Paper No. 106
`Filed: January 6, 2020
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`––––––––––––––––––
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`––––––––––––––––––
`
`THE MANGROVE PARTNERS MASTER FUND, LTD., APPLE INC., and
`BLACK SWAMP IP, LLC,
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`VIRNETX INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`––––––––––––––––––
`
`Case No. IPR2015-010471
`U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151
`
`––––––––––––––––––
`
`PETITIONERS’ REPLY REMAND BRIEF
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`
`
`
`
`1 Apple Inc. and Black Swamp IP, LLC, which filed petitions in IPR2016-00063
`and IPR2016-00167, respectively, have been joined as Petitioners in the instant
`proceeding.
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01047
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Introduction .................................................................................................... 1
`I.
`II. Claim Construction ....................................................................................... 1
`A.
`“Client” .................................................................................................. 1
`1.
`The Claim Language Supports Petitioners’ Construction .......... 2
`2.
`The Specification Confirms a “Client” Is Not Necessarily a
`User’s Computer ......................................................................... 4
`The Extrinsic Evidence Supports Petitioners’ Construction ...... 7
`3.
`“Encrypted Channel Between [A] and [B]” .......................................... 9
`B.
`III. The Challenged Claims Are Unpatentable................................................ 11
`A. Kiuchi Anticipates the Challenged Claims and Renders them Obvious
`with Rescorla ....................................................................................... 11
`1.
`Petitioners’ Anticipation Ground Is Correct and Properly
`Considered on Remand ............................................................. 11
`VirnetX Advances No Credible Response to the Petition’s
`Anticipation Ground ................................................................. 13
`Kiuchi with Rescorla Renders End-to-End Encryption
`Obvious ..................................................................................... 18
`Kiuchi in view of RFC 1034, With or Without Rescorla, Renders the
`Challenged Claims Obvious ................................................................ 20
`1.
`Kiuchi’s Client-Side Proxy Meets Petitioners’ and VirnetX’s
`Construction of “Client” ........................................................... 21
`Kiuchi’s Client-Side Proxy Meets Even VirnetX’s Construction
`of “Client Computer” ................................................................ 23
`VirnetX’s Nonobviousness Arguments Lack Merit ................. 25
`3.
`Dr. Guerin’s Testimony is Probative and Entitled to Weight ............. 27
`C.
`IV. VirnetX’s Procedural Arguments Are Meritless ...................................... 28
`A. VirnetX Concedes the Evidence Shows No § 315(b) Violation ......... 28
`B.
`VirnetX’s Arthrex Complaints Should Be Dismissed ......................... 32
`C.
`VirnetX Is Not Prejudiced by Apple’s Participation .......................... 33
`
`B.
`
`2.
`
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`IPR2015-01047
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151
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`V. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 34
`Exhibit List ............................................................................................................. 35
`Certificate of Compliance ...................................................................................... 39
`Certificate of Service .............................................................................................. 40
`
`
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`IPR2015-01047
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Abbott Labs. v. Cordis Corp.,
`710 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .......................................................................... 24
`Anchor Wall Systems, Inc. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc.,
`340 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ........................................................................ 7, 9
`Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp.,
`897 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .......................................................................... 32
`Arctic Cat Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc.,
`No. 19-1440 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 2019) ............................................................... 29
`Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
`941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .......................................................................... 32
`Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP,
`616 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............................................................................ 3
`Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc.,
`250 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .......................................................................... 16
`CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG,
`224 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ............................................................................ 5
`Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp.,
`658 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .......................................................................... 13
`ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc.,
`700 F.3d 509. (Fed. Cir. 2012) ........................................................................... 16
`Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC,
`IPR2012-00001, Paper 26, 6 (March 3, 2013) ................................................... 28
`In re Gleave,
`560 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .......................................................................... 21
`Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. Commerce Bancshares, Inc.,
`682 F. App’x 891 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ..................................................................... 17
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`IPR2015-01047
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151
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`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ............................................................................................ 19
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .............................................................................. 6
`Nidec Motor Corporation v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd.,
`868 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .......................................................................... 33
`Novartis AG v. Noven Pharmaceuticals,
`853 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .......................................................................... 23
`In re NuVasive, Inc.,
`841 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 28
`Omega Eng’g, Inc, v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................................................................ 3
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) .................................................... 2, 6, 7
`In re Rambus Inc.,
`694 F.3d 42 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................ 4
`Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp.,
`299 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ............................................................................ 6
`U.S. v. $671,160.00 in U.S. Currency,
`730 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2013) ............................................................................ 31
`VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ...................................................................passim
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 315(b) ....................................................................................... 28, 32, 33
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5) ............................................................................................... 29
`Other Authorities
`37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b)(2)(iii)-(iv) ............................................................................... 31
`37 C.F.R. § 42.23 ..................................................................................................... 28
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.52 ..................................................................................................... 29
`37 C.F.R. § 42.62 ..................................................................................................... 31
`
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`IPR2015-01047
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`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151
`
`VirnetX’s opposition (“Opp.”) strains the language of its claims, the ’151
`
`patent’s specification, and the record of these and related proceedings to contend
`
`its claims are patentable over Kiuchi. They are not—as Petitioners explained in
`
`their petition (“Pet.”), reply (“Reply”), and opening remand brief (“Br.”), Kiuchi
`
`renders the challenged claims unpatentable.
`
`II. Claim Construction
`
`A.
`
`“Client”
`
`The plain and ordinary meaning of a “client”—“a device, computer, system,
`
`or program from which a data request to a server is generated”—aligns fully with
`
`the language and context of the claims in this and VirnetX’s related patents, the
`
`’151 patent specification, and the extrinsic record. Pet. 15; Br. 6-9.
`
`VirnetX contends a “client” can only be a user’s computer. Opp. 6-9.
`
`VirnetX’s expert admitted the ’151 patent did not give “client” a special definition
`
`(Ex. 1036, 74:15-75:16, 95:1-5), and VirnetX identifies nothing in the prosecution
`
`history that altered its plain and ordinary meaning. Those facts doom VirnetX’s
`
`efforts to redefine this term now. The Board has thus properly rejected VirnetX’s
`
`attempts to constrict the meaning of “client.” E.g., IPR2014-00403, Paper 42, 23-
`
`24; IPR2014-00404, Paper 42, 7-9; IPR2014-00481, Paper 35, 26-27; IPR2014-
`
`00482, Paper 34, 9-12.
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151
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`1.
`
`The Claim Language Supports Petitioners’ Construction
`
`The language and context in which “client” is used in the claims confirms
`
`that Petitioners’ construction is correct. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
`
`1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The claims use “client” to distinguish the
`
`component that generates a “request” from the component referenced in that
`
`request. Claim 1 recites, for example, “intercept[ing] DNS requests sent by a
`
`client,” and “determining whether the intercepted DNS request corresponds to a
`
`secure server.”2 Those roles align with the conventional meaning of “client” in a
`
`client-server system; the “client” generates a request, while the “server” is
`
`identified by that request.
`
`Petitioners’ construction likewise reflects the skilled artisan’s understanding
`
`that a device in a client-server system that acts as a server in one operation can act
`
`as a client in another. Ex. 1014, 5-6. Indeed, nothing in the claims precludes a
`
`“secure server” in a first transaction from being a “client” in a second transaction
`
`involving a different “secure server.” Thus, far from “do[ing] violence to the claim
`
`language” (Opp. 6), Petitioners’ construction perfectly aligns with it.
`
`VirnetX’s construction, conversely, finds no support in the language or
`
`context of the claims. Critically, none of the claims contain language requiring the
`
`
`
`2 All emphasis added unless otherwise noted.
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151
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`device making the request to be a “user’s computer” despite the specification
`
`explicitly using that term. The claims also do not require checking a user’s status
`
`or credentials—they instead specify actions based on attributes of the request or
`
`the device making the request. For example, claims 1, 7, or 13, asses attributes of
`
`the domain name in the request (i.e., whether the “DNS request corresponds to a
`
`secure server”), while claims 2, 8, and 14 inquire “whether the client is authorized
`
`to access the secure server.” See also §III.B.2. And the “client,” of course, is a
`
`device, not a person.
`
`VirnetX’s related patents likewise contradict its arguments. For example,
`
`claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 9,386,000 recites a “client device” and then adds that
`
`“the client device is a user device.”3 If “client” device already meant a “user”
`
`device, the additional language in this claim would be superfluous. See Becton,
`
`Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 616 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2010). VirnetX’s related patents thus confirm a “client” device is not necessarily a
`
`“user’s” computer. Omega Eng'g, Inc, v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1334 (Fed.
`
`
`
`4 Any confusion VirnetX has about the support in the record for this ground (Opp.,
`
`13, n.5) is a problem of its own making. Petitioners have consistently maintained
`
`the client-side proxy is the “DNS proxy module” in this mapping.
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151
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`Cir. 2003) (claim terms presumed to have the same meaning in related patents); In
`
`re Rambus Inc., 694 F.3d 42, 48 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`2.
`
`The Specification Confirms a “Client” Is Not Necessarily a
`User’s Computer
`
`Given the absence of support for its proposed construction in the language
`
`and context of the claims, VirnetX reads its patent specification as supposedly
`
`redefining “client” to mean only a user’s computer. But the specification expressly
`
`distinguishes a “client” from a “user’s computer,” and the passages VirnetX cites
`
`cannot justify limiting the claims as it proposes.
`
`Initially, VirnetX dismisses the ’151 patent’s distinction between a “user’s
`
`computer” and a “client” (Ex. 1001, 38:54-57, 38:59-66, 44:8-13), contending the
`
`terms “are described synonymously” and are “not distinguish[ed].” Opp. 8. But
`
`the specification refutes VirnetX’s assertions: one passage states a “user’s
`
`computer … includes a conventional client (e.g., a web browser)…” (Ex. 1001,
`
`37:51-52), while another uses “client” without any statement or suggestion it must
`
`be a user’s device (Id., 15:61-64, Fig. 8). VirnetX ignores the latter, and
`
`implausibly asserts the former supports its construction, arguing that because a
`
`“user’s computer” has “a client” on it, the patent specification has equated a
`
`“client” with the “user’s computer.” Opp. 3. But that ignores that this sentence
`
`expressly differentiates the terms “user’s computer” and “client” and that its
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`language is illustrative, not definitional—a web browser running on the user’s
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`computer is identified as an example (“e.g.,”) of a client. And while VirnetX
`
`argues the specification supports its construction because it does “not distinguish”
`
`between the terms (Opp. 8), that flouts the presumption that “the use of …
`
`different terms … connotes different meanings.” CAE Screenplates, Inc. v.
`
`Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
`
`VirnetX contends other passages discussing authorization of users compel
`
`equating “client” with “user’s computer.” Opp. 3-5. They do not. One, describing
`
`a single embodiment of the invention, calls for a determination that a user has
`
`sufficient security privileges, but critically, imposes no restrictions on how that
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`determination is made, much less requires it to be made with a “user’s computer.”
`
`Ex. 1001, 37:60-66. Instead, it explains a user’s authorization can be checked
`
`without a user’s credentials and can be delegated to devices other than the “user’s
`
`computer.” Id., 38:46-50 (“Such a check can be made with reference to an
`
`internally stored list of authorized IP addresses or can be made by communicating
`
`with gatekeeper 2603 (e.g., over an “administrative” VPN 50 that is secure).” In
`
`the former case, if the IP address of a proxy computer associated with a user’s
`
`computer is on the “internally stored list” it would authorize the user in this
`
`example (as in Kiuchi).
`
`VirnetX also argues that, “[i]n every example” in the specification, “the
`
`computer at the other end of the encrypted/secure channel from the ‘secure
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`server’—the claimed ‘client’—is the computer being operated by the user.” Opp.
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`3. That is incorrect (see above), and even if true, would not justify redefining
`
`“client” to mean “a user’s computer.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358
`
`F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting contention that claims must be limited to
`
`a patent’s single embodiment). VirnetX also identifies no “expressions of manifest
`
`exclusion of restriction representing a clear disavowal of claim scope” (Teleflex,
`
`Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002)), and its expert,
`
`Dr. Monrose, conceded there were none (Ex. 1036, 74:15-75:16, 95:1-5). VirnetX
`
`simply ignores the “distinction between using the specification to interpret the
`
`meaning of a claim and importing limitations from the specification into the
`
`claim.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
`
`VirnetX also asserts the specification “expressly distinguishes the ‘client’
`
`from proxies like Kiuchi’s client-side proxy.” Opp. 4, 7-8. But here VirnetX
`
`ignores that one computer can play multiple roles in a client-server system. And by
`
`stating, “[t]he destination server sees only the [IP] address of the proxy server and
`
`not the originating client,” (Ex. 1001, 1:64-65), its specification not only confirms
`
`that multiple types of clients exist in the claimed systems but that from the
`
`destination server’s perspective, the “client” can be the proxy server.
`
`Other passages use “client” without any reference or context suggesting the
`
`necessity of a “user.” See, e.g., id., 6:38-40; 6:41-42; 7:27-30; 15:61-16:49.
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`VirnetX cannot simply dismiss these passages because they purportedly do not
`
`describe “the claimed VPN.” Opp. 9. As the Federal Circuit has held, “claim terms
`
`are normally used consistently throughout the patent,” Phillips, 451 F.3d at 1314,
`
`and a “varied use of a disputed term in the written description attests to the breadth
`
`of a term rather than providing a limiting definition,” Anchor Wall Systems, Inc. v.
`
`Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
`
`The ’151 patent’s thus uses “client” in its ordinary sense: “a device,
`
`computer, system, or program from which a data request to a server is generated.”
`
`3.
`
`The Extrinsic Evidence Supports Petitioners’ Construction
`
`Petitioners’ extrinsic evidence addresses a skilled artisan’s understanding of
`
`“clients” in the same context as the claimed systems: secure communications over
`
`the Internet using a “conventional client” in a client-server system. Ex. 1001,
`
`37:51-52. RFC 1945 defines the HTTP protocol from the late 1990s and early
`
`2000s (Ex. 1014, 1, 4), RFC 1983 concerns communications between two
`
`computers over “the Internet” (Ex. 1037, 1), and the Microsoft Computer
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`Dictionary defines “client” in “a local area network or the Internet.” Ex. 1043, 88.
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`Each describes a “client” as not being limited to a “user’s” computer, but as
`
`encompassing any “device, computer, system, or program from which a data
`
`request to a server is generated.” Pet. 15; Br. 6-9; Ex. 1014, 5 (any “application
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`program that establishes connections for the purpose of sending requests.”); Ex.
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`1037, 11 (“A computer system or process that requests a service of another
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`computer system or process”); Ex. 1043, 88 (“a computer that accesses shared
`
`network resources provided by another computer”). Each aligns with the ’151
`
`patent’s specification’s statement that a computer can include a client, and that a
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`web browser is an example of a client. Ex. 1001, 37:50-51.
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`VirnetX claims that RFC 1945 defines a “user agent” as “[t]he client which
`
`initiates a request” (Opp. 5 n.2), but ignores RFC 1945’s explanation that a proxy
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`“acts as both a server and a client for the purpose of making requests on behalf of
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`other clients” and that “[a]ny given program may be capable of being both a client
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`and a server; … these terms refers only to the role being performed by the program
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`for a particular connection, rather than to the program’s capabilities in general.”
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`(Ex. 1014, 5-6). See also Ex. 1037, 11 (defining “client” as a “computer system or
`
`process that requests a service of another computer system or process”); Ex. 1043,
`
`88 (explaining that, in a “client/server architecture,” both client and server can be
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`personal computers).
`
`VirnetX cites the Computer Desktop Encyclopedia (Ex. 2028), but this
`
`supports Petitioners’ construction, explaining “client” encompasses not only a
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`“workstation or personal computer in a client/server environment” but also “[o]ne
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`end of the spectrum in a request/supply relationship between programs,” i.e., a
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`component “from which a data request to a server is generated.” Ex. 2028, 3; Pet.
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`IPR2015-01047
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`15. Moreover, the “varied use of a disputed term … attests to the breadth of a term
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`rather than providing a limiting definition.” Anchor Wall, 340 F.3d at 1308–09.
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`Finally, VirnetX’s criticisms of the expert testimony are unwarranted. Opp.
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`5-6. Dr. Guerin testified that Kiuchi’s client-side proxy (consistent with RFC
`
`1945) “acts as a client computer in forwarding data requests to the server-side
`
`proxy and as a server in forwarding responses to data requests from the user
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`agent.” Ex. 1003, ¶16; Ex. 1014, 5. Likewise, Dr. Monrose testified that a
`
`computer that makes a request of another can be considered a “client” device. Ex.
`
`1036, 97:16-99:4.
`
`B.
`
`“Encrypted Channel Between [A] and [B]”
`
`VirnetX contends “between [A] and [B]” in the claims means “extending
`
`from [A] to [B]” (Opp. 9-10), and relies on this construction to assert the ’151
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`patent claims require “end-to-end” encryption—that traffic must be encrypted over
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`the entire path from A to B. Opp. 15-16, 22-23.
`
`VirnetX asserts its construction is correct because it was adopted by a
`
`district court. Opp. 9-10. But the claims of the ’151 patent must be construed with
`
`their broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI), not the narrower claim construction
`
`standard that district courts use. But VirnetX urged the district court to reject this
`
`narrower construction, arguing “between [A] and [B]” in the context of the ’151
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`patent’s claims and specification must be read more broadly—that “[s]ecurity—
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`i.e., encryption—is only necessary for public communication paths for the security
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`objective of the patents to be met because security can be inherently present on
`
`private portions of the path.” Ex. 1009, 10.
`
`Certainly, VirnetX would not have proposed an unreasonable construction of
`
`“between [A] and [B]” to a United States district court. And where two reasonable
`
`constructions exist for a disputed term, with one fully encompassing the other, the
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`BRI standard warrants use of the broader construction. Under BRI “between [A]
`
`and [B]” has the meaning VirnetX urged the district court to adopt and is what
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`Petitioners propose here—“in the space that separates” A and B. Pet. 15-16 (citing
`
`Ex. 1008; Ex. 1011, 8); FWD at 9. Thus, a channel in which data is encrypted
`
`when sent over public segments of the network path and protected using firewalls
`
`over private segments is an “encrypted” or “secure” channel “between [A] and
`
`[B].”
`
`Importantly, VirnetX’s patentability arguments based on its “between”
`
`construction are irrelevant to claim 13, which requires a “secure” rather than
`
`“encrypted” channel. No reasonable reading of claim 13 requires “end-to-end”
`
`encryption. VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2014) (finding, at VirnetX’s urging, that claim 13 does not require end-to-end
`
`encryption).
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`IPR2015-01047
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151
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`III. The Challenged Claims Are Unpatentable
`
`Kiuchi renders the challenged claims unpatentable in two independent ways.
`
`First, Kiuchi’s client-side proxy, working in concert with the C-HTTP name
`
`server, meets the requirements of the claimed “DNS proxy module.” Pet. 25.
`
`Kiuchi also discloses an “encrypted/secure channel” between its user agent and
`
`server-side proxy and origin server. And if the claims are found to require end-to-
`
`end encryption, Rescorla makes that modifications of Kiuchi’s system obvious.
`
`Pet. 41. Second, RFC 1034 makes obvious modifying Kiuchi’s C-HTTP name
`
`server to perform a standard/public DNS lookup instead of Kiuchi’s client-side
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`proxy. That modified C-HTTP server is a “DNS proxy module” while Kiuchi’s
`
`client-side proxy is a “client.” Pet. 43-46. Under either mapping, the challenged
`
`claims are unpatentable.
`
`A. Kiuchi Anticipates the Challenged Claims and Renders them
`Obvious with Rescorla
`
`1.
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`Petitioners’ Anticipation Ground Is Correct and Properly
`Considered on Remand
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`VirnetX urges the Board to not consider Petitioners’ anticipation challenge
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`based on Kiuchi’s client-side proxy working in concert with the C-HTTP name
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`server as the “DNS proxy server,” asserting it was “abandoned on reply” and “the
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`Federal Circuit did not instruct the Board to” consider it on remand. Opp. 12-13.
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`VirnetX is wrong on both counts.
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`First, Petitioners never abandoned this anticipation ground and consistently
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`advanced it throughout this proceeding.4 For example, Petitioners’ explained in
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`the petition that “Kiuchi’s client-side proxy – working in concert with the C-
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`HTTP name server – is a domain name server (DNS) proxy module” and thus is
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`the claimed “DNS proxy module.” See, e.g., Pet. 25-32. Petitioners explained that
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`“the client-side proxy makes the ‘determination’ with the assistance of the C-
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`HTTP name server.” Reply 14-15. And, after VirnetX asserted that this
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`“combination” mapping was a new argument (Paper 61 at 2 (“New Position #3”)),
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`Petitioners’ reiterated the Petition’s explanation that “the client-side proxy
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`determines whether the request corresponds to a secure server by asking the ‘C-
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`HTTP name server.’” Paper 62 at 2 (quoting Pet. 28-29); see also Petitioner CAFC
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`Br. 27. Petitioners advance the same basis in this remand. Br. 10.
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`VirnetX’s abandonment theory also cannot be reconciled with the Federal
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`Circuit’s decision, which recognized that Petitioners had “argued that [1] the
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`combination of the client-side proxy and the C-HTTP name server and [2] the C-
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`HTTP name server alone perform the functions of the claimed DNS proxy
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`4 Any confusion VirnetX has about the support in the record for this ground (Opp.,
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`13, n.5) is a problem of its own making. Petitioners have consistently maintained
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`the client-side proxy is the “DNS proxy module” in this mapping.
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`module.” 778 F. App’x at 905-06. VirnetX also incorrectly quotes the Federal
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`Circuit as “observ[ing]” that the petition’s mapping was “abandoned on reply.”
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`Opp. 12-13 (citing VirnetX, 778 F. App’x at 906). In the passage VirnetX quotes,
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`the Federal Circuit is simply recounting VirnetX’s argument (“According to
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`VirnetX, Petitioners initially asserted ….”). 778 F. App’x at 905.
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`Second, the Federal Circuit did not prohibit the Board from considering this
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`anticipation ground on remand—it recognized it was not resolved by the Board’s
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`final decision, and remanded to resolve the remaining issues in the proceeding.
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`778 F. App’x at 910. Indeed, after finding that the Board erred by relying on the
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`“the C-HTTP name server alone” as performing the functions of the claimed “DNS
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`proxy module,” it ordered “further proceedings consistent with [its] opinion,”
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`which logically includes consideration of Petitioners’ argument that “Kiuchi’s
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`client-side proxy – working in concert with the C-HTTP name server – is a [DNS]
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`proxy module.” Pet. 25. Given that, it would thus be improper for the Board to not
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`consider this anticipation ground on remand. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658
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`F.3d 1347, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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`2.
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`VirnetX Advances No Credible Response to the Petition’s
`Anticipation Ground
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`VirnetX raises a handful of supposed defects with Petitioners’ explanation
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`why Kiuchi anticipates the challenged claims. Opp. 12-16. None have merit.
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`First, VirnetX asserts that Kiuchi’s client-side proxy does not “forward the
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`DNS request to a DNS function” because it performs a DNS lookup in response to
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`“an error status” received from the C-HTTP name server. Opp. 13-14. But that
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`ignores that Kiuchi’s client-side proxy performs this step in response to receiving a
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`request that includes a URL containing a hostname (a “DNS request”). Ex. 1002,
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`65 (§2.3); Br. 10; Pet. 25-28. Specifically, once the client-side proxy determines
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`that the hostname in the URL does not correspond to a “secure server,” it forwards
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`the request to a conventional “DNS function” for resolution of the hostname
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`(“performs DNS lookup,” Ex. 1002, 8) as the claims specify. Br. 10-11; Pet. 29-32.
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`Importantly, and contrary to VirnetX’s assertion, the Federal Circuit made
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`no findings regarding whether Kiuchi’s client-side proxy “forward[s] the DNS
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`request to a DNS function.” As is evident from a sentence of the decision that
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`VirnetX omits, the Federal Circuit found only that the C-HTTP name server does
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`not “forward a DNS request to a DNS function” but instead sends “an error
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`message back.” 778 F. App’x at 906 (“Substantial evidence does not support the
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`Board’s finding that the C-HTTP name server performs the functions of the
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`claimed DNS proxy module.”). The Court’s observation that “[t]hat is not how
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`Kiuchi’s system works” thus, plainly, did not mean that it had found that Kiuchi’s
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`client-side proxy does not “forward the DNS request” as claimed. Id. Indeed, that
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`would make no sense, given that Kiuchi expressly says it does. Ex. 1002 (“If a
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`client-side proxy receives an error status, then it performs DNS lookup, behaving
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`like an ordinary HTTP/1.0 proxy.”); Pet. 29-32; Br. 10-11.5
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`Second, VirnetX incorrectly asserts that only the C-HTTP name server
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`“determin[es]” whether the DNS request corresponds to a secure server. Opp. 14-
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`15. But VirnetX does not and cannot dispute that Kiuchi’s client-side proxy will
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`ask the C-HTTP name server if “the requested server-side proxy [associated with
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`the hostname] is registered in the closed network” and then, based on its
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`interpretation of the response it receives, the client-side proxy will or will not
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`establish a secure connection. Ex. 1002, 65 (§2.3); Pet. 28-29; Ex. 1003, ¶¶23-24,
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`26-28; Br. 13-14; Opp. 14-15.
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`That Kiuchi’s client-side proxy performs the determination step by
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`communicating with the C-HTTP name server is of no practical or legal
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`consequence. Notably, the claims impose no restrictions on how the DNS proxy
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`server makes the determination. And the way that Kiuchi’s client-side proxy does
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`so is consistent with how the ’151 patent illustrates such determinations being
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`made. For example, in discussing Figure 27, the specification explains that DNS
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`5 VirnetX’s complaint that Petitioners “do not even attempt to explain how the
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`client side proxy” functions in this mapping (Opp. 14) ignores the record. See,
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`e.g., Br. 6, 10-12, 13-15.
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`proxy server 2610 can “determine whether [a] user is authorized to connect to the
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`secure host … by communicating with gatekeeper 2603 (e.g., over an
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`‘administrative’ VPN that is secure).” Ex. 1001, 38:35-50. It also makes clear that
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`the various ways of making this determination identified in the specification are
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`merely illustrative: “If access to a secure site has been requested