Case 1:13-cv-00932-AJT-IDD Document 107 Filed 02/25/14 Page 1 of 15 Page|D# 2510
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`Alexandria Division
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`STRAIGHT PATH IP GROUP, INC.,
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`v.
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`Plaintiff,
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`BANDWIDTH.COM, INC., et aI.,
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`Defendants.
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`§\/Q/\/%%%\J
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`Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-932 (AJT/IDD)
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER CONSTRUING CLAIMS
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`On January 16, 2014, the Court held a claim construction hearing with respect to certain
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`claim language of U.S. Patent Numbers 6,513,066 (“the ’066 patent”) and 6,701,365 (“the ’365
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`patent”). Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs setting forth their proposed constructions and
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`their presentations at the claim construction hearing, the Court rules as follows with respect to
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`the disputed terms of the ‘006 and ‘365 patents.
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`On January 28, 2003, the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) issued the ’O66 patent,
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`entitled “Establishing a Point-to-Point Internet Communication.” On March 2, 2004, the PTO
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`issued the ’365 patent, entitled “Point-to-Point Internet Protocol.” The patented invention
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`purports to provide a solution to a problem associated with intemet communication between
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`devices, specifically, that such communication generally requires knowledge of the devices’
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`respective “addresses,” typically intemet protocol (“IP”) addresses, but those addresses may not
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`be fixed. See ’066 patent at 1:32-2:3; ’365 patent at 1:28-63. During prosecution of the ’365
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`patent, the patentee compared this problem to that of “trying to call someone whose telephone
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`number changes afier each call.” Straight Path IP Group’s Markman Brief, Ex. 7 at 4.
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`The invention comprises two alternative protocols for establishing point-to—point
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`communications. The first uses a “connection server” to provide one “processing unit” with the
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`Verizon Exhibit 1012
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`IP address of a second processing unit, while the second exchanges the IP addresses via email,
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`without the use of a connection server. See ’066 patent at 227-37; ’365 patent at 1:66-2:28. This
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`case exclusively involves the first protocol that utilizes a “connection server,” one of the primary
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`terms to be construed.
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`As disclosed in claim 1 of the ‘O66 patent, the first protocol consists of: 1) “storing in a
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`database a respective Internet Protocol (IP) address of a set of processing units that have an on-
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`line status with respect to the Internet”; 2) transmitting a query from the first processing unit to a
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`connection server to determine the on-line status of a second processing unit”; and 3) “retrieving
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`the IP address of the second unit from the database using the connection server, in response to
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`the determination of a positive on—line status of the second processing unit, for establishing a
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`point-to-point communication link between the first and second processing units through the
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`Internet.” The ’365 patent has an identical specification but its claims cover a “computer
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`program product,” “computer data signal” and “computer system” for performing steps similar to
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`those set out in the ’066 patent.‘
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`At this stage in the proceedings, the construction of four terms remains in dispute:2
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`' The ‘365 patent also uses somewhat different terminology than the ‘O66 patent. Relevant for
`this case is that the ’365 patent uses the term “process” instead of “processing unit” and the term
`“network protocol address” instead of “IP address.” Defendants represented at the Markman
`hearing that an IP address is a type of network protocol address.
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`2 The parties initially disputed the meaning of ten terms found in claims 1 through 3 and 6
`through 8 of the ’066 patent and claims 1 and 3 of the ’365 patent. However, only Defendant
`Bandwidth.com, Inc., which has been dismissed from the case, disputed the meaning of two of
`the terms, “using the connection server” and “database.” Thus, those terms no longer need to be
`construed. At the Markman hearing, the remaining defendants conceded that four other terms,
`“Intemet,” “point-to-point Internet communication,” “point-to-point communications over the
`Internet,” and “point-to-point communication link between the first and second processing units
`through the Internet,” do not need to be construed.
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`2
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`(a) “processing unit,”
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`(b) “process,”
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`(c) "point-to-point”/“point—to-point communication,”3 and
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`(c) “connection server.”
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`II. STANDARD
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`The construction or interpretation of a claim is a question of law. Markman v. Westview
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`Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), ajfd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The words of
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`the claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,” that is, the meaning they
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`would have “to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.”
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
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`“Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in
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`the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the
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`entire patent, including the specification.” Id. at 1313. Thus, in interpreting claim tenns, “the
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`court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i. e. , the patent itself, including the
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`claims, the specification, and, if in evidence, the prosecution history.” Vitronics Corp. v.
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`Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). However, the court may also consider
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`extrinsic evidence, including, for example, treatises, dictionaries, and expert testimony. Phillips,
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`415 F.3d at 1317-18.
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`“If the claim language is clear on its face, then [the Court’s] consideration of the rest of
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`the intrinsic evidence is restricted to determining if a deviation from the clear language of the
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`3 The term “point-to-point,” as used in the ’O66 and ’365 patents, was construed in an earlier case
`filed in the Norfolk Division of this District. See Innovative Commc ’ns Tech., Inc. ("ICTI” v.
`Vivox, Inc., Nos. 2:12-cv-7 & 2:12-cv-9, 2012 WL 5331573 (E.D. Va. Oct. 26, 2012). That case
`settled before a final adjudication on the merits.
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`3
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`claims is specified.” Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331
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`(Fed. Cir. 2001). “If, however, the claim language is not clear on its face, then [the Court’s]
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`consideration of the rest of the intrinsic evidence is directed to resolving, if possible, the lack of
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`clarity.” Id “In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person
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`of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such
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`cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly
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`understood words.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
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`A claim term should be interpreted more narrowly than its ordinary and customary
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`meaning under only two circumstances: “ 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his
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`own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the
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`specification or during prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm ’I Am. LLC, 669 F.3d
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`1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must clearly set forth a
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`definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning. It is not enough
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`for a patentee to simply disclose a single embodiment or use a word in the same manner in all
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`embodiments, the patentee must clearly express an intent to redefine the term.” Id. (internal
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`citation and quotation marks omitted). “The standard for disavowal of claim scope is similarly
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`exacting.” Id. at 1366. “The patentee may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and
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`accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest
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`exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.” Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa
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`N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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`Title 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1] 2 requires that every patent's specification “conclude with one or
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`more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
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`inventor .
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`.
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`. regards as the invention.” A claim that fails to satisfy this particularity requirement
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`is invalid for indefiniteness. “The primary purpose of the definiteness requirement is to ensure
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`that the claims are written in such a way that they give notice to the public of the extent of the
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`legal protection afforded by the patent, so that interested members of the public, e. g., competitors
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`of the patent owner, can determine whether or not they infringe.” All Dental Prodx, LLC v.
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`Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779-80 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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`“In the face of an allegation of indefiniteness, general principles of claim construction
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`apply.” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “Only
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`claims not amenable to construction or insolubly ambiguous are indefinite.” Source Search
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`Tech., LLC v. LendingTree, LLC, 588 F.3d 1063, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
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`omitted). Patents are presumed valid, and an alleged infringer asserting that a claim term is
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`indefinite must prove “by clear and convincing evidence that a skilled artisan could not discern
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`the boundaries of the claim based on the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution
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`history, as well as her knowledge of the relevant art area.” Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-
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`I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249-50 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`III. CLAIMS
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`A. “processing unit”
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`The term “processing unit” is found in claims 1 through 3 and 6 through 8 of the ’066
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`patent. Straight Path contends that no construction is necessary as the term has a plain and
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`ordinary meaning. The defendants contend that the term should be construed to mean “a user
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`device.”
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`The defendants do not seem to dispute that the term “processing unit” has an ordinary
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`and customary meaning that is readily apparent even to a layperson. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1314. They nonetheless contend that the term must be construed, although it is unclear to the
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`Court how their proposed construction differs from that ordinary and customary meaning. To
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`the extent the defendants’ proposed construction would limit the scope of the term “processing
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`unit,” that limitation is unsupported. While the specification frequently employs the term “user”
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`in connection with the term “processing unit,”4 the patentee did not clearly disavow the ordinary
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`and customary meaning of the term.5 See Teleflex, Inc. , 299 F.3d at 1325. The Court will
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`therefore construe the term “processing unit” according to its ordinary and customary meaning,
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`without further restrictions.
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`B. “process”
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`The term “process” is found in claims 1 and 3 of the ’365 patent. Straight Path would
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`construe the term as “a running instance of a computer program or application.” The defendants
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`propose as the appropriate construction “an addressable program running on a user device.”6
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`The term “process” does not appear in the specification. However, in their respective
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`claims, the ’365 patent uses the term “process” in essentially the same manner in which the ’O66
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`patent uses the term “processing unit.” Compare, e.g., ’O66 patent claim 1, with ’365 patent
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`4 See, e.g., ’O66 patent at 5:67-6:4 (“The first user operating the first processing unit 12 is thus
`established in the database 34 as an active on-line party available for communication using the
`disclosed point-to-point Internet protocol”).
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`5 In their briefs and at the Markman hearing, the defendants argued that construction is necessary
`because the ’O66 patent requires that the processing units be “positioned at either ends of point-
`to-point communications.” Defendants Bandwidth.com, Inc.’s and Vocalocity, Inc.’s Joint
`Opening Claim Construction Brief at 23. But the defendants have failed to explain how the
`specification or prosecution history supports this proposed limitation in any way that is not
`already apparent from the claims themselves, or how the term “user” connotes “endpoint.”
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`° Defendants originally seemed to argue that the term “process” is indefinite, and to propose the
`above construction only as an alternative in the event the Court decided to construe the term. At
`the Markman hearing, however, the defendants clarified that their position is not that the term
`carmot be construed, but that Straight Path’s construction of “process” renders the term
`indefinite.
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`claim 3. Further, the parties seem to agree that a “process” is the running of a program on a
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`processing unit, essentially the plaintiff’ s proposed construction, and the Court finds that that
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`construction reflects the ordinary and customary meaning of the tenn, when read in light of the
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`claims. See ’365 patent claim 1 (claiming a “computer program product” for performing the
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`relevant steps); id. claim 3 (claiming, in a “computer system,” a method for performing the
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`relevant steps). The issue, then, is whether that ordinary and customary meaning should be
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`restricted as defendants propose.
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`As discussed above, the Court rejects the defendants’ attempt to construe “processing
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`unit” as “a user device,” and for the same reasons the Court rejects their attempt to insert the
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`tenn “user” into the definition of “process.” The remaining question, then, is whether, as the
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`defendants contend, “process” must be limited to an “addressable program.” The defendants
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`explain that, based on the claims, a process “needs to be addressable by a network protocol
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`address.” Defendants Bandwidth.com, Inc.’s and Vocalocity, Inc.’s Joint Opening Claim
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`Construction Brief at 13. Based on this explanation, however, the limitation would seem to be
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`redundant with the claims themselves. Moreover, to the extent the limitation would narrow the
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`term, the defendants have not pointed to any clear disclaimer of the full scope of the claim
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`language. Finally, the Court rejects the defendants’ argument that Straight Path’s construction,
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`which simply reflects the ordinary and customary meaning of the term, is “insolubly
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`ambiguous.” See Source Search Tech., LLC, 588 F.3d at 1076.7
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`Accordingly, the Court will construe the tenn “process,” as used in claims 1 and 3 of the
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`‘365 patent, as “a running instance of a computer program or application.”
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`7 Further, even if the term were ambiguous, the Court fails to see how Defendants’ proposed
`limitations would remedy any ambiguity.
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`C. “point-to-point” and “point-to-point communication“
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`The term “point-to-point .
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`.
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`. communication” is found in claims 1 through 3 and 6
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`through 8 of the ’066 patent and claims 1 and 3 of the ’365 patent. Straight Path proposes the
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`construction of “point-to-point” adopted in ICTI, viz., “communications between two processes
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`over a computer network that are not intermediated by a connection server.” See ICTI, 2012 WL
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`5331573, at * 10. The defendants propose the construction “communication between two user
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`processes, established by one of the processes using the network protocol address of the other
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`process, that is not intermediated by a connection server.”9 Thus, the parties agree that “point-to-
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`point communication” should be construed as communication between two “processes” that is
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`not intermediated by a “connection server,” a construction the Court finds consistent with the
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`claims and the specification. See generally ICTI, 2012 WL 5331573, at *7-*8. The issue, then,
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`is whether the term should be further limited, as defendants propose, by inserting the word
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`“user” before “processes” and indicating that communication is “established by one of the
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`processes using the network protocol address of the other process.” Embedded in this issue is
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`whether the Court should defer to, and on that basis adopt, the Court’s construction in ICTI.
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`Straight Path contends that, unless the defendants can show that the Court’s construction
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`in ICTI is incorrect as a matter of law, this Court is bound to follow that claim construction,
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`8 In the patents, the term “point-to-point” always appears in connection with the term
`“communication,” sometimes with the term “Internet” in between. The Court will therefore refer
`to the terms “point-to-point” and “point to point communication” collectively as “point-to-point .
`.
`. communication” or “point-to-point communication.”
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`9 Defendant Vocalocity originally proposed this construction, while Telesphere proposed an
`identical construction except that it used the term “clien ” instead of the term “user.” See
`Defendant Telesphere Networks Ltd.’s Opening Claim Construction Brief at 4. Telesphere
`subsequently indicated that it supports Vocalocity’s proposed construction. See Joint Claim
`Construction Statement Ex. A. The Court’s analysis would apply equally to Telesphere’s
`original proposed construction.
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`which, according to Straight Path, effectively rejected Defendants’ proposed limitations here.”
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`See Straight Path IP Group’s Markman Brief at 9 (citing DE Tech., Inc. v. ISHOPUSA, Inc., 826
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`F. Supp. 2d 937, 941 (W.D. Va. 2011) (“[A]bsent a showing by DE that the court's original
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`construction of a disputed term was incorrect as a matter of law, the court will apply its prior
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`Markman rulings in the instant action.”)). But in DE Technologies, on which Defendants rely,
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`the defendants sought to preclude the plaintifffrom relitigating terms the court had construed in a
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`previous suit the plaintiff initiated. Here, by contrast, Straight Path attempts to give preclusive
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`effect to terms construed in its favor in a case in which none of the defendants participated.
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`Thus, the Court finds it appropriate to independently assess the parties’ claim construction
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`arguments. ' I
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`'0 The defendants in ICTI did not propose to limit the construction of the term “point-to-point” in
`the same way Defendants propose here, but the ICTI court did entertain similar arguments when
`construing the terms “establishing a point-to-point communication” and “to allow the
`establishment of a packet-based point-to-point communication.” The ICTI defendants proposed
`the construction “using the network protocol address retrieved by the server from its database to
`create a direct communication, initiated solely by one of the processes, and not intermediated by
`a connection server, gateway, or similar device.” See ICTI, 2012 WL 5331573, at * 10. The
`court rejected that proposed construction, ruling that, “[h]aving already construed the term
`‘point-to-point,’ .
`.
`. the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms “establishing a
`point-to-point communication” and “to allow the establishment of a packet-based point-to-point
`communication,” as understood by a person of skill in the art when read in the context of the
`entire patent, is readily apparent even to a layperson.” Id. at *9.
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`" In any event, this Court’s construction of the term “point-to-point communication,” which is
`set forth below, is essentially consistent with that in ICTI, differing only in that it adds
`clarification on a point that is disputed between the parties in this case. See generally 02 Micro
`Int ’I Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A
`determination that a claim term ‘needs no construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’
`may be inadequate when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance on a
`term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.”).
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`Consistent with their other proposed constructions, Defendants first contend that, based
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`on the specification and prosecution history, the processes between which communication takes
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`place must be “user processes.” The Court rejects this argument for the reasons discussed above.
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`The defendants also contend that “point-to-point” communication must be “established
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`by one of the processes using the network protocol address of the other process.” Straight Path
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`opposes such a construction on several grounds. First, Straight Path contends that, while a
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`network protocol address is used in some embodiments of the invention to establish “point-to-
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`point communication,” the construction of that term should not be so limited because the
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`patentee did not act as its own lexicographer with respect to the term or clearly disavow its
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`scope. The Court carmot conclude, however, that “point-to-point communication” has a plain
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`and ordinary meaning that is apparent on the face of the claims. The Court must therefore
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`consider the claims in the context of the specification to determine how the patents use the term.
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`See Interactive Gift Express, Inc., 256 F.3d at 1331 (“If the claim language is clear on its face,
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`then [the Court’s] consideration of the rest of the intrinsic evidence is restricted to determining if
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`a deviation from the clear language of the claims is specified .
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`.
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`.
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`. If, however, the claim
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`language is not clear on its face, then [the Court’s] consideration of the rest of the intrinsic
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`evidence is directed to resolving, if possible, the lack of clarity.”).
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`The “Background of the Invention” section of the specification explains that,
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`“[g]enerally, devices interfacing to the Internet and other online services may communicate with
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`each other upon establishing respective device addresses,” and notes that “[p]ermanent IP
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`addresses of users and devices accessing the Internet readily support point-to-point
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`communications of voice and video signals over the Internet.” ’066 patent at 1:32-35, 61-63. By
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`contrast, “[d]ue to the dynamic nature of temporary IP addresses of some devices accessing the
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`Internet, point-to-point communications in realtime of voice and video have been generally
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`difficult to attain.” Id. at 1:67-2:3. Thus, the problem the patents seek to remedy is that of
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`establishing the device address of another user or device when that address is not fixed. The
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`“Summary of the Invention” section of the specification then goes on to explain that the “first
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`point-to-point Internet protocol” includes the steps of:
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`(a) storing in a database a respective IP address of a set of processing units that have an
`on-line status with respect to the Internet;
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`(b) transmitting a query from a first processing unit to a connection server to determine
`the on-line status of a second processing unit; and
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`(c) retrieving the IP address of the second unit from the database using the connection
`server, in response to the determination of a positive on-line status of the second
`processing unit, for establishing a point-to-point communication link between the first
`and second processing units through the Internet.
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`’066 patent at 2:6-25. The crux of the invention, then, is furnishing the IP address of one
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`processing unit to another processing unit to allow the processing units to communicate directly
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`with one another. Based on the specification, a person of ordinary skill in the art would therefore
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`understand “point-to-point communication” to be communication established by one processing
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`unit using the IP address of another processing unit.
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`Straight Path contends, however, that requiring the use of a network protocol or IP
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`address to establish point-to-point communication is inconsistent with certain of the patent
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`claims, referencing in particular claim 6 of the ’066 patent. Claim 6 applies to “[a] system for
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`point-to-point communications over the Internet comprising”:
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`a database for storing a set of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of at least one processing
`unit that has on-line status with respect to the Internet;
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`a first processing unit including:
`a first program for performing a first point-to-point Internet protocol; and
`a first processor for executing the first program and for transmitting a query;
`ll
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`a connection sewer, responsive to the query, for determining the on-line status of a
`second processing unit by searching the database, and for transmitting an online message
`to the first processing unit for establishing a point-to-point communication link between
`the first and second processing units through the Internet.
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`Because this claim does not explicitly indicate that one processing unit uses the IP address of the
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`other to establish communication, but rather refers to an online message sent to the first
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`processing unit by the connection server after determining the online status of a second
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`processing unit, Straight Path argues that “this claim recites how point-to-point communication
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`is established—an ‘online message’ is transmitted for establishing ‘point-to-point’
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`communication.” Straight Path IP Group’s Rebuttal to Defendants’ Opening Markman Briefs at
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`10. However, when claim 6 is read in the context of the specification and its dependent claims,
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`claims 7 and 8, it is clear that communication is actually established with the use of an IP
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`address. In that regard, Claim 7 applies to:
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`The system of claim 6 wherein the connection server, responsive to a positive
`determination of the online status of the second processing unit, retrieves the respective
`IP address of the second processing unit from the database and transmits the on-line
`message, including the IP address, to the first processing unit; and wherein the first
`processing unit establishes the point-to-point communication link between the first and
`second processing units through the Internet in response to receiving the IP address of the
`second processing unit from the connection server.
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`And Claim 8 applies to:
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`The system of claim 6 wherein the connection server, responsive to a negative
`determination of the on-line status of the second processing unit, generates an off-line
`message, and transmits the off-line message to the first processing unit.
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`The most logical reading of these claims is that claim 6 applies to the initial steps of detennining
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`the online status of the second processing unit and transmitting to the first processing unit a
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`message regarding that status, while claims 7 and 8 deal more specifically with the outcomes that
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`result depending on whether the second processing unit is online. If the second processing unit
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`is online, the connection server transmits the IP address of the second processing unit to the first
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`processing unit in order to facilitate point-to-point communication.”
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`For these reasons, the Court rejects the defendants’ construction insofar as it inserts
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`“user” before “processes,” but concludes that the construction of the term “point-to-point
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`communication” requires that such communication be “established by one of the processes using
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`the network protocol address of the other process.” The Court further concludes that the terms
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`“processing units” and “IP address,” which are used in the ’066 patent, should also be
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`referenced, together with “processes” and “network protocol address.” The Court will therefore
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`construe the term “point-to-point communication” as “communication between two processing
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`units or processes, established by one of the processing units or processes using the IP or
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`network protocol address of the other processing unit or process, that is not intermediated by a
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`connection server.”
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`D. “connection server”
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`The term “connection server” is found in claims 1 through 3 and 6 through 8 of the ’066
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`patent and claim 3 of the ’365 patent. Straight Path contends that no construction is necessary as
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`‘’ Straight Path also argues that the defendants’ proposed construction is inconsistent with claim
`1 of the ’365 patent, which recites a
`program code configured to receive queries for one of the network protocol address and
`the associated identifier of said one of the processes from other processes over the
`computer network at the server, and to allow the establishment of a packet-based point-
`to-point communication between said one of the processes and one of said other
`processes.
`
`The claim covers one process requesting the network protocol address of another process in
`order to establish point-to-point communication. This embodiment is entirely consistent with
`that portion of the defendants’ proposed construction indicating that communication is
`“established by one of the processes using the network protocol address of the other process.”
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`Case 1:13-cv-00932-AJT-IDD Document 107 Filed 02/25/14 Page 14 of 15 Page|D# 2523
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`the term has a plain and ordinary meaning, while the defendants would construe the term as “a
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`server that fiimishes a network protocol address needed to establish communications.”
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`As reflected in Defendants’ proposed construction, the term “server” has a plain and
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`ordinary meaning; and, in the context of the specification and the claims, it is clear that the term
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`“connection” is meant to convey only that the server facilitates point—to-point communication.
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`See, e.g., ’066 patent at 227-25 (reciting, in the “Summary of the Invention” section of the patent,
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`that the connection server receives a query from the first processing unit and is used to retrieve
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`the IP address of the second processing unit “for establishing a point-to-point communication
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`link between the first and second processing units through the Internet”). In light of the Court’s
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`construction of the term “point-to-point,” and the fact that the claims themselves describe the
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`specific functions performed by the connection server, the Court finds it unnecessary to impose
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`further limitations on the tenn. The Court will therefore construe “connection server” according
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`to its plain and ordinary meaning as “a server that facilitates point-to-point communication.”
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, the Court will construe the disputed terms as follows:
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`1. The term “processing unit,” as used in claims 1 through 3 and 6 through 8 of the ’066
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`patent, will be given its ordinary and customary meaning.
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`2. The term “process,” as used in claims 1 and 3 of the ’365 patent, will be construed as
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`“a running instance of a computer program or application.”
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`3. The term “point-to-point .
`
`.
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`. communication,” as used in claims I through 3 and 6
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`through 8 of the ’066 patent and claims 1 and 3 of the ’365 patent, will be construed as
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`“communication between two processing units or processes, established by one of the
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`processing units or processes using the IP or network protocol address of the other
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`processing unit or process, that is not intermediated by a connection server.”
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`4. The term “connection server,” as used in claims 1 through 3 and 6 through 8 of the
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`’066 patent and claim 3 of the ’365 patent, will be construed as “a server that facilitates
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`point—to-point communication.”
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`The Clerk is directed to forward copies of this Order to all counsel of record.
`
` Anthony J. Tre g
`
`United States
`
`istri tJudge
`
`February 25, 2014
`Alexandria, Virginia
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`Page 15 of 15