throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________________
`
`VALEO NORTH AMERICA, INC., VALEO S.A., VALEO GMBH,
`VALEO SCHALTER UND SENSOREN GMBH,
`AND CONNAUGHT ELECTRONICS LTD.,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`MAGNA ELECTRONICS, INC.,
`
`Patent Owner.
`____________________
`
`Case IPR2015-014101
`Patent 8,643,724 B2
`___________________
`
`
`
`PETITIONER’S REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE
`
`
`1
`Case IPR2015-01414 has been consolidated with this proceeding.
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Table of Authorities .................................................................................................. ii
`
`Page
`
`I.
`
`Phillips Confirms This Board’s Finding of Obviousness. .............................. 1
`
`A.
`
`This Board Has Authorized the Parties to Address the Phillips
`Standard in Their Substantive Papers. .................................................. 1
`
`B.
`
`Application of Phillips .......................................................................... 2
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`“a synthesized image is generated without duplication of
`objects” ........................................................................................ 3
`
`“approximates a view as would be seen by a virtual
`camera at a single location” ........................................................ 7
`
`3.
`
`“reconfigurable display” ........................................................... 10
`
`II. Wang Is Prior Art. .......................................................................................... 11
`
`III. Yamamoto Is Prior Art. ................................................................................. 12
`
`IV. Yamamoto, Mitsubishi, and Lemelson Teach Claims 1, 3-6, 10-12,
`14, 15, 17, 23, 25, 29-32, 41-43, and 46-48. ................................................. 15
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Patent Owner Improperly Focuses on Parallax Issues in a
`Misguided Attempt to Distinguish the Prior Art. ................................ 15
`
`Dr. Etienne-Cummings’ Analysis Demonstrates that Yamamoto
`and Mitsubishi Teach the Claimed Synthesized Image. ..................... 18
`
`V. Yamamoto, Mitsubishi, Lemelson, and Aishin Teach Claims 7-9. .............. 20
`
`VI. Yamamoto, Mitsubishi, Lemelson, and Goesch Teach Claim 45. ................ 21
`
`VII. Patent Owner’s Attacks on Valeo’s Experts Fail to Rebut the Strong
`Evidence of Obviousness. .............................................................................. 23
`
`VIII. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 25
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page
`
`Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc.,
`601 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............................................................................ 14
`
`Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) ............................................................ 14
`
`BAE Sys. Info. & Elec. Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Cheetah Omni, LLC,
`IPR2013-00175, Paper 45 (PTAB Jun. 19, 2014) ................................................ 13
`
`Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co.,
`441 F. 3d 945 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............................................................................... 3
`
`Cisco Sys. Inc. v. AIP Acquisition LLC,
`IPR2014-00247, Paper 39 (PTAB May 20, 2015) ................................................. 2
`
`Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC,
`582 F. App’x 864 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ......................................................................... 3
`
`ICU Med., Inc. v Alaris Med. Sys., Inc.,
`558 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ 14
`
`In re Keller,
`642 F.2d 413 (CCPA 1981) .................................................................................. 22
`
`In re Magna Elecs., Inc.,
`611 F. App’x 969 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ....................................................................... 11
`
`KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) .............................................................................................. 17
`
`Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. ITC,
`545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................ 11
`
`Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
`CBM2013-00009, Paper 10 (PTAB Mar. 28, 2013) ............................................ 13
`
`Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp.,
`514 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .............................................................................. 9
`
`ii
`
`

`
`
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) .................................................... passim
`
`Valeo N. Am., Inc. v. Magna Elecs., Inc.,
`IPR2014-00220, Paper 18 (PTAB May 29, 2014) ...................................... 4, 6, 11
`
`Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang,
`202 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ............................................................................ 16
`
`Regulations
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.24 ..................................................................................................... 13
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) .............................................................................................. 13
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial
`and Appeal Board, 81 Fed. Reg. 18750, 18761 (Apr. 1, 2016) .............................. 2
`
`Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 28764 (Aug. 14, 2012) ............... 13
`
`RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1987) ................ 8
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`
`
`
`In its Institution Decision, this Board explained that, although the ’724
`
`Patent expired May 22, 2016, this Board’s “analysis . . . is not impacted” by
`
`whether the claims are construed using “broadest reasonable interpretation” (BRI)
`
`ordinarily applicable in IPR proceedings or the Phillips standard applicable to
`
`expired patents. (Paper 7 at 11 n.5 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)).) Nevertheless, this Board “encouraged [the parties] to
`
`address the expiration date . . . and the appropriate claim interpretation standard in
`
`their papers.” (Id.) As discussed below, the Phillips standard does not change the
`
`proper construction or obviousness of the challenged claims. Yet, Patent Owner
`
`improperly seeks to use this Board’s invitation as a pretext to entirely redraft the
`
`claims to inject new concepts of parallax that run contrary to the claims and
`
`specification. Then, relying on its flawed constructions, and without presenting
`
`any new evidence, Patent Owner simply repackages and reasserts the same
`
`parallax-based arguments that this Board rejected in its Institution Decision.
`
`I.
`
`Phillips Confirms This Board’s Finding of Obviousness.
`
`A. This Board Has Authorized the Parties to Address the Phillips
`Standard in Their Substantive Papers.
`
`As a threshold matter, Patent Owner misguidedly asserts that Valeo, by
`
`applying the BRI standard in its Petition, “has waived its opportunity” to address
`
`the Phillips standard. (Paper 14 at 13.) This argument entirely ignores this
`
`Board’s express invitation to address the Phillips standard. (Paper 7 at 11 n.5.)
`
`1
`
`

`
`
`
`Further, the Cisco decision, on which Patent Owner relies, undermines any
`
`suggestion of waiver or impropriety. Notably, Cisco involved an IPR petition that
`
`addressed the BRI construction of patent claims that expired after institution and
`
`during the pendency of the IPR. Cisco Sys. Inc. v. AIP Acquisition LLC, IPR2014-
`
`00247, Paper 39 at 7 (PTAB May 20, 2015). Nevertheless, the Board invited the
`
`parties to brief the proper construction of disputed terms under the Phillips
`
`standard and ultimately cancelled the challenged claims. (Id. at 22-23.) Against
`
`this backdrop, Patent Owner provides no sound reason to bar Valeo from
`
`addressing the Phillips standard after institution.2
`
`B. Application of Phillips
`
`Under Phillips, patent claims are “given their ordinary and customary
`
`meaning,” which is “the meaning that [a] term would have to a person of ordinary
`
`skill in the art in question [“PHOSITA”] at the time of the invention.” 415 F.3d at
`
`1312-13. In determining the proper meaning, this Board primarily looks to the
`
`
`2 Consistent with this Board’s approach, the UPSTO recently established a
`
`procedure for addressing Phillips after
`
`institution, explaining: “it
`
`is
`
`too
`
`burdensome to require a petitioner to submit in its petition a construction under
`
`both a broadest reasonable construction and a Phillips-type construction if the
`
`petitioner determines that the challenged patent may expire before the end of the
`
`proceeding.” 81 Fed. Reg. 18750, 18761 (Apr. 1, 2016).
`
`2
`
`

`
`
`
`intrinsic evidence (i.e., the claim language, specification, and prosecution history).
`
`Id. at 1314. Importantly, claims must be interpreted in a way that gives meaning to
`
`each term without rendering any words “superfluous.” Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann
`
`Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950-51 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Claims also “must be read in view of
`
`the specification,” which will often provide “the single best guide to the meaning
`
`of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. Extrinsic evidence (i.e., all
`
`sources outside the public record of the patent) is “less significant than the intrinsic
`
`record” and cannot “contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the
`
`intrinsic evidence.” Id. at 1317, 1324. In some cases, the BRI standard and the
`
`Phillips standard may lead to the same construction. Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus
`
`AV, LLC, 582 F. App’x 864, 868-869 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`
`1.
`
`“a synthesized image is generated without duplication of objects”
`
`Claim Language Valeo’s construction
`
`Patent Owner’s Construction
`
`“a synthesized
`image is generated
`without
`duplication of
`objects”
`
`a synthesized image is
`generated with minimum
`multiple exposure of
`objects appearing in
`overlap zones
`
`(Paper 1 at 11.)
`
`the generated synthesized image
`shows primarily one
`representation (with minimal
`multiple exposure) of each
`object in the captured scene
`despite the claimed locations
`of image capture device
`
`(Paper 14 at 11.)
`
` As identified in boldface above, the parties dispute only the latter portion of
`
`this term, i.e., “without duplication of objects.” In its Petition, Valeo proposed to
`
`construe this portion to mean “there is minimal multiple exposure of objects
`
`3
`
`

`
`
`
`appearing in overlap zones in the synthesized image” (Paper 1 at 11), which
`
`essentially tracks this Board’s construction of a near verbatim term in U.S. Patent
`
`No. 7,859,565. Valeo v. Magna Elecs., Inc., IPR2014-00220, Paper 18 at 11-12
`
`(PTAB May 29, 2014) (construing “without duplication of image information” to
`
`mean “with minimal multiple exposure in the composite image”). For its part,
`
`Patent Owner concedes that Valeo’s proposed construction, “although given under
`
`the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, [is] appropriate under Phillips.”
`
`(Paper 14 at 9.)3 For these reasons alone, this Board should adopt Valeo’s
`
`proposed construction and find the challenged claims obvious.
`
`Without disputing Valeo’s construction, Patent Owner partially repeats
`
`Valeo’s construction but then seeks to rewrite the claim language to require
`
`“primarily one representation (with minimal multiple exposure) of each object in
`
`the captured scene despite the claimed locations of image capture device.” (Id. at
`
`11.) Worse, Patent Owner concedes that its proposed construction reads in
`
`concepts of eliminating parallax where none exist. (Id. at 10-11.) Significantly, as
`
`Patent Owner recognizes, the claims permit some multiple exposure of objects,
`
`which in turn may lead to duplications and misalignments of certain objects in a
`
`synthesized image. Patent Owner, however, improperly seeks to limit the claim
`
`language further so that the synthesized image must show primarily one
`
`
`3 Unless otherwise indicated, any emphasis in quotations has been added.
`
`4
`
`

`
`
`
`representation of each object. If anything, Patent Owner’s proposal injects
`
`ambiguity into the claim language to the extent individuals may disagree as to
`
`whether a given object is shown in primarily one representation. (Ex. 1066,
`
`Wolberg Suppl. at ¶10.)
`
`Nor does Patent Owner find support in the intrinsic record. Recognizing that
`
`the claims themselves say nothing about resolving parallax, Patent Owner simply
`
`points to the recited locations of the image capture devices and overlap zones, and
`
`relies on its expert’s testimony4 to infer that the claimed system must address
`
`difficulties related to parallax. (Id. at 9-11.) But even if the recited configuration
`
`would lead to parallax, it does not mean the claims require parallax to be resolved.
`
`Indeed, this Board rejected Patent Owner’s parallax arguments because the claims
`
`do not require the resolution of parallax. (Paper 7 at 22-23.)
`
`The specification further contradicts Patent Owner’s construction. As
`
`Dr. Wolberg explains, the specification does not at all address or treat issues of
`
`parallax, much less in the context of duplication of objects. (Ex. 1020, Wolberg
`
`¶¶45-46.) Indeed, the only method the specification discloses to reduce multiple
`
`exposure of objects is to adjust the field of view of the center (or rear) image
`
`capture device so as to minimize the overlap between the fields of view of the
`
`
`4 Dr. Etienne-Cummings’ testimony, which is extrinsic evidence and runs contrary
`
`to the intrinsic record, is entitled to little weight. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317, 1324.
`
`5
`
`

`
`
`
`center and side image capture devices. (Ex. 1066, Wolberg Suppl. at ¶12; Ex.
`
`1001 at 7:11-64.) As shown in Figure 4 below, when the field of view of the
`
`center image capture device is reduced, the overlap zones (annotated in red) are
`
`also reduced, which in turn reduces the likelihood of multiple exposure of objects.5
`
`(Id. at Fig. 4 (annotated); see also id. at 7:5-67.)
`
`
`
`
`
`Significantly, the claimed system cannot completely eliminate the overlap
`
`zones, and thus allows for some multiple exposure of objects. (Ex. 1020, Wolberg
`
`¶¶55-56; Ex. 1066, Wolberg Suppl. at ¶¶12-14; Ex. 1001 at 7:11-64.) That is why
`
`the specification discusses “reduc[ing] redundant or duplicative images” and
`
`explains that “in practice” such reduction may only be “accomplished to a
`
`satisfactory extent.” (Ex. 1001 at 7:11-14, 7:60-64); see also Valeo, IPR2014-
`
`00220, Paper 18 at 11-12 (basing construction on similar
`
`language
`
`in
`
`specification).
`
`
`5 A drawback of reducing the overlap regions is that it also increases the blind -
`
`zones of the center camera (annotated in grey). (Ex. 1020, Wolberg ¶45.)
`
`6
`
`

`
`
`
`Patent Owner, however, references these portions of the specification only in
`
`passing and asserts that they do not provide “the whole story.” (Paper 14 at 10.)
`
`Instead, Patent Owner seeks to justify limiting the claims to “primarily one
`
`representation . . . of each object” by pointing to unrelated portions of the
`
`specification that discuss compressing the image from the center image capture
`
`device. (Id. at 10-11.) But Patent Owner fails to explain how image compression
`
`reduces or eliminates object duplication. Rather, the specification discloses
`
`compressing the center image as a means to better align the pixels in the images
`
`captured by the center and side image capture devices. (Ex. 1001 at 14:52-15:44.)
`
`Significantly, image compression addresses only vertical mismatch in the captured
`
`images and not object duplication. (Ex. 1066, Wolberg Suppl. ¶¶15-16.) Thus,
`
`Patent Owner cannot use the term “without duplication of objects” to justify
`
`reading in new limitations regarding vertical mismatch and/or parallax.
`
`2.
`
`“approximates a view as would be seen by a virtual camera
`at a single location”
`
`Claim Language
`
`Valeo’s construction
`
`Patent Owner’s Construction
`
`This term should be given
`its ordinary meaning
`
`“approximates a
`view as would be
`seen from a virtual
`camera at a single
`location”
`
`a view that appears to be from
`a single virtual camera without
`different image sizes and
`disjointed boundary lines
`
`(Paper 14 at 11-13.)
`
`This term should be given its ordinary meaning, namely that the claimed
`
`view must be from a single virtual camera and does not have to be perfect or
`
`7
`
`

`
`
`
`precise such that there may be some deviation from the actual view. (Ex. 1066,
`
`Wolberg Suppl. ¶18.)
`
` The ordinary meaning follows from
`
`the word
`
`“approximate,” which is commonly understood to mean “nearly exact; not
`
`perfectly accurate or correct.” (Ex. 1069, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (2d ed.
`
`1987) at [3].)6
`
`By contrast, Patent Owner disregards the ordinary meaning and concedes
`
`that its construction is designed to introduce concepts of parallax into the claim
`
`language where none exist. (Paper 14 at 28-32.) To do so, Patent Owner entirely
`
`read outs the term “approximate.” Although Patent Owner proposes that the
`
`claimed view should “appear[]” to be from a virtual camera, this cannot substitute
`
`the term “approximate” because by definition any view from a virtual camera can
`
`only appear as such. Patent Owner further renders the term “approximate”
`
`meaningless by reading in new requirements that claimed view should be “without
`
`different size images and disjointed boundary lines.” To justify such wholesale
`
`revision of the claims, Patent Owner simply points to the recited locations of the
`
`image capture devices and relies on its expert’s testimony that the claimed view
`
`“would not include distortions caused by multiple views.” (Id. at 12.) But even if
`
`the recited configuration would result in parallax-inducing distortions, it does not
`
`mean the claim language requires resolution of parallax. (Paper 7 at 22-23
`
`
`6 Citations in brackets refer to the stamped page number on each exhibit.
`
`8
`
`

`
`
`
`(finding claims do not require the resolution of parallax).)
`
`The specification also contradicts Patent Owner’s construction because it
`
`explains that the claimed synthesized image may have some imperfections. As
`
`discussed above, the specification discloses “reducing” multiple exposure of
`
`objects “to a satisfactory extent.” (Ex. 1001 at 7:11-14, 7:60-64.) The disclosed
`
`camera configuration also leaves dead-zones behind the vehicle that are not imaged
`
`by any cameras. (Ex. 1020, Wolberg ¶56.) Overlap areas and dead-zones
`
`inevitably distort the synthesized image as compared to the actual view, which
`
`would not include such visual anomalies. (Id.)
`
`Patent Owner’s construction further excludes embodiments described in the
`
`specification that expressly permit different sized images and disjointed boundary
`
`lines. Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“We
`
`normally do not interpret claim terms in a way that excludes embodiments
`
`disclosed in the specification.”). For example, the specification discloses
`
`embodiments in which vertical compression is implemented only to “a lower
`
`vertical portion of [the] central image portion.” (Ex. 1001 at 15:62-64.)
`
`According to the specification, this is sufficient “[i]n most driving situations”
`
`because “objects imaged by rearward-facing image capture devices above the
`
`horizon are at a long distance from the vehicle” and “compression of the upper
`
`vertical portion . . . may be eliminated without significant reduction in
`
`9
`
`

`
`
`
`performance.” (Id. at 15:64-16:4.) But that implies other situations in which
`
`objects behind the vehicle are not very distant, such as when a large vehicle or tall
`
`building is directly behind the vehicle. (Ex. 1066, Wolberg Suppl. ¶¶20-21.) In
`
`those situations, the disclosed embodiment would not provide any image
`
`processing of the top portion and at least some portions of the synthesized image
`
`would include inevitably disjointed lines and different sized images. (Id. ¶21.)
`
`Therefore, the challenged claims specify a camera system that approximates
`
`a view from a virtual camera; they do not require a system that resolves parallax.
`
`This Board should not import such a requirement into the claims.
`
`3.
`
` “reconfigurable display”
`
`Valeo proposed, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that “reconfigurable
`
`display” means “a display in which a portion of the display upon which the driver
`
`views the synthesized image is used as a high-information content display to
`
`selectively display various types of auxiliary information.” (Paper 1 at 11.) This
`
`construction is appropriate under Phillips and follows from the specification,
`
`which explains that “the remaining portion of the display can be a reconfigurable
`
`high-information content display area to selectively display various types of
`
`information.” (Ex. 1001 at 12:55-58.)
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`
`
`
`II. Wang Is Prior Art.
`
`Ignoring the overwhelming evidence of record, Patent Owner persists in its
`
`argument that Wang is not prior art. (Paper 14 at 17-21.) Both the Federal Circuit
`
`and the Board have determined that Wang is prior art as of 1991, and have
`
`invalidated other patents of Patent Owner based on this reference. In fact, the
`
`Federal Circuit recently affirmed a Board decision finding that Wang invalidated
`
`patent claims having a priority date of February 26, 1993. In re Magna Elecs.,
`
`Inc., 611 F. App’x 969, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Ex. 1045). Similarly, Patent Owner
`
`argued in an earlier IPR that “Valeo fail[ed] to demonstrate . . . that Wang was
`
`publicly accessible more than one year prior to the [May 22, 1995] priority date of
`
`the ’565 patent.’” Valeo, IPR2014-00220, Paper 59 at 7. But the Board rejected
`
`that argument and invalidated numerous claims based on Wang. Id.
`
`Valeo also has submitted substantial evidence showing that Wang was
`
`“disseminated or otherwise made available” before the priority date of the ’724
`
`Patent such that “persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or
`
`art exercising reasonable diligence, c[ould] locate it.” Kyocera Wireless Corp. v.
`
`ITC, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For example, Valeo has submitted
`
`testimony from the earlier IPR2014-00220 proceeding, in which Gerard Grenier, a
`
`Senior Director at IEEE, confirmed that Wang “was published and presented as
`
`part of Euro SIC’91 which occurred May 27-31, 1991.” (Ex. 1055, Grenier at [1],
`
`11
`
`

`
`
`
`¶9; see also Ex. 1054, Grenier Tr. at 39:13-40:18.)
`
`Dr. Wolberg likewise confirms that Wang was publically accessible before
`
`the priority date of the ’724 Patent, and Patent Owner’s attempt to discount his
`
`testimony is meritless. Among other things, Dr. Wolberg identifies other articles,
`
`including those by different authors (e.g., Ex. 1040), that were published before the
`
`’724 Patent’s priority date and that in turn reference Wang—demonstrating that
`
`Wang was not just publicly accessible but, in fact, accessed by persons of ordinary
`
`skill. (Ex. 1020, Wolberg ¶84.) Based on his experience as an expert who attends
`
`IEEE conferences and reviews its publications, Dr. Wolberg further explains that
`
`he understands Wang was published around 1991. (Id.)
`
`Lest there be any doubt, Valeo has obtained and submitted copies of Wang
`
`that were distributed to libraries in the 1991-1992 timeframe. For example, the
`
`Linda Hall Library received a copy of Wang in 1991. (Ex. 1046 at [1].) The
`
`Library of Congress also has certified that Exhibit 1060 is a “true representation”
`
`of Wang from its collection and that it is “marked with a Library of Congress
`
`stamp that bears the date June 5, 1992.” (Ex. 1060 at [1, 3].) Thus, Wang was
`
`publically accessible long before the priority date of the ’724 Patent.
`
`III. Yamamoto Is Prior Art.
`
`Similarly, Patent Owner’s argument that Yamamoto is not prior art falls flat.
`
`As a threshold matter, Patent Owner provides zero analysis in the body of its
`
`12
`
`

`
`
`
`Response that the ’935 Patent represents an earlier reduction to practice of the
`
`challenged claims and instead improperly incorporates by reference 43 pages from
`
`a separate claim chart (“RTP Chart”) and 45 paragraphs (9 pages) of declaration
`
`testimony from its expert that parrots the RTP Chart. (Paper 14 at 17 (generally
`
`citing Ex. 2001, RTP Chart; Ex. 2004, Etienne-Cummings ¶¶54-99).) Thus, this
`
`Board should not consider Patent Owner’s improperly incorporated RTP chart and
`
`declaration testimony, which bring the Response to 106 pages and violates 37
`
`C.F.R. §§ 42.6(a)(3) and 42.24. See BAE Sys. Info. & Elec. Sys. Integration, Inc. v.
`
`Cheetah Omni, LLC, IPR2013-00175, Paper 45 at 23 (PTAB Jun. 19, 2014); Office
`
`Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 28764 (Aug. 14, 2012) (explaining claim
`
`charts count toward applicable page limit).
`
`Even if considered, the improper evidence does not come close meeting
`
`Patent Owner’s burden of proving that the challenged claims are entitled to the
`
`’935 Patent’s filing date. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
`
`CBM2013-00009, Paper 10 at 18 (PTAB Mar. 28, 2013). In particular, Patent
`
`Owner must demonstrate that the application from which the ’935 Patent issued
`
`provides sufficient written description and enablement support for the challenged
`
`claims.7 Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1334-1335 (Fed.
`
`
`7 Curiously, Patent Owner’s RTP Chart purports to compare the challenged claims
`
`to the ’935 patent, not the application from which it issued.
`
`13
`
`

`
`
`
`Cir. 2010). To provide sufficient written description, the earlier application must
`
`“reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of
`
`the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly &
`
`Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). This standard “requires an
`
`objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a
`
`[PHOSITA].” Id.
`
`Here, the ’935 Patent does not provide any written description to suggest to
`
`a PHOSITA that the applicants had possession of a vehicle vision system with a
`
`“reconfigurable display,” as required by the ’724 Patent claims. In fact, the word
`
`“reconfigurable” does not appear anywhere in the ’935 Patent. Importantly, a
`
`reconfigurable display requires functionality for selectively displaying information.
`
`(See Section I.B.3.) Although the ’935 Patent suggests that various types of
`
`information may be displayed by the disclosed system, it never describes any
`
`information that can be selectively displayed.
`
`Moreover, even though modifying a display to make it reconfigurable would
`
`have been obvious to a PHOSITA, obviousness alone cannot satisfy the written
`
`description. ICU Med., Inc. v Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2009). Indeed, Patent Owner apparently believed that a reconfigurable display
`
`was sufficiently different from what is disclosed in the ’935 Patent family because
`
`Patent Owner chose to file a separate family of patents directed to systems with
`
`14
`
`

`
`
`
`reconfigurable displays and the ’724 Patent issued from this separate family.
`
`Patent Owner cannot now erase the requirement of a reconfigurable display from
`
`the ’724 Patent claims to support its assertion of priority. Therefore, none of the
`
`challenged claims are entitled to a priority date of May 22, 1995.
`
`IV. Yamamoto, Mitsubishi, and Lemelson Teach Claims 1, 3-6, 10-12, 14,
`15, 17, 23, 25, 29-32, 41-43, and 46-48.
`
`A.
`
`Patent Owner Improperly Focuses on Parallax Issues in a
`Misguided Attempt to Distinguish the Prior Art.
`
`Based on its flawed claim constructions, which deliberately incorporate new
`
`concepts of parallax, Patent Owner incorrectly argues that the combination
`
`Yamamoto and Mitsubishi does not teach the challenged claims because it would
`
`“have exhibited the effects of unresolved parallax, even with Mitsubishi’s
`
`processing.” (Paper 14 at 22.) But as explained in Section I, the ’724 Patent itself
`
`does not teach methods of resolving parallax, and the challenged claims do not
`
`require resolution of parallax. (See Paper 7 at 22-23.) Rather, the challenged
`
`claims simply require that the synthesized image “approximate[]” a particular view
`
`from a virtual camera. (Id. at 23.) As this Board aptly explained:
`
`Even if the resulting image would suffer from parallax, we do not see
`
`how
`
`that contradicts Petitioner’s asserted reason for why a
`
`[PHOSITA] would have modified Yamamoto’s system, or why
`
`parallax concerns would have outweighed the advantage of improved
`
`image processing, such that a skilled artisan would have abandoned
`
`the three camera arrangement of Yamamoto. See Winner Int’l Royalty
`
`15
`
`

`
`
`
`Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) . . . . We
`
`also note that the claims do not require that the problem of parallax be
`
`solved entirely for the synthesized image.
`
`(Id. at 22.) Patent Owner offers no new evidence or analysis to suggest otherwise.
`
`Notably, Patent Owner fails to explain how the proposed combination is any
`
`different than the system disclosed in the ’724 Patent or how any alleged
`
`differences would have led a PHOSITA to abandon Yamamoto’s camera
`
`arrangement. For example, Yamamoto teaches a system with three rear-facing
`
`cameras and explains that “images captured by the three cameras are trimmed by
`
`the television monitor (4) to compose a single image to display.” (Ex. 1003,
`
`Yamamoto at [6].) In other words, the Yamamoto system trims or crops the
`
`captured images to reduce duplication in areas where the fields of view overlap and
`
`generates a synthesized image. (Ex. 1020, Wolberg ¶¶106-07.) This is precisely
`
`what the ’724 Patent proposes to reduce duplication. (Id.) In particular, the ’724
`
`Patent reduces the field of view of the center camera as a means for reducing the
`
`overlap zones and explains that the “[f]ield of view may be adjusted by utilizing a
`
`selective presentation of pixels [i.e., trimming] of the captured image in the
`
`displayed image.” (Ex. 1001 at 7:41-43.)
`
`A PHOSITA also would have sought to improve the Yamamoto system by
`
`looking to Mitsubishi, which teaches a more sophisticated image processing
`
`technique that extract patterns from each captured image and matches these
`
`16
`
`

`
`
`
`patterns to remove overlapping regions and properly align the images. (Ex. 1020,
`
`Wolberg ¶¶101,110; Ex. 1005, Mitsubishi at [6-7].) Despite criticizing Mitsubishi
`
`for purportedly “not disclos[ing] how to properly scale and align the images” to
`
`overcome parallax, Patent Owner fails to explain how this alleged deficiency
`
`would have tipped the scales and led a PHOSITA to abandon three-camera
`
`arrangement of Yamamoto. (Paper 14 at 27.)
`
`Even assuming that the claims require such scaling, Patent Owner narrowly
`
`reads Mitsubishi and unduly minimizes the knowledge and capability of a
`
`PHOSITA. See KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“A
`
`person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”).
`
`Significantly, Mitsubishi broadly teaches an “image synthesis process” that uses
`
`image registration techniques to synthesize a single image from multiple cameras
`
`and explains that “[t]he arrangement of the cameras may be altered depending on
`
`the type of vehicle and the location of the driver’s seat.” (Ex. 1005, Mitsubishi at
`
`[5]; see also Ex. 1066, Wolberg Suppl. ¶¶33-34, 37.) Thus, in Yamamoto’s three-
`
`camera arrangement, a PHOSITA would have found it obvious to scale images
`
`“depending on the relative camera distances from the rear of the vehicle, in order
`
`to maintain the same scale factors among images.” (Ex. 1020, Wolberg ¶102.)
`
`Indeed, as Dr. Wolberg explains, image scaling was a well-known technique used
`
`in image registration and a standard part of the toolkit available to a PHOSITA.
`
`17
`
`

`
`
`
`(Ex. 1066, Wolberg Suppl. ¶¶35-37; see also Ex. 1026 at 10; Ex. 1029 at 9-10; Ex.
`
`1068 at 11-12.) Thus, a PHOSITA would have found it obv

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