`Tel: 571-272-7822
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`Paper 13
`Entered: December 1, 2015
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`
`VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SIGNAL IP, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2015-01116
`Patent 6,012,007
`_______________
`
`Before MEREDITH C. PETRAVICK, JEREMY M. PLENZLER, and
`JAMES A. TARTAL, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denying Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71
`
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`IPR2015-01116
`Patent 6,012,007
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`On October 29, 2015, Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
`(“Petitioner”) filed a Request for Rehearing (Paper 12, “Req. Reh’g”) of our
`Decision (Paper 11, “Dec.”) denying inter partes review of Petitioner’s
`challenge to U.S. Patent No. 6,012,007 (Ex. 1001, “the ’007 patent”).
`Specifically, our Decision denied inter partes review of Petitioner’s
`challenge to claims 1, 17, and 19–21 based on obviousness over Cashler1
`and Schousek2. See Dec. 9–10.
`Petitioner’s Request alleges that the Board misapprehended or
`overlooked certain matters set forth in the Petition (Paper 2) and in the
`supporting Declaration of Dr. A. Bruce Buckman (Ex. 1002, “the Buckman
`Declaration”). Req. Reh’g 1.
`
`
`II.
`
`STANDARD OF REVIEW
`Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition,
`a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” Abuse of
`discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of
`law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.”
`PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567
`(Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). In its request for rehearing, the
`dissatisfied party must identify the place in the record where it previously
`addressed each matter it submits for review. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).
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`1 U.S. Pat. No. 5,732,375, iss. Mar. 24, 1998 (Ex. 1003, “Cashler”).
`2 U.S. Pat. No. 5,474,327, iss. Dec. 12, 1995 (Ex. 1004, “Schousek”).
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`IPR2015-01116
`Patent 6,012,007
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`III. ANALYSIS
`A. Alleged Inconsistencies
`Petitioner argues that our Decision in this proceeding is inconsistent
`with that in IPR2015-01004 (“the ’004 IPR”) also concerning the ’007
`patent. Req. Reh’g 2. Petitioner contends that “the Board, in this
`proceeding, found that Schousek does not disclose ‘establishing a lock
`threshold above the first threshold,’ but found, in the ’004 IPR, that
`Schousek does disclose this limitation.” Id. at 3.
`Our Decision noted that, in this proceeding,
`Petitioner does not cite to anything in Schousek teaching “establishing a first
`threshold” as required by claim 1. Rather . . . Petitioner considers Cashler’s
`discussion of a “high threshold” as teaching “establishing a first threshold,”
`and Schousek’s discussion of a “maximum infant seat weight” as teaching
`“establishing a lock threshold” in claim 1. [Pet.] 20–21, 35–37. It is unclear
`how these teachings are combined in Petitioner’s challenge to provide the
`“lock threshold above the first threshold” recited in claim 1.
`Dec. 8. Petitioner offers no explanation as to how its contentions in this
`proceeding are the same as those presented by the petitioner in IPR2015-
`01004. See Req. Reh’g 2–3.
`Accordingly we are not persuaded of inconsistencies in our Decision.
`B. Combination of Cashler and Schousek
`Petitioner appears to contend that we should have read the Petition as
`considering each of Cashler’s “low threshold” and “high threshold” as
`teaching the “first threshold” recited by the claims, rather than just the “high
`threshold.” Req. Reh’g 3–8. For example, Petitioner contends that “[w]ith
`respect to the ‘establishing a first threshold of the relative weight parameter’
`claim element, the Petition does not merely state that Cashler teaches a
`‘high’ threshold,” but also states that “‘Cashler teaches multiple thresholds
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`IPR2015-01116
`Patent 6,012,007
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`of the total calculated weight and using those thresholds in deployment
`decisions,’ namely, the ‘low’ and ‘high’ thresholds.” Id. (citing Pet. 20).
`Petitioner notes that the citations to paragraphs 12 and 21 of the Buckman
`Declaration support this position. Id. at 6–8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 12, 21).
`The cited portion of the Petition states that “Cashler teaches a ‘low’
`and a ‘high’ (i.e., a ‘first threshold’) threshold” when discussing the
`“establishing a first threshold” limitation. Pet. 20. In the following
`paragraph, when discussing the “allowing deployment when the relative
`weight parameter is above the first threshold” limitation, the Petition again
`specifically characterizes Cashler’s “high threshold” as the “first threshold”
`recited in the claims, stating that “[i]f the weight is above the high (i.e., the
`‘first threshold’) threshold then deployment is allowed.” Id. Petitioner
`attempts to support its new position that Cashler’s “low threshold” teaches
`the claimed “first threshold” by explaining that “[b]ecause the ‘high’
`threshold is necessarily greater than the ‘low’ threshold, and deployment is
`allowed when the weight is above the ‘high’ threshold, it is self-evident that
`deployment is also allowed when the weight is above the ‘low’ threshold.”
`Id. at 6.
`We are not persuaded that the Petition relied on Cashler’s “low
`threshold” as teaching the “first threshold” recited in the claims.
`Accordingly, we could not have overlooked or misapprehended this
`argument, as it was not raised in the Petition.
`Petitioner additionally appears to contend that we should have read
`the Petition as considering Schousek as teaching the “first threshold” recited
`in the claims. See Reh’g Req. 7–8. For the reasons noted above, we are not
`persuaded that Petitioner relied on anything other than Cashler’s “high
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`IPR2015-01116
`Patent 6,012,007
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`threshold” as corresponding to this limitation. We additionally note that the
`Petition’s claim chart cites only Cashler for the “establishing a first
`threshold” limitation. See Pet. 35–36.
`Petitioner fails to explain persuasively any further alleged error in our
`Decision. See id. at 8–9.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`For the reasons stated above, Petitioner’s request for rehearing is
`denied.
`
`
`
`PETITIONER:
`
`Michael J. Lennon
`Clifford A. Ulrich
`Michelle Carniaux
`KENYON & KENYON LLP
`ptab@kenyon.com
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Tarek N. Fahmi
`ASCENDA LAW GROUP, PC
`tarek.fahmi@ascendalaw.com
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