`571-272-7822
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`Paper 35
`Entered: November 16, 2016
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC. and MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`GLOBAL TOUCH SOLUTIONS, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2015-01175
`Patent 8,288,952 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`
`
`Before JUSTIN BUSCH, LYNNE E. PETTIGREW, and
`BETH Z. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`In this inter partes review, instituted pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314,
`Apple Inc. and Motorola Mobility LLC (collectively, “Petitioner”) challenge
`the patentability of claims 1–4, 14, 16, 17, 19, 22–24, 26, 27, and 38–40
`(“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the
`’952 patent”), owned by Global Touch Solutions, LLC (“Patent Owner”).
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`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision is
`entered pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the
`reasons discussed below, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the
`evidence that the challenged claims of the ’952 patent are unpatentable.
`
`A. Procedural History
`Petitioner filed a Petition for inter partes review of the challenged
`claims of the ’952 patent. Paper 3 (“Pet.”). Patent Owner did not file a
`Preliminary Response. On November 17, 2015, we instituted an inter partes
`review of the challenged claims of the ’952 patent. Paper 8 (“Institution
`Decision” or “Dec.”). After institution, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner
`Response, Paper 14 (“PO Resp.”), and Petitioner filed a Reply to the Patent
`Owner Response, Paper 20 (“Pet. Reply”). A consolidated oral hearing for
`this case and several others was held on August 3, 2016. A transcript of the
`hearing has been entered into the record. Paper 34 (“Tr.”).
`
`B. Related Matters
`The parties identify the following district court proceedings as related
`matters: Global Touch Solutions, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 3:15-cv-
`2750-JD (N.D. Cal.); Global Touch Solutions, LLC v. Toshiba Corp., No.
`3:15-cv-2746-JD (N.D. Cal.); Global Touch Solutions, LLC v. VIZIO Inc.,
`No. 3:15-cv-2747-JD (N.D. Cal.); Global Touch Solutions, LLC v. Apple
`Inc., No. 3:15-cv-2748-JD (N.D. Cal.); and Global Touch Solutions, LLC v.
`Motorola Mobility, LLC, No. 3:15-cv-2749-JD (N.D. Cal.). Pet. 3; Paper 6,
`2; Paper 7, 1–2. Petitioner also filed petitions for inter partes review of
`related U.S. Patent Nos. 7,994,726 (IPR2015-01171), 7,498,749 (IPR2015-
`01172), 7,329,970 (IPR2015-01173), and 7,781,980 (IPR2015-01174). Pet.
`3; Paper 7, 2–3. Trials were instituted in those proceedings as well. The
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`parties also identify as a related matter IPR2015-01151, which is an ongoing
`inter partes review of the ’952 patent filed by a different petitioner. Paper 6,
`2; Paper 7, 3.
`
`C. The ’952 Patent
`The ’952 patent is directed to portable electronic devices that operate
`on exhaustible power sources such as batteries. Ex. 1001, Abstract. A
`visible indicator such as a light emitting diode (LED) can be used to indicate
`the condition of the battery. Id. at 9:46–54, Fig. 11.
`
`D. Claims
`Independent claim 1 is illustrative and is reproduced below, with
`formatting added:
`A method of implementing a user interface of a
`1.
`product, the product comprising a power source, or a connection
`for a power source and at least one energy consuming load, said
`method including the step of
`using an electronic module comprising an electronic
`circuit including a microchip and a touch sensor forming part of
`the user interface, said microchip at least partially implementing
`the touch sensor functions and said method including the step of
`activating a visible indication in response to an activation
`signal received from the user interface, wherein the visible
`indication provides information to a user on at least one item
`from the following group:
`
`a state or condition of the product,
`
`location of the user interface,
`
`a battery power level indication.
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`E. Grounds of Unpatentability Instituted for Trial
`We instituted an inter partes review based on Petitioner’s contentions
`that the challenged claims are unpatentable based on the following specific
`grounds:
`
`References
`
`Basis
`
`Beard1 and Rathmann2
`Beard, Rathmann, and
`Danielson3
`Dec. 11.
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
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`35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
`
`II. DISCUSSION
`
`Challenged Claims
`1–3, 16, 17, 19, 22–24,
`26, 27, and 38–40
`4 and 14
`
`A. Claim Construction
`We construe explicitly only those claim terms or phrases in
`controversy, and we do so only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795,
`803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). We construe claim terms in an unexpired patent
`according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the
`specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).
`Consistent with the broadest reasonable construction, claim terms are
`presumed to have their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a
`person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire patent
`disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
`2007). An inventor may provide a meaning for a term that is different from
`
`
`1 U.S. Patent 5,898,290, issued Apr. 27, 1999 (Ex. 1005, “Beard”).
`2 U.S. Patent 5,955,869, issued Sept. 21, 1999 (Ex. 1006, “Rathmann”).
`3 U.S. Patent 5,710,728, issued Jan. 20, 1998 (Ex. 1007, “Danielson”).
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`its ordinary meaning by defining the term in the specification with
`reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d
`1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Absent such a clear, deliberate and precise
`definition, it is one of the “cardinal sins” of patent law to import limitations
`from an embodiment in the specification into the claims. Phillips v. AWH
`Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
`In the Petition, Petitioner proposed a construction for “energy
`consuming load.” Pet. 8–9. Patent Owner did not file a Preliminary
`Response. In the Institution Decision, we determined the term “energy
`consuming load” did not require express construction, and we did not
`expressly construe any other claim terms. Dec. 4–5.
`Patent Owner proposes a construction for “energy consuming load”
`and for various phrases that include the term “function[s].” PO Resp. 16–30.
`Patent Owner also proposes a construction for “user interface.” Id. at 15.
`As Petitioner points out, Patent Owner “proposes to construe ‘user
`interface,’ but it never applies this construction in its analysis and never
`explains why this construction could be relevant to any issue in this
`proceeding.” Pet. Reply 20. Accordingly, we determine “user interface”
`requires no explicit construction.
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`1. “energy consuming load” 4
`Patent Owner argues that “energy consuming load,” recited in claims
`1 and 26, means “an energy consuming component that receives power from
`the power source under the control of the microchip.” PO Resp. 20.
`Petitioner disagrees, arguing the claims do not recite using the microchip to
`control power to the load. Pet. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1033, 99:17–22). Thus,
`Petitioner asserts, Patent Owner attempts to improperly import limitations
`from the Specification into the claims. Id. at 4–5. Moreover, Petitioner
`argues Patent Owner’s expert confirms that the ordinary meaning of “energy
`consuming load” is “any part of the product that consumes energy when the
`product is used.” Id. at 4 (citing Ex. 1034, 102:1–5 (deposition testimony of
`Dr. Robert E. Morley in related matter IPR2015-01150)). For the following
`reasons, we agree with Petitioner that the broadest reasonable construction
`of “energy consuming load” is its ordinary meaning, i.e., any part of the
`product that consumes energy when the product is used. Pet. 9.
`We begin our analysis with the language of the claims. As Petitioner
`points out, the claim does not recite a microchip to control power to the load.
`Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Morley, agrees that nothing in the claim
`
`
`4 The “energy consuming load” is recited only in the preamble of claims 1
`and 26 and not recited anywhere else in any of the challenged claims. Claim
`1 is reproduced above. Claim 26 recites, in part, an “electronic module for
`use with a product, the product comprising . . . at least one energy
`consuming load.” The only other reference in the challenged claims to a
`load is in claim 16, which depends from claim 1 via its direct dependency
`from claim 2, and further recites “the method is applied to a product
`comprising the electronic user interface module, the power source and the
`load, with all enclosed or attached to a single product casing.”
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`language requires the energy consuming load to receive power under control
`of the microchip. Ex. 1033, 99:17–22.
`We turn now to the written description of the ’952 patent. We note
`the written description refers merely to a “load” and does not refer explicitly
`to an “energy consuming load,” which appears only in the claims. See Ex.
`1001, 6:66–7:4. At oral argument, Patent Owner acknowledged that there is
`“no explicit lexicography definition” for the terms load and energy
`consuming load. Tr. 93:15, 94:6–7.
`Because the patentee has not acted as his own lexicographer, we must
`consider whether the patentee has demonstrated an intent to deviate from the
`ordinary meaning of the claim term “energy consuming load” by including
`in the written description expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction,
`representing a clear disavowal of claim scope. See Thorner v. Sony Comput.
`Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Teleflex, Inc. v.
`Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). We have
`reviewed the portions of the written description cited in the Patent Owner
`Response and do not find any expressions of manifest restriction that limit
`the scope of “energy consuming load” to a load that receives power under
`control of the microchip.
`Patent Owner argues that a load under the control of the microchip is
`the “very character of the invention” that requires us to limit the claims. PO
`Resp. 16 (citing Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1370
`(Fed. Cir. 2003)). Patent Owner further contends “it is this very
`configuration that is central to the invention of the ’952 patent, and is
`provided in the specification in distinction over the prior art.” Id. (citing Ex.
`2002 ¶¶ 10–15). Patent Owner relies on a statement in the Specification of
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`the ’952 patent stating that the invention provides “a microchip controlled
`switch to manage both the current conducting functions and the MMI [(man-
`machine-interface)] functions in an electronic device, such as a
`flashlight . . . .” Ex. 1001, 3:61–64; see PO Resp. 16. As Petitioner points
`out, however, this passage describes only what a “microchip controlled
`switch” does according to one embodiment; it does not define or otherwise
`limit the scope of “energy consuming load.” See Pet. Reply 5.
`Patent Owner also cites portions of the ’952 patent as allegedly
`distinguishing devices with microchip-controlled switches from prior art
`flashlights with conventional mechanical switches that directly connect a
`power source to a load. PO Resp. 16–18 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:33–38, 5:8–15,
`7:23–29). But again, these passages describe features of switches; they do
`not indicate a clear disavowal of scope of the claim term “energy consuming
`load.” See Pet. Reply 6.
`We cannot redraft the claims for the Patent Owner to try to cover
`unclaimed features described in the Specification, even if the feature was
`found in every embodiment. See Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. v. BioGenex Labs.,
`Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (refusing to read limitation found
`in all embodiments in the specification into the claims because “[w]hen the
`claim addresses only some of the features disclosed in the specification, it is
`improper to limit the claim to other, unclaimed features”); see also E-Pass
`Techs., Inc. v. 3COM Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (refusing
`to read feature of every embodiment from specification into the claims
`because “[a]n invention may possess a number of advantages or purposes,
`and there is no requirement that every claim directed to that invention be
`limited to encompass all of them”). In the ’952 patent, the patentee
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`expressly claimed a microchip that “at least partially implement[s] the touch
`sensor functions,” but chose not to claim an energy consuming load that
`receives power from a power source under control of the microchip.
`Patent Owner does not allege that any prosecution history is helpful to
`ascertain the meaning of the “energy consuming load.” See Tr. 72:9–14.
`Petitioner points out that claims of Patent Owner’s related patents contradict
`Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Pet. Reply 8–10. When the patentee
`wanted to include a requirement that the microchip control the flow of
`power, it did so expressly and without leaving it implied in the term “energy
`consuming load.” For example, claim 52 of related U.S. Patent No.
`7,329,970 recites “using the microchip to control the connection of the
`power source to the load.” Ex. 1035, 16:31–42.
`We have considered the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence
`regarding the construction of the recited “energy consuming load.” For the
`reasons discussed, we agree with Petitioner that the scope of “energy
`consuming load” is not limited to a load that is under the control of the
`microchip, as asserted by Patent Owner.
`
`2. “function”
`Claims 1 and 26 recite, in part, a “microchip at least partially
`implementing the touch sensor[/sensing] functions.” Claim 1 recites
`activating “a visible indication in response to an activation signal received
`from the user interface,” and claim 26 recites the microchip is “configured to
`activate a visible indication in response to an activation signal received from
`the user interface.” Ex. 1001, 12:32–36, 14:2–5. Claim 2, which depends
`from claim 1, further recites the “method includes the selection and
`activation of a function or mode of the product in response to a further
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`activation signal(s) received from the user interface.” Id. at 12:42–45
`(emphasis added). Claim 3, which depends from claim 2, and claim 24,
`which depends from claim 1, each further recite “automatically deactivating
`a function that was activated in response to an activation signal received
`from said user interface.” Id. at 12:47–49, 13:56–58 (emphasis added).
`Claim 22, which depends from claim 1, further recites “activating or
`deactivating product functions in response to signals received from the user
`interface.” Id. at 13:49–50 (emphasis added). The parties dispute whether
`“a function,” as recited in claims 2, 3, and 24, or the “product functions,” as
`recited in claim 22, encompass activating the visible indicator or whether “a
`function” and “product functions” must be some function(s) other than
`activation of the indicator.
`Patent Owner first argues for a specific construction of “touch sensor
`functions” and “touch sensing functions,” as recited in independent claims 1
`and 26, respectively. PO Resp. 20–24. Petitioner states “Global Touch does
`not explain how or why this construction is relevant to this proceeding,”
`such that “no specific construction is necessary.” Pet. Reply 19.
`Specifically, Petitioner’s challenges do not depend on a construction of the
`recited touch sensor/sensing functions broader than Patent Owner’s
`proposed construction. Accordingly, there is no dispute between the parties
`in this proceeding regarding the proper construction of touch sensor/sensing
`functions, and we do not construe explicitly those terms.
`Patent Owner also argues that “a function or mode of the product,” as
`recited in dependent claim 2, should be construed as “function or mode of
`the product other than the visible indication.” PO Resp. 26. In support,
`Patent Owner argues the Specification of the ’952 patent describes the
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`visible indicator functionality “as a distinct and additional feature of the
`device in addition to control of other modes or functions,” and that “modes
`or functions other than the visible indicator are separately controlled by the
`user interface.” Id. at 25–26 (quoting Ex. 1001, 9:46–52, 10:26–35). With
`respect to claims 3, 22, and 24, Patent Owner again argues that the
`“function,” recited in claims 3 and 24, and the “product functions,” recited in
`claim 22, must be distinct from activating the visible indication, recited in
`claim 1, to avoid rendering claim language superfluous and because of the
`use of different terms (i.e., “function” versus “visible indication”). PO Resp.
`27–28 (asserting “function” excludes activating or deactivating the “visible
`indication”), 29–30 (asserting “plural functions” should be construed to be
`different from activation or deactivation of the “visible indication” for
`similar reasons as argued with respect to the term “function,” recited in
`claims 3 and 24). Patent Owner also argues the activation signal recited in
`claims 3 and 24 is different than the activation signal recited in claim 1
`because the recitation of “an activation signal” in claims 3 and 24 has no
`antecedent basis in any prior claim recitation. Id. at 28.
`Petitioner agrees that activating a “function” and activating a “visible
`indication” have different meanings. Petitioner argues, and we agree, that
`“function” is a broad term that encompasses any type of function, while
`“activating a visible indication” is a specific type of function. Pet. Reply 17.
`Petitioner cites testimony of Patent Owner’s expert in support. Id. at 18
`(citing Ex. 1033, 118:21–119:3; Ex. 1040 ¶ 50). Moreover, the
`Specification refers to “battery strength monitoring” as one example of a
`function. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:57–59, 8:58–63).
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`We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s attempt to narrow the
`term “function” to exclude activation of a visible indicator is contrary to the
`claims, the written description of the ’952 patent, and the testimony of
`Patent Owner’s own expert. Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that the
`broadest reasonable interpretation of “function” is not limited to a function
`other than activating the visible indicator, as asserted by Patent Owner.
`
`B. Obviousness of Claims 1–3, 16, 17, 19, 22–24, 26, 27, and 38–40
`over the Combination of Beard and Rathmann
`
`Petitioner contends that claims 1–3, 16, 17, 19, 22–24, 26, 27, and 38–
`40 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Beard and
`Rathmann. Pet. 30–55. Relying on the declaration testimony of Mr. Paul
`Beard, Petitioner explains how Beard and Rathmann allegedly teach all the
`claim limitations, and asserts an ordinarily skilled artisan would have
`combined the asserted teachings. Id. (citing Ex. 1003).
`
`1. Beard
`Beard describes an intelligent battery pack with a microcontroller and
`battery indicators for use with a portable electronic device. Ex. 1005, 1:18–
`21; see Ex. 1003 ¶ 68. The microcontroller responds to a touch-sensing
`circuit that detects changes in impedance or capacitance when an operator
`touches one or two contacts. Ex. 1005, 11:12–16; see Ex. 1003 ¶ 68. Figure
`11 of Beard is reproduced on the following page.
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`Figure 11 depicts battery pack 201 that provides an operator with an
`indication of battery capacity whether or not it is inserted into portable
`electronic device 203. Ex. 1005, 11:10–13. When fully inserted, battery
`pack contacts 241, 243 and 245 engage corresponding contacts 251, 253 and
`255, and, if sufficient power is available, device 203 may enter a fully
`operational state when the operator desires. Id. at 11:67–12:4.
`
`2. Rathmann
`Rathmann describes a “smart battery for use in an intelligent device
`having power management capabilities.” Ex. 1006, 1:12–16; 1:65–3:30.
`Rathmann’s indicator uses LEDs. In response to a signal from the battery
`pack’s user interface, four LEDs illuminate sequentially to indicate
`remaining battery charge. Ex. 1006, Fig. 3, 16:24–36; see Ex. 1003 ¶ 87.
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`3. Claim 1
`Petitioner asserts the combination of Beard and Rathmann teaches all
`of the limitations of independent claim 1.
`The Preamble
`First, Petitioner contends Beard discloses a “method for implementing
`a user interface of a product” for various reasons, including because Beard
`teaches providing “a visible indication of the state of the product’s battery”
`in response to a user touching contacts. Pet. 27–28 (citing Ex. 1005,
`Abstract; Ex. 1003 ¶ 122). Patent Owner does not dispute Beard discloses
`this limitation.
`Additionally, Petitioner contends Beard discloses battery pack 201 of
`Figure 11 and electrical connections that connect the battery pack to the
`energy consuming part of device 203, which teaches “the product
`comprising a power source, or a connection for a power source and at least
`one energy consuming load,” as recited in claim 1. Pet. 28. Petitioner
`contends Beard discloses the product comprises “at least one energy
`consuming load” because Beard discloses that the battery pack delivers
`electric charge energy to portable electronic device 203, which includes a
`load, such as any of the exemplary energy consuming components depicted
`in device 203 in Figure 11. Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1005, 11:57–61). We agree
`with and adopt Petitioner’s contentions regarding Beard’s teachings of this
`limitation. Id. Patent Owner argues Beard does not teach at least one
`“energy consuming load” because the energy consuming components that
`Petitioner points to do not “receive power from the power supply under the
`control of the control circuitry 223 (alleged to correspond to the claimed
`microchip) or user interface of the battery pack 201.” PO Resp. 32. Patent
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`Owner’s argument, however, depends on its proposed construction of
`“energy consuming load” as limited to a load under the control of a
`microchip, see id. at 30–45, a construction which we have not adopted.
`Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Morley, admits that if we do not adopt Patent
`Owner’s limiting construction, Beard discloses an “energy consuming load”
`as recited in claim 1. Ex. 1033, 170:2–7. Thus, we find Patent Owner’s
`argument to be unpersuasive.
`The First Method Step
`(The “using an electronic module” Step)
`Petitioner further contends Beard discloses “said method including the
`step of using an electronic module comprising an electronic circuit including
`a microchip and a touch sensor forming part of the user interface, said
`microchip at least partially implementing the touch sensor functions”
`because Beard discloses “using battery pack 201 of Figure 11 which is an
`electronic module comprising electronic circuitry” when a user touches the
`contacts. Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:20–24, Fig. 11; Ex. 1003 ¶ 128), 32.
`Petitioner further explains that Beard’s battery pack “includes a microchip
`and a touch sensor.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 129). Petitioner argues Beard
`discloses the microchip implementing touch sensor functions because
`Beard’s microchip controls “the display of charge status information upon
`detecting user input, a request, through the touch sensor.” Id. at 31 (citing
`Beard 11:14–22, 11:31–33 Ex. 1003 ¶ 132).
`The only aspect of this limitation Patent Owner disputes is whether
`Beard discloses a microchip that implements multiple touch sensor
`functions. PO Resp. 21–24. Petitioner contends Beard discloses its
`microchip activating multiple functions in response to input from the touch
`sensor. Pet. Reply 14. Specifically, Petitioner asserts Beard discloses
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`calculating and displaying battery capacity, calculating and displaying a
`remaining time estimate, and using a timer to determine when to deactivate a
`display. Id. at 14–15 (citing Ex. 1005, 11:31–40, 11:41–48, 10:51–54).
`Petitioner also points to testimony from Patent Owner’s expert stating that
`determining battery capacity and remaining time are two different functions.
`Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1033, 124:6–9, 126:2–14).
`After reviewing the submitted arguments and evidence, we agree with
`Petitioner. We note Patent Owner’s expert further testified that calculating
`battery capacity is a part of calculating a remaining time estimate. Ex. 1033,
`127:1–128:20. Nevertheless, even accepting that calculating battery
`capacity may be a part of, or required for, calculating a remaining time
`estimate, the evidence supports Petitioner’s position that calculating and
`displaying a remaining time estimate is a distinct function from calculating
`and displaying the battery capacity.
`The Second Method Step
`(The “activating a visible indication” Step)
`Petitioner asserts the combination of Beard and Rathmann teaches or
`suggests the recited step of “activating a visible indication in response to an
`activation signal received from the user interface, wherein the visible
`indication provides information to a user on at least one” of a “condition of
`the product, location of the user interface, [or] a battery power level
`indication.” Ex. 1001, 12:34–41. Specifically, Petitioner contends Beard
`discloses microchip 223 activating visual display 225 to provide battery
`power information in response to a user touching contacts 211 and 213. Pet.
`32 (citing Ex. 1005, 7:44–48, 11:14–22, 11:24–26, 11:31–33; Ex. 1003
`¶ 135). Petitioner further asserts the display of battery power level is both “a
`battery power level indication” and a “state or condition of the product,”
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`satisfying the second portion of the limitation requiring that the visible
`indication provide certain information. Id. at 31–34. Petitioner also asserts
`the LED used to display the battery power level information lights up when
`the user touches the contacts, providing the user information regarding the
`location of the user interface, which alternatively satisfies the second part of
`the limitation. Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 1005, 6:63–7:5, Figs. 5–6; Ex. 1003
`¶ 138).
`Petitioner contends Rathmann provides additional detail regarding
`how the microchip controls the activation of the visible indication. Pet. 34–
`35. Petitioner articulates reasoning with a rational underpinning for
`combining the asserted teachings of Beard and Rathmann. Pet. 17–23.
`Patent Owner does not dispute that the combination of Beard and
`Rathmann is proper or that the combination of Beard and Rathmann teaches
`the activating a visible indication step. We agree with and adopt Petitioner’s
`arguments regarding the specific teachings of Beard and Rathmann and the
`respective mapping of those teachings to the activating a visible indication
`step. Furthermore, we agree with Petitioner’s contention that an ordinarily
`skilled artisan would have looked to Rathmann’s more detailed disclosure
`regarding the activation of the visible indication under the control of the
`microchip at least for the reasons proffered by Petitioner. See Pet. 17–23.
`Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance
`of the evidence, that claim 1 would have been obvious in view of the
`combined teachings of Beard and Rathmann.
`
`4. Claim 26
`Petitioner argues independent claim 26 recites the same limitations as
`independent claim 1, except “in the context of a device claim.” Pet. 47
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`(citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 177). In fact, the structural limitations recited in
`independent claim 265 each appear in method claim 1, and Petitioner has
`mapped various aspects of Beard and Rathmann to those elements, as
`discussed above with respect to claim 1. Therefore, for the same reasons as
`discussed above with respect to claim 1, we determine Petitioner has
`demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 26 would have
`been obvious in view of the combined teachings of Beard and Rathmann.
`
`5. Claim 2
`Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and further recites “said method
`includes the selection and activation of a function or mode of the product in
`response to a further activation signal(s) received from the user interface.”
`Petitioner contends Beard discloses this additional limitation. Pet. 36–38.
`For the following reasons, we agree with and adopt Petitioner’s contentions
`regarding Beard’s teachings of this limitation.
`Petitioner argues “Beard discloses selecting the function of providing
`battery power-level information in response to a further activation signal
`received from the user interface” because the user selects the function by
`touching contacts 211 and 213, and Beard displays the information on visual
`display 225 in response to the user touching the contacts. Pet. 36–37 (citing
`Ex. 1005, 7:44–48, 11:14–22, 11:31–33; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 72, 73, 144).
`Petitioner further asserts the user may activate the indicator multiple times
`
`
`5 Some terminology in claim 26 is slightly different than the terminology
`used in claim 1, but neither party argues the claims should be construed
`differently. See Ex. 1001, 12:27–41, 13:64–14:10. The differences in
`terminology in claims 1 and 26 do not affect our analysis of Petitioner’s
`challenges.
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`and that such repeated action of the user touching the sensors and displaying
`the information teaches the recited “selection and activation of a function or
`mode of the product in response to a further activation signal(s) received
`from the user interface.” Id. at 37–38.
`Patent Owner argues the use of different terms (i.e., “function or mode
`of the product” and “visible indication”) require different constructions. PO
`Resp. 24–26. As discussed above, we disagree with Patent Owner’s position
`that the proper construction of function excludes activating a visible
`indication. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, id. at 24, such a
`construction does not render claim 2 superfluous. Claim 2 recites an
`additional step of selecting and activating “a function or mode of the
`product.” Accordingly, although the recited language covers selection and
`activation of a function different than the visible indicator, the language of
`the method step in dispute also is broad enough to cover a repeated selection
`and activation of the visible indicator.
`For the foregoing reasons, we determine Petitioner has shown, by a
`preponderance of the evidence, that claim 2 of the ’952 patent would have
`been obvious in view of the combined teachings of Beard and Rathmann.
`
`6. Claims 3 and 24
`Petitioner also contends, Pet. 39–39, 45–46, Beard discloses the
`additional limitation of dependent claims 3 and 24, which depend from
`claims 2 and 1, respectively, and further recite “automatically deactivating a
`function that was activated in response to an activation signal received from
`said user interface, a predetermined period of time after it was activated.”
`Ex. 1001, 12:46–50, 13:55–59. For the following reasons, we agree with
`and adopt Petitioner’s contentions regarding Beard’s teachings of these
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`limitations. Id. Patent Owner argues the combination of Beard and
`Rathmann does not teach delayed deactivation of a function other than the
`activation of the visible indicator. PO Resp. 50–51. Patent Owner’s
`argument, however, depends on its proposed construction of “function” as
`limited to a function other than activation of the visible indicator, see id. at
`27–28, a construction which we have not adopted.
`Moreover, even under Patent Owner’s proposed construction
`requiring the function t