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Paper No. 53
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`––––––––––––––––––
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`––––––––––––––––––
`
`THE MANGROVE PARTNERS MASTER FUND, LTD., and APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`VIRNETX INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`––––––––––––––––––
`
`Case No. IPR2015-010461
`Patent No. 6,502,135
`
`––––––––––––––––––
`
`PETITIONER APPLE INC.’S SEPARATE REPLY FILING
`
`
`
`1 Apple Inc., who filed a petition in IPR2016-00062, has been joined as a Petitioner
`in the instant proceeding.
`
`
`

`
`IPR2015-01046
`
` Petitioner Apple’s Separate Reply Filing
`
`Table of Contents
`
`Apple’s Joinder Is Not Barred under Section 315(b) ...................................... 1
`
`The Board Should Maintain the Current Schedule.......................................... 3
`
`
`
`i
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`
`
`

`
`IPR2015-01046
`
` Petitioner Apple’s Separate Reply Filing
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`803 F.3d 652 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .............................................................................. 1
`
`Elekta, Inc. v. Varian Medical Systems, Inc.,
`IPR2015-01401, Paper 19 (Dec. 31, 2015)........................................................... 4
`
`FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
`529 U.S. 120 (2000) .............................................................................................. 2
`
`Mexichem Amanco Holdings S.A. de C.V. v. Honewell International,
`Inc.,
`IPR2015-01309, Paper 25 (Apr. 17, 2016) ........................................................... 4
`
`Microsoft Corporation v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00109, Paper 15 (Feb. 25, 2013) ........................................................... 1
`
`Motorola Mobility LLC v. Softview LLC,
`IPR2013-00256, Paper 10 (Jun. 20, 2013) ........................................................... 1
`
`In re Procter & Gamble Co.,
`749 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................ 5
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 311 .......................................................................................................... 3
`
`35 U.S.C. § 315(b) ............................................................................................. 1, 2, 3
`
`35 U.S.C. § 315(c) ............................................................................................. 1, 2, 3
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(12) ........................................................................................... 1, 3
`
`Other Authorities
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.5 ..................................................................................................... 4, 5
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.101(b) ................................................................................................ 1
`
`ii
`
`

`
`IPR2015-01046
`
` Petitioner Apple’s Separate Reply Filing
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) ............................................................................................ 1, 3
`
`157 Cong. Rec. S1376 (Mar. 8, 2011) ....................................................................... 2
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`
`IPR2015-01046
`
` Petitioner Apple’s Separate Reply Filing
`
`The Board’s order instituting inter partes review on Apple's petition
`
`(IPR2016-00062) authorized Apple to make a separate filing of no more than five
`
`pages addressing “an issue unique to” Apple or “a point of disagreement related to
`
`[a] consolidated filing.” See Paper 28 at 5-6. This paper replies to issues raised by
`
`Patent Owner’s Response that are unique to Apple. See Resp., 57-60.
`
`I.
`
`Apple’s Joinder Is Not Barred under Section 315(b)
`
`Apple timely filed its petition and motion for joinder within one month of
`
`the Board’s institution decision in this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.122(b),
`
`42.101(b); 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(c), 316(a)(12). As this panel and others have
`
`repeatedly found, § 315(b) does not apply to a petition filed with a request for
`
`joinder. E.g., IPR2013-00109, Paper 15; IPR2013-00256, Paper 10.
`
`In response, Patent Owner argues Apple is time-barred based on its theory
`
`that § 315(b) provides an exception only for “a request for joinder,” and not a
`
`petition. Resp., 57-60. That theory conflicts with the statute, the Board’s rules and
`
`how the Federal Circuit has construed both. In Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc. v.
`
`Apple Inc., 803 F.3d 652, 657 (Fed. Cir. 2015), a case which Patent Owner fails to
`
`even cite, the Federal Circuit held that § 315(c) permits “an otherwise time-barred
`
`party [to] nonetheless participate in an inter partes review proceeding if another
`
`party files a proper petition.” The Court explained that “the [§]315(b) time bar
`
`does not impact the Board’s authority to invalidate a patent claim,” and by its
`
`1
`
`

`
`IPR2015-01046
`
` Petitioner Apple’s Separate Reply Filing
`
`terms does not apply to requests for joinder made under Section 315(c). Id.
`
`That explanation accords with the plain language of the statute. The first
`
`sentence of § 315(b) bars institution of an IPR filed more than a year after a party
`
`was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent, while the second
`
`sentence of § 315(b) creates an exception to that rule. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Patent
`
`Owner’s construction of the statute would render § 315(b)’s second sentence
`
`superfluous – it would create an exception for something not even addressed in the
`
`first sentence (i.e., joinder to other proceedings). To make any sense, the second
`
`sentence of § 315(b) must create an exception to what is prohibited in the first
`
`sentence: the “institut[ion]” of an IPR by a time-barred party. Id., § 315(b); see
`
`FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
`
`Patent Owner next argues that “the Board treated the terms ‘petition’ and
`
`‘request for joinder’ as interchangeable.” Resp., 59. That theory conflicts with the
`
`plain language of the statute: § 315(c) states that a request to join an instituted
`
`IPR is based on “a petition” that is filed by a party. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)
`
`(referring to “a request for joinder under subsection (c)”); id. § 315(c) (referring
`
`only to “a petition”); 157 Cong. Rec. S1376 (Mar. 8, 2011) (“if an [IPR] is
`
`instituted on the basis of a petition…, a party that files an identical petition will be
`
`joined to that proceeding”). Patent Owner’s contention that the second sentence of
`
`§ 315(b) merely “exempts” a request for joinder from the one-year time limitation
`
`2
`
`

`
`IPR2015-01046
`
` Petitioner Apple’s Separate Reply Filing
`
`is thus facially inconsistent with the statutory text: the time-bar of the first sentence
`
`refers only to a “petition,” not a request for joinder, § 315(b), and the time limit on
`
`joinder is defined separately in § 316(a)(12) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b).
`
`Patent Owner also points to the language stating that “the Director … may
`
`join … any person who properly files a petition under section 311,” § 315(c)
`
`(emphasis added), to contend that Congress meant to incorporate the timing
`
`requirements for filing a petition, Resp., 58-59. But § 315(c) specifically refers to
`
`“section 311,” which sets out general rules for who may file an IPR petition and
`
`when. Apple’s IPR petition met every requirement stated in § 311. See Paper 28,
`
`1-3; Paper 11, 2. Indeed, the time-bar that Patent Owner claims Apple ran afoul of
`
`is not in § 311, but in § 315(b). Thus, even if § 315(c) incorporates the timing
`
`requirements in § 311, it does not incorporate the one-year time limit from being
`
`served with an action for infringement, which is found only in § 315(b). Patent
`
`Owner’s repeated “objections” to Apple’s joinder must be dismissed.
`
`II. The Board Should Maintain the Current Schedule
`
`Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner Mangrove did not identify each and
`
`every RPI. Resp., 46-57. Even if true, Mangrove is not subject to a § 315(b) issue,
`
`and as the Board has found, Mangrove could update its disclosure of RPIs without
`
`any consequence. Paper 11, 8. If the Board determines that Mangrove should do
`
`so, the Board should exercise its discretion and maintain the current schedule of
`
`3
`
`

`
`IPR2015-01046
`
` Petitioner Apple’s Separate Reply Filing
`
`this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.5; see, e.g., IPR2015-01401, Paper 19, 6-10 (Dec.
`
`31, 2015) (waiving resetting the filing date); IPR2015-01309, Paper 25, 4-5 (Apr.
`
`7, 2016) (resetting the filing date while maintaining the same FWD schedule);
`
`compare id., Paper 9 with Paper 26.
`
`Indeed, compelling public policy reasons justify doing so – it would avoid
`
`further unwarranted delays to the Office reaching a conclusion on the patentability
`
`of the ’135 and ’151 patents. Apple raised inter partes reexamination challenges
`
`to these patents in July of 2011, before enactment of the America Invents Act,
`
`more than a year before the underlying litigation’s first jury verdict, and more than
`
`four years before the second jury verdict. Control Nos. 95/001,682, 95/001,697.
`
`Since then, Patent Owner has engaged in an unprecedented campaign to delay
`
`entry of a final PTO decision on the ’135 and ’151 patent claims—claims which
`
`underlie a $625 million verdict against Apple in the Eastern District of Texas.
`
`Despite the PTO’s continued rejection of each and every claim, Apple’s
`
`reexaminations proceedings against the ’135 and ’151 patents remain pending.
`
`The reason is simple – Patent Owner has exploited procedural defects in the inter
`
`partes reexamination scheme to paralyze those proceedings, filing more than 35
`
`administrative petitions in those two proceedings alone to exploit the PTO’s
`
`practice of suspending action in the proceedings while a decision on a petition is
`
`pending. Patent Owner has also openly sought to delay those proceedings – it has
`
`4
`
`

`
`IPR2015-01046
`
` Petitioner Apple’s Separate Reply Filing
`
`asked not only to suspend them at various times, but to extend every deadline set
`
`by the PTO for Patent Owner to take action, regardless of the circumstances. The
`
`clear intent of Patent Owner’s campaign of delay is to increase the chances of the
`
`jury verdict reaching the Federal Circuit before a final decision from the Board.
`
`This pattern of delay has continued unabated into the present proceedings.
`
`Patent Owner requested and obtained multiple extensions to the due dates of its
`
`filings, and has asked for even more extensions. See e.g., Ex. 2038, 29:7-12; Paper
`
`40, 455. Then, two business days before its Response was due, Patent Owner filed
`
`a petition for a writ of mandamus of the Board’s decision to grant Apple’s motion
`
`for joinder, Paper 40, despite settled case law foreclosing such an action. In re
`
`Procter & Gamble Co., 749 F.3d 1376, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Patent Owner’s
`
`petition and motion for an emergency stay lacked any merit, and the Federal
`
`Circuit promptly denied Patent Owner’s petition after briefing was completed.
`
`Patent Owner’s campaign of delay should not be tolerated further. Even if the
`
`Board determines that another Mangrove entity is an RPI, it should exercise its
`
`sound discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5 to maintain the current schedule.
`
`
`
`Dated: May 9, 2016
`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`/Jeffrey P. Kushan/
`Jeffrey P. Kushan
`Reg. No. 43,401
`SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
`5
`
`

`
`IPR2015-01046
`
` Petitioner Apple’s Separate Reply Filing
`
`1501 K Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Attorney for Petitioner Apple
`
`6
`
`

`
`IPR2015-01046
`
` Petitioner Apple’s Separate Reply Filing
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of May,
`
`2016, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing and any
`
`accompanying exhibits by e-mail on the following counsel:
`
`Joseph E. Palys
`josephpalys@paulhastings.com
`
`Naveen Modi
`naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`
`
`Dated: May 9, 2016
`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`/Jeffrey P. Kushan/
`Jeffrey P. Kushan
`Reg. No. 43,401
`SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
`1501 K Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Attorney for Petitioner Apple

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