`____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________________
`
`MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`BRADIUM TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
`Patent Owner
`____________________
`
`CASE IPR2015-01432
`Patent 7,139,794
`____________________
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER BRADIUM TECHNOLOGIES LLC’S
`PRELIMINARY RESPONSE PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. §42.107
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`I.
`THE REQUIREMENTS TO INSTITUTE AN INTER PARTES REVIEW .................... 2
`II.
`III. GROUND 1 IS FATALLY FLAWED BECAUSE THE PETITION DOES NOT
`ESTABLISH THAT EITHER LINDSTROM OR POTMESIL IS PRIOR ART ............. 3
`A.
`Petitioner Has Not Shown that Lindstrom Qualifies as Prior Art. ......................... 4
`B.
`Petitioner Has Not Shown that Potmesil Qualifies as Prior Art. ........................... 9
`IV. THE PETITION FAILS TO ESTABLISH A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF
`PREVAILING ON GROUND 1 ...................................................................................... 12
`A.
`Claim 1 ................................................................................................................. 13
`Element 1.A "a parcel request subsystem, including a parcel
`1.
`request queue, operative to request discrete image data parcels in a
`priority order” .......................................................................................... 13
`Element 1.C "said parcel request subsystem being responsive to an
`image parcel request of assigned priority to place said image parcel
`request in said parcel request queue ordered in correspondence
`with said assigned priority” ..................................................................... 19
`Element 1.D " an parcel rendering subsystem coupled to said
`parcel data store to selectively retrieve and render received image
`data parcels to a display memory” ........................................................... 22
`Element 1.E "said parcel rendering system providing said parcel
`request subsystem with said image parcel request of said assigned
`priority” .................................................................................................... 24
`Elements 1.F, 1.G, And 1.H "wherein said parcel rendering
`subsystem determines said assigned priority based on a determined
`optimal image resolution level [I.F], wherein said display memory
`is coupled to an image display of predetermined resolution [1.G]
`and wherein said determined optimal image resolution level is
`based on said predetermined resolution [1.H]” ........................................ 25
`Element 1.I " wherein said assigned priority further reflects the
`proximity of the image parcel referenced by said image parcel
`request to a predetermined focal point” ................................................... 31
`Conclusion as to Ground 1, Claim 1 ........................................................ 33
`7.
`Claim 2 ................................................................................................................. 33
`Element 2.A " determining, in response to user navigational
`1.
`commands, a viewpoint orientation with respect to an image
`displayed within a three-dimensional space” ........................................... 33
`
`B.
`
`
`
`
`
`-i-
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`
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`5.
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`6.
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
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`Page
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`6.
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`Element 2.B "requesting, in a priority order, image parcels
`renderable as corresponding regions of said image” ............................... 35
`Element 2.D "wherein said priority order is determined to provide
`a progressive regional resolution enhancement of said image as
`each said image parcel is rendered” ......................................................... 37
`Element 2.H "wherein said step of rendering provides for the
`selective rendering of said plurality of image parcels having the
`highest associated resolutions to the corresponding regions of said
`image” ...................................................................................................... 39
`Element 2.I " wherein said step of rendering limits the selective
`rendering of said image parcels to image parcels having associated
`resolutions less than a predetermined level” ............................................ 41
`Element 2.K "wherein said priority order is re-evaluated in
`response to a chance in said viewpoint orientation” ................................ 43
`Conclusion as to Ground 1, Claim 2 ........................................................ 44
`7.
`THE PETITION FAILS TO ESTABLISH A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF
`PREVAILING ON GROUND 2 ...................................................................................... 44
`A.
`Claim 1 ................................................................................................................. 47
`Element 1.A "a parcel request subsystem, including a parcel
`1.
`request queue, operative to request discrete image data parcels in a
`priority order” .......................................................................................... 47
`Element 1.B "to store received image data parcels in a parcel data
`store” ........................................................................................................ 48
`Element 1.C "said parcel request subsystem being responsive to an
`image parcel request of assigned priority to place said image parcel
`request in said parcel request queue ordered in correspondence
`with said assigned priority” ..................................................................... 49
`Element 1.E "said parcel rendering system providing said parcel
`request subsystem with said image parcel request of said assigned
`priority” .................................................................................................... 50
`Elements 1.F, 1.G, And 1.H "wherein said parcel rendering
`subsystem determines said assigned priority based on a determined
`optimal image resolution level [I.F], wherein said display memory
`is coupled to an image display of predetermined resolution [1.G]
`and wherein said determined optimal image resolution level is
`based on said predetermined resolution [1.H]” ........................................ 51
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
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`5.
`
`-ii-
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`
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`V.
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`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
`
`Page
`
`
`
`6.
`
`7.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`4.
`
`Element 1.J " wherein said discrete image data parcels are of a
`first fixed size as received by said parcel request subsystem” ................. 52
`Element 1.K "of a second fixed size as rendered by said parcel
`rendering subsystem” ............................................................................... 53
`Conclusion as to Ground 2, Claim 1 ........................................................ 53
`8.
`VI. THE PETITION FAILS TO ESTABLISH A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF
`PREVAILING ON GROUND 3 ...................................................................................... 53
`A.
`Claim 2 ................................................................................................................. 53
`Element 2.B "requesting, in a priority order, image parcels
`1.
`renderable as corresponding regions of said image” ............................... 54
`Element 2.D "wherein said priority order is determined to provide
`a progressive regional resolution enhancement of said image as
`each said image parcel is rendered” ......................................................... 55
`Elements 2.E and 2.F ............................................................................... 56
`Element 2.H "wherein said step of rendering provides for the
`selective rendering of said plurality of image parcels having the
`highest associated resolutions to the corresponding regions of said
`image” ...................................................................................................... 56
`Element 2.I " wherein said step of rendering limits the selective
`rendering of said image parcels to image parcels having associated
`resolutions less than a predetermined level” ............................................ 57
`Element 2J "wherein said step of rendering selectively renders
`said plurality of image parcels as the unique textures for the
`corresponding regions of said image” ...................................................... 58
`Element 2K "wherein said priority order is re-evaluated in
`response to a change in said viewpoint orientation” ................................ 59
`Conclusion as to Ground 3, Claim 2 ........................................................ 60
`8.
`VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 60
`
`
`5.
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`6.
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`7.
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`
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`
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`-iii-
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`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`2Wire, Inc. v. TQ Delta LLC,
`IPR2015-00239, (P.T.A.B. May 29, 2015) ....................................................................... 5, 9, 19
`
`ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’n, Inc.
`694 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................ 18
`
`Apple Inc. v. DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc.,
`IPR2015-00369 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2015) ................................................................... 6, 7, 9, 10
`
`Apple, Inc. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00445 (P.T.A.B. July 9, 2015) ............................................................................ 34, 38
`
`Cisco Systems, Inc., v. C-Cation Technologies, LLC,
`IPR2014-00454 (P.T.A.B. August 29, 2014 ...................................................................... passim
`
`Dish Network L.L.C. v. Dragon Intellectual Property, LLC,
`IPR2015-00499 (P.T.A.B. July 17, 2015) ........................................................................ 6, 8, 11
`
`Google Inc. v. ART+COM InnovationPool GmbH,
` IPR2015-00788 (P.T.A.B. September 2, 2015) ................................................................. 4, 5, 9
`
`Google, Inc. v. Everymd.com LLC,
`IPR2014-00347 (P.T.A.B. May 22, 2014) .......................................................................... 14, 21
`
`Gracenote, Inc. v. Iceberg Industries LLC,
`IPR2013-00552 (P.T.A.B. March 7, 2014) ........................................................................ passim
`
`Hopkins Manufacturing Corporation v. Cequent Performance Products, Inc.,
` IPR2015-00613 (P.T.A.B. August 7, 2015) ...................................................................... 18, 58
`
`In re Khan,
`441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............................................................................................ 13, 18
`
`In re Lister,
`583 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ........................................................................................ 4, 7, 11
`
`Kinetic Technologies, Inc. v. Skyworks Solutions, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00529 (P.T.A.B. September 23, 2014), ............................................................. passim
`
`KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc.
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ........................................................................................................ 2, 13, 28
`
`
`
`
`
`-iv-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Norman International, Inc. v. Hunter Douglas Inc.,
`IPR2014-01173 (P.T.A.B. February 10, 2015) ......................................................................... 18
`
`Plant Science, Inc. v. The Andersons, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00939 (P.T.A.B. December 14, 2014) ....................................................................... 19
`
`Printing Industries of America v. CTP Innovations, LLC,
`IPR2013-00474 (P.T.A.B. December 31, 2013) ................................................................. 14, 32
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) .......................................................................................................................... 4
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) .......................................................................................................................... 2
`
`35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 311(b) .......................................................................................................... 4
`
`Rules
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) ........................................................................................................ passim
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 .......................................................................................................................... 1
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2) ........................................................................................................... 3, 4, 8
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(1)(i) ............................................................................................. 2, 18, 34, 48
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.62(a).................................................................................................................. 9, 59
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65 .......................................................................................................................... 10
`
`37 C.F.R. §42.6(a)(3) ............................................................................................................. passim
`
`FRE 602 .................................................................................................................................... 6, 10
`
`FRE 702 ........................................................................................................................................ 10
`
`FRE 802(6)...................................................................................................................................... 9
`
`FRE 803(6)(D) ................................................................................................................................ 9
`
`FRE 901(a) ...................................................................................................................................... 9
`
`
`
`
`
`v
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`
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`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`Patent Owner Bradium Technologies LLC (“Patent Owner”) hereby
`
`preliminarily responds under 37 C.F.R. § 42.107 to the Petition challenging U.S.
`
`Patent No. 7,139,794 (the “ ‘794 patent”) filed by Petitioner Microsoft
`
`Corporation (“Petitioner”). Petitioner’s request for inter partes review must be
`
`denied for at least the following reasons:
`
`(a) With respect to Ground 1, the Petition fails to establish that either
`
`Lindstrom (Ex. 1011) or Potmesil (Ex. 1002) qualifies as prior art against the
`
`‘794 patent.
`
`(b) The Petition does not “specify where each element of the claim is
`
`found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.” 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.104(b)(4) because it (i) fails to map each actual term of the claims to a specific
`
`teaching from an asserted reference and (ii) provides citations to the asserted
`
`references that do not in fact teach the claim elements against which such citations
`
`are applied.
`
`(c) The Petition provides merely conclusory statements on how or why a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art (a “POSITA”) would have combined the asserted
`
`references to establish the alleged obviousness of the claims, which are insufficient
`
`to provide the “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support
`
`
`
`
`
`-1-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. 550 U.S.
`
`398, 418 (2007).
`
` (d) The Petition improperly seeks to circumvent the 60 page limit set
`
`under 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(1)(i) by attempting to incorporate by reference
`
`arguments from the Michalson Declaration, in violation of 37 C.F.R. §42.6(a)(3).1
`
`Due to at least these deficiencies, the Petition does not present “a reasonable
`
`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims
`
`challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The particular deficiencies in the
`
`Petition that this Response discusses below are exemplary only, and do not exhaust
`
`all the instances where the Petition fails to meet the requirements for instituting an
`
`inter partes review.
`
`II. THE REQUIREMENTS TO INSTITUTE AN INTER PARTES REVIEW
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) sets forth the threshold requirements for instituting an
`
`inter partes review:
`
`
`
`
`This violation is rampant throughout the Petition. A particularly egregious
`1
`
`example is at p. 11, where, after stating that “Prof. Michalson opines that claims 1
`
`and 2 are obvious over the Yap reference in view of additional prior art,” the
`
`Petition incorporates by reference the arguments in paragraphs ¶¶ 340 – 384 of the
`
`Michalson Declaration (Ex. 1008), spanning a total of twenty-three pages.
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`(a)THRESHOLD.—The Director may not authorize an inter partes
`review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the
`information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any
`response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable
`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1
`of the claims challenged in the petition.
`(Emphasis added). Among various other requirements, the petition “must specify
`
`where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed
`
`publications relied upon” (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)), and it must contain a “full
`
`statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of
`
`the significance of the evidence including material facts, and the governing law,
`
`rules, and precedent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2). Moreover, a petition is subject to
`
`the prohibition that “[a]rguments must not be incorporated by reference from one
`
`document into another document.” 37 C.F.R. §42.6(a)(3).
`
`III. GROUND 1 IS FATALLY FLAWED BECAUSE THE PETITION DOES
`NOT ESTABLISH THAT EITHER LINDSTROM OR POTMESIL IS
`PRIOR ART
`
`
`
`Ground 1 is based, in part, on two references: An Integrated Global GIS and
`
`Visual Simulation System by P. Lindstrom et al., Tech. Rep. GIT-GVU-97-07,
`
`("Lindstrom") (Ex, 1011) and Maps Alive: Viewing Geospatial Information on the
`
`WWW, Michael Potmesil, Computer Networks and ISDN Systems Vol. 29, issues
`
`8-13, pp. 1327-1342 ("Potmesil") (Ex. 1002). Petitioner fails to meet its burden of
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`establishing that the Lindstrom and Potmesil references are printed publications
`
`within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 311(b), and that such references are
`
`prior art to the ’794 Patent. In particular, Petitioner fails to show in the Petition, or
`
`even otherwise, that each reference was “publicly accessible,” prior to the critical
`
`date, i.e., that each reference “has been disseminated or otherwise made available
`
`to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or
`
`art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307,
`
`1311 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding a reference had not been shown to be a printed
`
`publication under this standard).
`
`A. Petitioner Has Not Shown that Lindstrom Qualifies as Prior Art.
`
`The Petition does not contain a “full statement of the reasons” why
`
`Lindstrom is prior art, and Ground I fails on this basis alone. See 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.22(a)(2). The Petition includes only a conclusory assertion that Lindstrom is
`
`prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), Petition at Pages ii and 14. Lindstrom is
`
`undated. While Petitioner has attached declarations from Lindstrom and Carpenter
`
`that purport to address the issue, the conclusory assertion in the Petition makes no
`
`reference to those declarations, and fails to present any “statement of the reasons,”
`
`much less a “full” one, regarding the key issue of whether the Lindstrom reference
`
`is qualifying prior art. In Google Inc. v. ART+COM InnovationPool GmbH,
`
`IPR2015-00788, Paper 7 (P.T.A.B. September 2, 2015), the PTAB held in similar
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`
`circumstances that the declaration should be ignored, and that the petition itself
`
`was insufficient to prove that a reference was prior art.
`
`,In Google, the Petition attempted to establish that the Leclerc reference
`
`qualified as a “printed publication” under § 102(b) merely by asserting, in
`
`conclusory fashion, that “ ‘each of the asserted grounds consists of references that
`
`were patented or published prior to December 17, 1995’” and that “‘all the
`
`references herein qualify as prior art under at least pre-AIA § 102(a) and (b).’” Id.
`
`at 6. The Petition there was accompanied by the Declaration of Dr. Lastra (id. at
`
`10), which included testimony asserting that Leclerc was publicly available prior to
`
`the critical date. The Board held that since “[n]one of this testimony was cited or
`
`discussed in the Petition…we decline to give any weight to it.” Id. See also
`
`2Wire, Inc. v. TQ Delta LLC, IPR2015-00239, Paper 18 at 10 (P.T.A.B. May 29,
`
`2015) (“Consequently, we do not consider information presented in the Declaration
`
`but not discussed sufficiently in the Petition.”).
`
`Similarly here, the Board should decline to give any weight to the Peter
`
`Lindstrom and Charles Carpenter declarations, since neither of them is discussed in
`
`the Microsoft Petition. Indeed, Petitioner’s attempt to address this critical issue
`
`through declarations represents an attempt to circumvent the page limits by
`
`including extra arguments outside the Petition. The Petition does not meet
`
`Petitioner’s burden, and the Board should disregard the Lindstrom reference. See
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(a)(3) & 42.22(a)(2). See also Apple Inc. v. DSS Tech. Mgmt.,
`
`Inc., IPR2015-00369, Paper 14 at 10 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2015) (burden under §
`
`314(a) not satisfied by conclusory assertion as to “publication” of asserted
`
`reference).
`
`Even if the Board considered the Lindstrom and Carpenter Declarations,
`
`they do not establish that the Lindstrom reference was publicly accessible prior to
`
`the critical date of the ’794 Patent. See Dish Network L.L.C. v. Dragon Intellectual
`
`Property, LLC, IPR2015-00499, Paper 7 at 10-11 (P.T.A.B. July 17, 2015)
`
`(reference not shown to be a printed publication without satisfactorily showing
`
`public accessibility). Here, the declarations do not demonstrate that either
`
`declarant has personal knowledge of the public accessibility of the Lindstrom
`
`reference as of 1997. Both declarants assert that they checked a specific FTP site
`
`that was known to them. Ex. 1012 at ¶ 4; Ex. 1013 at ¶ 7. This does not establish
`
`public accessibility.
`
`The declarations also include conclusory statements that Lindstrom was
`
`“available to the public” and “could be located by the general public” “through a
`
`search of the online Georgia Tech catalog” or a web search engine, Ex. 1012 at ¶ 4;
`
`Ex. 1013 at ¶ 7. Tellingly, neither declaration states that the declarant himself used
`
`an internet search engine or used a Georgia Tech catalog to find Lindstrom, or
`
`observed anyone else doing so. Thus, neither declarant has personal knowledge of
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`
`public accessibility. The statements therefore lack foundation and should be
`
`disregarded. FRE 602. See also Apple Inc., IPR2015-00369, Paper 14 at 5-7
`
`(P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2015) (Petitioner failed to show that the library stamp date
`
`indicated that the reference was publicly accessible due to no showing of
`
`declarant’s personal knowledge of how or when the reference was made available
`
`to the public or of declarant’s specialized knowledge of MIT library archiving
`
`procedures).
`
`The standard for “public accessibility” is not whether the publication was
`
`available online to one who knew where to look for it. Instead, “public
`
`accessibility” requires a showing that the reference could be located by interested
`
`persons exercising reasonable diligence. In re Lister, 584 F.3d 1307, 1314-16
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2009). The Carpenter and Lindstrom Declarations’ assertion that
`
`Lindstrom was available through a search of the online Georgia Tech catalog not
`
`only is not based on any statement of personal knowledge, it also fails to show the
`
`nature and extent of the cataloging and indexing had been done prior to the critical
`
`date. In Lister, the Federal Circuit held that indexing in the Copyright Office
`
`catalog was insufficient to support a finding of public accessibility, though
`
`demonstrated accessibility through Westlaw or Dialog would be sufficient. Id. at
`
`1315. Petitioner, which has the burden, does not provide any evidence to show
`
`that any cataloging done at Georgia Tech qualifies as sufficient under Lister. See
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`also Dish Network L.L.C., IPR2015-00499, Paper 7 at 10-11 (P.T.A.B. July 17,
`
`2015) (insufficient evidence as to when and how a thesis was made available to the
`
`public and library’s “specific practices as to indexing and cataloging papers in the
`
`relevant time period”). Petitioner’s failure to provide any evidence as to how
`
`Lindstrom was cataloged or in what manner it could have been located through
`
`search tools prior to the critical date of the ’794 Patent is fatal to its assertion that
`
`Lindstrom is prior art.
`
`The exhibits attached to the Lindstrom and Carpenter declarations also do
`
`not show that Lindstrom is a printed publication. Exhibits B and C to both
`
`declarations (which are identical), and Exhibit D to the Carpenter Declaration are
`
`inadmissible as hearsay. Exhibits B and C are purported e-mails by a Ms. Swobe,
`
`who has not submitted a declaration. Exhs. 1012 at ¶¶ 9-10; 1013 at ¶¶ 16-17.
`
`Her statements, offered for the truth of their contents, are hearsay. In addition, the
`
`declarations assert that Exhibits B and C show that Lindstrom was made available
`
`on an FTP site and web location, (Ex. 1012 at ¶¶ 9-10, Ex. 1013 at ¶¶ 16-17),
`
`without showing indexing or cataloging of the reference. As discussed above, the
`
`failure of evidence regarding the indexing and cataloging renders the evidence
`
`fatally deficient. Exhibit D to the Carpenter Declaration is a purported screenshot
`
`taken from the “Wayback Machine,” a third-party archive regarding which no
`
`authenticating declaration has been provided. It, too, is hearsay. Ex. 1013 at ¶¶
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`
`
`13-14. Likewise, Exhibit D of the Carpenter Declaration purportedly shows a
`
`1998 version of the GVU Technical Reports website, Ex. 1013 at ¶¶ 13-14, but the
`
`declaration does not allege that Lindstrom was cataloged or findable based on this
`
`website. A screenshot purporting to show an FTP directory that contained
`
`Lindstrom (Ex. 1013 at ¶ 11) also does not show indexing or cataloging of either
`
`Lindstrom or that directory.
`
`In conclusion, Petitioner has not shown that Lindstrom was publicly
`
`accessible prior to the critical date.
`
`B. Petitioner Has Not Shown that Potmesil Qualifies as Prior Art.
`Petitioner has also not shown that Potmesil is a printed publication. The
`
`Petition itself is devoid of a "full statement of the reasons" why Potmesil is prior
`
`art. The Petition's only statement on this key issue is in a single, conclusory
`
`sentence on page 13, which is insufficient for the reasons discussed above. 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2); Google Inc., IPR2015-00788, Paper 7 at 10 (P.T.A.B.
`
`September 2, 2015); Apple Inc., IPR2015-00369, Paper 14 at 10 (P.T.A.B. Aug.
`
`12, 2015); Whole Space Industries Ltd., IPR2015-00488, Paper 14 at 8 (P.T.A.B.
`
`July 24, 2015); 2Wire, Inc., IPR2015-00239, Paper 18 at 10 (P.T.A.B. May 29,
`
`2015).
`
`Exhibit 1002 (which is not explained in the Petition) also does not show that
`
`Potmesil is a printed publication because the d’Arnaud Declaration relies on
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`unauthenticated hearsay, and even if this hearsay is considered, the declaration still
`
`contains insufficient facts.
`
`A UCSC library sticker that Ms. d’Arnaud relies upon as purporting to show
`
`a receipt date of November 6, 1997 for Potmesil is unauthenticated hearsay if
`
`relied upon for the truth of this date, and Petitioner has not shown that a hearsay
`
`exception applies. See Apple Inc. v. DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc., IPR2015-00369, Paper
`
`14 at 6-7 (P.T.A.B. Aug 12, 2015) (library stamp was hearsay and Petitioner failed
`
`to establish that hearsay exception applied).
`
`The Petition and Ex. 1002 contain insufficient information to authenticate
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`Potmesil and its purported library sticker. See FRE 901(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.62(a).
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`The cover of Potmesil in Ex. 1002 is incomplete because one of the library stickers
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`on the left-hand side is partially obscured, and because the back cover page is
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`entirely omitted. The Petition refers to Potmesil as “issues 8-13,” while the
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`purported cover page lists the issue as issue 7. (Petition at ii; Ex. 1002 at pp. 4-5.)
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`Petitioner has not shown that any hearsay exception applies to the Potmesil
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`sticker, including the business record hearsay exception FRE 802(6). For one,
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`without a complete and unobscured copy of the cover of Potmesil, Petitioner
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`cannot show that the circumstances surrounding Potmesil meet the trustworthiness
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`requirement of FRE 802(6)(E). Further, Ms. d’Arnaud is not a qualified witness
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`under FRE 803(6)(D) because she does not state that she has personal or expert
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`10
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`knowledge of the library’s procedures as they existed in 1997. See FRE 602, 702.
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`Ms. d’Armaud does not state that she was employed by the library in 1997 and
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`does not state that she investigated the library’s 1997 procedures. Ex. 1002 at 1, ¶¶
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`1-3.
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`Also, the library sticker purports to show only a library receipt date, which is
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`insufficient to establish public accessibility without competent evidence as to (1)
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`when and how Potmesil was made available to the public and (2) the library’s
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`specific practices as to indexing and cataloging papers. Dish Network L.L.C.,
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`IPR2015-00499, Paper 7 at 10-11 (P.T.A.B. July 17, 2015). Ms. d’Arnaud’s naked
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`opinion at Paragraph 6 that “[b]ased on the library’s normal procedures” Potmesil
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`was placed “into circulation” has no foundation in personal knowledge or
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`expertise, and she further does not explain what the library’s applicable
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`“circulation” procedures were in 1997, and thus her unsupported opinion is entitled
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`to no weight. See FRE 602, FRE 702, 37 C.F.R. § 42.65. Therefore, Petitioner has
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`submitted no competent evidence that Potmesil was disseminated or otherwise
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`made available to the extent that an ordinarily skilled artesian exercising
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`reasonable diligence could locate it. See In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2009).
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`11
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`Therefore, since neither Potmesil nor Lindstrom is prior art against the ‘794
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`patent, Ground 1, which is based on both of these references, fails completely on
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`this basis alone.
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`IV. THE PETITION FAILS TO ESTABLISH A REASONABLE
`LIKELIHOOD OF PREVAILING ON GROUND 1
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`Even if Lindstrom and Potmesil were prior art, Ground 1 would still not
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`establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to claims 1 and 2. In
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`Ground 1, the Petition alleges that claims 1 and 2 are unpatentable as obvious over
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`Potmesil, Lindstrom, and PCT Publication No. WO 1999/041675 by Cecil V.
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`Hornbacker, III ("Hornbacker") (Ex. 1003). Petition at p.15. For at least the
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`following reasons, the Petition fails to establish a reasonable likelihood of
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`prevailing on Ground 1.
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`Before addressing the claims, the Petition at pages 15 – 19 provides a
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`summary of its obviousness arguments that includes some inaccurate statements
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`regarding the references upon which the Petition relies; these statements are
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`generally addressed below in Sections IV.A-B.
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`The summary also includes at pp. 17 - 19 a deficient explanation for
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`supporting the combination of Potmesil, Hornbacker, and Lindstrom. Rather than
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`explain the differences between the references and the claims, and provide an
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`articulated reasoning with rational underpinnings why a POSITA would have
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`modified a specific portion of one of the asserted references in light of specific
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`12
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`teachings from the other references, the Petition at p. 18 provides an inadequate,
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`conclusory justification based merely on these references allegedly “address[ing]
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`the common technical issues in visualizing large amounts of data,” and being
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`directed to “substantially similar online system[s].”Such conclusory assertions are
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`inadequate to support an obviousness analysis. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (2007)
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`(Combination of prior art teachings must be based on “some articulated reasoning
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`with some rational underpinning.”) (quoting In re Khan, 441 F.3d 977, 998 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2