Filed on behalf of: Apple Inc., et al.
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`Entered: June 6, 2016
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________________
`
`APPLE INC. and MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`GLOBAL TOUCH SOLUTIONS, LLC,
`Patent Owner
`_______________________
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2015-01175
`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952 B2
`_______________________
`
`Before JUSTIN BUSCH, LYNN E. PETTIGREW, and
`BETH Z. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR PETITION FOR
`INTER PARTES REVIEW OF U.S. PATENT NO. 8,288,952
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`

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`Case IPR2015-01175
`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
`
`II.
`
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`
`The Prior Art Discloses the Claimed “Energy Consuming Load.” ................. 2
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`A. Global Touch’s Proposed Construction Should Be Rejected. .............. 2
`1.
`The Claim Language Does Not Support Global Touch’s
`Construction. ............................................................................... 3
`Global Touch Attempts to Improperly Read Limitations
`from the Specification Into the Claims. ...................................... 4
`The Claims of Global Touch’s Related Patents Contradict
`Its Narrow Construction. ............................................................. 8
`Beard Discloses the Claimed “Energy Consuming Load.”................. 10
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`B.
`
`III. The Prior Art Discloses the claimed “Function[s].” ...................................... 13
`
`A.
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`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
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`Beard Discloses At Least Three “Functions” Activated By the
`Touch Sensor ....................................................................................... 14
`Beard Discloses Functions Other than Activation of the Visible
`Indication. ............................................................................................ 16
`Global Touch’s Proposed Construction of “Function” Should
`Be Rejected. ......................................................................................... 17
`The Term “Touch Sens[or/ing] Functions” Needs No
`Construction In This Proceeding. ........................................................ 19
`
`IV. Global Touch’s Remaining Arguments Are Flawed. .................................... 20
`
`A.
`B.
`
`C.
`
`The Term “User Interface” Needs No Construction. .......................... 20
`Beard Discloses that the Power Source Is Enclosed in the
`Product Housing. ................................................................................. 20
`Global Touch’s Complaints About Mr. Beard’s Testimony
`Lack Merit. .......................................................................................... 22
`
`V.
`
`Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 24
`
`
`
`i
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`

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`Case IPR2015-01175
`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Patent Owner Global Touch Solutions, LLC’s opposition is noteworthy for
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`what it does not say. Global Touch and its expert witness do not dispute that all
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`the basic technical elements of its alleged invention were known and used by those
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`skilled in the field of portable, battery-powered devices in the late 1990s: batteries,
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`switches, microchips, touch sensors. Global Touch and its expert also nowhere
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`dispute that there was ample motivation among those in the field to combine
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`references with complementary disclosures to solve the familiar problem of how to
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`readily determine and indicate to a user the remaining battery power in a portable
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`device. Rather, Global Touch tries to save the claims of its patent from being
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`found invalid by adopting a familiar but flawed legal tactic: advocating an
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`improperly narrow construction of a central claim term to avoid the prior art by
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`improperly importing embodiments from the specification. This is improper under
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`the Phillips claim construction standard and the Broadest Reasonable Interpretation
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`standard governing in this proceeding.
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`Global Touch seeks to construe the simple term “energy consuming load,”
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`which appears in every claim, to require not just a load that consumes energy, but
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`also that a microchip controls the flow of power to the load. This proposed
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`construction, with its extraneous new limitation, finds no basis in the plain English
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`words of the claim, is flatly contradicted by the claims of Global Touch’s own
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`1
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`

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`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
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`related patents, and epitomizes a “cardinal sin” of patent law: reading a limitation
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`from an embodiment of the specification into the claims. Further, Global Touch
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`distorts the word “function” in an attempt to avoid the prior art, relying on a
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`tortured reading of the claims that is factually and legally unsound. These flawed
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`arguments should be rejected and the Board should invalidate all of the challenged
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`claims of the ’952 patent.
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`II. THE PRIOR ART DISCLOSES THE CLAIMED “ENERGY
`CONSUMING LOAD.”
`A. Global Touch’s Proposed Construction Should Be Rejected.
`The Board previously determined that the term “energy consuming load”
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`does not require construction. (Paper No. 8, “Inst. Dec.” at 4-5.) Global Touch
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`now asks the Board to reverse itself and construe the term, not by explaining or
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`clarifying any of those three words, but by adding a new limitation: “an energy-
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`consuming component that receives power from the power source under the
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`control of the microchip.”1 (Paper No. 14, “Response” at 20.) This construction is
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`not supported by the claims or specification, and is contradicted by the claims of
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`related patents. It should be rejected.
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`1 All emphasis added, unless otherwise noted.
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`2
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`

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`Case IPR2015-01175
`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
`1.
`
`The Claim Language Does Not Support Global Touch’s
`Construction.
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`Nothing in the claims supports Global Touch’s new requirement. First, the
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`claims do not include any language requiring that the microchip controls power to
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`the load. Claim 1, for example, is reproduced below:
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`1. A method for implementing a user interface of a product, the
`product comprising a power source, or a connection for a power
`source and at least one energy consuming load, said method including
`the step of using an electronic module comprising an electronic circuit
`including a microchip and a touch sensor forming part of the user
`interface, said microchip at least partially implementing the touch
`sensor functions and said method including the step of activating a
`visible indication in response to an activation signal received from the
`user interface, wherein the visible indication provides information to a
`user on at least one item from the following group:
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`a state or condition of the product,
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`location of the user interface,
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`a battery power level indication.
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`(Ex. 1001, “’952 patent” at 12:27-41.) The claim states that the electronic circuit
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`includes a microchip, the microchip “at least partially implementing the touch
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`sensor functions . . . .” The claim does not require, or even suggest, that the
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`microchip controls power to the load—a fact confirmed by Global Touch’s expert
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`during deposition. (Ex. 1033, “Morley Tr.” at 99:17-22.)
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
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`Second, the undisputed plain and ordinary meaning of the three words
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`“energy consuming load” is “any part of the product that consumes energy when
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`the product is used.” (Paper No. 3, “Petition” at 8-9.) This too was confirmed by
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`Global Touch’s expert during deposition. (Ex. 1034, “Morley Microsoft Tr.” at
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`102:1-5 (“So I believe that something could be an energy-consuming load whether,
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`in general, whether it’s under control of a micro [sic, microchip] or not. If it’s a
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`load and it consumes energy, it’s an energy consuming load generically speaking,
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`yes.”) Nothing about the words “energy consuming load” implies the existence of
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`a microchip, much less that a microchip controls power to the load. Global
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`Touch’s added requirement is unsupported by the claim language and contrary to
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`the plain meaning of the term.
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`2. Global Touch Attempts to Improperly Read Limitations
`from the Specification Into the Claims.
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`Global Touch’s construction is not supported by the specification, either.
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`“An inventor may provide a meaning for a term that is different from its ordinary
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`meaning by defining the term in the specification with reasonable clarity,
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`deliberateness, and precision.” (Inst. Dec. at 4 (citing In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475,
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`1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).) But absent such a clear, deliberate and precise definition,
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`it is one of the “cardinal sins” of patent law to import limitations from an
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`embodiment in the specification into the claims. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
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`4
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`1303, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The ’952 patent nowhere defines “energy
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`consuming load”; it uses the term in the ordinary way. Global Touch’s attempt to
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`read embodiments from the specification into the claims is error.
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`Global Touch argues that the “very character of the invention” compels the
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`conclusion that the words “energy consuming load” somehow mean that there is a
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`microchip that controls power to the energy consuming load. (Response at 16.)
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`This is incorrect. To be sure, the ’952 patent describes a microchip controlling
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`power to the load as a feature of one embodiment of the invention. But this
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`description of one aspect of an embodiment is not a definition of the “energy
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`consuming load.” Global Touch relies heavily on column 3, lines 61-66 in the
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`specification: “According to one embodiment of the present invention, there is
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`provided a microchip controlled switch to manage both the current conducting
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`functions and the MMI functions in an electronic device.” (’952 patent at 3:61-
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`64.) But that passage describes only what a “microchip controlled switch” does
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`according to one embodiment; it does not define what an “energy consuming load”
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`is.2
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`2 If Global Touch’s argument were correct, and the embodiments described in the
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`specification were so limiting, the claims would be confined to a flashlight, a fan, a
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`wall light, and any other embodiment described in the specification.
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
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`And the same is true for the portion of the specification relied on by Global
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`Touch as allegedly distinguishing the prior art based on microchip control of
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`power to the load. (Response at 18 (citing the ’952 patent at 7:23-29).) This
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`portion of the specification describes the features of “switch 102”; it does not
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`define or limit the “energy consuming load.” That Global Touch is reading
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`features from the specification into the claims is demonstrated by the testimony of
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`its own expert, who would interpret “energy consuming load” to include not just
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`microchip control of power to the load, but also two more features found nowhere
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`in the claim language: that the load be a “significant draw[] on the exhaustible
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`power supply” (without explaining what makes a draw “significant”) and that the
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`system include a “switch in series between the power supply” and the load (even
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`though this switch is nowhere in the claims). (Ex. 2002, “Morley Decl.” ¶ 15;
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`Morley Tr. at 88:4-19.) Global Touch is not only narrowly interpreting the term
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`“energy consuming load”; it is trying to improperly limit the claims to the specific
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`configuration described in embodiments in the specification.
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`Further, Global Touch’s effort to import elements of an embodiment into the
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`claims is legally flawed. Global Touch argues that because “[e]very single
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`embodiment disclosed in the ’952 Patent includes such a microchip-controlled
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`switch that manages conducting of current to the load” this limitation should be
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`read into the claims. (Response at 19.) But it is legal error to redraft the claims to
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`try to cover unclaimed features disclosed in the specification, even if the feature is
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`found in every embodiment. See Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. v. BioGenex Labs., Inc.,
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`473 F.3d 1173, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (refusing to read limitation found in all
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`embodiments in the specification into the claims because “[w]hen the claim
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`addresses only some of the features disclosed in the specification, it is improper to
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`limit the claim to other, unclaimed features”); see also E-Pass Techs., Inc. v.
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`3COM Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (refusing to read feature of
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`every embodiment from specification into the claims because “[a]n invention may
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`possess a number of advantages or purposes, and there is no requirement that every
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`claim directed to that invention be limited to encompass all of them”).
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`The cases cited by Global Touch support the same conclusion. Global
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`Touch relies primarily on Alloc, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 342 F.3d
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`1361, 1369-71 (Fed. Cir. 2003), but the Federal Circuit acknowledged there that “it
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`is impermissible to read the one and only disclosed embodiment into a claim
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`without other indicia that the patentee so intended to limit the invention.” 342 F.3d
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`at 1370. The Alloc court instead relied on the prosecution history and express
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`statements in the specification distinguishing the prior art to limit the invention.
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`Id. at 1369-72. Global Touch, by contrast, does not cite to the prosecution history,
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`and, as discussed above, the specification does not rely on a microchip controlling
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`power to the load as a distinction over the prior art.
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`7
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`

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`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
`3.
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`The Claims of Global Touch’s Related Patents Contradict
`Its Narrow Construction.
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`Further, the claims of Global Touch’s own related patents contradict its
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`narrow new construction. When the patentee wished to include a requirement that
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`the microchip control the flow of power, it did so expressly and without leaving it
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`implied in the term “energy consuming load.” Claim 52 of related U.S. Patent No.
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`7,329,970 (the “’970 patent)3, for example, recites “using the microchip to control
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`the connection of the power source to the load,” the “load” being a reference to the
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`“energy consuming load” mentioned earlier in the claim. (Ex. 1035, “’970 patent”
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`at cl. 52.) This is the very limitation Global Touch now tries to read implicitly into
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`the meaning of “energy consuming load.” If the term “energy consuming load”
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`already required microchip control of the flow of power to the load, there would
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`have been no need for Global Touch to expressly include this requirement in claim
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`52 of the related ’970 patent.4
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`3 The ’970 patent is the subject of related case IPR2015-01173.
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`4 Other related patents expressly claim the microchip controlling power to the
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`load, which further emphasizes that the term “energy consuming load” does not
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`include this limitation. See, e.g., Ex. 1036, U.S. Patent No. 6,621,225, Cl. 18 (a
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`parent of ’952 patent with same specification) (“said microchip and said power
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`8
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`In addition, it is established law that “unless otherwise compelled the same
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`claim term in the same patent or related patents carries the same construed
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`meaning.” In re Rambus Inc., 694 F.3d 42, 48 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotations
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`and alterations omitted). But here, Global Touch does not propose its narrow
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`construction across all of its related patents. It conspicuously avoids construing
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`“energy consuming load” for the ’970 patent, even though the claims include
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`precisely this term. (Ex. 1037, IPR2015-01173 Response.) Adopting Global
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`Touch’s proposed constructions would leave the Board contradicting the
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`controlling law of Rambus by construing “energy consuming load” differently in
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`the ’952 patent from the ’970 patent, with no justification for the difference.5
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`It is not surprising that Global Touch does not propose construing “energy
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`consuming load” for the ’970 patent, because applying its narrow new construction
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`switch control energy flow from said power source to said [energy consuming]
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`load”).
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`5 The ’970 patent is a continuation-in-part sibling of the ’952 patent, and has a
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`slightly different specification, but as shown in the redline attached as Exhibit 1038
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`the differences have no impact on the meaning of the term “energy consuming
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`load.” Dr. Morley confirmed during his deposition that the term should be
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`construed consistently across the Global Touch patents. (Morley Tr. at 90:1-14.)
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`9
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
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`to that patent would render its claim 52 nonsensical and redundant. Under Global
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`Touch’s construction, the claim would include the same limitation about
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`controlling power twice: “using the microchip to control the connection of the
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`power source to the [energy consuming load] [energy-consuming component
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`that receives power from the power source under the control of the
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`microchip].” This cannot be correct.
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`Further demonstrating the fallacy of Global Touch’s construction, there are
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`claims in related patents that require an “energy consuming load” but do not even
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`require a microchip, which Global Touch tries to read into its construction. For
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`example, claim 21 of U.S. Patent No. 7,498,749 (the “’749 patent”)6 recites an
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`“energy consuming load,” but does not require any microchip. (Ex. 1039, “’749
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`patent” at cl. 21.) Applying Global Touch’s construction to this claim would add a
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`microchip that is nowhere in the claim language. This, again, cannot be correct.
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`Beard Discloses the Claimed “Energy Consuming Load.”
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`B.
`Only based on its unduly narrow construction is Global Touch able to argue
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`that the prior art does not disclose an “energy consuming load.” (Response at 30-
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`31.) Global Touch’s construction is factually and legally unsupported, as
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`6 The ’749 patent is a sibling of the 952 patent and shares the same specification. It
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`is the subject of related case IPR2015-01172.
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`10
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
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`explained above. Beard discloses an “energy consuming load” under the plain
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`meaning of the term: any part of the product that consumes energy when the
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`product is used. (E.g., Petition at 29.) For example, Beard discloses a portable
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`electronic device, 203, with many different components that consume energy from
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`the battery pack when the product is used. (See, e.g., id.; Beard at 11:57-61, Figs.
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`5, 8, 11.)7
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`Further, even under Global Touch’s incorrect construction, the Beard
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`reference on its face discloses an energy consuming load. Global Touch asks the
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`Board to construe “energy consuming load” as “[1] an energy consuming
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`component that [2] receives power from the power source [3] under the control of
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`the microchip.” (Response at 31.) Beard discloses such an energy consuming
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`component when it discloses, for example, an Infrared Transceiver and Interface
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`Circuitry in the battery pack in Figure 11:
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`7 Global Touch spends much of its discussion of this limitation addressing
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`arguments never made by Petitioners. (Response at 33-45.) This discussion is
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`misleading and irrelevant, and should be ignored.
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`11
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
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`
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`(Beard at Fig. 11 (annotation added).)
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`As discussed in the Petition, the claimed microchip is the “Control
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`Circuitry” 223. (See, e.g., Petition at 32-33 (citing Beard at 11:12-22).) The
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`claimed power source is the Batteries 231. (See, e.g., id. at 30-31 (citing Beard at
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`11:24-26).)
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` According to Beard, the Infrared Transceiver 235, with its
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`accompanying Interface Circuity 233, is used to communicate information about
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`the battery consumption and life between the battery pack 201 and the portable
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`device 203. (See, e.g., Beard at 11:52-55.) This Infrared Transceiver meets even
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`Global Touch’s narrow construction. First, it is an energy consuming component,
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
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`which cannot be reasonably disputed. (Morley Tr. at 143:19-144:11; Ex. 1032,
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`“Beard Suppl. Decl.” ¶ 3.) Second, Beard discloses that the transceiver receives
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`power from the power source and that the power source is under control of the
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`microchip. (Morley Tr. at 143:19-144:11 (confirming that the transceiver receives
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`energy from the batteries); Beard Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 4-7 (explaining that the
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`transceiver receives energy from the batteries under control of the microchip.)
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`Figure 11 of Beard depicts the control circuit 223 (the “microchip”) placed
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`between the batteries 231 (the “power source”) and the interface circuitry 233 and
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`transceiver 235, thereby controlling power to the transceiver.
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`III. THE PRIOR ART DISCLOSES THE CLAIMED “FUNCTION[S].”
`Global Touch argues that the prior art fails to disclose numerous different
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`“function” limitations in the instituted claims (Response at 45-51, 54-55), but
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`Global Touch’s challenges boil down to two claim construction arguments. First,
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`it argues that “functions” in independent clams 1 and 26, and dependent claim 22,
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`should be construed to require more than one function and, second, it argues that
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`“function[s]” as used in dependent claims 2, 3, 22 and 24 should be construed to
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`exclude the function of activation of the visible indication. These arguments fail to
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`save the claims from being invalidated by the prior art.
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`First Petitioners do not dispute that claims 1, 22 and 26 recite plural
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`“functions,” but this is irrelevant; Beard expressly discloses at least three functions
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
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`that meet these claim limitations. Second, as discussed further below, Global
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`Touch is wrong that activation of the visible indication is not a function, but even
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`if it were right, Beard still discloses the limitations of claims 2, 3, 22 and 24 under
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`Global Touch’s restrictive construction.
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`A. Beard Discloses At Least Three “Functions” Activated By the
`Touch Sensor
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`Global Touch argues that Beard does not meet the limitations of claims 1, 22
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`and 26 because it does not disclose more than one function activated by the touch
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`sensor. (Response at 45-47, 54-55.) But Beard actually discloses activation, via
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`the touch sensor, of three functions: two functions relating to indicating remaining
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`battery life and one function related to timing. The two functions related to
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`remaining battery life are: (1) calculation and display of battery capacity (Beard at
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`11:31-40,) and (2) calculation and display of a remaining time estimate (Beard at
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`11:41-48). Global Touch contends that these are a single function, but the Beard
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`reference itself, and Global Touch’s expert’s testimony, make clear that each is
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`actually a distinct function. (See, e.g., Beard at 11:45-48 (“Instead of (or in
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`addition) displaying the percentage of available battery capacity, the control
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`circuitry 223 interacts with the display 225 to deliver the time estimates to the
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`operator.”.)
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`Global Touch concedes that Beard discloses the two features of calculating
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`and displaying battery capacity and calculating and displaying remaining battery
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`time. (Response at 46-47.) And Global Touch’s expert admits that each of these
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`two are “functions.” (Morley Tr. at 124:6-9, 126:2-14.) Global Touch’s expert
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`also concedes that the two are separate functions:
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`Q. Determining remaining time in a battery is a different function
`than just determining battery capacity, right?
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`A. Correct. The -- determining the time, you would need to know
`what the draw is, and if you know the capacity and the draw, you can
`estimate the time until it’s discharged.
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` (Morley Tr. at 126:16-22.) The expert’s conclusion is not surprising, since the
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`specification of the Beard reference repeatedly describes calculating and displaying
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`battery capacity as a different feature from calculating and displaying a remaining
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`time estimate. (See Beard at Abstract, 10:37-40, 11:45-48, 12:59-65.) Therefore,
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`Beard discloses two separate functions activated by the touch sensor.
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`Beard also discloses a third function: using a timer to determine when to
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`automatically deactivate the display. Beard discloses that “a timing circuit
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`prevents the contact 155 from holding the display 157 and associated circuitry in
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`an active state for more than a ten (10) second interval.” (Beard at 10:51-54.)
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`Global Touch’s expert confirmed at deposition that this timing is a function in the
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`context of the Global Touch patents. (Morley Tr. at 125:4-18.)
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`In addition, claims 3 and 24 require that the function be automatically
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`deactivated “a predetermined period of time” after it was activated. While Global
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`Touch does not specifically challenge this limitation, Beard nonetheless discloses
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`it: all three functions are automatically deactivated after ten seconds. (Beard at
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`10:51-56; see also Beard Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 9-10 (explaining that the timing circuit is
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`disabled after ten seconds).)
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`B.
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`Beard Discloses Functions Other than Activation of the Visible
`Indication.
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`These three functions disclosed in Beard also meet the limitations of claims
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`2, 3, 22 and 24, even under Global Touch’s erroneous narrowing of the word
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`“function” to exclude the function of activation of a visible indication. As
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`explained in the Petition, Beard’s disclosure of a display of battery capacity is the
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`claimed activation of a visible indication. (Petition at 32-33.) Beard’s disclosure
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`of calculation and display of a remaining time estimate, and the ten second timing
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`function, are therefore not activation of the same visible indication recited earlier
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`in the claim, and meet the limitations of claims 2, 3, 22 and 24, even if activation
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`of a visible indication did not qualify as a claimed function. (E.g., Beard at
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`Abstract (battery time estimate), 10:51-56 (ten second timer).)
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`16
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`Case IPR2015-01175
`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
`C. Global Touch’s Proposed Construction of “Function” Should Be
`Rejected.
`
`Further, Global Touch is incorrect to construe the word “function” to
`
`exclude the function of activation of a visible indication. Global Touch argues that
`
`because the claims use two different terms, “function” and “activation of a visible
`
`indication,” the term “function” must exclude the function of “activation of a
`
`visible indication.” This is not persuasive.
`
`Global Touch is correct that two different claim terms should normally be
`
`construed to have different meanings. (Response at 25.) Petitioners agree that
`
`“function” and “activation of a visible indication” mean different things:
`
`“function” is a broad term that encompasses any kind of function, while “activation
`
`of a visible indication” is a specific type of function. But that does not mean that
`
`“function” should be construed to exclude “activation of a visible indication.” The
`
`words “car” and “sedan” have different meanings. That does not mean that a
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`“sedan” cannot be a type of “car.”
`
`Global Touch’s own expert candidly admitted that “activation of a visible
`
`indication” is a “function”:
`
`Q. So indicating a condition of the battery, whether it's good or bad,
`is another example of a function according to the Global Touch
`patents, right?
`
` A. Yes.
`
`17
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-01175
`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
`
`(Morley Tr. at 118:21-119:3.) And in his declaration supporting case IPR2015-
`
`01172, relating to U.S. Patent No. 7,498,749 which is a sibling of the ’952 patent
`
`and shares the same specification, Global Touch’s expert states: “Claim 21 recites
`
`two separate function activations in response to an activation signal received via
`
`the user interface switch. One is recited as the activation of the visible indicator.”
`
`(Ex. 1040, IPR2015-01172 Morley Decl. ¶ 50.)
`
`The fact that activating an indicator is an example of a “function,” also is
`
`supported by the specification. The specification uses the term “function” broadly,
`
`and expressly states that “battery strength monitoring” is but one example of a
`
`function. (’952 patent at 8:58-63; see also, e.g., id. at 1:57-59.) Nothing in the
`
`specification suggests that the broad term “function” excludes any specific
`
`function of the invention.
`
`In addition, Global Touch argues that because claims 3 and 24 include two
`
`references to “an activation signal” these two references must correspond to
`
`different signals. (Response at 28.) This is wrong. Independent claim 1 recites
`
`“an activation signal.” (’952 patent at cl. 1.) Dependent claims 3 and 24 also each
`
`recite “an activation signal.” (Id. at cls. 3, 24.) Global Touch argues, in essence,
`
`that the identical phrase “an activation signal” has different meanings in different
`
`claims. But this is contrary to black-letter Federal Circuit law. See Rambus, 694
`
`F.3d at 48 (“unless otherwise compelled the same claim term in the same patent or
`
`18
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-01175
`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
`
`related patents carries the same construed meaning”). The phrase “an activation
`
`signal” means the same thing in all three claims: one or more activation signals
`
`(without any limitation as to the exact type or number of signals). See, e.g., Silicon
`
`Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Techs., Inc., 607 F.3d 784, 789-90 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding
`
`that “a rasterization process” referred to “one or more” processes and should not be
`
`limited). Global Touch’s attempt to narrow these claims should be rejected.
`
`D. The Term “Touch Sens[or/ing] Functions” Needs No
`Construction In This Proceeding.
`
`Global Touch offers a specific construction of “touch sens[or/ing]
`
`functions,” found in claims 1 and 26: “functions of the device that are activated or
`
`controlled in response to touch sensor inputs.” (Response at 24.) But Global
`
`Touch spends most of this section addressing a construction proposed by Microsoft
`
`in a different proceeding. (Response at 22-24.) Apart from the requirement for
`
`multiple functions, addressed above, Global Touch does not explain how or why
`
`this construction is relevant to this proceeding. Therefore, no specific construction
`
`is necessary. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1999) (holding that only terms which are in controversy need to be construed
`
`and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).
`
`19
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-01175
`U.S. Patent No. 8,288,952
`IV. GLOBAL TOUCH’S REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE FLAWED.
`A. The Term “User Interface” Needs No Construction.
`Global Touch construes the term “user interface” circularly (referring to it as
`
`an “operator” “interface”) and by adding yet another new limitation: “an interface
`
`between a device and its operator to receive and manage an input command from
`
`the operator.” (Response at 15.) The term “user interface” needs no construction
`
`in this proceeding; only terms which are in controversy need to be construed and
`
`only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am.
`
`Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Global Touch proposes to
`
`construe “user interface,” but it never applies this construction in its analysis and
`
`never explains why this construction could be relevant to any issue in this
`
`proceeding. Consequently, the Board should decline to construe this term.
`
`B.
`
`Beard Discloses that the Power Source Is Enclosed in the Product
`Housing.
`
`Global Touch argues that Beard does not disclose a power source “enclosed
`
`in” the product housing because “the batteries 231 and the components of the
`
`device 203 are not included in the same housing.” (Response at 52.) This is
`
`incorrect. Beard discloses two configurations for its device: the battery pack can
`
`be removed from the portable device and operated separately, or the battery pack
`
`can be in