:·:··:·:·: .. :·. ~-: :.·::: ·._;_:: :..:..::,.:_· .. '.' ...
`
`----- ··· ---·--·---··-:·
`
`;···;·:::.:-:.·.";(."·-::-:.-::->:---:-----.--.-•• _..,•·.·.;·;·.-.
`
`ti.S. Department of Justice
`Offi.ce of the Inspector General
`
`I u.s.I1:.~-Q-i~ 'n•~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
`;:< J 1
`c 75
`1 C,riminal Calls: A Review of the
`Bureau of Prisons' Management of
`Inn1ate Telephone Privileges
`
`RECEIVED
`law Library
`JAN 1 0 2000
`University of Wisconsin
`Mad·ison, WI 53706
`
`Michael R. Bromwich
`Inspector General
`August 1999
`
`GTL 1019
`IPR of U.S. Patent No. 8,626,118
`
`

`
`CRIMINAL CALLS: A REVIEW OF THE
`BUREAU OF PRISONS' MANAGEMENT OF
`INMATE TELEPHONE PRIVILEGES
`
`EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`Telephone privileges for Bureau of Prison (BOP) inmates have increased
`dramatically since the 1970s, when inmates were permitted one telephone call
`every three months and the call was placed by BOP staff. Now, most BOP
`inmates are allowed to make as many telephone calls as they are able to pay for
`or as many collect calls as people outside prison will accept. Even though all
`inmate calls are recorded, except prearranged calls between inmates and their
`attorneys, the BOP listens to few such calls --approximately 3.5 percent of all
`calls made by federal inmates. Consequently, prison officials have little control
`over any criminal activities discussed during those calls.
`
`This special review conducted by the Office of the Inspector General
`(OIG) found that a significant number of federal inmates use prison telephones
`to commit serious crimes while incarcerated- including murder, drug
`trafficking, and fraud. Although the BOP has been aware of this problem for a
`long time, it has taken insufficient steps to address the abuse of prison
`telephones by inmates. The BOP has failed to respond adequately, partly
`because of the fear of litigation if it made changes to inmate telephone
`privileges, partly because of its misplaced reliance on new technology to
`provide solutions, and partly because of its apparent belief that inmates
`primarily use the telephone to maintain family relationships and ties to the
`community.
`
`We believe that the fear of litigation should not prevent needed measures
`to combat inmate telephone abuse. We also conclude that no technology on
`the horizon will solve the problem of inmate telephone abuse without
`aggressive intervention by BOP officials. Moreover, while providing inmates
`access to telephones may further importa,.,t(-,orrectional objectives, such as
`maintaining an inmate's ties to his family,
`· BOP's responsibilities extend
`
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`
`

`
`beyond this objective. Permitting inmates virtually unlimited telephone
`privileges comes at the cost of providing them the ability to commit serious
`criminal activity using prison telephones. As described in this report, we
`believe that the BOP needs to squarely address what appears to be widespread
`inmate abuse of prison telephones and take immediate and meaningful actions
`to correct the problem.
`
`II. The OIG Review
`
`At the outset of our review, we attempted to determine the scope of
`inmate abuse of prison telephones. We found that the BOP had a paucity of
`information on this issue. Neither BOP headquarters in Washington, D.C., nor
`BOP facilities keeps statistics of cases in which inmates are accused of
`committing crimes from prison using the telephone. Although the BOP
`maintains statistics on violations of prison regulations, this data is not
`sufficiently specific to identify which cases involved the use of telephones.
`Several BOP officials acknowledged to us that their limited statistics do not
`represent the overall number of telephone violations because many violations
`are resolved informally or not pursued administratively when criminal charges
`are brought.
`
`Given the limited information available from the BOP, we attempted to
`independently identify the scope of inmate telephone abuse through a
`questionnaire we sent to all 94 United States Attorneys' Offices (USAOs). In
`the questionnaire, we asked the USAOs to identify any cases they prosecuted
`involving crimes committed by inmates using telephones in BOP facilities.
`We sent a similar questionnaire to the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI)
`and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) headquarters, for distribution to
`all FBI and DEA field offices, asking them to identify investigations they
`conducted involving federal inmates' use of prison telephones to commit
`crimes. In response to our requests, we received information from 72 USAOs,
`16 FBI field offices, and 11 DEA field offices. Because these organizations do
`not index cases according to whether they took place in prison or involved the
`use of telephones, their responses to our questionnaires were based more on the
`recollection of the people who filled them out rather than on any
`comprehensive statistical review.
`
`We also sent a questionnaire to the 66 BOP facilities that use the Inmate
`Telephone System (ITS), a telephone system that can store and analyze data
`
`11
`
`

`
`about inmate telephone calls better than the older telephone system used in 27
`other BOP facilities. In this survey, we sought information aboutthe volume
`of inmate calls and each institution's monitoring practices, staffing, equipment,
`and other policies related to the detection of telephone abuse by inmates.
`
`We also visited nine BOP facilities to interview staff responsible for the
`institution's security and inmate telephone monitoring operations. These nine
`facilities represent institutions with different security levels and different
`physical layouts, two factors that affect the methods of monitoring the use of
`prison telephones. We visited four penitentiaries, three medium security
`facilities, and two low security institutions.
`
`In addition, we examined several prosecutions of high-profile inmates
`who were convicted of committing crimes from inside a BOP facility. We
`examined these cases to determine what steps, if any, the BOP had taken to
`prevent these inmates from using the telephones to continue their criminal
`activities while they were incarcerated. We also interviewed one of these
`inmates, Rayful Edmond III, about his experience using prison telephones to
`commit crimes.
`
`In total, we interviewed more than 70 BOP employees and
`approximately 20 other persons in the Department of Justice. We examined
`numerous documents, including BOP program statements on inmate telephone
`usage, the case law on inmate rights to telephone access, and the litigation and
`settlement agreement in a large class action lawsuit brought by inmates against
`BOP regarding the telephone system.
`
`III. OIG Findings
`
`A. Inmate Telephone Abuse
`
`Our interviews, case examinations, data collection, and document review
`paint a troubling picture of the scope and seriousness of inmate use of prison
`telephones to engage in criminal activity.
`
`From our interviews of law enforcement officials, we determined that
`inmate abuse of prison telephones appears to be widespread. For example,
`responses to our survey to the USAOs revealed 117 cases which those offices
`had prosecuted recently involving inmates' use of prison telephones to commit
`
`1ll
`
`I
`~
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I f:$
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I r I
`
`

`
`criminal acts. Eleven of these cases involved prosecutions for murder or
`attempted murder arranged by inmates over prison telephones. In one case, an
`inmate used prison telephones to attempt to arrange the murder of two
`witnesses and a judge and to pay for the executionwith illegal firearms. An
`additional ten inmates were prosecuted for schemes to threaten witnesses, and
`twelve were prosecuted for attempts to influence the testimony of witnesses.
`Twenty-five cases involved fraud schemes, many involving credit cards. In
`one case, an inmate directed by prison telephone a fraudulent employment
`matching service scheme that involved approximately $1.6 million. Another
`inmate used prison telephones to swindle trucking companies out of more than
`$100,000.
`
`The 16 FBI field offices that responded to our questionnaire reported that
`they conducted 44 investigations between 1996 and 1998 involving prison
`inmates. Of these cases, 27 involved introduction of narcotics into a BOP
`institution; 11 involved drug conspiracies outside prison being conducted over
`the telephone by inmates from inside prison; 2 involved financial fraud; 1
`involved bribery and obstruction of justice; and 3 were ongoing so details were
`not provided. However, these offices could not state defmitively whether the
`cases involved the use of prison telephones because their records were not
`indexed in that fashion. Yet, we believe that these statistics, which were based
`on the memories of those responding to the questionnaire, probably undercount
`the total number of FBI cases involving inmates using prison telephones
`because the FBI does not index cases based on their location or whether an
`inmate was involved.
`
`We also surveyed the DEA about any drug cases it has investigated
`involving the use of prison telephones by federal inmates. Eleven out of
`twenty-one DEA offices responded. They reported 12 cases at BOP facilities
`in which federal inmates had used prison telephones to commit crimes in the
`recent past. In none of these cases was the criminal activity detected by the
`BOP.
`
`The head of the FBI office in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, which
`handles many FBI cases involving crimes in prison because of the office's
`proximity to a large number of BOP institutions, also believed that many
`inmates commit criminal activities over prison telephones. He told us that he
`believed that when large scale drug dealers serve time in the United States
`Penitentiary (USP) in Lewisburg, "all you do is change his address and his
`
`IV
`
`

`
`I
`•
`I
`•
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`
`I
`I
`I
`I
`
`phone number" by putting him in prison. He stated that drug dealers can
`conduct business as usual and may even feel a bit more secure behind bars than
`they do on the street. Another former Williamsport FBI agent told us that he
`believes few inmate calls from USP Lewisburg were legitimate calls to family
`and friends of inmates. Both FBI officials told us that in their view the BOP
`makes little effort to target inmate telephone calls for suspicious activity and to
`refer such evidence of criminal conduct to the FBI for investigation. A federal
`prosecutor from the Los Angeles USAO, who works mostly on prosecutions
`involving crime in prisons, similarly said that the use of prison telephones to
`commit crimes is rarely detected by the BOP.
`
`These statements were supported by our interview ofRayful Edmond, a
`notorious Washington D.C. drug dealer who used prison telephones at USP
`Lewisburg to run a drug organization through contacts to Colombian cocaine
`cartel members who he met in prison. Edmond told the OIG that during his
`incarceration at USP Lewisburg, he talked on the telephone "all day long" and
`made arrangements for drug deals on the telephone almost every day, including
`participating in conference calls to Colombia. He estimated that he arranged to
`have drugs brought into prison 50 or 60 times. He claimed that almost half of
`Lewisburg inmates were involved in bringing drugs into the institution and that
`most of these drug deals were arranged over prison telephones. Edmond said
`that he had little concern about conducting drug deals on prison telephones
`because he knew that most calls were not being monitored. He said he also
`believed that even if he were caught abusing his telephone privileges, at worst
`he would receive a light punishment or a restriction of his privileges for a short
`period of time.
`
`B. BOP's Efforts to Prevent Inmate Telephone Abuse
`
`Based on our review, we concluded that the BOP's limited attempts to
`monitor inmate calls are virtually useless in preventing inmates from
`committing crimes using the telephones. For example, only 3.5 percent of the
`tens of thousands of calls made each day from BOP facilities are monitored.
`Our survey found that even though inmate telephones were available an
`average of 18 hours per day, the institutions had staff assigned to listen to
`telephone calls an average of only 14 hours on weekdays and 12 hours on
`weekends. Our survey also indicates that 16 of the 66 BOP institutions using
`ITS assign staff to listen to inmate telephone calls less than 50 percent of the
`
`v
`
`

`
`time that the telephones are operational. While all calls are recorded and can
`be listened to later, we found that this occurred rarely.
`
`We found that a few inmates were using prison telephones excessively.
`We found that approximately 74 percent of the inmates used the telephone less
`than 300 minutes during a one-month period. However, 15 inmates at the nine
`institutions we visited spent over 66 hours each on the telephone during a one(cid:173)
`month period, but none of the institutions had done anything about this
`excessive telephone use or was even aware of it.
`
`During our visits to the nine institutions, we also saw that the BOP staff
`responsible for monitoring inmate telephone calls was not sufficiently trained
`on the telephone monitoring equipment or monitoring procedures. We did not
`talk to any telephone monitor who had received anything other than on-the-job
`training. We found no monitors who had received formal instruction on the
`best way to monitor; how to recognize suspicious activities or coded inmate
`language; which inmates should be monitored; or how to detect three-way
`calls, which are prohibited under BOP regulations. The telephone monitoring
`officer position is generally a rotating assignment, typically lasting 18 months.
`Several telephone monitors we interviewed said that by the time they learn
`how to effectively monitor inmate calls, their rotation was nearing its end.
`Moreover, the few permanent telephone monitors with whom we spoke did not
`use all of the tools that were available to them, such as the alert function on the
`ITS system that notifies the monitoring officer with an audible alarm whenever
`specified inmates were using the telephone. Several of the telephone monitors
`were not even aware that ITS had such a function.
`
`Many BOP facilities make little or no effort to monitor telephone use by
`high-risk inmates. For example, in response to our survey, 27 percent of the
`institutions reported that they do not use the ITS alert function. At the nine
`institutions we visited, we found few proactive investigations of any high-risk
`inmates' use of the telephones. Several of the nine institutions made no
`attempt to even identify inmates who posed a high risk of using the telephones
`for criminal activity.
`
`Correctional officers are sometimes assigned collateral duties of
`monitoring inmate calls. However, we found that they generally monitor
`inmate calls in a perfunctory way and do the minimum required by their post
`orders. For example, at USP Atlanta the "post orders" expect (but do not
`
`Vl
`
`

`
`r
`I
`r
`l
`I
`I
`
`I
`I
`
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`
`require) certain correctional officers to listen to and file telephone monitoring
`reports for six or seven telephone calls each shift. That would result in 135
`telephone monitoring reports each 24-hour period. Instead, we were told that
`between zero and 16 reports were filed each day at this institution. Many of
`the reports written by remote monitoring officers that we reviewed were
`virtually useless, containing short notations that were oflittle use in any
`monitoring effort.
`
`We also found that the equipment used to monitor inmate calls was
`inadequate. For example, five of the nine telephones used for monitoring
`inmate calls at USP Atlanta were broken and no work orders had been
`submitted to repair the majority of them. The telephone monitor in USP
`Atlanta told us that he believed the correctional officers who were supposed to
`monitor calls were breaking the equipment so they would not have to monitor
`inmate calls. We contacted the monitor again several weeks after our visit and
`he informed us that the equipment had not yet been fixed.
`
`Many inmate calls are in foreign languages. Yet, none of the facilities
`we visited had monitoring staff who were fluent in French, Russian, Chinese,
`or Arabic. Some BOP facilities do not have monitors who are fluent in
`Spanish, despite the fact that many facilities have a very significant Spanish(cid:173)
`speaking population.
`
`At the nine institutions we visited, we found that virtually no review is
`performed of the inmates' lists of approved numbers they may call to
`determine, for example, whether the lists include known criminals or past
`criminal confederates of the inmates. Inmates are permitted frequent changes
`to their telephone lists, and BOP staff normally approve the changes without
`review. None of the institutions we visited asked the Special Investigator
`Supervisor (SIS) office -- the part of the institution responsible for
`investigations of inmates -- to review inmate calling lists.
`
`C. Case Studies
`
`In addition to our general surveys and site visits, we examined several
`high-profile prosecutions of inmates who were convicted of conducting their
`crimes from inside a BOP facility. We looked at their cases to determine the
`BOP's actions in each case and what, if anything, it could have done
`differently to detect the criminal activity. These cases provide vivid examples
`
`Vll
`
`

`
`1\l;':Ti ···.
`
`l
`
`of the BOP's failure to adequately monitor inmate telephone use, especially
`those inmates who are likely to commit further crimes in prison.
`
`Rayful Edmond was convicted in 1989 of running a large and
`sophisticated criminal enterprise that controlled much of the cocaine market in
`Washington, D.C. Soon after his arrival in USP Lewisburg, a correctional
`officer who was monitoring one of Edmond's telephone calls reported that he
`appeared to be engaging in a drug deal. The BOP reported this incident to the
`FBI and was told to keep a close watch on Edmond. Yet, we found no
`evidence that the BOP gave any additional information about Edmond's drug
`activities in prison to the FBI, or that the BOP sanctioned Edmond in any way
`for his use of prison telephones to continue his drug dealing.
`
`In 1992, the FBI obtained information from an informant about
`Edmond's continued drug activities using prison telephones and shared that
`information with the BOP. But the BOP still took no action to discipline
`Edmond or restrict his calling privileges. Finally, in 1994, the FBI learned
`from another informant that Edmond was continuing to broker cocaine deals
`from prison. The FBI opened an investigation of Edmond and eventually
`confronted him with the evidence of his drug dealing. Edmond admitted that
`he had continued drug trafficking activities in prison.
`
`Our review showed that despite significant evidence that Edmond was
`continuing to engage in criminal activities using prison telephones, the BOP
`took no measures to restrict his privileges and expended little effort to monitor
`his calls. Moreover, several other inmates associated with Edmond also used
`the prison telephones to commit crimes without any response by the BOP. For
`example, we reviewed the case of Jose Naranjo, who was convicted of
`conspiracy to distributed cocaine in 1979. While serving a 12-year sentence in
`Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Otisville, he used the prison telephones
`to participate in a conspiracy to import cocaine from Colombia, South America
`to North Carolina. Even after his conviction for that crime, he continued to
`enjoy full telephone privileges. After being transferred to FCI Petersburg, he
`engaged in other conspiracies to distribute cocaine, and in 1995 was again
`convicted of drug distribution offenses. After Naranjo's sentencing, the federal
`prosecutor wrote to the BOP to urge it to prohibit Naranjo from using prison
`telephones. However, during our review in 1998, we were surprised to learn
`that Naranjo's telephone privileges had been restored and that the BOP was
`making no special effort to monitor his calls.
`
`V111
`
`

`
`I
`.I
`I
`.I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`
`Another case we examined was even more troubling. Anthony Jones, a
`drug dealer in Baltimore, Maryland, was convicted of being a felon in
`possession of a firearm and was incarcerated at a BOP facility in Allenwood,
`Pennsylvania. While incarcerated, Jones became aware of an ongoing grand
`jury investigation into his drug activities. He used the prison telephones to
`order his associates outside prison to murder two witnesses he suspected had
`testified against him. One of the witnesses was killed and the other was shot
`several times. As a result, in May 1998 Jones was convicted of murder and
`attempted murder charges, and he received a sentence oflife imprisonment
`without parole. Yet, even after this conviction, Jones retained full telephone
`privileges and the BOP did not take any measures to monitor his telephone
`calls. Only after the OIG questioned the BOP about Jones' telephone access
`did it move to restrict his telephone privileges in July 1998.
`
`The case ofOreste Abbamonte provided another example of the BOP's
`failure to monitor or restrict inmate telephone abuse. Abbamonte had a long
`history of convictions for drug distribution. In 1986, while imprisoned in FCI
`Lewisburg, he was convicted for using prison telephones to orchestrate the
`distribution of multiple kilograms of heroin. After this conviction, the USAO
`for the Southern District of New York wrote a letter to the Director of the BOP
`stating that Abbamonte's access to prison telephones had enabled him to
`commit drug crimes while incarcerated and expressing the hope that narcotics
`distributors would have special restrictions placed on their use of prison
`telephones. When Abbamonte was sentenced, the court specifically
`recommended that Abbamonte be confined to the BOP's highest security
`facility and that he have limited telephone privileges.
`
`Despite these recommendations, the BOP placed no restrictions on
`Abbamonte's telephone use, and his drug trafficking using prison telephones
`continued. While in a BOP facility in Leavenworth, Abbamonte again used
`prison telephones to conspire to purchase cocaine, and he was convicted in
`1992 for this offense.
`
`When we reviewed Abbamonte's BOP files in 1998, we were surprised
`to find that Abbamonte's telephone privileges were not limited in any way,
`despite the USAO's letter, the court's specific request, and his repeated use of
`the prison telephones to commit crimes. He has never been charged with any
`violations of BOP regulations for using prison telephones for his continuing
`
`lX
`
`

`
`criminal activities, and he was not even placed on the special monitoring list
`maintained by the prison's SIS office.
`
`Finally, we reviewed BOP case files from four randomly selected
`inmates whose convictions received significant public attention and who
`appeared to have the resources to continue criminal activities while
`incarcerated. We reviewed these files to determine what steps, if any, the BOP
`took to prevent these inmates from using the telephones to continue their
`criminal activities while in BOP custody. In two of the four cases, we found
`that the BOP was properly monitoring the inmates' telephone calls, but in the
`two others cases the BOP was not. In one of these cases, the prosecutor had
`even made a specific request for such monitoring to occur and the warden had
`provided assurances that it would. Despite these representations, no onitoring
`of this inmate's calls was occurring.
`
`IV.
`
`BOP's Corrective Efforts
`
`Our review found that the BOP has taken only limited and insufficient
`corrective efforts to address the serious problem of inmate telephone abuse for
`a variety of reasons - such as a lack of resources, the press of other issues, and
`the belief that a settlement with inmates in a class action lawsuit about inmate
`access to telephones imposes restrictions.
`
`Three working groups have reviewed inmate telephone use in the past
`few years- a BOP working group convened in August 1996, a Department of
`Justice working group convened in the fall of 1996, and another BOP working
`group in 1997. However, changes as a result of these working groups have
`been extremely limited. For example, the BOP has attempted to implement
`only one significant change in its telephone policy - an increase in the severity
`of the sanction for inmate telephone abuse. This revision has yet to take effect
`because the rule-making process required to enact the new policy is still
`ongomg.
`
`Several BOP officials told us they believed that a new generation of
`telephone equipment planned for installation in all BOP institutions during the
`next two years will detect many cases of inmate telephone abuse. However,
`we found that the BOP's postponement of needed reforms until this new
`telephone system is operational is not justified. No new technology on the
`horizon- including the BOP's new inmate telephone system- will solve the
`
`X
`
`

`
`I
`I
`
`.I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`
`problem of inmate telephone abuse without aggressive intervention by BOP
`officials. Implementation of a new inmate telephone system is not the cure all
`that some BOP officials apparently are counting on. In fact, given the lack of
`understanding and failure to use some of the security features that already exist
`in the BOP telephone system, the new system may have little impact on BOP's
`efforts to detect telephone abuse by inmates.
`
`V. OIG Recommendations
`
`We believe that unless the BOP places meaningful restrictions on inmate
`telephone privileges, steps up its monitoring of selected inmate calls, and
`disciplines telephone abusers consistenly, no significant change in the level
`and seriousness of inmate telephone abuse will occur.
`
`Based on our review, we recommend that the BOP take steps to curb
`prison telephone abuse in four ways. First, the BOP must increase the
`percentage of inmate telephone calls it monitors if it expects to make any
`headway on the problem of inmate telephone abuse. While additional
`resources will be helpful in this regard, because of the high volume of inmate
`calls the only realistic solution is to reduce the number of calls so that BOP
`staff assigned to this task can monitor a greater percentage of calls. Towards
`this end, we make various recommendations, including that the BOP impose
`limits on all inmates' telephone privileges, set a significantly higher goal for
`monitoring inmate calls and then calculate the resources needed to meet this
`goal, have telephone monitors on duty at all times that prison telephones are
`available to inmates, do a better job identifying inmates with a high probability
`of abusing their telephone privileges, and institute a plan to monitor these
`inmates calls proactively.
`
`Second, the BOP must increase and more consistently discipline
`telephone abusers. During our review, we found various cases in which
`inmates retained full telephone privileges even after they were convicted of a
`crime involving use of prison telephones. We recommend that the BOP
`develop and enforce policies to ensure that administrative action is quickly
`taken against inmates who abuse their telephone privileges, particularly those
`inmates convicted of crimes stemming from their use of prison telephones.
`The BOP also should develop and implement policies that mandate restriction
`of telephone privileges as the preferred sanction for inmate telephone abuse.
`Subsequent violations of BOP telephone policies should result in increased
`
`Xl
`
`

`
`l
`
`sanctions that include loss of all telephone privileges. Inmates who commit
`crimes using prison telephones also should have their privileges revoked. The
`BOP also should consider designating certain institutions or wings of
`institutions as housing units for inmates whose telephone privileges have been
`revoked or restricted. This would alleviate the problem of inmates without
`telephone privileges getting other inmates to make calls for them.
`
`Third, the BOP should restrict telephone privileges proactively for
`inmates who have a history of telephone abuse or a likelihood of abuse. This
`would mean that some inmates simply would not have telephone privileges
`because of their previous behavior using the telephones in prison. As an
`additional safeguard to deter potential criminal conduct, the Department of
`Justice should educate prosecutors about the availability of court orders
`restricting an inmate's telephone privileges in racketeering and drug cases.
`The Department also should consider seeking legislation to permit similar
`court orders in all cases in which the government can make a showing that the
`defendant should not be entitled to telephone.privileges because of a prior
`history of telephone abuse. Moreover, the Department should emphasize to
`USAOs the need to inform BOP of inmates who pose special risks of
`committing serious crimes while incarcerated, as outlined in a letter from the
`Attorney General on May 7, 1998. As of the fall of 1998, the BOP had
`received only two such notifications. These notifications are critical because
`they fill gaps in BOP's knowledge about the inmate's history and put the BOP
`on notice of the risk posed by certain inmates. In light of the BOP's failure to
`properly monitor high-risk inmates after either court order or notice from
`prosecutors, we recommend that a reporting system be established to assure
`USAOs that the BOP has taken proper measures after such a notification.
`
`Fourth, the BOP should emphasize the responsibility of its officers to
`detect and deter crimes by inmates using BOP phones. Our review found that
`SIS officers at BOP institutions spend far too little time detecting and deterring
`criminal conduct committed by inmates using prison telephones. The SIS's
`mission should be expanded to include a more substantial focus on the
`detection of crimes by inmates in BOP custody. This could be accomplished
`through additional training for SIS staff, greater communication between the
`SIS and other law enforcement agencies, and better intelligence-gathering on
`inmates. In addition, the BOP should revise its procedures to require SIS staff
`to ensure that the numbers listed on an inmate's telephone calling list are
`investigated prior to approval of those lists, especially with high-risk inmates.
`
`Xll
`
`

`
`-I
`
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`I
`~
`I
`~
`~
`
`In sum, permitting inmates access to prison telephones and protecting the
`public against crimes committed with prison telephones present a complex
`balancing of interests. Our review highlighted the problem of inmate abuse of
`prison telephones, and the serious crimes that are committed by inmates using
`the telephones. Because of the BOP's generally ineffective efforts to monitor
`calls, prevent inmate telephone abuse, or sanction inmates who abuse their
`telephone privileges, we believe that the BOP's current policy of affording
`unlimited telephone access to the vast majority of its inmates requires serious
`examination and substantial revision.
`
`Michael R. Bromwich
`Inspector General
`
`Xlll
`
`

`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
`
`CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1
`I. Overview ............................................................................................ 1
`II. The OIG Review ................................................................................ 3
`III. Organization of Report ...................................................................... 6
`
`CHAPTER TWO: FEDERAL INMATE ACCESS TO TELEPHONES .......... 8
`I. Background on the BOP .................................................................... 8
`II. Background on Inmate Telephone Use in the BOP ......................... 10
`A. The BOP Philosophy on Inmate Use of Telephones ............... 10
`B. History oflnmate Access to Telephones ................................. 12
`Inmate Telephone Abuse and-the BOP's Early Responses ..... 12
`C.
`D. The Development of the Inmate Telephone System ................ 16
`1. Features and Installation of the System ........................... 16
`2. Washington v. Reno ......................................................... 18
`3. Current Telephone Systems in BOP Facilities ................. 20
`4.
`ITS II ................................................................................ 20
`