any difference between the claim and these
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`asserted references.
`
`Claim 1
`
`1.
`The treatment of claim 1 typifies the deficient obviousness analysis
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`characteristic of the entire Petition. No difference between claim 1 and either of
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`the asserted references is ever identified, which is unsurprising since the Petition
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`never even quotes the claim in its analysis. Instead, for largely all the elements of
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`claim 1 (labeled but never quoted) the Petition summarizes one aspect of Potmesil
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`purporting to have some relevance to the claim element, then summarizes one
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`14
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`purportedly relevant aspect of Hornbacker, and provides extensive strings of
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`