throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`_________________________
`
`LINDSAY CORPORATION
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`VALMONT INDUSTRIES, INC.
`Patent Owner
`_______________________
`
`Case No. IPR2015-01039
`U.S. Patent No. 7,003,357
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`I. INTRODUCTION
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`Case IPR2015-01039
`
`Valmont Industries, Inc. (“Valmont”) requests that the Board exclude Exhibit
`
`1019 (Design Patterns) and the identified paragraphs of Exhibit 1009 (Declaration
`
`of Dr. Craig Rosenberg) and Exhibit 1018 (Reply Declaration of Dr. Craig
`
`Rosenberg) (collectively, the “Challenged Evidence”) submitted by Lindsay
`
`Corporation (“Lindsay”), for the reasons stated below. Valmont also respectfully
`
`requests that the Board preclude Lindsay from using the Challenged Evidence at any
`
`hearing or in any paper in this proceeding.
`
`II.
`
`STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
`
`Valmont timely objected to Exhibit 1009, based on the grounds asserted
`
`herein, in its Notice of Objections served on October 8, 2015. Lindsay relies on
`
`Exhibit 1009 in its Petition, filed on April 10, 2015, and in its Reply, filed April 22,
`
`2016. Valmont timely objected to Exhibits 1018 and 1019 in its Notice of Objections
`
`to Petitioner’s Supplemental Evidence served on April 22, 2016. Lindsay relies on
`
`Exhibits 1018 and 1019 in its Reply, filed on April 22, 2016.
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARD
`
`The admissibility of expert testimony in IPRs is governed by the Federal Rules
`
`of Evidence. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.62 (“[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence shall apply
`
`to [an IPR] proceeding.”). According to Rule 402, “[i]rrelevant evidence is not
`
`admissible.” Evidence is only relevant if it has a “tendency to make a fact more or
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`1
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`Case IPR2015-01039
`less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of consequence
`
`in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401.
`
`According to Rule 702, an expert witness must be “qualified as an expert by
`
`knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,” and the testimony must “help
`
`the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” In addition,
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`Rule 702 requires that the expert’s testimony be “based on sufficient facts or data”
`
`and “the product of reliable principles and methods”; and the expert must “reliably
`
`appl[y] the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Id. Finally, “[e]xpert
`
`testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is
`
`based is entitled to little or no weight,” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a).
`
`In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that scientific expert testimony is
`
`admissible only if it is both relevant and reliable. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow
`
`Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
`
`526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (stating that in Daubert “this Court focused upon the
`
`admissibility of scientific expert testimony. It pointed out that such testimony is
`
`admissible only if it is both relevant and reliable.”). In Kumho, the Supreme Court
`
`extended its holding in Daubert to apply “not only to testimony based on ‘scientific’
`
`knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’
`
`knowledge.” 526 U.S. at 141.
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`2
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`Case IPR2015-01039
`In determining whether an expert’s testimony is admissible, the Board must
`
`determine whether: (1) the expert is qualified; (2) the expert’s testimony is relevant;
`
`and (3) the expert’s testimony is based on sufficient facts or data and is reliable. If
`
`any of these requirements is not met, the expert’s proposed evidence and opinions
`
`should be excluded under Rule 702, Rule 402, 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a), and the Supreme
`
`Court’s holdings in Daubert and Kumho.
`
`IV. ARGUMENTS
`
`A. Numerous conclusory statements in Exhibits 1018 and 1009 should
`be excluded under FRE 702, 703, and 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a).
`
`Paragraphs 13-14, 43, and 46 in Exhibit 1009 and Paragraphs 3, 8, 12, 17-18,
`
`26-27, and 29 in Exhibit 1019 should be excluded under at least FRE 702, 703, and
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a), as they are conclusory and unsupported by additional evidence
`
`as explained below. Expert testimony that “does little more than repeat, without
`
`citation to additional evidence, the conclusory arguments of their respective counsel”
`
`will be accorded little or no weight. Edmund Optics, Inc. v. Semrock, Inc., IPR2014-
`
`00583 (Paper No. 50) (emphasis added).
`
`1. Dr. Rosenberg fails to provide evidentiary support for his conclusory
`statements that a “handheld device” includes a “laptop.”
`
`Dr. Rosenberg’s statements that a “handheld device” includes a “laptop”
`
`merely parrot the conclusory arguments of Lindsay’s counsel. See e.g., Ex. 1009,
`
`¶¶ 13, 14, 43, and 46; Ex. 1018, ¶ 3; Petition at 6; and Reply at 4. None of these
`
`3
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`Case IPR2015-01039
`statements disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based and
`
`thus, should be excluded. FRE 702, 703; 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); see also Infobionic,
`
`Inc., IPR2015-01704, 2016 WL 1081571 (Feb. 16, 2016) (“We do not find the
`
`testimony of Petitioner's expert to be persuasive or helpful as it repeats the
`
`Petitioner's arguments and offers little or no elaboration as to how one of ordinary
`
`skill in the art would understand the term ‘subset.’”).
`
`For example, Dr. Rosenberg makes several presumptive statements that a
`
`“laptop” is a “handheld device” without explaining the underlying basis for that
`
`conclusion. See Ex. 1009, ¶¶ 13, 14; Ex. 1018, ¶ 3. In fact, Dr. Rosenberg
`
`acknowledged in his deposition that the only documentary evidence he relied for his
`
`conclusion was the Dictionary.com definition of “handheld” published more than a
`
`decade after the filing date of the ‘357 application. See Cross-Examination of
`
`Petitioner’s Reply witness, Craig Rosenberg, Ph.D. (Exhibit 2019), 15:12-25, 17:6-
`
`18:1.
`
`2. Dr. Rosenberg’s interpretation of numerous claim terms relate to legal
`issues for which Dr. Rosenberg is not an expert.
`
`The statements in Paragraph 43 of Exhibit 1009 implicate Dr. Rosenberg’s
`
`understanding of United States patent law and/or patent examination practice with
`
`respect to a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA), a subject on which he is not
`
`an expert. The paragraphs should thus be excluded under Rules 401 and 402 as
`
`4
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`Case IPR2015-01039
`irrelevant, under Rule 602 as lacking foundation, and under Rules 701 and 702 as
`
`providing legal opinions on which a lay witness is not competent to testify. Dr.
`
`Rosenberg’s testimony on legal standards regarding U.S. patent law is not admissible
`
`under 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). For example, Dr. Rosenberg states, “I agree that the
`
`proposed constructions for those terms represent their broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation in light of the ’357 Patent specification.” Ex. 1009, ¶ 43. With respect
`
`to the “means plus function” elements of the claims, Dr. Rosenberg “agree[s] with
`
`the identification of structure disclosed in the specification to perform the functions
`
`that is set forth in the petition at pages 7-8.” Id.
`
`3. Dr. Rosenberg’s conclusory statements regarding motivation to
`combine are inadmissible.
`
`Valmont moves to exclude Dr. Rosenberg’s statements in Paragraphs 8 and 12
`
`of Exhibit 1018 regarding motivation to combine because they are vague, conclusory,
`
`and generally unhelpful in analyzing the prior art or why a person of ordinary skill
`
`in the art would be motivated to combine the references, and improperly attempt to
`
`re-characterize and expand on Linsday’s previously-filed insufficient evidence. See
`
`Edmund Optics, Inc., IPR2014-00583, 2014 WL 4731775, at *6 (Sept. 19, 2014)
`
`(according little or no weight to declarations that “provide[d] no sufficiently
`
`meaningful … analysis that would constitute articulated reasoning with rational
`
`underpinning for combining the cited references … as required by prevailing law”).
`
`5
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`Case IPR2015-01039
`For example, Paragraph 8 contains multiple conclusory statements beginning
`
`with “A fair reading of my [previous] testimony reveals….”, in which Dr. Rosenberg
`
`merely attempts to improperly re-characterize and expand on Lindsay’s previously
`
`insufficient evidence without properly moving to supplement evidence. Ex. 1018, ¶
`
`8 (“A fair reading of my testimony reveals . . . .”). To the extent Dr. Rosenberg
`
`actually said as much in his initial Declaration, there is simply no need to supplement
`
`the record with the new statements in Paragraph 8. To the extent Dr. Rosenberg adds
`
`new evidence, it is improper.
`
`In Paragraph 12, Dr. Rosenberg “disagrees” with Dr. Mercer’s opinion that a
`
`“POSITA would have no motivation to create such a handheld device,” stating that
`
`such an opinion is “inconsistent with a tidal wave of design thought in which the end
`
`goal is to achieve a smaller hardware package providing robust functionality of larger
`
`hardware to enhance productivity so that users of technology can achieve more and
`
`not be tethered to a desk, i.e. enhanced mobility and portability.” Id., ¶ 12. Dr.
`
`Rosenberg provides no evidence, however, that a POSITA would be motivated to
`
`create the handheld device in the ’357 patent and instead relies on his unsupported
`
`conclusion that a “hand-held” device includes a “laptop”: “[t]his general desire and
`
`goal is expressly stated in AIMS, a 1996 article, where a PC based software product
`
`disclosing all the claimed functionality of the ’357 patent is sought to be improved
`
`by putting it on a laptop and interfacing it with wireless communications.” Id.
`
`6
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`Case IPR2015-01039
`4. Paragraphs 18 and 26 in Exhibit 1018 should be excluded as
`inadmissible under FRE 701, 702 and 703.
`
`Dr. Rosenberg makes numerous observations in Paragraphs 18 and 26 of
`
`Exhibit 1018 without laying a foundation for his opinion or otherwise demonstrating
`
`a basis for his knowledge regarding a POSITA’s belief. Valmont thus moves to
`
`exclude these statements under FRE 701, 702 and 703, as they are inadmissible for
`
`not being based on sufficient facts or data, are not the product of reliable principles
`
`and methods, and do not apply reliable principles and methods to the facts of the case.
`
`In particular, in almost every statement in Paragraph 18, Dr. Rosenberg fails
`
`to cite to any documentary evidence supporting his testimony. For instance, Dr.
`
`Rosenberg fails to identify the basis of, or documentary evidence supporting, his
`
`statements regarding: (a) why “26,000 total pixels is more than enough to display
`
`GUI elements depicting valves, irrigation patterns, and animations” and “GUI
`
`elements can easily be drawn with as few as about 1000 pixels”; (b) “animating these
`
`GUI elements is as simple as cycling through one or more images or pixels to impart
`
`motion”; and (c) “as few as 4 images or renderings could be used to show a sprinkler
`
`head cycling through an irrigation pattern.” Ex. 1018, ¶ 18. He further conclusorily
`
`states that “a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’357 patent
`
`applications filing would know that he could achieve the above GUI elements with
`
`one image or rendering” based on their “problem solving capabilities.” Id.; see also
`
`7
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`Case IPR2015-01039
`Exhibit 2019, 30:23-31:3 (acknowledging “problem solving capabilities” were not
`
`previously discussed). In fact, other than the citations Dr. Mercer identified in his
`
`Declaration, Dr. Rosenberg provides no citations whatsoever in Paragraph 18. See
`
`generally Ex. 1018, ¶ 18.
`
`Paragraph 26 fairs no better. Dr. Rosenberg provides no citations to his
`
`statements that: (a) “Scott distinguishes between the generation of a Site map’s
`
`rendering and the use of a site map by a user”; (b) “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art
`
`would recognize that the memory and computing power for storing and displaying a
`
`graphic and sending a control signal based upon user interaction—the latter steps of
`
`Scott (after rendering)— is not a highly memory or computer intensive task”; and
`
`(c) “at the time of the filing of the ’357 patent application, simple graphical icons
`
`could easily occupy less than 1 kb of memory, leaving substantial free memory
`
`available for other tasks.”
`
`B. Numerous Paragraphs in Exhibits 1009 and 1018 should be
`excluded because they lack foundation and evidentiary support.
`
`Valmont moves to exclude Paragraphs 13, 14, 20, 22, 28, 31, 34-36, 38, 40,
`
`42, 56, 61, 65, and 70-75 of Exhibit 1009 and Paragraphs 17, 27, and 29 of Exhibit
`
`1018 because they lack foundation under Rule 602, and are unsupported by sufficient
`
`facts, data or reasoned explanation under Rules 701, 702, and 703 as explained below.
`
`The Board accords little or no weight to expert testimony that “does little more than
`
`8
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`

`
`Case IPR2015-01039
`repeat, without citation to additional evidence, the conclusory arguments of their
`
`respective counsel.” Edmund Optics, Inc. v. Semrock, Inc., IPR2014-00583
`
`(emphasis added). Because the Board may accord no weight to expert testimony, a
`
`Motion to Exclude is proper.
`
`For example, in Paragraph 13 of Exhibit 1009, Dr. Rosenberg fails to identify
`
`the basis for, or additional evidence supporting, his statement that a handheld
`
`computer includes a “smartphone, PDA, laptop, or tablet into a full featured digital
`
`stethoscope.” Ex. 1009, ¶ 12. Similarly, in Paragraph 14, Dr. Rosenberg states,
`
`without explanation, that “handheld devices include[e] laptops, PCs, smartphones,
`
`and tablets.” Id., ¶ 14. In Paragraph 34, Dr. Rosenberg makes numerous
`
`unsubstantiated statements concerning Internet programming standards such as
`
`HTML and/or WAP protocols before he conclusorily states “the mobile terminal MT
`
`is able to receive commands to control the field devices in response to selections or
`
`inputs made by the mobile terminal user by means of the interactive WWW pages.”
`
`Id., ¶ 34.
`
`In Paragraphs 20 and 22, Dr. Rosenberg characterizes the ’357 patent, but fails
`
`to cite to the patent or otherwise explain the basis for his statement. Id., ¶¶ 20-22. Dr.
`
`Rosenberg makes similar unsupported characterizations concerning Abts in
`
`Paragraph 28, Scott in Paragraphs 31, 35 and 36, AIMS Telemetry Network in
`
`9
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`

`

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`Case IPR2015-01039
`Paragraphs 38 and 65, Walker in Paragraphs 40 and 42, and Pyotsia, Scott, and AIMS
`
`in Paragraph 61. Id., ¶¶ 28, 31, 35-36, 38, 40, 42, 61 and 65.
`
`In Paragraph 70, Dr. Rosenberg fails to cite documentary evidence supporting
`
`his testimony as to why “it is merely a matter of design choice to choose the wireless
`
`radio band that is most suited to the environment in which the system will operate”
`
`and how it would have been obvious to a POSITA “for the radio link in Scott to use
`
`the spread spectrum and VHF/UHF radio communications disclosed in Abts.” Id., ¶
`
`70. In Paragraph 71, Dr. Rosenberg fails to explain how it would have been obvious
`
`to a POSITA “to combine the disclosure of Scott regarding GUIs that are shaped to
`
`identify operating irrigation patterns for specific irrigation equipment with the
`
`disclosure in AIMS regarding the GUIs showing the change in the status of the
`
`irrigation equipment.” Id., ¶ 71. In Paragraph 72, Dr. Rosenberg fails to explain how
`
`“it would have been obvious to a person skilled in the art, in response to a change in
`
`status of the irrigation equipment, to combine the change in shape of the GUIs.” Id.,
`
`¶ 72.
`
`In Paragraph 56, Dr. Rosenberg fails to explain the basis for his statement that
`
`“if it were determined that a laptop computer is not sufficiently compact to be
`
`considered a hand-held display or hand-held remote user interface, in my opinion it
`
`would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill at the time to combine Scott with
`
`Pyotsia.” Id., ¶ 56.
`
`10
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`

`

`
`Case IPR2015-01039
`In Paragraph 73, Dr. Rosenberg conclusorily states, “[f]or a fault notification
`
`to work, it must have (1) a minimum and/or maximum limit and/or (2) a predefined
`
`range of values that are utilized and compared against for the software to decide if it
`
`needs to trigger a notification event.” Ex. 1009, ¶ 73. He further indicates without
`
`citation that “even a single threshold level can be considered to be within a range,”
`
`and “depending on how the system was designed and configured, there could easily
`
`be a default ‘zero point’ or “reference point” that a second value can be compared to
`
`in a range calculation.” Id.
`
`In Paragraph 74, Dr. Rosenberg claims it was “well known” that “triggers are
`
`invoked by comparing the current value of a variable with a range of acceptable
`
`values, and/or upper or lower limits, for that variable,” but fails to identify any
`
`documentary evidence to support as much. Id., ¶ 74. In Paragraph 75, Dr. Rosenberg
`
`states only that his “evaluation of the ’357 Patent, along with its prosecution history
`
`and related prior art discussed above, leads me to conclude that each of the claims
`
`would have been anticipated or been obvious to one of skill in the art at the time of
`
`filing of the ’357 Patent.” Id., ¶ 75.
`
`In Paragraph 17 of Exhibit 1018, Dr. Rosenberg conclusorily states “the
`
`various hardware limitations Dr. Mercer points to as part of his opinion are not
`
`problems in the 2001/2002 timeframe to achieve the claimed limitations of the ’357
`
`patent with anticipated success using commonly held knowledge possessed by those
`
`11
`
`

`

`
`Case IPR2015-01039
`of ordinary skill in the art.” Ex. 1018, ¶ 17. Dr. Rosenberg’s statements in Paragraph
`
`27 concerning “rotation or pixel conversion” and what a person or ordinary skill in
`
`the art would recognize regarding “the distinction between CAD rendering and
`
`simple display,” and Paragraph 29 regarding cell phone capability and what a person
`
`of ordinary skill in the art’s expectations of success, are similarly unsupported. Id.,
`
`¶¶ 27, 29.
`
`C. Numerous Paragraphs in Exhibit 1018 should be excluded under 37
`CFR § 42.123 because they present new arguments on the merits.
`
`Valmont moves to exclude Paragraphs 3, 11-12, 18, 26-27, 29, and 32 in Exhibit
`
`1018 as they present new arguments on the merits and constitute improperly filed and served
`
`supplemental information. 37 C.F.R. § 42.123; see also Toshiba Corp., IPR2014-01447,
`
`2016 WL 932016, at *22 (Mar. 9, 2016) (“our Rules expressly provide procedures
`
`for introducing supplemental evidence or supplemental information into a
`
`proceeding”). Valmont moves to exclude Paragraph 32 for the additional reason that
`
`it impermissibly relies on Exhibit 1019, which lacks foundation under Rule 602.
`
`Notably, by presenting new arguments and evidence in Paragraphs 3, 11-12, 18, 26-
`
`27, 29, and 32, Lindsay acknowledges that its initial evidence was insufficient.
`
`For example, in Paragraph 11, Dr. Rosenberg presents an entirely new theory
`
`that there is a “division between preliminary set up (e.g., rendering of site maps) and
`
`subsequent monitoring and control functionality.” Ex. 1018, ¶ 11; see also Exhibit
`
`12
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`

`

`
`Case IPR2015-01039
`2019, 27:15-24 and 45:21-46:14 (admitting the distinction was not previously raised).
`
`Dr. Rosenberg’s statements in (a) Paragraph 18 regarding the “rendering”
`
`capabilities of a PDA, (b) Paragraph 26 regarding how “Scott distinguishes between
`
`the generation of a Site map’s rendering and the use of a site map by a user,” and (c)
`
`Paragraph 27 regarding how “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the
`
`distinction between CAD rendering and simple display, and understand techniques
`
`such as graphical manipulation such as rotation to save memory,” all hinge on Dr.
`
`Rosenberg’s new “rendering/display” theory. Because these paragraphs constitute
`
`improperly filed and served supplemental information, they should be excluded. See 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.123.
`
`Moreover, in Paragraph 3, Dr. Rosenberg argues for the first time that “during
`
`the 2001/2002 timeframe, [he] personally used laptops in a “hand-held” manner,”
`
`and that between 1997 and 1998, while he was working for Boeing, he “and the other
`
`Boeing engineers used the laptops in a hand-held manner.” Ex. 1018, ¶ 3. In
`
`Paragraph 12, Dr. Rosenberg’s motivation to combine argument is based on his new
`
`claim that “there has been a consistent desire and goal of shrinking hardware and
`
`software,” and there was “a tidal wave of design thought in which the end goal is to
`
`achieve a smaller hardware package providing robust functionality of larger
`
`hardware to enhance productivity so that users of technology can achieve more and
`
`13
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`

`

`
`Case IPR2015-01039
`not be tethered to a desk, i.e. enhanced mobility and portability.” Ex. 1018, ¶ 12; see
`
`also Exhibit 2019, 28:13-30:1 (admitting that this position not previously raised).
`
`In Paragraph 32, Dr. Rosenberg argues for the first time that “[o]ne of ordinary
`
`skill in the art at the time of the invention knows that graphical representations of
`
`what a user sees is not communicated to a controller to achieve commands of that
`
`equipment.” Ex. 1018, ¶ 32. He further states that “a fundamental tenet of GUI design,
`
`the representation of data—what the user sees in a GUI—is decoupled from the data
`
`and underlying control so that simpler data constructs and commands can be
`
`manipulated and communicated to achieve the desired command.” To make this
`
`argument, Dr. Rosenberg relies impermissibly on Exhibit 1019, which is
`
`inadmissible for the reasons discussed below. Id.
`
`Indeed, Dr. Rosenberg’s entire reply declaration should be disregarded. “Once
`
`the Board identifies new issues presented for the first time in reply, . . . the Board
`
`[need not] parse the reply brief to determine which, if any, parts of that brief are
`
`responsive and which are improper.” Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina
`
`Cambridge Ltd., No. 2015-1693, --- F.3d ---, 2016 WL 2620512, at *8 (Fed. Cir.
`
`May 9, 2016). Petitioner has identified new issues raised in Dr. Rosenberg’s reply
`
`declaration. Therefore, the Board need not determine which portions are new. Id.
`
`14
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`

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`Case IPR2015-01039
`D. Exhibit 1019 (Design Patterns) should be excluded for numerous
`reasons.
`
`Valmont moves to exclude Exhibit 1019 as it is improperly filed and served
`
`supplemental information (37 C.F.R. § 42.123), has not been properly authenticated (FRE
`
`901), lacks foundation (FRE 602), constitutes inadmissible hearsay (FRE 801, 802),
`
`and the probative value of the information in it is substantially outweighed by a
`
`danger of unfair prejudice (FRE 403). See Toshiba Corp., IPR2014-01447, 2016
`
`WL 932016, at *22.
`
`E. Numerous unreferenced paragraphs in Exhibit 1009 should be ex-
`cluded as irrelevant
`
`Paragraphs 15-29, 63, 64, and 75 of Exhibit 1009 are irrelevant under Rule
`
`401 as they are not referred to in Lindsay’s Petition and therefore inadmissible under
`
`Rule 702, as they do not help the Board to understand the evidence or to determine a
`
`fact in issue. Furthermore, incorporation by reference of these paragraphs would be
`
`prohibited under 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). Accordingly, these paragraphs should be
`
`excluded as inadmissible under FRE 402 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3).
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
` For the stated reasons, Valmont asks that the evidence discussed above be excluded.  
`
`15
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`

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`Case IPR2015-01039
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` /P. Weston Musselman, Jr./
`P. Weston Musselman, Jr.
`Reg. No. 31,644
`
`
`

`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`Date: May 16, 2016
`
`
`Customer Number 26171
`Fish & Richardson P.C.
`Telephone: (612) 337-2508
`Facsimile: (612) 288-9696
`
`
`
`16
`
`

`

`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Case IPR2015-01039
`
`Pursuant to 37 CFR § 42.6(e)(4), the undersigned certifies that on May 16,
`
`2016, a complete and entire copy of this PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO
`
`EXCLUDE EVIDENCE was provided via email to the Petitioner by serving the
`
`correspondence email address of record as follows:
`
`HOVEY WILLIAMS LLP
`
`Scott R. Brown, Reg. No. 40,535
`Matthew B. Walters, Reg. No. 65,343
`10801 Mastin Blvd., Suite 1000
`Overland Park, Kansas 66210
`P: (913) 647-9050; F: (913) 647-9057
`srb@hoveywilliams.com
`mbw@hoveywilliams.com
`ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` /Christine Rogers/
`Christine Rogers
`Fish & Richardson P.C.
`60 South Sixth Street, Suite 3200
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`(650) 839-5092
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`17

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