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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`________________________
`VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.,
`
`Petitioner,
`v.
`SIGNAL IP, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`Case IPR2015-01116
`Patent 6,012,007
`________________________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S ADDITIONAL BRIEFING CONCERNING THE
`STIPULATION AND PARTIAL JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY IN THE
`RELATED LITIGATION
`
`
`
`1  
`
`
`
`  
`
`

`
`Pursuant to the Board’s Order of September 2, 2015, Patent Owner submits
`
`the following additional briefing to address the issues raised by the parties’
`
`stipulation and the Court’s partial judgment of invalidity in the underlying
`
`litigations.
`
`
`
`(1) Claims 1, 17, and 20 of the ‘007 patent are not indefinite.
`
`Petitioner challenges the patentability of claims 1-3, 5, 9, and 17-21 of
`
`U.S. Patent 6,012,007 (the “’007 Patent”). In the Court’s order of partial
`
`summary judgment in the underlying litigation, claims 1, 8, 9, 17, 18, 19,
`
`and 20 were found invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2.1
`
`This determination was made pursuant to the parties’ stipulation that,
`
`In light of the Court’s claim construction order, Plaintiff
`and Defendants stipulate to entry of a partial final
`judgment that the following claims are invalid due to
`indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2: . . .
`(iii) claims 1, 8, 9, 17, 18, 19, and 20 of the ’007 patent.2
`
`Notably, this stipulation related to a procedural action concerning the “entry
`
`of a partial final judgment,” and not to the correctness of the Court’s
`
`determination concerning validity of the subject claims. This is evidenced by
`
`                                                                                                                
`  
`
`1 Ex. 3001 at 2.
`
`2 Ex. 2002 at 2.
`
`2  
`
`

`
`further provisions of the stipulation that,
`
`Plaintiff and Defendants reserve all appellate rights,
`including, but not limited to, the right to appeal the
`Court’s April 17, 2015 claim construction order to the
`United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
`Plaintiff reserves all rights as to claims not addressed by
`the Court’s claim construction order, or any new claims
`that may be issued by the United States Patent Office.3
`
`With respect to claims 1, 17, and 20 the Court deemed the term
`
`“relative weight parameter” to be indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
`
`paragraph 2.4 The relative weight parameter is calculated from sensor
`
`outputs and airbag deployment is allowed when the relative weight
`
`parameter is above an established first threshold.5 Further, when the relative
`
`weight parameter is above a lock threshold (established above the first
`
`threshold), a lock flag is set provided airbag deployment has been allowed
`
`for a given time. The flag is cleared when the relative weight parameter is
`
`below an unlock threshold (indicative of an empty seat) for a time.6
`
`                                                                                                                
`
`3 Id. at 2-3.
`
`4 Ex. 2001 at 60-63.
`
`5 Ex. 1001 at 5:48-54.
`
`6 Id. at 5:55-63.
`
`  
`
`3  
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`

`
`The specification does not specifically define the “relative weight
`
`parameter,” but does specify that the subject supplemental inflatable
`
`restraint (SIR) system is intended to inhibit airbag deployment when a seat is
`
`empty or occupied by a small child.7 This goal is accomplished by “tuning”
`
`the system to inhibit deployment for occupants weighing less than a first
`
`amount and, concurrently, always allowing deployment for occupants
`
`weighing more than a second amount.8 Passenger weight is determined by a
`
`seat occupant sensing system in which various sensors provide outputs
`
`proportional to the pressure exerted thereon, and a microprocessor analyzes
`
`these signals.9
`
`In light of this explanation, a person of ordinary skill in the art would
`
`readily conclude that the recited “relative weight parameter” is a measure
`
`(for example, related to the weight of a passenger as determined by the
`
`sensors) that permits the determination of whether or not to allow airbag
`
`deployment according to (i.e., relative to) the established thresholds therefor.
`
`A number of examples of a relative weight parameter are given in various
`
`                                                                                                                
`
`dependent claims:
`
`7 Id. at 2:55-58.
`
`8 Id. at 2:58-61.
`
`9 Id. at 2:61 – 3:10.
`
`  
`
`4  
`
`

`
`In claim 3, the relative weight parameter “is the total
`force detected by all the sensors.” In claim 4, the
`“relative weight parameter is a long term average
`obtained by the following steps: averaging all sensor
`outputs over a plurality of sample events to obtain a
`cumulative average; and long term filtering the
`cumulative average to obtain the long term average.” In
`claim 5, “the relative weight parameter is a load rating
`obtained by: calculating a load rating for each sensor as a
`function of the difference between the sensor output and
`a base value; and summing the load rating for all the
`sensors to derive a total load rating.” In claim 6, “the
`relative weight parameter is a fuzzy value obtained by:
`calculating a total load rating for all the sensors;
`determining a fuzzy load value from the total load rating;
`calculating a long term average for all the sensors;
`determining a fuzzy average value from the long term
`average; and combining the fuzzy average and the fuzzy
`load value to obtain the fuzzy value.” Claims 21-23
`depend from claim 17, and, like claims 3-6, provide
`detailed embodiments of possible relative weight
`parameters (the total force, long term average of sensor
`outputs, and total load rating, respectively). Claim 20
`depends from claim 17, but does not give an exemplary
`relative weight parameter. Rather, in claim 20, “the
`microprocessor is further programmed to inhibit
`deployment when the relative weight parameter is below
`
`5  
`
`  
`
`

`
`a second threshold.”10
`The Court mistakenly concluded that claims 1, 17, and 20 do not
`
`make clear what the bounds of a relative weight parameter may or may not
`
`be.11 However, claim breadth is not necessarily synonymous with
`
`indefiniteness.12 Indeed, a single embodiment may provide broad support for
`
`the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art in cases involving
`
`predictable factors, such as mechanical or electrical elements.13
`
`Here, a person of ordinary skill in the art would readily understand the
`
`boundaries of claims 1, 17, and 20, because the recited “relative weight
`
`parameter” must be sufficient to permit a determination of whether or not to
`
`                                                                                                                
`
`10 Ex. 2001 at 60-61 (citations omitted).
`
`11 Id. at 61.
`
`12 Cf. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) (a
`
`claim, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, need only
`
`inform with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of
`
`the invention to satisfy § 112); Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. M-I
`
`LLC, 514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (indefiniteness requires that a skilled
`
`artisan could not discern the boundaries of a claim).
`
`13 See, e.g., In re Vickers, 141 F.2d 522, 526-27 (CCPA 1944); In re Cook,
`
`439 F.2d 730, 734 (CCPA 1971).
`
`  
`
`6  
`
`

`
`allow airbag deployment according to the established first threshold and lock
`
`threshold. In other words, by establishing these thresholds, the bounds of the
`
`relative weight parameter are defined. As to what may constitute the
`
`measure of the relative weight parameter, the specification is replete with
`
`examples,14 all of which are dependent on the weight of the seat occupant
`
`(i.e., the forces determined by the sensors that make up seat occupant
`
`sensing system). As stated in the specification, the use of such measures
`
`allows for a determination of whether a seat occupant is an adult-sized
`
`person, in which case airbag deployment is allowed, or not, in which case
`
`deployment should be prohibited.15
`
`Accordingly, claims 1, 17, and 20 are not indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §
`
`112, paragraph 2.
`
`
`
`(2) If the Board determines the claims 1 and 17 are indefinite, that
`
`determination should not extend to the challenged dependent claim.
`
`If the Board determines that claims 1 and 17 are indefinite under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2 because the meaning of “relative weight
`
`parameter” is not sufficiently clear, that determination should not extend to
`
`                                                                                                                
`  
`
`14 See, e.g., Ex. 1001 at 3:49-56; 4:12-35.
`
`15 Id. at 5:25-29.
`
`7  
`
`

`
`at least claims 3, 5, and 21, because each of these respective dependent
`
`claims sufficiently defines the relative weight parameter to permit a person
`
`of ordinary skill in the art to discern the bounds of the claims.16
`
`Claims 3 and 21, for example, each specify that the relative weight
`
`parameter “is the total force detected by all the sensors.” Claim 5 specifies
`
`that “the relative weight parameter is a load rating obtained by: calculating a
`
`load rating for each sensor as a function of the difference between the sensor
`
`output and a base value; and summing the load rating for all the sensors to
`
`derive a total load rating.” These claims restrict the relative weight
`
`parameter to readily determinable quantities and measures. Accordingly,
`
`there are not indefinite.
`
`
`
`(3) If the Board determines any of the challenged claims are indefinite,
`
`the Board should not institute this proceeding as to those claims.
`
`As noted above, the parties have not stipulated to indefiniteness of
`
`claims 1, 8, 9, 17, 18, 19, and 20. Rather, the parties stipulated to “entry of a
`
`partial final judgment,” but left open their options to appeal the Court’s
`
`determination of indefiniteness.17 No admissions or concessions were made
`
`                                                                                                                
`  
`
`16 Nautilus, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120.
`
`17 Ex. 2002 at 2-3.
`
`8  
`
`

`
`concerning the validity of the challenged claims as a result of the parties’
`
`stipulation.
`
`Notwithstanding the above, if the Board separately determines that
`
`claims 1, 8, 9, 17, 18, 19, and 20 are incapable of being construed, for
`
`example because the Board determines the claims are indefinite, then the
`
`Board should exercise its discretion and deny institution as to those claims.18
`
`Where a claim’s meaning is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2, any
`
`rejection based on prior art is improperly based on speculation.19
`
`Accordingly, if the Board determines that claims 1, 8, 9, 17, 18, 19, and 20
`
`are indefinite, then it would be improper to institute an inter partes review
`
`based on any comparison of those claims to the asserted prior art.
`
`
`
`(4) If the Board determines the parties have stipulated that the
`
`challenged claims are indefinite, the Board should deny the petition
`
`with respect to those claims.
`
`Although Patent Owner believes that the parties’ stipulation is not an
`
`agreement that claims 1, 8, 9, 17, 18, 19, and 20 are indefinite, if the Board
`
`                                                                                                                
`
`18 See, e.g., Blackberry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas, LLC, Case IPR2013-
`
`00036, slip op. at 20 (PTAB Mar. 7, 2014) (Paper 65).
`
`19 In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–63 (CCPA 1962).
`
`  
`
`9  
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`

`
`determines otherwise then the Board should exercise its discretion under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 314 to deny the Petition with respect to those claims. As indicated
`
`above, it would be improper to institute an inter partes review based on any
`
`comparison of claims deemed to be indefinite to the asserted prior art.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`Dated: September 10, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Ascenda Law Group, PC
`333 W San Carlos St., Suite 200
`San Jose, CA 95110
`Tel: 866-877-4883
`Email: tarek.fahmi@ascendalaw.com
`
`
`
`
`
`/Tarek N. Fahmi/
`Tarek N. Fahmi
`Reg. No. 41,402
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`  
`
`10  
`
`

`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing
`PATENT OWNER’S ADDITIONAL BRIEFING CONCERNING THE
`STIPULATION AND PARTIAL JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY IN THE
`RELATED LITIGATION
`
`was served on September 10, 2015, by filing this document though the
`Patent Review Processing System as well as by delivering a copy via email
`directed to the attorneys of record for the Petitioner at the following address:
`Michael J. Lennon
`Clifford A. Ulrich
`Michelle Carniaux
`Kenyon & Kenyon LLP
`One Broadway
`New York NY 10004
`
`ptab@kenyon.com
`
`
`
`
`The parties have agreed to electronic service in this proceeding.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`/Tarek N. Fahmi/
`Dated: September 10, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Tarek N. Fahmi
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Reg. No. 41,402
`Ascenda Law Group, PC
`333 W San Carlos St., Suite 200
`San Jose, CA 95110
`Tel: 866-877-4883
`Email: patents@ascendalaw.com
`
`
`
`  
`
`11  

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